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DEDICATION

This issue of *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* has been dedicated to Fuat Sezgin, who specialized in the history of Arabic-Islamic science. He was the founder and honorary director of the Institute of the History of the Arab Islamic Sciences there.



The Fourth Figure in Aristotle^{*}

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Research Article

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Abstract: This paper investigates whether Aristotle was aware of the fourth figure, and if he was aware of the fourth figure, why he excluded it from his system. Various commentators have explained why this figure does not exist in the system, so this paper compiles and examines these arguments through a certain logical frame. By inquiring into why the fourth figure was not included in his logical system, the paper considers whether logical factors may explain this exclusion.

Keywords: Aristotle, Aristotelian logic, logical frame, syllogism, the fourth figure.

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Introduction

In order to construct a logical syllogism,

- (1) there must be three terms,
- (2) two premises must be constructed with these terms,
- (3) one of the terms must be stated in both premises, but not in the conclusion.

Below are all syllogistic figure combinations with the terms M, S and P.

M P <u>S M</u> S P I. Figure	P M <u>S M</u> S P II. Figure	M P <u>M S</u> S P III. Figure	P M <u>M S</u> S P IV. Figure
P M <u>M S</u> P S V. Figure	M P <u>M S</u> P S VI. Figure	P M <u>S M</u> P S VII. Figure	M P <u>S M</u> P S VIII. Figure

Textbooks usually state that there are 256 forms of these initial four figures. Most logicians claim that twenty-four of them are valid, while some others say that nineteen of them are valid, and the rest assert that only fifteen are valid. Among the twenty-four forms are more commonly thought to be valid. By reversing the premises’ order, we can find forty-eight valid forms.¹ The below table shows the twenty-four valid forms with their traditional mnemonic names:

¹ Colwyn Williamson, “How Many Syllogisms are There?” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 9 (2018), 77-85.

In The First Figure	In The Second Figure	In The Third Figure	In The Fourth Figure
MaP & SaM SaP (Barbara)	PeM & SaM SeP (Cesare)	MaP & MaS SiP (Darapti)	PaM & MaS SiP (Bramantip)
MeP & SaM SeP (Celarent)	PaM & SeM SeP (Camestres)	MeP & MaS SoP (Felapton)	PaM & MeS SeP (Camenes)
MaP & SiM SiP (Darii)	PeM & SiM SoP (Festino)	MaP & MiS SiP (Datisi)	PiM & MaS SiP (Dimaris)
MeP & SiM SoP (Ferio)	PaM & SoM SoP (Baroco)	MiP & MaS SiP (Disamis)	PeM & MaS SoP (Fesapo)
		MeP & MiS SoP (Ferison)	PeM & MiS SoP (Fresison)
		MoP & MaS SoP (Bocardo)	
Weakened Moods: Barbari, Celaront, Cesaro, Camestros, Camenop			

Aristotle’s analysis of syllogisms shows that the first three figures exist in *Analytica Priora*. The question is, then, why Aristotle did not also include the fourth figure and its valid forms.

A Brief History of the Fourth Figure

The oldest source who mentions the fourth figure is Theophrastus, who was Aristotle’s student and successor. It is peculiar that Aristotle himself does not evaluate this figure within his system. Yet, we do not find any sources that consider the fourth figure as a separate figure for more than a thousand years after Aristotle’s death. According to Hubien, the first thinker to consider this figure separately was Jean Buridan (fl. ca. 1300).²

² Hubert Hubien, “Jean Buridan on the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 29 (1975), 271.

According to most history of logic books, this figure was first added to the Aristotelian understanding of syllogism by Galen of Pergamon (fl. ca. 129), hence this figure is called the Galencial Figure.³ Yet, in both Galen's and his contemporaries' works, we find neither any explanation of this form nor any mention of its existencet. Some commentators, such as Friedrich Ueberweg, Heinrich Scholz, J. W. Stakelum and Jan Łukasiewicz, asserted that there is no evident connection between the fourth figure and Galen.⁴

In *Institutio Logica* Chapters IX-XI, Galen mentions that particular affirmative conclusions can be achieved by premises conversion, because the universal affirmative conclusion can also be expressed as a particular affirmation. Particular negation conclusions can only be achieved from a universal negation conclusion but not by premises conversion. Galen refers to obtaining new forms in the first, second and third figures but does not refer to a new kind of figure.⁵ Kieffer, the translator of Galen's work, comments that this is not a new method; an indirect way of obtaining this kind of imperfect syllogism can be found in Aristotle and Theophrastus, so Kieffer remarks, "There is no justification for attributing the invention of the fourth figure to Galen".⁶ It is a only talk that Galen himself accepts the fourth figure,⁷ and he denies the existence of any figure other than the first three figures in chapter 12.1: "These syllogisms are called

³ Thomas Reid, *Analysis of Aristotle's Logic, with Remarks* (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1806), 57.

⁴ Friedrich, Ueberweg, *System der Logik und Geschichte der Logischen Lehren* (Bonn: Bei Adolph Marcus, 1865), 341; Heinrich Scholz, *Concise History of Logic* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), 38; James W. Stakelum, "Why 'Galenian Figure'?" *The New Scholasticism* 16 (1942), 289-96; Jan Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic* (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1957), 39.

⁵ Galen, *Galen's Institutio Logica*, trans. John Spangler Kieffer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press), 40-43.

⁶ Galen, *Galen's Institutio Logica*, 102.

⁷ Pamela Huby, *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence: Commentary*, vol. 2, ed. & trans. William W. Fortenbaugh at al. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 64.

categorical, as I have said, and it is not possible to construct them in more than the three mentioned figures or in any other number in each figure”.⁸ Łukasiewicz quotes from Wallies in the introduction to his edition of Ammonius’ *On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics*:

There are three kinds of syllogism: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the syllogism *κατά πρόσληψιν*. Of the categorical there are two kinds: the simple and the compound. Of the simple syllogism there are three kinds: the first, the second, and the third figure. Of the compound syllogism there are four kinds: the first, the second, the third, and the fourth figure. For Aristotle says that there are only three figures, because he looks at the simple syllogisms, consisting of three terms. Galen, however, says in his *Apodeictic* that there are four figures, because he looks at the compound syllogisms consisting of four terms, as he has found many such syllogisms in Plato’s dialogues.⁹

Łukasiewicz discusses this comment:

Galen divided syllogisms into four figures, but these were the compound syllogisms of four terms, not the simple syllogisms of Aristotle. The fourth figure of the Aristotelian syllogisms was invented by someone else, probably very late, perhaps not before the sixth century a.d. This unknown scholar must have heard something about the fourth figures of Galen, but he either did not understand them or did not have Galen’s text at hand.¹⁰

The first Arabic work is, source more light on the historical problems with Galen and the fourth figure, “On the fourth figure of the categorical syllogism, which is the figure attributed to Galen” by Najm al-Dīn Abū al-Futūḥ Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Sarī, often referred to as Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ.¹¹ He explains that:

⁸ Galen, *Galen’s Institutio Logica*, 43

⁹ Maximilianus Wallies, “Praefatio,” *Ammonii in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium*, ed. Maximilianus Wallies (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1899), ix.

¹⁰ Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle’s Syllogistic*, 41.

¹¹ A. Ibrahim Sabra, “A Twelfth-Century Defence of the Fourth Figure of the

Ahmad ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi has related in his epitome of the *Analytica [Priora]* that someone (literally : *a man*) mentioned to his teacher Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī that he had a Syriac 13 treatise (*maqālah*) of Galen on this topic (literally : *in this meaning*). But al-Kindī disavowed this [figure], and stated that a rational division requires only three figures and no others, and he has not acknowledged a fourth figure. And it has been related that [Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Tarkhān] al-Fārābī has a discussion (*kalām*) about the standing of this figure and its illegitimacy (literally: *its rejection*), which I have not seen. These, then, are the books which we have seen that have afforded discussion (or: *mention*) of this figure. As for the rest of the books and commentaries which have come down to us, those of Aristotle and Alexander and Porphyry and other ancients and moderns, we do not find them affording discussion (or: *mention*) of it, but all of them when they divide the figures I divide them into three, and stipulate that they have no fourth. And we have found Galen [himself] doing likewise in the ninth chapter (*maqālah*) of the *Peri Apodeixeiōs*, for he divided the assertoric (or: *categorical*) figures into three only and concluded with the statement that they have no fourth; and he does likewise in his *Book on the Enumeration of Syllogisms*, [But] we have not yet seen from among the books on logic [attributed to Galen] despite the great number of which the *Fihrist* speaks, any except for these two books. [But] there happened to come to us the discourse (*maqālah*) by a man known as Dinḥā the Priest (*Dinha al-qass*) entitled "The Fourth Figure of Galen".¹²

Interestingly enough, he quotes from some of the missing works of Galen. Rescher presented Islamic sources as evidence of the idea that this form belongs to Galen. For Rescher, there are two methods of obtaining figures: either we take two premises that have not been distinguished, in which case we obtain three figures, or we get a pair of premises that depend on a result,

Syllogism," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 28 (1965), 15.

¹² Nicholas Rescher, *Galen and Syllogism* (Pennsylvania; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 52.

from which we obtain four. Rescher holds that Galen may have examined these two different methods of producing figures separately in two books. It can be one of missing books of Galen's.¹³

The fourth figure was recognized by Peter of Mantua in 1483, and was debated by Peter Tartaret in 1480, by Richard Crackenthorpe in 1622, and by Antoine Arnauld in 1662.¹⁴ Once we come to modern philosophy, we see many interpretations of Aristotle's figures:¹⁵ that only first figure syllogisms can be valid (*Kant 1762*), that only two of the fourth figure syllogisms can be valid (*Maier 1900*), that none of the fourth figure syllogisms can be valid (*Prantl 1925*), that none of the syllogisms Aristotle raised in *Analytica Priora* 1.7 can be valid (*Maier 1900*), and that any valid syllogism will be rendered invalid if the order of its two premises is exchanged.

On the Existence of the Fourth Figure in Aristotle's Understanding of Syllogisms

Aristotle divides forms of reasoning into the perfect (τέλειος) and the imperfect (ἀτελής) ones: "I call perfect a deduction which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make the necessity evident; a deduction is imperfect if it needs either one or more things ..." (24b22-25).¹⁶ According to Aristotle, only deductions in the first figure are perfect. In order to make the imperfect (in the second and third figures) forms perfect, they must to be reduced to the first figure: "it is clear too that all the imperfect deductions are made perfect by means of the first figure. For all are brought to a conclusion either probatively or *per impossibile*..." (29a30-33). Thereby the perfect syllogisms are the axi-

¹³ Rescher, *Galen and Syllogism*, 20-1.

¹⁴ Neil Tennant, "Aristotle's Syllogistic and Core Logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 35 (2014), 5, fn. 6.

¹⁵ Marilyn Jager Adams, "Aristotle's Logic," *Psychology of Learning and Motivation*, vol. 18, ed. Gordon H. Bower (New York and Boston: Academic Press, 1984), 279.

¹⁶ All quotations of Aristotle are from the English translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

oms of the syllogistic.¹⁷ Ross argues that Aristotle's second and third figures can only be made perfect by reducing them to the first figure.¹⁸ Also, Ibn Al-Sari shows that fourth figure forms can be reduced to the first figure by presenting these syllogisms:¹⁹

Bramantip: for PaM & MaS (By replacing the premises) MaS & PaM then PaS (from Barbara) SiP

Camenes: for PaM & MeS (By replacing the premises) MeS & PaM then PeS (from Celarent) SeP

Dimaris: for PiM & MaS (By replacing the premises) MaS & PiM then PiS (from Darii) SiP

Fresison: for PeM & MiS (By conversion of the premises) MeP & SiM then (from Ferio) SoP.

Fesapo: for PeM & MaS (By conversion of the premises) MeP & SiM then (from Ferio) SoP.

Avicenna (Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Hasan ibn 'Alī ibn Sīnā) states that there are two difficulties in reducing this figure, and Nasīrūddin Tūsī declares that both of them are the conversion of each two premises.²⁰


Rose states that when Aristotle gives a premise "AB" he means that A is predicated of B, which implies that A is the predicate and B is the subject. He claims that Aristotle established his syllogistic theory on this representation. In a syllogism with notation ABΓ, AB and BΓ are the premises and AΓ is the conclusion. Therefore, for the first figure, with ABΓ notation and AB as the major premise, BΓ is the minor premise and AΓ is the conclusion. For the second figure, with BAΓ notation and BΓ as the major premise, BA is the minor premise and AΓ is the conclusion. For the third figure, with AΓB notation and ΓB as the major premise, AB is the minor premise and AΓ is the conclusion;

¹⁷ Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, 43.

¹⁸ W. David Ross, "Discovery of the Syllogism," *The Philosophical Review* 48 (1939), 251-72.

¹⁹ Sabra, "A Twelfth-Century Defence of the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism," 21-6.

²⁰ Hüseyin Atay, "Mantıktaki Kıyasın Dördüncü Şekline Dair," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 16 (1968), 36.



Rose further claims that Aristotle gives the major premise prior to the minor premise perhaps because of his symbolization. Yet we cannot make a similar triple representation for the fourth figure. Rose argues that since we cannot make this representation, the fourth figure was not present in Aristotle's system.²¹ Without a possible symbolization, Aristotle did not include the fourth figure. If we assume that Aristotle remained loyal to this symbolization, one may wonder why he did not attempt Γ BA (which would ignore observance of the habit of reading from the left to right). However, Rose indicates that this situation violates a clear rule:

This circumstance is of course due to the fact that the major term is always written to the left of the minor term, with the result that the major premise is always in some way farther to the left than is the minor premise. Thus in each figure there is a natural and understandable tendency to state the major premise before the minor. But it is merely a matter of convenience, not yet the result of a rigid convention, and where the context is appropriate Aristotle has no qualms about stating the minor premise first.²²

Additionally, in Aristotle's system, we do not see such symbolism or other research efforts; this kind of symbolization effort began after Aristotle. Rose supported this convention of writing the major premise first, Aristotle's choice of letters for the terms in each figure, and his failure to discuss the distribution of terms and the rules of the syllogism. Nevertheless, it is clear that this representation is suitable for Aristotelian syllogism.

Krois argues that Aristotle built a system of formal logic but that this system could not be understood until the 19th century. Aristotle's logical validity is only formal, yet it was not explained

²¹ Lynn E. Rose, "Aristotle's Syllogistic and The Fourth Figure," *Mind* 74 (1965), 382-9.
²² Rose, "Aristotle's Syllogistic and the Fourth Figure," 389.

in a formal way. Moreover, the validity of this formal structure does not bear any significance from Aristotle's perspective. For Koris, the fourth figure does not exist, and it does not have any importance for Aristotle's metaphysics.²³

Further Comments on the Fourth Figure

Varied commentators, noted below, claim that the reason Aristotle did not include the fourth figure is because it is irrelevant to his logic.

Henle argues that this problem is a psychological problem, rather than a logical one. Even though the fourth figure is not included, for Henle, he has built a perfect system.²⁴

For Maritain, there is no place in logic for the fourth figure; it is just a grammatical debate.²⁵

Türker claims that leaving out the fourth figure occurred due to Aristotle's inclination to make everything triple. He claims that this trilogy may be explained only by the methodical task of Hellenistic philosophy: there is no explanation apart from that. The only possible reason is then the importance of trichotomy.²⁶

However, these and similar comments are outside the logical frame, I do not agree that.

Tracing the Fourth Figure in Aristotle

As noted in the introduction, this paper's task is to show whether there is a fourth figure in Aristotle's syllogistic logic and whether Aristotle was aware of the figure. Hence, we must first look at how Aristotle explains figures. Aristotle explains the first figure in *Analytica Priora* chapter IV:

²³ John Michael Krois, "Validity in the Cultural Sciences?" *Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science*, eds. Mary Domski, & Michael Dickson, (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court 2010).

²⁴ Paul Henle, "On the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism," *Philosophy of Science* 16 (1949), 94.

²⁵ Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Logic*, trans. Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1937), 187.

²⁶ Sadık Türker, *Batı Düşüncesinde Üçleme Sorunu* (İstanbul: Külliyat Yayınları, 2012), 147-8.

Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is in the middle as in a whole, and the middle is either in, or not in, the first as in a whole, the extremes must be related by a perfect deduction. I call that term middle which both is itself in another and contains another in itself: in position also this comes in the middle. By extremes I mean both that term which is itself in another and that in which another is contained. (25b32-37)

The second figure in chapter V:

Whenever the same thing belongs to all of one subject, and to none of another, or to all of each subject or to none of either, I call such a figure the second; by middle term in it I mean that which is predicated by both subjects, by extremes the terms of which this is said, by major extreme that which lies near the middle, by minor that which is further away from the middle. The middle term stands outside the extremes, and is first in position. (26b34-39)

The third figure in chapter VI:

But if one term belongs to all, and another to none, of a third, or if both belong to all, or to none, of it, I call such a figure the third; by middle term in it I mean that of which both are predicated, by extremes I mean the predicates, by the major extreme that which is further from the middle, by the minor that which is nearer to it. The middle term stands outside the extremes, and is last in position. (28a10-15)

Aristotle gives the description of the middle term after creating figures. Yet in a later part of *Analytica Priora* he explains all figures at once:

If then the middle term is a predicate and a subject of predication, or if it is a predicate, and something else is denied of it, we shall have the first figure; if it both is a predicate and is denied of something, the middle figure; if other things are predicated of it, or one is denied, the other predicated, the last figure. For it was thus that we found the middle term placed in each figure. (47a40-b6)

Peterson says that Aristotle's first figure is simple and structured stately; however, when other figures get involved, the sys-

tem becomes complicated and difficult to solve and understand. The fourth figure might lose attention in the system, that Aristotle established alone and without any help, due to the proliferation of figures. Further, due to the education approach of his school, the Lyceum, this figure might have remained undisclosed.²⁷ But, according to some, Aristotle determines the figures according to position of the middle term. We can see this explained when he writes

Since we know what sort of problem is established in each figure, and in which the universal and in what sort the particular is established, clearly we must not look for all the figures, but for that which is appropriate to the problem in hand. If it is established in more figures than one, we shall recognize the figure by the position of the middle term. (47b9-14)

Here Aristotle says that each figure should be based on the middle term while creating problems. This does not mean that he created figures based on the middle term. The figures already exist and which of these figures will be applied to the problem in question, the movement is based on the middle term. In a sense, this is a practical application of a theoretical structure. We see that he evaluates each permutation of syllogistic form according to the terms in the premise before. Therefore, the establishment of the figures would be completely a formal assessment; whether Aristotle was aware of a fourth figure is not under question.

Distinguishing between the orders of the two premises, known as the minor and major premises, started after Aristotle.²⁸ Thus, in determining the figures, the premises' position in the argument rather than their given terms is what matters. A description of the fourth figure made in a similar way would not be so different than the first figure.

In evaluating Aristotle's *Organon*, some commentators

²⁷ James B. Peterson, "The Forms of the Syllogism," *The Philosophical Review* 8 (1899), 371-2

²⁸ Charles H. Manekin, "Some Aspects of the Assertoric Syllogism in Medieval Hebrew Logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 17 (1996), 50.

(Łukasiewicz, Ross, Henle, etc.) find some matters missing, while others argue that some matters are treated in excess. According to Home and Kames, the majority view is that, in the *Organon*, the fourth figure is not involved in any way, neither accepted nor rejected; it is a matter that fails even to draw notice.²⁹ But some commentators, such as Ross, imply that Aristotle was aware of the forms that can occur in the fourth figure.³⁰ Although Aristotle does not mention the fourth figure, we can find the forms in the fourth figure indirectly. In 29a19-27, he recognizes that a universal or particular affirmation as a first premise and a universal negation as the second premise in the first figure yields as a particular negation conclusion, which amounts to recognizing the validity of Fesapo and Fresison in the fourth figure. Similarly, in 53a9-14 he recognizes the validity of the other moods of Bramantip, Dimaris, Camenes in the fourth figure.³¹ See, for example,

e.g. if A belongs to every or some B , and B belongs to no C ; for if the propositions are converted it is necessary that C does not belong to some A . (29a23-25)

Forms in this passage are written in this way:

1) $BaA \ \& \ CeB \ \therefore \ AoC$

2) $BiA \ \& \ CeB \ \therefore \ AoC$

Once we change the location of the premises, we get:

1') $CeB \ \& \ BaA \ \therefore \ AoC$ (Fesapo)

2') $CeB \ \& \ BiA \ \therefore \ AoC$ (Fresison)

Patzig says that “it is clearly assumed that Aristotle saw the equivalence of (1) with (1') and of (2) with (2')”.³² Additionally, Aristotle’s approach to (1) and (2) shows a conclusion in the eighth figure. Aristotle recognizes that with a minor term as C and major term as A , then in the conclusion, the minor term will

²⁹ Henry Home & Lord Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, ed. James A. Harris (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 665-6.

³⁰ Ross, *Aristoteles*, çev. Ahmet Arslan vd. (İstanbul: Kaba l c ı Yay ı nevi, 1995), 53.

³¹ Ross, *Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics* (London: Clarendon Press), 314.

³² Günther Patzig, *Aristotle’s Theory of the Syllogism* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 109-10.

be predicated to the major term. This stems from Aristotle's effort to incorporate this form with the first figure.

..., all the universal deductions give more than one result, and of particular deductions the affirmative yield more than one, the negative yield only the stated conclusion. For all propositions are convertible save only the particular negative; and the conclusion states one thing about another. Consequently, all other deductions yield more than one conclusion, e.g. if A has been proved to belong to every or to some B , then B must belong to some A ; and if A has been proved to belong to no B , then B belongs to no A . This is a different conclusion from the former. But if A does not belong to some B , it is not necessary that B should not belong to some A ; for it may belong to every A . (53a4-14)

Patzig stated this case by using a law of propositional logic,³³

$$[(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r] \wedge (r \rightarrow s) \rightarrow ((p \wedge q) \rightarrow s),$$

which is called hypothetical syllogism.³⁴ With this expression we can get all weakened forms. From that we can derive the idea that Aristotle was aware of these forms. However, by changing the location of the premises we can acquire the other figures,

$$[(p \wedge q \rightarrow r) \wedge (r \rightarrow s)] \rightarrow (p \wedge q \rightarrow s) \rightarrow (q \wedge p \rightarrow s),$$

and by this expression, we can convert the forms of the first figure to the fourth figure,

MaP & SaM $\therefore$ SaP (Barbara) $\rightarrow$ MaP & SaM $\therefore$ PiS $\rightarrow$ SaM & MaP
 $\therefore$ PiS (Bramantip)

MeP & SaM $\therefore$ SeP (Celarent) $\rightarrow$ MeP & SaM $\therefore$ PeS $\rightarrow$ SaM & MeP
 $\therefore$ PeS (Camenes)

MaP & SiM $\therefore$ SiP (Dariii) $\rightarrow$ MaP & SiM $\therefore$ PiS $\rightarrow$ SiM & MaP $\therefore$ PiS
 (Dimaris)

³³ Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism*, 111.

³⁴ Alfred N. Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912, vol. 3, 112, prop. 3.33.

In this process, the results are syllogisms in the first figure, which are equipollent with the original. According to Henle:

Now Aristotle's theory of the syllogism bears every indication of being carefully worked out. All possible combinations of modal premises are considered and under each combination of modalities, the enumeration of different quantities and qualities of premises is fairly complete. Where there are omissions they can as a rule be supplied by the reader without much trouble. ... To summarize the situation with regard to Aristotle: the aim of his investigation is to discover conclusions of modal syllogisms. For this purpose, the fourth figure yields results easily obtainable otherwise and is not worth the trouble.³⁵

However, this result is not as easily obtainable as Henle might think. Because of that, Peterson comments:

The moods of the fourth figure are nothing but varied forms of certain moods of the first and third figures and so we are restricted to the three figures recognized by Aristotle.³⁶

The problem with this is that by converting the other figures to the fourth figure, the invalid forms become valid. For Merrill, all the valid and invalid forms that can be made in the first, the second and the third figure can also be converted into the fourth figure.³⁷ If we apply this to Datisi in the third figure, we should get a valid I-I-I form in fourth figure. Yet this form cannot be valid. In order to avoid this impasse, Peterson attempts to show the invalidity of some of the forms in the third figure. In my opinion, the problem with the fourth figure is that it has no place in an Aristotelian syllogism.³⁸

With regards to Aristotle's theory, we may also make the same claim on the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth figures, too. Additionally, we can be sure that Aristotle was aware of the other figures and the forms in these figures. The existence of the

³⁵ Henle, "On The Fourth Figure of the Syllogism," 102.

³⁶ Peterson, "The Forms of the Syllogism," 374.

³⁷ Daniel D. Merrill, "Reduction to the Fourth Figure," *Mind* 74 (1965), 66-70.

³⁸ Peterson, "The Forms of the Syllogism," 374-5.

fourth figure is not something that he missed;

If then we must take something common in relation to both, and this is possible in three ways (either by predicating *A* of *C*, and *C* of *B*, or *C* of both, or both of *C*), and these are the figures of which we have spoken, it is clear that every deduction must be made in one or other of these figures. (41a13-18)

Assessment and Discussion

In my opinion, it is not failing or fallacy that Aristotle does not take seriously the fourth figure. His system is a successful one. However, it is an undue criticism to say that he was not aware of the existence of the fourth figure, or some other one. Clearly, he was well aware of the existence of the all other figures and deliberately did not take the fourth figure into account.

We have seen above that, if we give a definition of the fourth figure in public, practical use (e.g. by examples), its application is not quite different from the first figure. In this sense, if we agree on the idea that Aristotle's syllogism is not formal, we can also understand why he did not address this figure.

Nevertheless, I believe that Aristotle's system was a formal one. As we seen above, Aristotle has not failed to notice the existence of the fourth figure; on the contrary, he investigated it. But Aristotle's logic is a metaphysical system rather than one exclusively to be formalized. Aristotle did not consider predication as inclusion, as it is in the classical logic. According to Aristotle, this is a categorical arrangement.

I think that Rose's presentation above is compatible with Aristotle's system. However, I believe that Rose's explanation brings no clarity to the problem. Agreeing with Koris, I think that the problem originates for metaphysical reasons. Thinking differently about the existence of the fourth figure, I think that the reason for the absence of this figure can be explained by metaphysical rather than formal justification. Thus, it cannot be created in a different way than the other three forms. Thus, the question remains of why Aristotle gets this figure.

Scientific investigation is not about an object for Aristotle; it is about an incident or situation. It is not the case that, for a premise such as SaP, that S contains P. That is, subjects of the predicate S are subjects of the predicate P. So, for the fourth figure the mould that PM and MS, subjects of the predicate P are subjects of the predicate M and subjects of the predicate M are subject of the predicate S, in this case subjects of the predicate P are subject of the predicate S. This is eighth figure, not fourth.


First of all, it must be defined premise for to construct Aristotle's syllogism. Aristotle defines the simple statement as, "The simple statement is a significant spoken sound about whether something *"belongs to"* or *"does not belong to"* (in one of the divisions of time)" (17a22-24). Here, we define a premise, SP as whether what belongs to S also belongs to P or not. Thus,




Aristotle gives how to construct a syllogism by premises,

For in general we stated that no deduction can establish the attribution of one thing to another, unless some middle term is taken, which is somehow related to each by way of predication... So we must take a middle term relating to both, which will connect the predications, if we are to have a deduction relating this to that. (41a2-13)

This passage's phrase, "each by way of predication," can be better understood as "by category". So we can show the syllogism as




The other figures can be presented in the following way:



In this presentation, for fourth figure, M and M' are different terms. So we can see here the origin of Rose's comment. But if we want to understand why this figure has its conclusion, then we must engage in the following steps:

The other figures can be reduced to the first figure by conversion. Conversion is not a simple subject and predicate replacement. If a subject expands, then the subject will alter and the propositions will change from the first proposition. Hence the conversion would be:



The reduction of the second figure to the first figure is, then,




The idea that M is in between S and P comes from the first premise and we get its relation with S from conversing. The middle term is given in both premises and predicated to the other

terms. In this case, the first premise is reduced by conversing and then keeping the structure of the syllogism. As such, the third figure would be:



The idea that M is in between S and P comes from the first premise, and we get its relation with S from conversing. S is restricted, which protects the structure of the syllogism. Yet, in the fourth figure, in both premises it is not the case that there is an M in between S and P. If we try to get it, we will have this from:



M moved by this way will create a new term(because in this conversion, if the term extends, the term will be different and the premise will be too). In this case M will be a different cause in this syllogism than in the previous syllogism that is reduced to the first figure. In the second shape, the structure of the comparison with the expansion of P is disrupted, and thus is not applicable. In a similar way, if we disrupt the structure of the syllogism, and this is not applicable.


The form's middle term reduced from second and third figures to first figure maintains the structure. In the syllogism re-

duced from fourth figure, the middle term does not maintain the structure. Therefore, this syllogism's middle term is different.

We are deceived in such cases because something necessary results from what is assumed, since deduction also is necessary. But what is necessary is wider than deduction; for every deduction is necessary, but not everything which is necessary is a deduction. (47a31-34)

Every necessary conclusion is not a proof. Results obtained from the fourth figure are correct. However, the deduction is necessarily dependent on the middle term to come as a cause. The cause of the results obtained in the fourth figure is not then middle term in the syllogism.

In this syllogism, if we want to find as a result PS, it will be the first figure,



Yet this case is a syllogism of another inquiry. This inquiry is not about P, it is about S, i.e. first premise is MS and second premise is PM and conclusion is PS.

Now, we try to construct an example for fourth figure, for to clear my frame, with S: 'Animal', M: 'Human', P: 'Thinker';

Every Thinker is Human

Every Human is Animal

∴ Some Animal is Thinker

If we reduce to first figure by changing the propositions;

Every Human is Animal

Every Thinker is Human

∴ Some Thinker is Animal

Whereas, following is required to maintain syllogism form;

Every Human is Animal

Every Thinker is Human

∴ Every Thinker is Animal

Actually, the syllogism has been reduced in the first figure, converted by first premise

Every Human is Animal

Some Thinker is Human

∴ Some Thinker is Animal

In the second premise here, content of the middle term 'Human', is restricted, and considered as a new term. So not all of the category of 'Human' is examined; rather now a part of the 'Human' has been established for syllogism. In this case, the middle term in the last syllogism for 'Human' is different from the middle term of the first, it has been subset of the first. So, it is not possible to reduce Bramantip to Barbara, only to Darii.

I do not say here that the conclusion from the syllogism of Bramantip is invalid. Aristotle notes that other conclusions can be obtained by conversion of the other conclusion, as we have seen above. I intended to show; the fourth figure will not be established in Aristotle's system. Aristotle system is not to achieve the conclusion. I think that this entity has a structural purpose, which is the middle term. As we have seen here, the middle term for the conclusion obtained in the fourth figure can not be given as 'cause'. Here, it may come to mind, that this correlation applies to affirmation but not to denials. This is quite clear according to Aristotle. For Aristotle, the relation between the subject and the predicate is a predication. It is not the case that this predication is a positive or a negative one. We study this relation only after we make it. This distinction allows the structure shown in the referred figures to be understood in relation to each other. Reducing forms to each other is an entirely different matter. This is why, Aristotle mentioned the fourth figure, but did not take it as a syllogism. It cannot be built in Aristotle's logic.

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The Relationship between God's Knowledge and Will in the al-Ghazālīan Theology: A Critical Approach

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Research Article

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Abstract: Three divine attributes (knowledge, will and power) discussed in the classical ages of Islamic theology were established as a doctrine in time, and the other doctrines of divine attributes were removed from the Sunnī theology. Divine knowledge is an attribute whose activity is generally to know all possible options about the universe, while the divine will is another attribute whose activity is to choose only one of the similar or dissimilar options. But they are seen incompatible when considered in the frame of God's relationship to the universe: (i) if it is obviously known which option will happen, it is not really chosen at the moment of choice, and (ii) if it is uncertain which option will be chosen, it cannot be known which option will happen until preference. What is problematic here is that you attempt to design the divine attributes and actions according to two-valued logic: His all activities must happen one after another. Then, which solution is proposed for the issue by al-Ghazālī, who claims that knowledge and the will are the mutually compatible and complementary attributes for God's relationship to the universe? I discuss whether al-Ghazālī supports his claim with adequate arguments or not.

Keywords: Al-Ghazālī, divine attributes, omniscience, divine will, two-valued logic.

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Introduction

Some theistic theologians and philosophers such as al-Ash‘arī (d. 936), al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), and Leibniz (d. 1716) claim that the life, will, omniscience, and omnipotence are the compatible attributes with each other, and that those are the best and the most perfect attributes to describe God: a notion of God in which even one of these attributes is overlooked is not perfect.¹ But I have some doubts whether there is a consistency among all divine attributes describing divine essence in general, and more specifically between divine will and omniscience, for the opinion that both are compatible attributes and equally function for divine essence cannot be consistently defended:

(i) A thing known undoubtedly to take place in a certain moment of the future can never be willed or preferred. For example, if God, whose knowledge about the universe is *always* complete and perfect, knows that Q (among the others such as P, X, Z) will take place in a certain time and place, Q will absolutely take place according to His knowledge.

(ii) If it is uncertain that which option (among the others) God will choose, nobody knows which option will take place by the choice. Suppose that God has various (or infinite) options about the universe to prefer one over the others, and that He is (now) in the decision phase: which one will He choose? It is seen that there must be a kind of epistemic uncertainty until (or immediately before) He prefers one of them to others. Namely, although He knows in detail what Q, P, and X are, it will (or must) be entirely uncertain that which option He will choose in decision instant.

Then, if you strongly emphasize divine will to describe God perfectly, you cannot defend the other attribute, omniscience, by the equal emphasis in a theological system rationalized with two-

¹ For more information on free will, see İsmail Şimşek, *Düşünce Tarihinde Tanrı'nın Özgürlüğü Sorunu* (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2017), 191-270. Also see John Martin Fischer & Robert Kane, *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

valued logic. The essential principle of two-valued logic is stated by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* that “it is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect,”² and in *De Interpretatione* that “the positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate.”³ This “is the most certain of all principles”⁴ says Aristotle. Avicenna explains it in the way that “one does not issue except for one,” as one of the most general principles of his psychology and theology. Although some theologians such as al-Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī raises some critical objections to the Avicennian principle, this Aristotelian-logical principle became the main principle designing both philosophical and theological methodology under different appearances as the ultimate basis for the scientific paradigm from Aristotle until the 18th century. For example, the method of “classification and successive elimination” (*al-sabr wa al-taqsīm*), the primary one of the epistemological methods of Ghazālian theology, is a method for reducing a claim to one of two opposite propositional forms, positive or negative, because “the positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate.”⁵ If one of these two opposite propositions is true, the other is certainly untrue, and there is no third possible way. What is problematic here is that you attempt to design the divine attributes and actions in the frame of two-valued logic: God *first* must know something and *then* wills it. His all activities must happen one after another, not in a “moment,” according to two-valued logic. Also, He *first* must be *only* at the choosing step, not both before and after choice at the same time. The fact that God *first* knows something, and *later* prefers it among the others in His knowledge, *then* begins to create it,

² Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, trans. W. David Ross, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. VIII, ed. W. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 1005b19-20.

³ Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, trans. E. M. Edghill, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. I, 17a34-5.

⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1005b21.

⁵ Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 17a34-5.

shows that divine activities occur in a fictional sequence designed by two-valued logic which enables Him not to be in two different states in one moment, or to do three actions in a moment, or to engage in four different jobs at the same time. Then, it requires a hierarchy in which God would successively put His activities into practice, and we encounter a priority and posteriority issue. This is the point in where divine knowledge conflicts with the divine will.

It is well known that al-Ghazālī is one of the Muslim theologians who argue that all attributes of God can be defended by equal emphasis without posing any problem for God's essence and His relationship with the universe. In what follows I present al-Ghazālī's statements regarding two attributes in some passages from *al-Iqtisād fī al-Itiqād* and *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, and discuss them in terms of whether there is a consistency between these two attributes.

1. Al-Ghazālī's Arguments for God's Knowledge and Will

Al-Ghazālī makes a clear distinction between two divine attributes, the will and knowledge, in terms of their functions, in some passages of *al-Iqtisād* and *Tahāfut*:

We mentioned both in our book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, and they have no escape from them at all.

One of them is that some of the celestial movement are ... from the east to the west, and some are ... from the west to east. The opposite of that is equivalent to it in possibility, since the directions are equivalent for motions. How then is it necessitated by the eternal essence ... that a certain direction is determined instead of an opposite direction that is equivalent to it in all respects? ...

The second is that (...) a pole (*qutb*) is (...) one of two points that are opposite to each other on the surface of the sphere (...), and the equator (*al-mintiqah*) is a great circle at the middle of the sphere that is equidistant from the two poles. We say that the body of the outermost sphere (*al-falak al-aqsā*) is symmetric and uniform, and every point on it could be imagined to serve as a pole. So, what is

that which necessitates the specification of two points among, according to them, infinitely many points? There must be an attribute that is additional to the essence and whose function is to specify a thing among its counterparts. This attribute is nothing but the will.⁶

As opposed to the philosopher's views on divine attributes, Al-Ghazālī's all attempts in both cases are to show that the will "*whose functions is to specify a thing among its counterparts*" is different from the omniscience whose function is to know all possible options available about a fact or event. Existing separately, these two attributes are different in terms of their functions, and both are added to God's essence.

At the very beginning of the "Eleventh Discussion" of *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, al-Ghazālī presents a series of propositions to find a rational basis for omniscience:

Inasmuch as existence for the Muslims is confined to the temporally originated and the eternal, there being for them no eternal other than God and His attributes, [all things] other than Him being originated from His direction through His will, a necessary premise regarding His knowledge became realized for them. For that which is willed must necessarily be known to the willer. On this, they built that everything is known to Him because all [things] are willed by Him and originated by His will. Hence, there is no generated being that is not originated by His will, nothing remaining [uncreated] except Himself.⁷

Although the passage attempts to develop an argument for omniscience, it also gives further details about the will: 'if there is something except God's essence and attributes, it is temporarily originated through His will,' the argument continues, 'if something is temporarily originated through His will, then it is known to Him,' then 'if there is something except God's essence and attributes, it is definitely known to Him.' It is also possible to draw

⁶ Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, trans. Aladdin M. Yaqub (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 108.

⁷ Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, A parallel English-Arabic text, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 125.

another conclusion or a principle containing the will, as mentioned above, from this syllogism which is specifically created to make an argument for omniscience: *what is willed must necessarily be known to its willer*.⁸

This short sentence seems obvious, but we need to analyze it properly in order to reach a quite clear understanding of the relationship between knowledge and will. Then, we can start by reversing some parts of the sentence: *A willer necessarily knows what he wills*. For example, Ali wills water to drink, then he knows necessarily what water is before he wills it. It is true that human beings necessarily know *what* they will, but not *which one* they will –more precisely they cannot necessarily know which one they choose before their choices. We all know that there is a clear distinction ‘what’ and ‘which one.’ For instance, Ali knows that *what* water means both before and after he wills, and that what he chooses is water, but it is impossible for him to know *which one* (among the beverages) he will choose until he chooses drinking water or makes a decision for it. Before he chooses water, he has no knowledge about whether he drinks water or fruit juice. It is hardly possible for al-Ghazālī to accept such an idea of God, who has no knowledge about whether He will create the universe until He chooses it.

We must, then, consider the idea of God who knows in detail each part of the whole universe throughout His existence. A theist believes that God’s existence has no starting point and endpoint since He continuously and always exists. It means that God always knows in detail each part of the universe both before and after He decides to create it, that is, He knows which option He will choose before He wills. But in this case, we encounter another significant problem: that He knows in detail everything which is existing now and will exist in future removes divine

⁸ The same conclusion can be re-established in a different syllogism: (i) the things willed by God must be known to Him, (ii) temporarily originated beings are the ones willed by God, (iii) then, temporarily originated beings are must be known to Him.

will, because if you certainly know which option you will choose in future, you do not really choose it, but only do it in accordance with your knowledge. For example, if Ali certainly knows now which option he will choose in the future, it will be meaningless for him to choose the option he already knows. Then, what is known to exist cannot be really willed.

It appears that the function of one of two attributes will be naturally secondary or inactive if you consider the other attribute as the principal or most appropriate for God's essence. We still do not know whether al-Ghazālī is aware of this conflict between the functions of these two attributes, and whether he offers a solution to it if he is aware of. It seems not possible to express any opinion so long as I cannot determine the Ghazālian content of the will. Therefore, we should analyze some passages that he attempts to define the will in *al-Iqtisād* and *Tahāfut*. It may be very useful to see them in their contexts:

The will is nothing but an attribute whose function is only to distinguish a thing among its counterparts⁹

The true nature of the will is to distinguish a thing among its counterparts.¹⁰

Will [is] an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing from its similar.¹¹

Will is, according to al-Ghazālī, an attribute to distinguish a thing among its counterparts. We have already given its example in the opening sentences that we quoted from *al-Iqtisād* and *Tahāfut*: Will is an attribute whose function is to specify a thing among its counterparts/the similar alternatives standing separately in mind:

God, the Exalted, knows that the existence of the world at the time when it was brought into existence is possible, and that its existence before or after that time is equivalent to it in possibility, for all

⁹ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, 106.

¹⁰ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, 107.

¹¹ Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 22.

these possibilities are equivalent. Hence [divine] knowledge ought to attach to them as they are. If the attribute of will decrees that the world should come into existence at a specific time [among the others], knowledge would attach to this specification –namely, that it should exist at that time– because the will attaches to this specification.¹²

Al-Ghazālī states in the passage that there are different possible times in which the world will be created, and God knows each possible time for the creation, and that divine knowledge must attach to the will when it chooses one of those times. This statement is not adequately clear to understand what al-Ghazālī means regarding the relationship God and the universe, therefore we need to exemplify it: Suppose that there are some alternative times, Q, P, and X, in divine knowledge for the creation of the world. Al-Ghazālī argues that all these temporal points are equivalent to each other in possibility, and no one has a priority over the others in divine knowledge. When the will, whose function is *to choose* only one point among the other points, freely specifies one of them, knowledge attaches to this specification (or to the will). Namely, you cannot see any changing in God's knowledge before and after He wills because both knowledge and the will attach to the specification. On the other side, there is a close relationship between the will and action, since all choices are made by an agent who is free in his own actions. In his book *Tahāfut*, Al-Ghazālī claims,

Will necessarily entails knowledge. Similarly, action necessarily entails will.¹³

Agent is an expression [referring] to one from whom the act proceeds, together with the will to act by way of choice and the knowledge of what is willed.”¹⁴

We cannot think of the will alone without considering knowledge, and of the action alone without considering the will.

¹² Al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, 105-6.

¹³ Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 57.

¹⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, 56.

Will necessarily contains knowledge, because it acts according to knowledge, and similarly, action necessarily contains will, because every action depends on the will. And the term ‘agent’ contains knowledge, will and action since each action proceeds from the agent who acts according to his knowledge and will. Then, God, as an agent, has *knowledge* in which different or similar options about the universe are going to take place, and the *will* whose function is to choose one option among the others. He *knows* all possible options concerning each part of the universe and *chooses* freely someone among those possible options:

If the attribute of will decrees that the world should come into existence at a specific time [among the others], knowledge would attach to this specification –namely, that it should exist at that time– because the will attaches to this specification. So the will is the cause of the specification; and knowledge attaches to this specification, is dependent on it, and does not affect it.¹⁵

According to the passage, whenever He wills the world to create at a specific time among infinite options of time (P, Q, X, Z, and so on) in His knowledge, He chooses freely, for instance, the option Q time, but not P, X or Z, and he starts the action of the creation of the world in Q time.¹⁶ This result is actually not different than what I previously reached above. Therefore, if it is correct, the relationship al-Ghazālī establishes between divine will and knowledge deserves a strong criticism since he could not adequately rationalize it.

2. Some Difficulties in Ghazālian Arguments

a) Since al-Ghazālī established his theory of divine attributes in the Aristotelian paradigm, all of the criticism to be directed to Aristotelian paradigm will be also directed to his theory constructed with two-valued logic.

¹⁵ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, 105-6.

¹⁶ For more details on Ghazalian divine will, see Fehrullah Terkan, “el-Ğazālî'nin İlahî İradeye Dair Argümanları ve Müslüman Filozofların İtirazlarına Verdiği Cevaplar”, *900. Vefât Yılında İmâm Gazâlî*, (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 615-39.

b) In my opinion, the statements of al-Ghazālī concerning divine will and knowledge are almost wholly anthropomorphic. It seems that human being and his attributes were the basic models to establish his theory of divine attributes.

c) A theist surely believes that God's essence, existence, and knowledge never change by other divine attributes or external effects. And there is no beginning for His essence, existence and knowledge, thus, you cannot use the term 'in past-eternity', implying a kind of beginning, for God's will or choice. It is a merely formal and fictional 'point' that, not corresponding to any factual reality, human mind –thinking in temporal or situational categories– imagines in order to start some divine activities. We initially start activity of the will from this formal and fictional point, and then make it a reality when we establish an argument for God's choice: "God chose it in the past-eternity." The Ghazālīan theory of the divine will with 'optional choice' does not function without the word "in the past-eternity." If you remove it, you must refer it only to God's eternal essence, for God still exists even long before each point that can be marked for "eternity."

d) If you examine the Ghazālīan theory in detail, you will confront some other big problems: Suppose that you go back to the beginning of the universe. At that time, what you see is that the universe has not existed yet, and that God will choose one of two options: (i) the universe will come into existence, and (ii) the universe will not. I wonder whether there is a real choice: since the universe does not actually exist, there is no two options, but the first one that God can will. The second option is always there by itself apart from God's will and without any preference.

e) Also, suppose that you are with God immediately before He chooses one of the infinite options regarding with the universe included in His knowledge. If you ask Him 'Which option (among the others) will you choose?', He will never answer to this big question at that time since He is going to choose one of them a little later. Therefore, He will never know which one he will choose until he chooses it. But, if he knew which one He

would choose before the choice, there would be no real choice.

f) According to al-Ghazālī, all options concerning the universe exist in God's knowledge in its possibility, and He prefers one to others by His own free will. But what does it mean 'to prefer one (of the alternative options) to others', and what kind of process should He follow to prefer a thing to others?

To prefer Q to the other alternative options (P, X, and Z) necessarily entails to compare Q with the others. Let us take the sentence 'Ali is going to go to school tomorrow' as Q, and the sentence 'Ali is going to go for his vacation tomorrow' as P, and the sentence 'Ali is going to die tomorrow' as Z. Each option has one (or more) justification that caused it to be chosen or eliminated by His will, and He knows each justification in detail. Keeping in our mind that the goodness is one of the attributes of God and He wants goodness for human beings, let us suppose that it is good for Ali 'to go to school tomorrow', which is the better option to be chosen by God. In such cases, He must compare all justifications, and find the better justification, and finally choose/prefer it to other options. If He directly makes His decision on Q without making a comparison among all justifications, there will be no significance to know more than one option and to choose one of them. But if He makes His decision immediately after He compares all justifications and finds the better, He will know only by syllogism the better one for Ali, for a comparison is a kind of syllogism. But we use a syllogism to gain knowledge about what we do not know. If He compares an option to the others, then, God will also complete His knowledge in time by syllogisms and reasonings to cover up His theoretical deficiency.

g) According to Ghazālian theory, God has all possible knowledge regarding the universe in pre-eternity, and He chooses anyone among his possible knowledge, and then He puts it into action. It can be expressed the above order as follows: (i) divine knowledge (i.e. all possible options in God's knowledge), (ii) will (choosing one of the possible options), and (iii) action.

Unfortunately, al-Ghazālī overlooks a critical point in this

order: If God has no knowledge about which option He is going to choose until He wills, He will learn it after choosing it. Then there must be a second knowledge between His will and action: (i) Raw knowledge, (ii) will, (iii) complete knowledge, and (iv) action. Al-Ghazālī, moreover, makes an interesting claim that the sense perception, hearing and sight are the additional perfections for knowledge and that it is also true for God.

Knowledge is perfection and hearing and sight are additional perfections for knowledge. We have shown that they are a form of completion to knowledge and imagination. Whoever knows something without seeing it and then sees it would benefit from increased revelation and knowledge. Thus, how could it be said that this [form of perfection] is true of that which is created but not of the Creator?¹⁷

Al-Ghazālī explicitly states that someone who knows something before seeing it would attain an increased revelation and knowledge when he sees it and that it surely is true for God. Considering his expression that sense apprehension complements knowledge to be perfect, I necessarily conclude that God is not completely perfect until He will hear and see the universe and all its components. Then, we reach the final state of his hierarchy: (i) raw knowledge, (ii) will, (iii) complete knowledge, (iv) action, and (v) the final/perfect knowledge.¹⁸

Conclusion

The scientific method grounding on two-valued logic of the Aristotelian paradigm has been a basic dynamic for all rational thoughts until the 18th century. To become an information science depends on its expression rationally by two-valued logic within this method. However, two-valued logic rationalizes every information according to the values of ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence,’ each of which corresponds to huge fields. Namely, everything must be necessarily located either in the fields of ex-

¹⁷ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Moderation in Belief*, 112.

¹⁸ For additional criticisms, see Hasan Akkanat, *Klasik Dönem İslam Felsefesinde Tümmeller* (Adana: Karahan Yayınevi, 2016), 442-57.

istence or nonexistence. Similarly, all judgments must be made in the frame of two-valued logic, either in the form of 'there is' or 'there is not'.

Although al- Ghazālī criticizes some opinions of the philosophers in various matters, he builds his opinions to the extent that two-valued logic allows him, and he considers this kind of logical dimension as the basic method which completely expresses the goals of the divine text. We can see a clear example of this in the issue of divine attributes in general, more specifically in the issues concerning God and the universe relation such as temporality, eternity, omniscience and the will. Treating divine essence and attributes on an anthropomorphic ground, al-Ghazālī argues that divine knowledge and the will are the attributes compatible with each other: God knows all alternative options that will exist or not in future about the universe, and He chooses one of them, and finally He takes it into action. Even though such an anthropomorphist process is quite appropriate for human beings, it causes major problems if you take it for God: (i) If God's essence, existence and knowledge never change, He knows in detail each part of the universe that will exist in future. (ii) But if God creates the universe by choosing it, He does not know which option he will choose and create until He wills it. (iii) And if God knows all alternative options about the universe and He chooses one of them, His knowledge will change after He chooses it. Because He knows what the universe is before He chooses it, but not that which universe (among the others) He himself will choose. He *will* know which universe he is going to choose while choosing it. Then, the status of His knowledge will not be the same in both cases: Knowledge before the will, I call it 'raw knowledge'; and knowledge after the will, I call it 'complete knowledge.'

It is obvious that the Ghazālian theory of divine attributes, which he attempts to show it as the sole purpose of the religion, have some problems arisen from the peripatetic methodology by two-valued logic, which need to be criticized in a philosophical point of view.

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The Image of Woman in the Islamic Philosophical Tradition^{*}

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Research Article

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Abstract: In the Islamic philosophical tradition, it seems that the image of woman has not been studied very much and the role of woman has hardly ever mentioned. First, we will briefly explain why we chose the concept of imagination. Afterward, from which sources the Islamic philosophical tradition has formed its concepts, and as a result, we would try to talk about where it established philosophy, whether it was theoretical or practical. Finally, we want to finish the subject by giving examples from the fact of women in Islamic philosophical tradition.

Keywords: Islamic philosophical tradition, Ancient Greek philosophy, the image of woman, conception, metaphysics, principles.

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Introduction

The Islamic philosophical tradition took the concept of imagination or *taḥayyul* from the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, especially from Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic school. Imagination is used to imagine a thing or being, to revive a mind or to transform a phenomenon into a metaphysical concept.¹ It would be appropriate to say that the image of the woman in the Islamic philosophical tradition is presented as a phenomenon imagined in mind as a continuation of the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, and consequently, that its connections with reality are only expressed in the mind depending on metaphysical principles.

In Islamic society, as revealed in the social life of that day, it should say that the social situation of woman has not affected too much, her conditions should be represented only through a set of principles and concepts. Tradition in Islamic philosophy more likely passed through us from Ancient Greek, although some extent influenced by Islamic culture and tradition, philosophers interpreted it in conjunction with the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition. In other words, we see that some concepts and structures created in the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition have been presented as an element of Islamic religion, under the influence of Platonism, especially Neo-Platonism, by reconciling with Islam.

The Background of the Subject

Ancient Greek philosophy has three different contributions in Islamic philosophical tradition. These are Pythagoreanism, Platonism and Aristotelianism. It seems that Pythagoreanism does not take much part in the Islamic philosophical tradition,

¹ The word Greek *phantasia* was translated into Arabic as *taḥayyul* or *ḥayāl*. See Aristotle, *De Anima (On the Soul)*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986), III.3; al-Fārābī, *Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, ed. Albert Naṣrī Nādir (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), 114-6; Averroes, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb an-Nafs*, ed. Alfred L. Ivry (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'lā fī ath-Thaqāfa, 1994), 116-20.

except that is effective on al-Kindī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī or on Ikhwān al-Ṣafā in the Ismaili tradition.² We can say that there has not much of place for the woman in this school. When we speak of the point of view of Islamic moral philosophical tradition to the woman, especially of al-Kindī and al-Rāzī, we cannot say to be mentioned as a good being.

It is obvious that the Islamic philosophical tradition originally represented a metaphysical and conceptual structure. In other words, it is based woman upon certain concepts that created in minds than practice. It is understood in Islamic philosophy that we should look at not only the woman but other social events or worldly things from this theoretical point of view. Metaphysics, in particular, is an indispensable part in the Islamic philosophical tradition. So this tradition, from the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, says that all practices in life must emerge depending on metaphysical principles.³ Therefore, we need to know Plato and Aristotle very well. Again we need to know the syncretism of them, namely Neo-Platonic worldview which is fed with the common elements of the two, so that we can see that it takes a lot of place in the Islamic religion.

What jointly expressed by the Platonic Ishrāqī tradition and the Aristotelian Mashshāī tradition would be the positioning of the woman through metaphysics. It is necessary to say that all of the facts on practice or about life and society are determined through metaphysical principles since all this is adopted through these principles.⁴ In this respect, it cannot be said that the Islamic

² Al-Kindī, *Risāla fī al-Ḥila li-Dafʿ al-Aḥzān*, ed. Mustafa Çağrı (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1998); Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Kitāb at-Ṭibb ar-Rūḥānī*, ed. Paul Krauss, *Rasāil al-Falsafīyya* (Cairo: Jāmiʿat al-Fuād al-Awwal, 1939); Ikhwan al-Ṣafā, *Rasāil Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ wa Ḥillān al-Wafāʾ* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1957).

³ To get information what about metaphysics, its main features and content, see al-Fārābī, *Fī Aḥrāḍ al-Ḥakīm fī Kullī Maqāla min al-Kitāb al-Mawsūm bi al-Ḥurūf*, ed. Friedrich Dieterici, *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1890), 34-8.

⁴ For the ideal worldview defended by Platonic school, see Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1987), VII; Plotinus, *The Enneads*,

philosophical tradition is within the properly view of life. Because it cannot be possible to fully reflect the discourses determined the life with reference to its own metaphysical conception to that life.

Woman in Islamic Philosophy

The negative approach of the Pythagorean tradition to woman, especially al-Rāzī, taking advantage of the Platonic point of view (by seeing woman as an object of love and desire, and concerning that love would drive human being apart intelligible faculties and give place to desire prior to intellect), expresses that woman will defeat those who are engaged in philosophy. From the al-Rāzī's argument that it should definitely not be married and be in love, we can say that woman is regarded as an object which to inactivate intellectual faculties in Islamic Pythagorean philosophy. Since the society has been determined by an *idea* in the Platonic tradition, not only the woman but also the man has no individual role in society. There is a social role or a social mind, and Plato considers woman as an element of this social role. From this point of view, this occurs in the conception of the state, especially of morality and politics, in Islamic philosophical tradition. It is known that especially the policies of Aristotelian tradition are not much in the Islamic world. It has been held some arguments as the reason for this such as Plato's *Republic* was known and Aristotle's *Politics* was not known, but we think it is an insubstantial argument. For the Aristotelian conception of state does not match with the conception of the Islamic state. In particular, because an understanding stood out the aristocracy or elites which adopted the rule of the administration and more likely to be simulated or associated by the *caliph* and *philosopher king*, we can say that Plato's *Republic* dominated the Islamic world completely.

trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991), VI. For the foundations of the Aristotelian metaphysics, see Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 2004), IV.

Now, it is approached to the subject of woman and other social events, by means of integration the Platonic conception of the state which is dominant in the Islamic world with the Aristotelian *Nicomachean Ethics* which dominate in the field of morality.⁵ There is no place for women in Plato because the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition reflects the culture of the Ancient Greek society. Since there is a patriarchal family structure in Greek culture, the woman is a being, who comes after the slaves, is a member of the family with children and dependent on the family. She only comes to the fore with her fertility, which makes her obliged to work only in a certain division of labor. Despite the fact that Plato paid attention to the education of woman in her State, women cannot be said to have many places in the state administration because their emotions and desires prioritize to their intellectual faculties. In Plato, a woman can only be in a category of protector, so she may be a part of the military class, but this also has certain conditions.

In the Platonic tradition, women are the common property of society and keep living from any kind of a shame. In the Islamic philosophical tradition, this situation is somewhat more softened. When we look at the conception of the state of *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* by al-Fārābī, which is a commentary of Plato's *Republic*, it is possible to say that the woman is not represented anywhere. Al-Fārābī does not mention anywhere about the woman or the role of the woman. Now, if we consider that there is a virtuous chief or *imam* who represented the same thing with a concept of the prophet in the head of virtuous state or society, we clearly understand that there is no role for the woman in the state. Because the intellectual faculty exacts us representing a mind that

⁵ The foundation of morality has always been in the direction of Aristotelian thought in the Islamic conception of society and politics as well as in philosophy. The moral tradition, which started with Ibn Miskawaih and continued with Ṭūsī, always made statements that laid the foundations of *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, there is a point that should not be forgotten that this tradition is sometimes interpreted from a Platonic perspective. For the basic work of the Aristotelian tradition, see Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Harris Rackham (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Edition, 1996).

prefers to the emotion or the desire. Al-Fārābī implies that women can never become a *caliph* or a *head of state* and she cannot attain a wise personality within the administration by means of her emotional entity and crushing drop in her desires.

When we look at Avicenna, we can see that he targets the priority of power as a representation of the Platonic tradition. Avicenna remarks some of the religious texts, Quran and hadiths slightly apart from the Peripatetic Islamic philosophical tradition. Here we see that the philosopher has a negative attitude towards woman. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly inheritance from Greek thought, that is to say, Avicenna did also not give the right which has not been given by Ammonian tradition. Based on the verses about the woman's inheritance and protection of men for women, Avicenna speaks out that her place is home and she has no any power of representation out of the home, and that women cannot have a place in the administration due to being weak-minded, giving her emotions prominence and being fanciful.⁶

The discourse that the woman has weak-mind plays an important role in Avicenna's perception of the woman. Since the woman cannot be included in any administration due to her lack of reason, the woman is a being that works for Avicenna only in terms of fertility. But her fertility is not an obstacle for her to marry with an elite man. In order to get married a philosopher man with woman befitting to his own, the woman has to be educated at home. That is, the woman who is not given any duty has been granted the chance to obtain the honor of being a mother of a certain human only with fertility. In this way, the woman should be content with the honor of being the wife of a certain man. Avicenna said that it was the right decision for God not to give the divorce right to the woman because of emotional and weak-minded. In this respect, it is stated in the Avicennian tradition that women are not considered as any social personality and

⁶ Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitāb ash-Shifā'*, ed. Āyatullāh Ḥasanzādah al-Āmulī (Qum: Maktab al-I'lām al-Islāmī, 1997-8), X.

they do not have any social position, and even according to Avicenna, the most important thing of woman is her chastity, honor, obedience to husband and being a good wife and raising good children for him.

According to al-Ghazālī who maintains this view, since the marriage contract between men and women resembles slavery, she must obey her husband in full, so that it is necessary to do what his husband says, in such a way that does not imply a revolt to God.⁷ Obviously, in this idea whose bases go back to Aristotle, the woman is accepted as a being weak-minded inherently, insufficient and unstable in reasoning. From this perspective, it is thought that the existence of a man is an active form and of a woman as a passive matter. Similarly, both thinkers argued that the woman has to be provided her education and maintained protection by the man at home, by telling about the lack of reason resulting from the creation of the woman, the pursuit of her desires and her ambitiousness.

In the same way, it is said in the views of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī that the woman should be used as a slave and must obey her husband.⁸ This is related to the fact that the head of household is the man, with reference to the householding is the same as the state administration and the house should be ruled by reason because the state can be ruled by reason.⁹ According to al-Ṭūsī, the goal of marriage is to protect the property and ensure the continuation of the generation. Therefore, a housewife must have two priority qualifications, those are thriftiness and fertility. In addition, she should be gentle, modest, chaste, obedient and religious. Her beauty should not be the main cause to get married, because the woman's beauty can often be a trap and cruelty due to her weak-mind.

⁷ Al-Ghazālī. *at-Tibr al-Masbūk fī Naṣīhat al-Mulūk*, trans. Alī b. Mubārak & ed. Aḥmad Shamsuddīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988).

⁸ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, ed. Muḥtabā Minouī & ʿAlī Riḍā Ḥaydari (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Khawārizmī, 1976), II.3.

⁹ For Aristotle's views on the householding, see Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), III.

The most important discourses in Islamic philosophy belong to Averroes. In the chapter on the protectors and the wise men of his *Kitāb as-Siyāsa*, commented Plato's *Republic*, as opposed to Plato, Averroes clearly says from Aristotelian psychology that the woman is the same race with the man and deserves all kinds of education because she is a human being.¹⁰ Here Averroes discusses whether the woman can perform other social duties and does this through gender. The question of whether a woman is a human as a sex will be given the answer that she is definitely a human by nature. So, in society, in the same way, women can do many things that men are able to do, or even have to do. Thus, Averroes states that the Andalusian women lost their own essential feelings in time and tried to live without any pleasure, by keeping their hands off the social activities and by directing themselves to the things such as carpet weaving which were just about subsistence.

Talking about the importance given to women by Islam, Averroes speaks of the fact that the woman was taken the backseat in Islamic society and culture in contradiction with the Qur'an's orders. For according to Quran, the woman was the same animal that derives from the same soul as the man and complements each other. Averroes expressed that women wanted to be taken the backseat themselves and that they abstracted from society by detracting them from social works and turning themselves to household chores. Consequently, for Averroes, by losing their abilities, they cause the impoverishment of societies because of living as a weed and they are represented as a burden in the family. Averroes says that women's education is obligatory like men and that they should be wise people. In social work, women should be directed towards jobs that are in their own power even though they represent weak power, while men should leave their jobs to women in which they are less talented than women and they are not capable. Averroes gave an example

¹⁰ Averroes. *aḍ-Ḍarūrī fī as-Siyāsa: Mukhtaṣar Kitāb as-Siyāsa li-Aflāṭūn*, trans. Aḥmad Shehlān (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdat al-'Arabiyya, 1998), I.

of music, for the composition of the music made by the man and read by the woman. Averroes introduces examples of animals in particular, indicating that people are like animals and that people can do the same work with the male and female. But they should do so according to their size, their grade and intelligence in their social work.

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Book Review

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Moses Maimonides (d.1204) is a Jewish religious scholar, philosopher and physician. He was born on March 30, 1135, in Cordoba, Spain. In the Islamic literature, he was called as Mūsā bin Maymūn or shortly Ibn Maymūn. He is known to English speakers as Maimonides and Hebrew speakers as Rambam (abbreviation of Rabbi Mōsheh bēn Maymūn). In the Jewish history, he was accepted as the greatest Jewish philosopher of the medieval period and his works have been still widely read today.

Maimonides' famous work *Mishneh Torah*, which was given a commentary on Talmud (Jewish Lawbook) and later named as *Yad ha-Hazaka* (The Mighty Hand),¹ was completed in 1180 after a work that lasted ten years and it is the only work of the author that he wrote in Hebrew. Maimonides, although this work is mainly based on the Babylonian Talmud, he also benefited from the Jerusalem Talmud and other Jewish religious literature. He has pioneered the writing of new books in the field of Jewish law, which was an example of similar works with its unique style. However, from the period of the author of this work, which has aroused wide interest in the Jewish world, there were also strong reactions against his work *Mishneh Torah*.

¹ Hebrew word *yad*, is the numerical equivalent of fourteen. Thus *Mishneh Torah* is actually divided into fourteen booklets (volumes).

Mishneh Torah, his fourteen-volume work of Jewish law (Halakha),² took him to the leading rabbinic authority of his time or better to say that in all of the Jewish history. Maimonides gave this name to *Mishneh Torah* (it means the Second Torah) and advised an ordinary Jew to begin this work after the Torah reading. In his introduction of the book, he says, “One should read the written Torah and then read *Mishneh Torah*. Then he will know the Oral Torah in its entirety, without needing to read any other text besides.” Thus, he aimed to be reached Jewish culture by the public easily, who are far from the Talmud's voluminous books and its commentaries.

Mishneh Torah is divided into fourteen booklets. The first one is the Book of Knowledge that describes the fundamentals of the Torah and the nature of Jewish life which must follow all Jews in every step of their lives. Then it goes to prayer and daily rituals that lead every Jew closer to his God (The Book of Love). The third section is the Book of Times that examines Jewish festivals. Then it moves to marriage and the Jewish family matters (the Book of Women). To protect the person from diving into the materialistic world, Maimonides suggests getting away from the world and seclusion from the world (asceticism) in the Book of Holiness and the Book of Vows. In the Book of Seeds, he describes the laws related to agriculture and calculate Jubilee year. The second half of his work is related to the national administration of the Jews. The Book of Sacrifices starts with the Temple and the ritual of public sacrifices and then moves to the cleaning of body and etc. (the Book of Purity). And the next one is about the laws of damages (the Book of Torts). The other section (the Book of Acquisitions) reviews trade laws. The Book of Justice examines leasing, credit and lending issues. The final section, the Book of Judges, tells two vital institutions for the nation of Israel; monarchy and the Sanhedrin. The book ends with the longing of the Messianic Era that occupies an important role in Jewish life.

² In Judaism, it is accepted as the living body of beliefs and practices that include morals and rituals.

Although *Mishneh Torah* is generally related to Halaka, its philosophical aspects are also remarkable. However, the author's philosophical interpretations and rationalist ideas have been interspersed in various parts of the work. In these chapters, the author tries to rationalize the view of the Jewish people who do not have sufficient knowledge in religion and ethics, to reveal the ultimate religious meaning in human actions and pursue wisdom (hokmah) and to stay away from strict literal approaches that he sees them equivalent with ignorance. According to him, a man should dedicate one-third of his educational life to Mikre (reading and seeking knowledge), one third to Mishnah, one third to learning Talmud. To bring wisdom forward and go after it, it is necessary for religious perfection and it is a vital gain for humans.

Maimonides makes a philosophy of history in *Mishneh Torah* as well. According to him, the three phases of the history of humanity's belief draw attention:

- (1) The emergence and development of paganism.
- (2) Abraham's opposition to his pagan society.
- (3) Selecting and sending of Moses and giving Torah.

Thus, he evaluates the abandonment of God's faith, in other words, to shift into idolatry as a human fault in the form of worship.

Maimonides has been influenced by the ideas of Muslim philosophers because he was living with a Muslim environment. Same as in Islamic philosophy, and in particular in Ibn Rushd's opinions, Maimonides emphasized that there were two separate paths of the truth; one for the intellectuals and the other one for the ordinary people. According to this, intellectuals should use the process of interpretation (observation) that reconcile mind and religion. Maimonides thinks that religion and philosophy can be reconciled and implies in all his works that such a peace is possible. He states that we must determine the wisdom and reasons of religious orders as much as we can and to understand

the relations between these orders and their relations with the principles of faith.

As a result, Maimonides saw philosophy as an instrument for the religious experience otherwise it is not possible to reach the peaks of the love of God. That is why he emphasized great importance to study philosophy, even according to him, studying philosophy is a religious duty like studying of Torah. Therefore, without philosophy, knowing, loving and fearing of God is not possible. Based on this, in early volumes of *Mishneh Torah*, he described God in a philosophical way in terms of essence and existence.

With all these features of Mishne Tora is a unique work. it is difficult to find such rabbinic literature in the Jewish tradition that is the systematizing system of the Talmud without neglecting philosophy.



Hasan Akkanat, *Universals in Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy [Klasik Dönem İslam Felsefesinde Tümmeller]* (Adana: Karahan Yayinlari, 2016), 498 pp.

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Book Review

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This book, *Universal in Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy (An Analysis in the Axis of Avicenna)*, was written to analyze the extent of the influence of Aristotelian methodology on almost all disciplines, especially in logic, theology and law, which have emerged in the Islamic world since the tenth century. The author, in its preface to the book, especially thanks to James Richard Davis, the author of the book, *Aristotle on the Relationship of Perception and Thought*, which contributed greatly to the formation of the framework and conceptual scheme of this Book.

The problem of the universals is one of the most central issues in the history of philosophy. Particularly, it constitutes the basic reference of all subjects related to the 'knowledge' of Medieval Philosophy. The main references for this problem can be listed as follows: First, Aristotle and Aleksandros's psychology and universal doctrines; second, the theories of self and reason of classical psychology; third, the concepts, definitions, propositions and syllogism theories of classical logic; fourth, quality, quantity, status, relevance and ownership categories; fifth, the first principles of metaphysics; sixth, discussions of divine and human knowledge; seventh, the universal status of moral principles. (p. 9).

According to Akkanat's argument, the Aristotelian science paradigm forms the general framework of the middle ages Islam-

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ic philosophy. The main interest of this study, which is shaped within this framework, is the metaphysical universal. Metaphysics is a top discipline. Because, on the one hand, it explores divine issues in terms of its subject; on the other hand it dictates its principles to the sub-sciences. In addition, it identifies the principles, topics and areas of research of other disciplines and examines the common concepts that these disciplines will use in their research under the heading of 'general concepts' (el-umûru'l-âmmeh). The universal is directly related to the mental concepts used in all disciplines as well as to the particular entities that most of the sciences are working on. This relationship network has an irresistible relationship with other networks when Aristotelian systematic is mentioned, and minds who want to know things must use Aristotelian methodology. (p. 13)

Before discussing the subject of universals, the author emphasizes that the philosophy used in the name of Islamic philosophy in the classical period does not have the same meaning as the philosophy used today. According to him, the concept of philosophy used in that period corresponds to science in today's terminology. "For example, as the philosophers distribute the religious sciences to various units under the word of philosophy, religious sciences are now distributed to various units under the word of social sciences. Science is a superstructure, and the name of this superstructure is the philosophy at that time." (p. 16)

After this expression which is an introduction to Akkanat's work, we can give information about the content and scope of the work. The work consists of two parts. The first chapter is entitled Aristotelian Psychology and Universals. The second part is the title of Psychology and Universals in the Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy. In both chapters, psychological and epistemological progress was followed under similar headings in the formation of knowledge. In the second part, the problem of universals has been analyzed by taking Avicenna center.

According to this, in classical/rational psychology consisting of Aristotelian theses, the senses and mind are examined in terms of being the epistemological tools that can eliminate the curiosity of human, not from medical and biological perspectives. The process which begins from singular objects in the ex-

ternal world and progresses until they emerge as a concept or as a principle form the basic research area of Aristotelian psychology. The last lines of the Posterior Analytics contain adequate and sufficient arguments for this process: "... memory comes from the senses and experience comes from memory (from the accumulation of memories about the same thing). Because a single experience consists of many memories. It is the principle of art or knowledge from the whole universal (that is, one and the same in most of all things) that is based on experience or soul. (Art deals with the things that happen, what knowledge is, what it is.) So neither these forms come to us in a certain form innate nor are they more cognitive than other situations." (p. 24.)

Aristotle's approach to abstraction on universals is important in terms of determining a general framework. In summary, there are many objects similar to each other, these objects come with an external sensation to reach a certain multiplicity in the inner sensation and this multiplicity into a single understanding with various mental activities in mind constitutes the basic conditions for creating a holistic meaning. Aristotle explains this by analogy to a defensive strategy developed by a military unit that is subjected to a fierce attack. Accordingly, the remaining soldiers in the defenses are placed individually against the enemy. Aristotle likens it to the fact that each of the singulars creates a universal meaning in the mind through our senses. The soldiers here represent singular objects. However, when these soldiers form a pure side by side, instead of seeing them as individual soldiers, we speak of a general meaning that they create. (pp. 26-27)

Although Islamic philosophers adhere to Aristotelian psychology and doctrine of universals, they have revealed many new and original views on these issues. Akkanat deals with the original ideas developed by Islamic philosophers on these issues under three headings. The first is the originality of the inner senses. Avicenna has added the inner senses to the imagination ability and the fantasy. In this respect, he argued that apart from Aristotle, active intellect showed the universals in singular forms to material Intellect through imagination ability. In addition, Al-Farabi and Avicenna built the prophetic status on a trilateral relationship, which is ensured by the coordination of active intel-

lect, human intellect and imagination. The prophets also have practical knowledge in conjunction with the theoretical, and again have both the divine field and the singular knowledge of the past and the future.

The second original analysis of Islamic philosophers has been about intellects. Avicenna added to his theory of Aristotelian intellects the intellect, which was in the capacity as a function. He determined this function to differentiate the active intellect effect on human intellect in two ways. Accordingly, if active intellect influences material intellect to give the first principles or the first intelligible, intellect is created in the capacity. If he acts to show the universal meanings of forms, the actual intellect is revealed. As it is to be remembered, Aristotle suggested that the first principles were derived from the outside world by induction. In fact, both Al-Farabi and Avicenna established the working principle of the mind in medieval psychology, and they established a very strong basis for them. (p. 485)

Another thesis of Islamic philosophers about intellects is about acquired intellect. Aristotle did not set an ability to keep intelligible and suggested that the mind should, again and again, abstract everything that he wanted to think. Because according to him, the material can only accept one form. Since the two forms cannot appear at the same time in the material, they will not be able to think of both ideas at the same time. Although this point of view was based on the Alexandrian texts, the Islamic philosophers tried to overcome this problem with acquired intellect. Acquired intellect contains not only each of the universal meanings but also the proposition groups that are compounded from several meanings. Thus, both theoretical and practical reason can think of them as they wish. (p. 486)

The third of the original analysis of Islamic philosophers and perhaps the first order in the context of the problem of universals are the intelligible meanings. On the one hand, Aristotle argued that the meanings in the mind are universal, and on the other hand, it is a meaning that comes from many singularities. However, he did not give any explanation about the structure and condition of a meaning that came to mind for the first time. If the first thing that comes to mind is singular, it is not possible to have it in mind. If it occurs in the mind, it is not yet universal,

so it is not intelligible. If experiences are made up of many memories, then experiences must be naive universals. However, Aristotle says that intelligible meaning only appears in the mind. So what is the structure and nature of this first meaning? Al-Farabi and Avicenna say that the meanings that come to mind from the outside world are singular meanings and judgments. They are not yet universal; therefore they cannot be the subject of science. At this stage, Avicenna makes them subject to a dual assessment. All the meanings, substantial and accidental species. Hence, in our minds, firstly, species-specific meanings begin to form. (p. 486)

Meanings are subject to three evaluations according to the existence and ways of being. The fields of existence are the divinity, the external world, and the human mind. Before it exists in the outer world and in the mind, the meaning of all singulars and universals exists in God. These occur in the human mind with the sensation, after they occur in the outside world with various causes. The issue of universality is also related to the meanings of the mental existence style. The universal meanings that exist in the mind are dealt with in three parts as natural, logical and mental. Natural is the meaning we have gained from the outside world. Logical is a genus, species, distinction, characteristic and general accident. Intellectual is the universal meaning that is compounded from natural and logical. (p. 487)

At this stage, the problem arises as to what is 'universal' or 'universal meaning'. Avicenna's second resolution on intelligible is that he interpreted the condition of 'many things' in a highly original manner. Aristotle stipulated the existence of multiple carriers in the external world. This, however, requires a situation that occurs after sensation. In other words, if we obtain from other singular singulars that we have derived from singulars, or if we can load many singular singularities that are actually actual, the meaning can be universal. In other words, if we derive a meaning from the singulars that we obtain from other existing singulars, or if we upload it to many actual singulars, the meaning can be universal. Such an argument leaves two questions unanswered. If the universals have necessarily the actual carriers in the external world, then will the meanings that we have only built in our minds and which are not directly outside the

carrier, such as propositions and syllogisms, will not be considered universal? While God knows everything and the vastness he knows is not in the outside world yet, what is it that he really knows? In order to overcome these two problems, Avicenna had to reinterpret the very expression of the Aristotelian universal. He reserves the expression, ‘many things’ in the definition. On the other hand, he divides the plurality into three groups in terms of his actual presence in the outside world, his existence in terms of possibility, and his absence. A meaning fictionalized by the universals of the mind - because it is already constructed with universals - is universal only, and it is not obligatory to exist in the outside world. Sometimes meaning can be loaded with more than one singular. God knows the whole universe and its contents with their own attributes, and when it forms such a universe, the universe and its components are fully compatible with it. We see here that Avicenna developed scientific arguments in accordance with religious thought or made the requirements of religious thought compatible with scientific propositions. (pp. 487-488)

Avicenna's third analysis on intelligible is about the existence of universals in the external world. Universals are universally absent in the outside world. They exist in the style of existence in accordance with the conditions of the outside world. Therefore, there is no humanity in the outside world; there are people established with humanity. That means that the universals are preceded by singularities in the outside world. However, such a situation does not mean that there existed universals in the outside world, and then that singulars occurred in these universals. It is the causality that establishes singulars in the outside world and they exist in the universal meanings. The universals are the meanings that exist in divine knowledge.

“It seems that the Muslim philosophers, on the one hand, subjected the scientific texts of their period to a qualified reading, identified problems, analyzed them and had long debates on them. On the other hand, they tried to reflect their basic sensitivities to the scientific thinking they inherited with logical forms. The scientific thought they elaborated was discussed in many respects, but when it was taken from the medieval science paradigm, it crossed both Aristotle and Alexander.” (p. 488)