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DEDICATION

This issue of Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review has been dedicated to Hubert L. Dreyfus who is one of the laborers to come out and who would be a member of the advisory committee, a valuable philosopher giving us all kinds of support. We lost him this year, we are so sorry. May sleep in the light.



Some Remarks on Averroes' *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* Book Alpha Meizon

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Research Article

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Abstract: Averroes, considered to be the greatest Aristotelian commentator in the Middle Ages, has written three different types of commentary on almost all the works of this great philosopher: short, middle and long. These commentaries have been translated into Latin and Hebrew in the early period, and profoundly influenced both Medieval Europe and Jewish thought for centuries. The effect of Averroes in the West was to spread the whole of Europe under the name of Latin Averroism. The text what you have consists of some remarks about the translation of the commentary on the 'Book Alpha Meizon', the second book of Averroes' *Tafsīr Mā Ba'd at-Ṭabī'a*.

Keywords: Aristotle, Averroes, *Metaphysics*, Long Commentary, the Book Alpha Meizon, linguistical aporias, conception.

Introduction

This paper aims at explaining about the commentary on the ‘Book Alpha Meizon’, the second (in original Greek, first) book of Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*.¹ The only Arabic manuscript of the work is found in the Leiden University Library.² The Arabic text of the ‘Book Alpha Meizon’ used by Averroes has been translated by Naẓīf b. Yumn (second half of the tenth century). This book begins from A.5, 987a6, that is, at the end of Section 5. Neither does the translation of the first five sections of this book nor the commentaries written on them find. Besides, there are no missing parts of the great commentary in the Latin and Hebrew translations. Walzer held that the beginning of the Book Alpha Meizon was no longer available in twelfth-century Spain.³ According to Bertolacci, Naẓīf’s translation was to complete probably missing in Ustāt’s translation.⁴ When Ibn al-Nadīm narrated the men who translated philosophical works of Aristotle into Arabic, he did not mention Naẓīf’s translation.⁵

¹ Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1990). Expressions in the work such as [T] and [C] that are located in the translation are made up of the first letters of the Latin terms ‘Textus’ and ‘Commentus’, and are set by Maurice Bouyges. The first of them points to the Arabic text of *Metaphysics* and the latter to Averroes’ comments. It was used symbols like [a], [b], [c] and so on for Averroes’ citation to Aristotle, and [A] to refer to the relevant part of the ‘Book Alpha Meizon’. Expression [987a...] have been sent to numbering in the text of Aristotle made by Immanuel Bekker.

² *MS Leiden*, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 2074. For presentation to MSS, see Maurice Bouyges, “Notice”, Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, xxvii ff.

³ Richard Walzer, “On the Arabic Versions of Books A, α and Λ of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), 217.

⁴ Amos Bertolacci, “On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 249; Bouyges, “Notice”, lvi. Related to the ‘Book Alpha Meizon’, see Bertolacci, “On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”, 253ff.; Bertolacci, “The Arabic Version of the Book Alpha Meizon of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and the Testimony of MS. Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. Lat. 2048”, *Les Traducteurs au Travail. Leur Manuscrits et Leur Méthodes*, ed. J. Hamesse (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2001), 173ff.; Walzer, “On the Arabic Versions of Books A, α and Λ of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”, 217ff.

⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. Gustav Flügel (Leipzig: Verlag von FCV Vogel, 1872), I 244 and II 109.

1. Averroes' *Tafsīr* and the Book Alpha Meizon

Arabic *Metaphysics* (ما بعد الطبيعة) begins with the Book Alpha Elatton (مقالة الألف الصغرى) instead of the Book Alpha Meizon (مقالة الألف الكبرى). The first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is attributed to Theophrastus by Albert the Great. He claimed that the statement "All men by nature desire to know"⁶ at the beginning of *Metaphysics* did belong to Theophrastus and this book was not crucial in Arabic translation, as exemplified al-Fārābī for this.⁷ Albert's thesis does not include any evidence; on the contrary, the most works on *Metaphysics* in Arabic philosophical tradition mention either the Book Alpha Meizon or its content. Furthermore, Theophrastus' metaphysical work is available in Greek, Arabic and Latin,⁸ and when we compare it with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, it seems that this cannot belong to Theophrastus. Thereinafter we are going to discuss this by quoting passages from Avicenna and al-Shahrastānī. Also, it shows us that *The Book on the Science of Metaphysics* by Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī opposed to this claim.⁹

The subject of generation and corruption is frequently

⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, trans. David Ross, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-52), VIII, A.1, 980a21.

⁷ Albert the Great, *Analytica Posteriora*, ed. Augusti Borgnet, *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1890), I,t2, II 22. In his treatise al-Fārābī does not mention the Book Alpha Meizon. This is because al-Fārābī probably had not a translation of this book. See al-Fārābī, *Fī Aghrāḍ al-Ḥakīm fī Kullī Maqāla min al-Kitāb al-Mawsūm bi al-Ḥurūf*, ed. Friedrich Dieterici, *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1890), 36.

⁸ Dimitri Gutas published it including in Greek text and Medieval Arabic translation, English translations of Greek and Arabic texts with introduction, commentaries and glossaries, as well as the Medieval Latin translation, and with an excursus on Graeco-Arabic technique. Theophrastus, *On First Philosophy (Known as His Metaphysics)*, ed. and trans. Dimitri Gutas (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

⁹ For the commentary on the Book Alpha Meizon, see Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb fī 'Ilm Mā Ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a*, ed. Angelika Neuwirth, *Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī Bearbeitung von Buch Lambda der Aristotelischen Metaphysik* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1976), 97-100. Also for Arabic *Metaphysics* and Abdallaṭīf al-Baghdādī's metaphysical work, see Cecilia Martini Bonadeo, 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī's Philosophical Journey: From Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to the 'Metaphysical Science' (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013).

emphasized in the Book Alpha Meizon. Even though Aristotle argues that this subject belongs to natural science, he covers this issue in his *Metaphysics* because Ancient Greek natural philosophers made subject ‘things that come-to-be and pass-away’ for metaphysics. Whereas coming-to-be and passing-away represent potentiality, metaphysics does actuality.¹⁰ For Aristotle, there is a big difference between being ‘potential’ (δυναμεις / بالقوة) and being ‘actual’ (ἐνεργεια / بالفعل). According to him, while the actual is what comes-to-be and passes-away, the potential is not.

It is necessary to be coming-to-be for a passing-away, and also for coming-to-be an act, namely motion. For this reason, while the matter is potential in itself, the things that come-to-be from the matter are the actual. Because, as Avicenna points out, something is not the potential in every respect, that is, there is no potency for what is impossible to be actual.¹¹ For Aristotle, actuality is more superior qualification than potentiality, because potentiality makes possible ‘not being’ at the same time. However, since the actual always represents the existent, and since eternality and necessity require to actuality, the actuality regarding Aristotle already holds itself to be potential in itself. According to him, actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially.¹²

Aristotle says that Empedocles’ views of ‘love’ (φιλία / محبة) and ‘hate’ (νεῖκος / عداوة) are less contradictory than other philosophers in regards to reasons and principles.¹³ Empedocles put to love and hate the four elements and tried to explain coming-to-be and passing-away of beings in the universe by mingling and

¹⁰ Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, C.1a, I 56.

¹¹ Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitāb ash-Shifā’*, ed. Ḥasanẓādah al-Āmulī (Qum: Maktab al-Ilām al-Islāmī, 1997-8), 189. See *as-Simā’ at-Ṭabī’i*, ed. Muhittin Macit and Ferruh Özpılavcı (Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2004-5), I 99.

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, Θ.8, 1050b6-8. For an exhaustive explanation, see David Ross, *Aristotle* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 183-5.

¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, B.4, 1000b12-7; Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, C.15t, I 256.

alteration of these elements. Aristotle mentions in his *On Generation and Corruption* that Empedocles does not accept any form of coming-to-be and passing-away except for mingling and alteration of the elements.¹⁴ Birth and death also occur in that way.

Averroes uses the word 'muthul' (مثل), commonly used in Arabic in acknowledgment of Greek 'forms' (εἶδος / ἰδέα), in the sense of 'prototypes', and suggests the term 'şuwar' (صور) for Plato's forms. Averroes knows that Plato used mathematical things borrowed from Pythagoreans as an intermediate entity between the ideal world and the real world, and makes a distinction between forms and mathematical objects. It is also seen that the same sensitivity is observed in Latin translation and that the word 'forma' was used instead of forms and 'exemplaria' instead of prototypes.¹⁵

2. Some Linguistical Aporias in the Book Alpha Meizon

Translations made in the early period had problems linguistically. Since the Greek philosophical concepts have not yet formed in Arabic, translations were carried out in ordinary language, and sometimes the usage of this terminology caused to some mistakes. For this reason, in some translations, Greek concepts were transferred to Arabic as they are and Arabicized. For instance, in the first translations made from Greek into the Arabic language, the term 'element' was translated into Arabic as 'uṣṭukus' (أسطقس) instead of 'unṣur' (عنصر) in the form of the Greek word 'stoikheos' (στοιχείος).

By the term 'scientific philosophy' (الفلسفة العلمية), Averroes refers to the manner of 'apodictic' / 'burhānī' (ἀπόδεικτική / برهانی) based on clear evidence. In Latin, it was used 'philosophia

¹⁴ Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, trans. H. H. Joachim, *The Works of Aristotle*, II, 314b5-15.

¹⁵ *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in Eosdem Commentariis*, trans. Michael Scot, *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. VIII (Venetiis: Apud Iunctas, 1562), T.50, 27G.

speculatia' correctly.¹⁶ Again, the term 'forms' (εἶδη) in Greek is translated into Arabic as 'anwā' (أنواع), which means 'species'. Although this translation is sometimes accurate, it can cause wrongness in some places. Much as the Arabic translation used the predicate 'genus' for Plato's *Form of the Good* and 'species' for other forms, because of participating from that Form and coming under it for each of them, this distinguishing based upon the genus-species distinction in the logic cause not to be understood. Again, Averroes uses the expression 'mathematical species' (الأنواع التعليمية) instead of 'mathematical objects' (τὰ μαθηματικά). Regarding this passage, Avicenna's expression 'mathematical things' (الأمور التعليمية) states the matter more accurately.¹⁷

Arabic translation of *Metaphysics* used by Averroes is not a variance with Aristotle's text sometimes. For example, the name Cratylus in the original text, who is the teacher and friend of Plato, was mistakenly written Democritus in Arabic translation.¹⁸ Passages quoted by al-Shahrastānī are correctly called Cratylus.¹⁹ Again, regarding Socrates, it is stated that he is not interested in the universals. In Aristotle's text, however, it is mentioned that Socrates seeks after the universals in ethical matters.²⁰ Averroes, on the other hand, in his *Short Commentary on the Metaphysics* says that in the time of Socrates, philosophers maintained that

¹⁶ *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in Eosdem Commentariis*, T.5, 7F. For Aristotle's theory of demonstration, see Ali Tekin, *Varlık ve Akıl: Aristoteles ve Fârâbî'de Burhan Teorisi* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2017).

¹⁷ Averroes, *Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Ṭabî'a*, C.6g, I 69; Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyyât min Kitâb ash-Shifâ'*, 320. See also Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", 262.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, A.6, 987a33. Averroes, *Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Ṭabî'a*, T.5, I 63.

¹⁹ Al-Shahrastānī, *Kitâb al-Milal wa an-Nihâl*, ed. William Cureton (London: The Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts, 1842-6), II 288. For a comparative table of the copies of al-Shahrastānī and Naẓîf with the original text, see Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", 264-6.

²⁰ "Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions." Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, A.6, 987b1-4.

there were eternal and universal intelligible and taught that they existed outside the soul in the same way as they existed in the soul, yet simultaneously they maintained that these intelligible were the principles of sensible substance.²¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias said that Socrates occupied himself with ethical questions and seeking the universal, he paid no attention to natural things, but he was the first to concern himself with definitions.²² Thomas Aquinas remarked that Socrates was unwilling to make any investigation into the nature of physical things, but only busied himself with moral matters. And in this field, he first began to investigate what the universal is, and to insist upon the need for definition.²³ Suárez claimed that Socrates applied “what things there are above us, don’t matter to us”. And he would also counsel “search not things higher than yourself”.²⁴

One of the greatest fault in the translation is to translate the ‘earliest philosophy’ (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) at the end of the Book Alpha Meizon as the ‘first philosophy’ (الفلسفة الأولى) namely metaphysics. Aristotle here means the natural philosophy in the early period, but the translator, Naẓīf b. Yumn, misunderstands this conception, afterward, the translator mistranslates the statement onward.²⁵ Accordingly, this leded Averroes to make a misleading comment. But Averroes could not take care of the use of the term ‘first philosophy’ that Aristotle gave the name of ancient philosophy worked by the first philosophers or physicians. It is bizarre for a philosopher like Averroes to be deceived

²¹ Averroes, *Talkhīṣ Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, ed. ‘Uthmān Amīn (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1958), 51. Also for English translation, see *On Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”: An Annotated Translation of the So-Called Epitome*, trans. Rüdiger Arnzen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 70.

²² Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1*, trans. W. E. Dooley (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.

²³ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), I 1.10.152.

²⁴ Francisco Suárez, *A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics or A Most Ample Index to the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 1.q19, 29.

²⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, A.10, 993a15. Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, T.50, I 160.

to such a translation, although he knows Presocratic philosophers could not improve on the material cause. Averroes repeated this kind of misconceptions in the “Proemium” to the ‘Book Lambda’, by explaining the book names of Metaphysics, such as used the ‘Book Iota’ (Yā’) instead of the ‘Book Kappa’ (Kāf).²⁶

3. Sample Passages Concerning the Subject

3.1. Some concepts from Averroes’ commentaries on the *Metaphysics* (Arabic and English)

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.1a, I
55

لما كانت القدماء الأول من الطبيعيين قد اتفقوا على أن المبدأ لجميع المتكونات واحد من الأسطقات الأربع، فبعضهم كان يضع أنه النار، وبعض أنه الهواء، وبعض أنه الماء، ما عدا الأرض.

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.1a, I
56

وإنما قال “...كأنه نوع هيولى...” لأن الهيولى بالقوة وهذه بالفعل، ولأن الهيولى بالحقيقة هي التي لا تكون ولا تفسد، وكل واحد من هذه كائن فاسد، وهؤلاء لم يشعروا من الأسباب إلا بالسبب الذي على طريق الهيولى.

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.6a, I
66-7

اعتقد أن المعاني التي توجد لأشخاص نوع نوع واحدة بعينها، وهي حدود الأشياء هي أمور

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.1a, I
55

Since the first ancients of the naturalists had agreed that the principle of all the existents was one of the four elements, some of them used to put it as fire, some as air, and some as water, except the earth.

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.1a, I
56

He said “...like the material species...”, since the matter is potential while these [principles] are actual, and since yet the matter, in fact, does not come-to-be and pass-away while each of these [principles] come-to-be and pass-away. They did not comprehend causes except for material cause.

Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a, C.6a, I
66-7

He believed that the meanings singly existed for individuals of

²⁶ Averroes, *Tafsīr Mā Ba’d at-Ṭabī’a*, III Proe., 1393-1405.

ضرورية خارج النفس، وسماها صورا ومثلا أي هي صور للأشياء المحسوسة ومثل للطبيعة.

Talkhīṣ Mā Ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a, 51

فلما كان في زمن سقراط ورأوا أن ههنا معقولات أزلية، قالوا بوجودها خارج النفس على الجهة التي هي عليها في النفس، ورأوا أنها مع ذلك مبادئ الجوهر المحسوس.

each species are the same, and they are the definitions of things outside the soul necessarily and called them forms and examples, that is, they are forms of the sensible things and examples of nature.

Talkhīṣ Mā Ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a, 51

In the time of Socrates, they maintained that there are eternal intelligible and held that their beings are outside the soul in the same way as they exist in the soul, yet simultaneously they maintained that these are the principles of sensible substance.

3.2. Comparison of Ross' translation of *Metaphysics* with Naẓīf's Arabic translation (incorrect translations)

Metaphysics, 987a29-b2 (Naẓīf)

[Tafsīr Mā Ba'd aṭ-Ṭabī'a, T.5]

After the systems aforementioned existed the philosophy of Plato, whose philosophy was following those [philosophers] in most respects, but in some, his philosophy was agreeing on the Italians. The first thing that occurred after Democritus was the views of Heraclitean philosophers about the fact that all the other things have a constant flux and there is no knowledge about them; these opinions he held even later. As for Socrates, he spoke of only ethical matters, not something of the uni-

Metaphysics, 987a29-b4 (Ross)

[The Works of Aristotle, VIII]

After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the

versal nature...

[In Arabic translation b3-4 is missing]

Metaphysics, 987b14-6 (Nazîf)

[Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a, T.6]

But they disputed about the sensible things and the mathematical species, saying of the latter that they are intermediate between those things. Some of the sensible things are permanent and non-moving, the species that [pradicate] to many things. The species is that thing existed for each thing.

Metaphysics, 988a8-15 (Nazîf)

[Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a, T.9]

He has used two causes that of the essence of a thing and the material cause. The species are the cause of essence of all other things. As for the species, [their cause is] the one; and what the matter is of which the species are predicated on them, and of which is asserted in the species. For the essence of the dyad is great and small. Again, he has assigned the cause of the good and the praised to the elements, one to each other. Those are what we said in the investigation actualized about the firsts.

world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions.

Metaphysics, 987b14-6 (Ross)

[The Works of Aristotle, VIII]

Further, besides sensible things and forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from forms in that there are many alike, while the form itself is in each case unique.

Metaphysics, 988a8-15 (Ross)

[The Works of Aristotle, VIII]

He has used only two causes, that of the essence and the material cause (for the forms are the causes of the essence of all other things, and the one is the cause of the essence of the forms); and it is evident what the underlying matter is, of which the forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the one in the case of forms, viz. that this is a dyad, the great and the small. Further, he has assigned the cause of good and that of evil to the elements, one to each of the two, as we say some of his predecessors sought to do.

Metaphysics*, 993a15-6 (Nazîf)*[*Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a*, T.50]**

It is worth for the first philosophy to investigate the view of all things because it contains to all principles and on what the first is.

Metaphysics*, 993a15-6 (Ross)*[*The Works of Aristotle*, VIII]**

For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lips, since it is young and in its beginnings.

3.3. Comparison of Averroes' *Tafsîr* with other books (Averroes vs. Avicenna and al-Shahrastānî)

Averroes, *Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a*, C.31d, I 125

He means that the substances of this separated forms are not one of the substances of these sensible things. Because, those [forms] are the eternal, while these [sensible things] come-to-be and pass-away. Thus, it is not possible to be reasons for them, neither have the forms nor the efficient causes.

Averroes, *Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a*, C.6g, I 69

Some people opposed to the Heraclitean doubt that disappearance of knowledge about sensible things and things in the sensible that are the mathematicals.

***Metaphysics*, 987a32-b2 (Nazîf)**
[*Tafsîr Mâ Ba'd at-Tabî'a*, T.5]

The first thing that occurred after Democritus was the views of Heraclitean philosophers about the fact that all the other things have a constant flux and there is no

Avicenna, *al-Ilâhiyyât min Kitâb ash-Shifâ'*, IV.3, 189

As for the particular things which comes-to-be and passes-away, on what they said, the potency in them is before the action in time; and as for the universal or eternal things that do not pass-away, if particular, they do not advance potential things at all.

Avicenna, *al-Ilâhiyyât min Kitâb ash-Shifâ'*, VII.2, 321

As for the mathematicals, in his opinion, they are the meanings between the forms and the material things.

al-Shahrastānî, *Kitâb al-Milal wa an-Nihâl*, II 288

Aristotle, in the Treatise Alpha Meizon of the Book *Metaphysics* reported that Plato frequented Cratylus during his youth, and wrote down at his dictation what

knowledge about them; these opinions he held even later. As for Socrates, he spoke of only ethical matters, not something of the universal nature...

[In Arabic translation b3-4 is missing]

he related from Heraclitus namely that all the sensible things are corruptible, and knowledge does not embrace them. Then, after him, he frequented Socrates, whose doctrine was to seek definitions without investigating the nature of sensible and other things.

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E



Idealistic Groundwork for Plato's Philosophy of Education *

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Research Article

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Abstract: There are some terms which should be defined conceptually in the philosophy of values, such that they show us the quality of value judgments. As we have already pointed out, we have to start thinking about values with the essence of ethical concepts, and it is possible for us to create a norm of politics or law through these concepts. The *Good* as the basic concept of morality is the most comprehensive term that describes the reason for being in existence. Because questioning what good is will provide us to make judgments about what is the meaning of all life.

Keywords: Plato, forms, the allegory of the cave, education, idealism, three-piece spirit understanding.

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Introduction

Since each scientific field reflects itself in the area of morality, it is correct to speak of life in the guise of morality, and accordingly an education. The knowledge of the judges about what is good in both the being and the knowledge theory leads us to a methodological understanding of how training should be done. Beliefs and wits, that is, all kinds of judgments of existence, conclude the morality of all these vital items matured with education. Morality is an essential building block that ends in itself other intellectual activities as the fruit of the system of all beings. It is crucial earning the materials of this building stone with proper training. In this article, we will try to deal with the theory of the ideals that constitute the root of Plato's educational understanding, how he shapes himself, and how dangerous and incomplete and somewhat dangerous the philosophy of Platonist education is regarding humanity. Plato's understanding of education presents an inner view through his philosophy of politics and law.

1. Plato's Idealist Philosophical Understanding

The human mind builds Plato's philosophy in an attempt to recall the innate concepts and to reach the knowledge of the mere reality called the idea. Given the question of what is in the Socratic dialectical method, the conception of the concept implies the comprehension of these concepts, that is, something conceptually grasped.¹ Plato, however, puts the Pythagorean spiritual teaching beside the concept, as he conceptually conceives something that he will not take the person to the real knowledge of that thing.

Plato tries to get out of the objects of mathematics that are in the mind of ideas and the Socrates concept of consensus, and that is in mind and go beyond the senses. It tends to shape its thinking by combining the influences from previous philosophies with

¹ Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), *Phaedrus* 265d.

Socrates' philosophy. Pythagoras attempts to create a new system of philosophy by adding Socratic dialectics to the ideas of unity and unity in the views of Elea and Heraclitus, which he adds to the doctrine of mathematical world and spirit immortality. Plato's theory of ideas emerges as a consequence of these forms of thought. This theory is most appropriately expressed in the seventh chapter of the *State*, which has become famous as a cave parable.²

The passage about the cave depicts people who have been shot in chains so that they cannot see their daylight. Behind them, a fire and a puppet show were arranged to look at the shadows reflecting the wall. People believe that the words on their tongue are in the shadows and that these shadows are the only reality. A man who survives a cave gradually adapts himself to the light of the world. First, he distinguishes shadows and reflections, then physical objects, and ultimately heavenly bodies and the sun. According to Plato, this is a climbing form. The man returning to the cave will not be accustomed to the darkness, and for some time the caves in the cave will not be as well diagnosed as other people. Then he will awaken a lot of anger by saying that the shadows are ridiculous and unreal and that the real reality is out there. If the people who were hit by the chain come from their hands, they will kill this man from the outside.³ "If you interpret the world as a cave dungeon, the light of fire to be the sun, and the upward journey towards poor faith, as the ascension of the soul into the mental world, you will not misunderstand me as I have explained it as you wish, only God knows it is true or false. But when my vision of good or bad ideas emerges at the end of everything and is only visible with an effort, it is the universal source of all beautiful and true things,

² For Plato's theory of forms, see İlyas Altuner, "Ontological Bases of the Universe in Plato's and Aristotle's Cosmologies", *Iğdır University Journal of Social Sciences* 3 (2013), 3-4.

³ *Republic* 514a-517a. For the explanation of this passage, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Ethikin Kısa Tarihi*, çev. Hakkı Hünler, Solmaz Zelyut Hünler (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2001), 53.

the father and master of this visible world, the mind and the reality in mental things source, and that is the power that must be fixed in the eye, whether it be in rational action, in either social or personal life."⁴

2. World Prison and Chain Training

By mentioning that all knowledge can be obtained through the recollection of the mind, Plato evaluates it in two distinct categories: the real world in which the rememberer is, and the ideal world in which he is remembered. The mind concentrates its attention on what is common to everything that is attributable to the entity, not to what is particular about things. Plato's idea, which takes the name of the concept in Aristotle, says: "Assuming that they have many common names, they have the same ideals."⁵ Ideals are not only the objects of rational thought but also the absolute reality at the same time. The ideals constitute the eternal and immortal world that exists on its own, and can only be grasped with the mind.⁶

Besides the immutability of ideas, everything that is real, that belongs to this world, is subject to a change and disappearance. According to Plato, nature (physis) or the universe, which is not realistic and therefore composed of entities that are grasped by feelings and desires, not reality, is a copy of the world of ideas. The existence of the world of objects is an illusion or blood, and the knowledge of the existence of the real is in the world of ideas, the place where the presence of existence exists.⁷ Ideals represent actual existence, essence, i.e., self. Something happens when the idea joins him.⁸

It is seen that ideals are reduced to a thing and are in opposition to many things. This unity comes from the immutability of

⁴ *Republic* 517a-b.

⁵ *Republic* 596a.

⁶ *Phaedrus* 247c

⁷ *Epinomis*, trans. Alfred Edward Taylor (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons 1956), 992b-d.

⁸ *Phaedo* 78d.

ideas and over the changing world. If an artist who does something does what he is doing, God does everything he does, by doing it by himself, by one principle, to possess one reality, and others from this one truth.⁹ In such a design it is seen that the beings of the entire objective world are not real, but a reflection of the real, that is the ideation. The representation of reality as an essence is related to the mind beyond the sensibility. Mental is the truth, and it is clear that reality is something beyond senses.¹⁰

Ideals correspond to an ontological understanding as seen above. Plato, however, uses ideas in a logical sense, in which the ideals have the function of giving the order to chaos in singular objects, of collecting similar ones under the universality, in managing in ideology, and in separating it from other universals.¹¹ In Plato's maturity works, this logical direction comes to the forefront. The appearance of this is not the transition from the ideal to the concepts, but from the concepts to the ideal. The ideal is a means of making things that give shape to objects in the world, and the forces that move them. The good idea in this sense will be the primary idea that moves everything and is the source of all your mind.¹² "Now, I will call you an idea that gives you the ability to know the reality and the wise to the known thing. It is the reason you must know that it is science and [it is] the subject of knowledge at the same time, so it is a reality."¹³

Plato tries to explain that the line-of-sight is separate from the world of idea and phenomenon. The line is divided horizontally into two, with the world of imagination and perception at the bottom, and the world of ideas, the mathematical things, and

⁹ *Republic* 596a-597d.

¹⁰ This idealistic thought design manifests itself in the philosophy of Hegel, an important representative of German idealism. Hegel, who also added Plato and Kant idealism to Descartes rationalism, stated that the rational is the rational and the rational is the rational and the rational. G. Wilhelm Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. S.W. Dyde (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), Preface.

¹¹ *Theaitetus* 185a-186e. Cf. *Cratylus* 440b.

¹² *Sophist* 247e-248c.

¹³ *Republic* 509a.

forms that are tightly connected to forms according to Plato. Because wise men know that the world of phenomena, which consists only of reflection, is a reflection of the ideals, they give importance to the things that give birth to them and try to reach its knowledge.

According to Plato, there are things in the ideology that the mind automatically embraces with its persuasive power. Mind assumptions are taken not as a principle, but as a hypothesis, that is, as a step, as a basis, and all the assumptions on all assumptions rise to the ideals. In doing so, no observer will resort to conceptual crossover, eventually reaching a grip again, which is a good idea. The mind uses this quadruple method to achieve good ideas: Blood, faith, deduction, and understanding. The latter is the highest point created by the knowledge of good ideas.¹⁴ When it perceives the world of spiritual sensation in the form of all kinds of learning, it is only by remembering this conception, the ideals world.¹⁵ Since God wants to compare the world to the most beautiful of all possible comprehension possibilities, and in every way the most perfect, he has created a single entity that encompasses all living beings in essence,¹⁶ which is no better than a good idea.

The theme of the immortality of the soul described in the last part of the state dialogue has brought Platon to the mind of the soul both before and after the creation, while Pythagorean presents a reflection of the idea of spiritual thought. Elsewhere it appears that this view is presented as a nuance of the idea of recalling an ideal in the spiritual mind.¹⁷ It is a situation that can be understood as a result of turning a face into a good way of life, a lifestyle that can be turned into a mental one. In such a case, it is emphasized that everything is not the human being, but God,

¹⁴ *Republic* 510a-511e.

¹⁵ *Meno* 81c.

¹⁶ *Timaeus* 30d.

¹⁷ *Phaedo* 79a vd.

who is the source of pure goodness.¹⁸ God here is synonymous with a Good Idea, and all ideas from God are also accepted.

3. The Three-Piece Spiritual Understanding and the Nature of Human Education

Plato tries to build a model of the state that meets all practical needs. Three states of citizenship are needed in this state: artisans and farmers who will attend the material needs of society, soldiers to defend the state, and managers who will organize the social life of the state. The aim of distinguishing the three classes here is a shift to suggest that three different classes are needed, each one performing its function.¹⁹ Plato relies on two passages for this transition, one is not right, and one is wrong. Entirely incorrect belief is that it is better for one person to get into a single job, and this form of work part is the best form in all possible circumstances. The belief that is false is that people need to be divided in nature to suit each of these functions. These views of Plato were reinforced by the three-part soul (psykhe) doctrine.²⁰

The arguments about the three-part soul are independent of the discussions about the three-part state. The presence of parts of the spirit is demonstrated by the fact that in Plato there is a conflict. If one wants to drink water because he is thirsty at the same time and if he does not want to drink because he doubts the state of water then at least two things we are burdening one wanting to drink and the other not wanting to drink because the same predicate can and can not be loaded on the same subject at the same time it has to exist. The rhetoric found at the base of this argument is that a person cannot simultaneously move both in a given direction and in the same sense that he or she can not do both and do not do it at the same time.

The shortcut to escape from Plato's argument is to say that

¹⁸ *Laws* 716d-e.

¹⁹ See *Republic* 423d.

²⁰ For a detailed explanation and interpretation of the three-piece spiritual understanding, see MacIntyre, *Ethik'in Kısa Tarihi*, 53ff.

man does not have the conflicting desires. He aspires not to get sick as human desire to go thirsty, and this water is only a contingent fact that both he will make his thirst and ill him. What this person wants is to drink this particular water, and the thing that he is afraid of is drinking the same water. Plato's definition of "incompatible desires"²¹ is justified in a sense, but none of the conclusions of Plato's assertion that they are incompatible exist. The reason for this is not the possibility of having both desires, but the possibility of satisfying these wants. Plato, as if the desire to drink the intellect, the danger born from drinking is an insight into the mind. However, we do not mind to drink, we learn it and use it in the mind while learning. It is our connection with our other, as well as possible different purposes, and our choices, whether or not a desire is based on reason. Plato indicates that the mind is always right and that there is a clear distinction between reason and appetites.

It is clear that Plato's Pythagorean influence on the issue of separation of an immortal soul, a prison or a grave, is evident. The division of spirit is not only between mind and appetite in the State; There is also a spiritual part which is not related to the standards of rational behavior and of the physical desires but of the rules of important practice and the anger and the resentment.

Plato believes that there are innate shoemakers and innate rulers. Justice in the state is a matter of everyone knowing their place. The courage from four traditional virtues belongs to the auxiliary guardian class, whose function is defense, and the wisdom belongs to the ruling guard class. Dimensionality is not a class, but a virtue of society as a whole. Because, in Plato's words, "the desires of the majority in the downward direction will be controlled by the aspirations and wisdom of a few at the top". Justice belongs not to any class or personal relation between types, but to society as a whole.

²¹ *Republic* 572b.

Justice in spirit is a matter of likeness of each part of the soul to fulfill its function which is peculiar to itself. An individual becomes courageous because he or she has the role of the wise and spiritual part because of the common mind. That is, the individual is measured if reason governs his or her downward bodily affairs. But the justice soul belongs not to this or this part or the parts of the soul but the holistic arrangement of the soul. Then two questions arise: who will be fair and how the just state will come to fruition. These items are asked together and are misleading. Plato will treat them as belonging to each other, where they discuss the state and the soul decay. Just people, at least some administrators, will rarely be outside the fair state, where they are a systematically educated in the justice. There is no possibility of a just state where there are not just people. In this respect, the question of how the state will come to fruition and how to educate a fair person has to be asked and answered together. So we are here to reach the point where Plato's philosopher-king ideal is on the stage.

4. Reflections of the Allegory of the Cave on Education

In Plato's famous allegory, the cave is now evidently a place for its educational model. However, it should be kept in mind that the tutorial example in the allegory of the cave is more concerned with the education of the ruling class-philosophers on the mind of Plato. From this point of view, we can say that the descriptions of allegories are the content of a higher education, which is a subset of the other classes of society, which is absorbed by Platonic dialectic teaching. Nevertheless, however, there is no need to consider that allegory is a restriction to be regarded as a general educational philosophy. The seventh book of the *State of the allegory of the cave* begins: "And now, I said, I am going to portray to you how educated or uneducated our nature is."²² The more educated and uneducated emphasis in these first lines is only a part of Plato's description of ideals teaching

²² *Republic* 514a.

can be seen as proof that the cave allegorical discussed, in fact, also describes Platon's ideal educational process as a whole.²³

Platon's cave is now apparently a place that completely embraces the sensory-physical world. All of the sensual powers in human also constitute the boundaries of the cave. Outside of the cave, inside the cave is the world of ideas, which is the source of sensual data, the source of knowledge and information, and the source of true knowledge and truth. On the other hand, the process of getting out of the cave is not just a story of salvation, because the cave is a unique place where a person, a sensible and physical being, can live and go. Also, human beings are defined by their social relations with other people in the cave: humans create a social hierarchy among themselves, according to who sees the shadows on the wall more clearly or faster.²⁴ Of course, since people have been chained since their birth and watched only these shadow games, they think of them as the only real thing and do not even get rid of their chains or go out of the cave. Even when the fists are thawed and they turn their backs and see the burning fire for the first time, and the dazzling eyes choose the other objects in the cave to be fanciful, the shadows they have seen until that time will continue to be real. Moreover, since this new situation means both physical pain and the shaking of all knowledge and beliefs, one will prefer to return to the former prisoner status first. But it will be understood that the world of shadows is not the only reality when he will show them one thing at a time, teach their names, and eventually extend a teacher's hand to guide him out of the cave towards the sun, which is also the main source of fire burning in the cave.

Plato tells us that we should not reject the view that the mind accepts as a place of knowledge that is not there before, as it de-

²³ About an advanced analysis for the groundwork of education in the allegory of the cave, see Martin Heidegger, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, trans by. Thomas Sheehan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). About a criticism on this work, Oğuz Haşlakoglu, "Heidegger'in 'Platon'un Hakikat Doktrini' Makalesi Üzerine Bir Eleştiri", *Felsefe Tartışmaları* 32 (2004).

²⁴ *Republic* 516d.

picts the process of getting used to the light of a person who has only seen shadows in his life, education, and the ability to see blind eyes.²⁵ Instead, training should be a process in which, with an essential effort, one can discover the conditions of his environment. But this is not an easy process, because at the same time mental upheavals, or even a psychological revolution, coincide. Let us remember the one who had to look at the wall of the cave from the time it was born, and then released and turned back. Here, the mind's entirely changing its position corresponds to a painful and challenging process of transformation, just as a glance. The person who rids of the chains and turns back to the fire that is burning behind is in action other than the knowledge and habits that he has until then. This step is also beginning of the transition from uneducated to the educational process.

As an essence of education, Paideia is a process in which an empty mind is not a transfer of information, but a process that transforms the character and the mind as a whole and changes the existential ground on which man has existed until that time. In this sense, education is not only about the acquisition of new information, but also about the conditions in which the human being is in, the relationships of everything that exists as a whole to each other. The fact that the real light outside of the cave, the presence of the sun, the opening of the features that make people human, and the actual potentials that people do not realize when they are connected to their existing but shadow games, thus allowing him to liberate himself.²⁶

In Plato, education is a kind of intervention in human nature. It accepts some of the innate traits of a person but also suggests that these characteristics can be changed through education. In other words, the features that nature makes are

²⁵ *Republic* 518b.

²⁶ Mehmet Barış Albayrak, "Platon'un Eğitim Modelindeki Çelişki Üzerine", https://www.academia.edu/3334915/Platon_ve_Egitim (Date Accessed: 09.11.2016).

improved by education.²⁷ Plato tells us that human beings can be inserted into the desired mold and that training must begin in childhood so that it can be realized. Even if there is a soul created by nature, it can only be changed in childhood. Plato tells us that a mold can be inserted into a shape when it is desired to put it in the younger and younger age.²⁸ If education takes an essential place in the shaping of children, supervision is crucial. Provide a progressive education system. We should not be surprised if Plato thinks that 'children and children should be under control'. They say: "If they are good, they will say we will. If it's bad, we'll ban it. We will not let the analysts trick the nannies and tell the children that we ban them. We will want children to kneel their souls before their bodies, with beautiful tails."²⁹

Another thing Plato wants to check is the games of children. "We must put our children's games on a tight plane from the beginning. If the children go out of the rules in their plays, are they expected to grow up and respect the law when they are men?"³⁰ "Plato also emphasizes music education and physical education, which he believes will contribute to the human soul. With the belief that music and physical education will bring the human spirit to life, it says that these training should be given to people starting from childhood. It refers to the importance of 'exercise for the body, music for the soul'. Music education is done like it is supposed to enrich people, make beautiful.³¹ The place where your music will take people is beauty love. After telling the importance of spiritual nourishment, he says through physical education, "the athletes can survive their lives according to their lives".³² What is important here is that we understand that body and music lessons complement each other. Plato is a shy, soft, only children who are taking physical education classes will be

²⁷ See *Republic* 424a-425c and 519a.

²⁸ *Republic* 377b.

²⁹ *Republic* 377c.

³⁰ *Republic* 425a.

³¹ *Republic* 401e.

³² *Republic* 404a.

brave. The type of human that he wants in his state is also the type of person who is formed as a result of these training and whose body structure is harmonious, and wisdom has been attained.³³

Plato says that immediately after the infancy, children have to start school at the age of three. According to him, his father continues to read the book, does not want to stop the education he does not want, and 'everyman' is more a man of the state than his father, so he will receive compulsory education as much as he can.³⁴ It thinks that it will be useful to give the education to the buildings built for this purpose. We can also understand the idea of school at the head: "The day should be born in the morning, sent to the children's teachers; no lamb or slaves, and no slaves without a master, as neither sheep nor any other animal can live without a shepherd."³⁵ Already, in Plato, education is the ultimate goal, to educate qualified citizens and good managers; we can say that Plato is fed up with the individual and the family, the state.

According to Plato, the essence of education is that the soul of a child in the age of play is an excellent man in his adulthood and that he is a perfect man in his adulthood. It is the right direction, especially for the thing that requires the virtue of work to be human.³⁶

Evaluation and Conclusion

Plato does not distance himself from the knowledge and practice of virtues such as Socrates. According to him, there can not be any openness or disconnection between what is good and what is right. It is action with knowing the purpose, equating knowledge with a kind of virtues. From the equality he establishes between expertise and knowledge, he posits a thesis that "a

³³ See Vildan Burkaz, "Platon ve Rousseau'da İnsan Bağlamında Eğitim", *Ane-mon: Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2:2 (2014), 103-4.

³⁴ *Laws* 804d.

³⁵ *Laws* 808d.

³⁶ *Laws* 643c-d.

well-knowing person will necessarily do it". It is ridiculous if a person necessarily knows that something is evil, and if he is doing evil even when he is different, or if he is otherwise, or if he is deterred from doing good in a certain way.³⁷ Because a person's detention from self-righteousness and evil is already showing his ignorance in his good conscience. It is contrary to the nature of a person to do something that someone knows what is bad and wrong.³⁸

In Xenophanes' *Recollection from Socrates*, Socrates speaks with his friend Euthydemus about controlling and disciplining himself and uses the notion of "self-dominance" in the original context, particularly as to appetite and passion, in the sense of weak will.³⁹ This weakness of will indicates the lack of share of the human ideal. Plato also links his weakness of will that Socrates has with the delusion of the connection of man to the world, that is, to the reality of the phenomena.

When moral knowledge is the subject, knowing is also about value because we see that moral knowledge is loaded with value. After accepting virtue as information, the possibility of basing the evil on knowledge is coming to an end. On the other hand, when the source of knowledge is the soul when evil is done, it is directed to the wishes of the body and the body, not the spiritual and spiritual demands. Therefore, acts that violate the source of knowledge cannot be brought together with the principle of bad behavior that finds the source of the source.

Plato believes that the fact that virtue is one thing, that it is an idea, that what appears to be various and different virtues is, in fact, the appearance of a single virtue from other care. According to him, the virtues are a whole; Divine religiosity, moderation with wisdom, knowledge, and courage are in essence pieces of the same goodness. For example, temperance means that every

³⁷ *Protagoras*, 355a-b.

³⁸ *Protagoras*, 358c-d.

³⁹ Ksenophon, *Sokrates'ten Anılar*, çev. Candan Şentuna (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997), 104-5.

organ of an individual should not be hindered from satisfying the other agencies and qualities of every individual, and knows its limit. When it comes to fairness, it is that each member of the society has individual rights and does not interfere with the rights and needs of others. In that case, what is modesty for the individual and justice for the society is the pillar? So the difference is a difference, and it is necessary to understand and evaluate all these benefits or virtues taking into account the whole of human nature. Justice, courage, moderation, wisdom are not different parts or parts of virtue, but different names that are given to the whole and should be considered as information by it.⁴⁰

Severe objections to Plato's moral and justice understanding have been directed. Aristotle has openly criticized the meaning of this promise and the word in his book *Nicomachean Ethics*. He contends that Plato does not take into account the role of the will and will like moral actions such as Socrates. According to him, it is our choice to choose the virtuous one and the bad one. "It is not possible to do evil unintentionally, and it is not possible to obtain happiness unintentionally. Man is the owner and primordial of his actions as children. If these things look like this and we cannot take the actions to the beginnings other than what we have, the ones who have the beginnings, the ones that are themselves are also the wills and willingly done."⁴¹

According to Aristotle, then, the reason for your virtue is not ignorance. However, even though Plato and Socrates have said that the rhetoric about the evil will be by man's free will, it is worth to say that the lack of share from the ideal, the departure of human will when it comes to its place, and the education is given to ideas do not give rise to the tendency to gain man's free will. Also, Aristotle points out that "habits have become natural in time," and therefore the possibility of your virtue to become

⁴⁰ *Protagoras*, 329b-333d.

⁴¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), 1113b5.

an inward character: "It is the nature of an insensitive person that is not knowing that character has come into play about individual things. Moreover, it is contrary to the fact that injustice does not want to be unjust, or that someone who pursues pleasure does not want to be a delightful person. But at first, he was in his hands not tossed it. In the same way, it is not in the first place that it is not for the injustice or pleasure fellow; for that, they are willingly doing so. It's almost impossible for them not to be like that anymore once they've been there."⁴²

Plato's spirit reflects the three-part condition of the whole philosophy, and thus of the understanding of education. For this reason, it is restricted by the Platonist understanding that the human being who can measure himself from the ideal can take on a self-other than his self-self. Plato naturally holds the children of the philosophers as the most important individuals of the ideal educational process, typically, to receive the uppermost education, as it makes the share of the ideals unique to philosophers, and this training cannot be given to any other group of individuals. The philosophers, wisely possessing intellectual virtues, are provided with education according to the state they occupy in the state, and the ideal distinction between people results in superiority over others. The justice of the virtues of reason, courage, and desire, which corresponds to the three-part condition of the soul, is the emergence of individuals who live in the best way of life. Therefore, Plato's understanding of the state, the education of the individuals is adjusted according to the steps of the caste system, and the state comes out as a practitioner of this education.

Here, Plato's approach to family understanding is at the forefront. According to him, the family is a structure that does not have enough power to educate the individual, and for this reason, the state should separate children from their families and train them as needed. Plato seems to have devoted human

⁴² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1113b10-20.

liberty only to philosophers, and those who represent the lower classes are in the service of the upper class. It is incompatible with the intellect that is common to all people, that abstracting one's abilities and entirely guiding ideals. Plato's understanding of education can thus be understood as a mechanism that classifies people and dampens their competence. However, justice is not possible in society unless morality and justice are common to all individuals.

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The Relationship of Idea and Particulars in Plato: Episteme versus Doxa

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Abstract: In this study, the epistemological approach of Plato is examined through his distinction between episteme and doxa. In this investigation, it is aimed to explain the theory of ideas, which is the concept that whenever a scholar studies on Plato, and their relations with the particulars. In our research, without ignoring the role and the place of the theory of ideas, we tried to understand the concept of doxa in his epistemology. In *Theaitetos*, which is one of his later dialogues. Plato attempted to answer the question of what knowledge is without using the theory of ideas. By using these data, we could say that Plato shows us what knowledge is not rather than what it is..

Keywords: Plato, episteme, doxa, knowledge, ideas, particulars.

Introduction

In this study, we are going to try to comprehend the question of what is knowledge in the context of Plato's dialogues on the basis of the *episteme-doxa* distinction. In addition, as a result of this distinction, we will try to reveal the hierarchies of the states of the mind and the objects which is subject to the mind in terms of knowledge. But in the case of Plato, it is the problem of ideas that should be dealt with first. Because Plato tried to grasp the totality (universal) of things mentally, and determined the ultimate basis of all existence in an idea. To this must be added the imagination of the combination of the mental and the corporeal, which leads us to think of the world as a hierarchical structure. This process must be understood from beginning to end in a necessary connection with the idea of the Absolute mind or the good. Plato identifies this idea of good with God, both in its first form and in later forms. It consists of a philosophical monotheism that identifies God with the idea of goodness, the belief that the world is the work of reason and a copy of the world of ideas.

From this point on, it can be seen that Plato, as a different approach in the Greek mindset, adheres not only to the theory of immortality, but also to the eternity of the soul, which is logically correct in itself. In addition, remembrance is a necessary consequence of this commitment. As a matter of fact, when it comes to knowledge for Plato, it is understood that the basic basis is the immortality of the soul and the teaching of remembering besides the ideas.

The most important problem in Plato's theory of knowledge, which he put forward in the first two periods, stems from his view of the universe. His point of view shows a dualistic structure. The metaphysical aspect of Plato's philosophy in the first two periods, on the one hand, and the epistemological aspect on the other, reveals to this dualistic structure. This duality was reflected in his theory of knowledge, leading to the emergence of

the distinction between *knowledge* (episteme) and *belief* (doxa).¹ The distinction between knowledge and conjecture has been treated not only as two states of the mind, but also as the same objects that satisfy these two states.

Two important reasons can be mentioned that lead Plato to this duality: the first one is that he was under the influence of Protagoras' relativity and Heraclitus' theory of flux and considered these two teachings valid for this world. The second is that, under the influence of Pythagoreanism and Socrates, he saw that mathematical objects and Socratic definitions are immutable.

The perceived triangle is relative and variable in the relativity of Protagoras and Heraclitus's doctrine of flux. Therefore, perceptible objects cannot be the subject of knowledge. The subject of knowledge is only the ideal, competent, unchanging and real triangular knowledge. Thus, Plato distinguishes between objects and the universe to which they belong: Ideas are abstract or conceptual, but real, the universe of ideas; Imagination is the universe of tangible or perceptible semi-real objects. While the first of these meets the true knowledge (episteme), the second meets belief (doxa).²

1. Ideas as Absolute Reality

In Plato's thought, the ideas that exist on their own and constitute an eternal, unchanging world are expressed with the words *eidos*³ and *idea* in ancient Greek language.

¹ There are some researchers offer that *doxa* in Plato's approach is very different from *belief*, for more information: Jessica Mosses, *Plato's Doxa, Analytic Philosophy*, 6/1, 2020, p. 193.

² "If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind ; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature..." (*Timaeus*, 51d-e.)

³ *Eidos* means image, appearance, shape, form, form, formative nature, type, species, see: F.E. Peters, *Greek philosophical Terms A Historical Lexion*, Newyork University Press, 1967.

Plato uses the same terms without ignoring the philosophical terminology of the preceding tradition, but in a unique context. In this usage, the meanings of some concepts may show parallelism with the previous usages. Plato clearly uses *eidos* and *idea*, literally interchangeably. Thus, instead of talking about the "beautiful itself", etc., he will speak of the "beautiful *eidos*" or "idea of the beautiful".

The *Idea* or *eidos* of beauty is another way for Plato to refer to *beauty* itself. According to Plato, it is Beauty itself, which is literally truth and the object of knowledge. Whatever thoughts we may have of beauty, there is a true and unchanging *Beauty* that we can grasp and which is whatever it is quite independently of our thoughts.

Although a serious criticism of the Ideas will be made by Plato himself in the role of the Elean Stranger in *Parmenides*, the Ideas, which are presented as the final stop of moral inquiry in the so-called first dialogues, are clearly mentioned in the so-called middle dialogues as the objects of the soul's deep and conscious thought when it withdraws from the senses.⁴

With the *Republic*, Plato paves the way for separating the sphere of existence of the Ideas from the sensible world, and from there he allocate a separate sphere of being, especially as stated in *Timaeus*, in the dialogues that follow. At various points in the dialogues, it appears that Plato gave priority to one or the other of the Ideas. In this way, if we do not mention the famous hypotheses about the One mentioned in *Parmenides*, both Good and Beautiful are brought to the fore. But the problem of the interdependence of the Ideas with each other, or the "participation" or "coexistence" (*koinoia*) as Plato put it, "connection", "interconnection", "gathering", "matching", "commonness", and thus the problem of the subordinate-super-super-subordination hierarchy of the Ideas, is not dealt with formally until *Sophist*. Again,

⁴ See: Cornford, F.M., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist*, Courier Dover Publications, 2003.

on the basis of predicate, a consensus is reached that some Ideas will be blended with others and others will not, and that it is the duty of dialectics to select and separate the various groupings, especially through the divaritative method known as *diairesis*.⁵

There is not much problem with the transcendence of ideas.⁶ But Plato's use of methexis also brings to mind immanence to some extent. So where do we have to place Ideas? This is where analogy comes into play. Just as aistheta (sensibility) resides in a kind of organic unity – which is the cosmos – so do Ideas exist in a certain “intelligible place” located “beyond the heavens”.

At first glance it seems that there is a Platonic idea for each class of things. So there are *ethical Ideas*⁷, there are Ideas of natural things⁸, and even Ideas of trivia that are not worth mentioning.⁹ It is perhaps even more surprising to realize that even artificial things, correlations, and negatives have Ideas. Are Ideas, then, just ideas or concepts? This question is actually asked in dialogues, but only to be denied.¹⁰

2. A Review of Ideas and Their Relation to Particulars

Plato never answers the main question about the scope of the world of ideas – in the context of the Parmenides dialogue.¹¹ Because the dual origin of the theory of ideas makes it difficult to

⁵ R. Robinson, after stating in which meanings Plato uses dialectic in his dialogues (strong speech, art of discussion, the way followed in discussion), states that in the middle period, Plato believed that dialectic was not only the noblest but also the most useful method. Robinson further argues that this method is used in language (Kratylos 390), mathematics (State 510-511), Rhetoric and Psychology (Phaedrus, 269-73), and all ethnic and political sciences. Thus, Robinson says, everything related to each other is clarified by this method. (Robinson, Richard: *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996, p.69)

⁶ Plato, *Timaeus* 51b-52d.

⁷ Plato, *Phaedo* 101b-c.

⁸ Plato, *Timaeus* 51b; Sophist 266b.

⁹ Plato, *Parmenides* 130c.

¹⁰ Plato, *Parmenides* 132b-c, 134b.

¹¹ If VII letter (342a) is to be regarded as a genuine Platonic text, Plato at the end of his life had acknowledged the existence of mathematical objects, moral terms, natural and artificial objects, every species of living creature, every moral quality, and forms of all actions and passions.

answer this question. As a matter of fact, as Aristotle told us while explaining Platonism¹² a root was Socrates' research to define *universals*. Unconcerned with any system of nature, Socrates limited himself to attempting to define moral terms such as the *Just*.

By accepting the Heraclitus doctrine of flux as a theory applied to sensuous things, Plato saw that the subject of a Socratic definition could not be the sensuous thing. For sensuous things are unknowable, being in a constant state of change; therefore, he said that the subject of the Socratic definition must be a separate entity, which he calls the idea, and that the group of sensuous things that have the same name as the idea has a share of this idea. The assumption behind this is that any noun must have a fixed meaning that we think of when we hear it spoken of: The speaker and the listener thus think of the same object in their minds. Only in this way can they understand each other and conversation is possible. In this series all genus nouns nevertheless have the same right to have a form for their meaning; and hence we arrive at the expression: "We are accustomed to accepting a single form (or character, *eidos*) for all the group of things we call the same name."¹³ We can say that this is hot, this is dirty, this is humanitarian, this is just, etc. If all such expressions are in the same position, we must assume a common character or form/idea for an existing genus. The world of ideas must outnumber the vocabulary of any language.¹⁴

But how do ideas look if we start from the other root of Platonism—Pythagorean number theory as the true being of all things? According to Aristotle, Plato understood the relationship between things and ideas exactly as the Pythagoreans understood the relationship between things and Numbers: When he said that things share in the Forms, he was merely making a verbal change to the Pythagorean wording that things represent (or

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 6.

¹³ Plato, *Republic* 596a.

¹⁴ Cornford, *ibid*, p.16-17.

embody) numbers. Form has now become more than the meaning of a genus name—an entity whose metaphysical position Socrates probably never explored. Socrates never had “a system of nature”; but Plato gives Ideas a separate existence, in a world of intelligible, real being, fulfilled by the Pythagorean Numbers, as the reality that appearances represent in one way or another, or to a certain extent. There is no difficulty with mathematical Forms, which are absolutely separate from visible and tangible bodies and constitute a field of eternal truth (truth). Again, moral ideas remain as ideals that are never materialized or realized in human action and character. The forms of both classes in question can be expressed as eternal things that the soul can know without any recourse to the bodily senses.

In fact, in the *Parmenides*, Plato decisively goes against Socrates through Parmenides. Are warmth or coldness or redness the types of objects that can be known by an disembodied soul independently of all sensory experience? Is redness or warmth an eternal and real form that explains the occurrence of red or hot things in the physical world? Do objects share Redness when no one sees them, or Warmth when no one hears their warmth? These may be questions that have plunged Plato into the indecision and uncertainty that Socrates admits in the dialogue. The most important and most notable consequence of accepting an Idea for each kind of noun was that it then became impossible to set a limit to the world of Ideas. The infinite is unknowable, and if the Ideas are unknowable, their reason for existence vanishes. However, Plato leaves this question unanswered. Parmenides then turns to Plato's second line of criticism: What is the relation between the separate Ideas and the things that share them?¹⁵

If we force the natural meaning of taking or sharing, will we assume that the Idea is contained in each of the things as a whole, or that everything receives a part of the Idea? This dilemma can actually be taken as an objection to some of the mis-

¹⁵ Plato, *Parmenides*, 131a.

leading connotations of the word take part. Many things can share in an Idea in the sense that they all have the same relation to it. However, the question of what the relationship might be remains unanswered.

The suggestion that the Idea can only be a thought in our minds is firmly denied. The Idea is not a mental entity; it must be an object of thought, whatever its number, which the human mind may or may not think.¹⁶

Finally, it has been argued that while the Idea has a separate existence, what is here in this world is not the Idea but a copy or image of the Idea. There can be multiple copies of something original. If the relationship is, then in this case there would be similarity. But it will lead to an endless regression. If the original and the copy are similar, they have a common character; however, in this case, our reasons for putting forward another Idea for the original thing and the copy to share are no less than the reasons leading to an original Idea for all copies to share. It follows from this that the shareholding relationship cannot be reduced to similarity, so we must seek an explanation for the shareholding relationship. So one might reason on this point that it may be true that the copy resembles the original, at least to some extent; but it is not all that is meant to be told. There is a similarity between both copies.¹⁷

The result of all these criticisms is that until now no intelligible explanation has been given about the relation between Ideas and things; metaphors will not be subjected to serious scrutiny. Parmenides ends with a picture of an ideal world drawn beyond the reach of human knowledge. A God may know Ideas, but can we humans know something outside of the things in our world? Parmenides himself, on the other hand, concedes that Ideas are a necessity for thought; Without ideas, philosophical discourse or speech of any kind would be impossible. This result simply

¹⁶ Plato, *Parmenides*, 133c-d.

¹⁷ Cornford, *ibid*, p.20.

means that existing difficulties cannot be overcome.

So, Plato's purpose in writing *Parmenides* may have been to show that he was as conscious of the difficulties that exist as his critic, and to expose them for reflection by his students and friends.¹⁸ Besides, what we mean by the difficulty here is a difficulty related to the nature of the relationship between ideas and particulars.

3. The Hierarchy of Mind and Objects in Plato's Epistemology

It should be noted that for Plato, ultimately, knowledge or reality, even truth, cannot be in the world of becoming. Plato constantly stresses the impossibility of making a definition of knowledge on the reliability of the data provided by our senses perceiving a world of particulars that is changing and in constant flux.¹⁹ In addition to this, Plato still does not neglect to make a detailed investigation of whether a definition of knowledge can be made based on particulars. And yet, as always, he ultimately concludes his investigation, leaving us with a picture of what knowledge is rather than what it is not.

In *The Republic*, Plato uses the following expressions in the dashed line analogy that he uses to explain the main elements of his metaphysical view, his understanding of degrees of being:

SOCRATES: Represent them, then, by a line divided into two unequal sections. Then divide each section—that of the visible kind and that of the intelligible—in the same proportion as the line.³⁹ In terms now of relative clarity and opacity, you will have as one subsection of the visible, images. By images I mean, first, shadows, then reflections in bodies of water and in all close-packed, smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort. Do you understand?

GLAUCON: I do understand.

¹⁸ Cornford, *ibid*, p.20.

¹⁹ See: Plato, *Theaitetos* 185.; W.F.R. Hardie, *A Study in Plato*, Oxford At The Clarendon Press, 1936, pp.,29.; Zeev Perelmutter, *Doxa versus Episteme: A Study in Aristotle's Epistemology and Scientific Thought*, University of Toronto, 2002, pp.,30.

SOCRATES: Then, in the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images—that is, the animals around us, every plant, and the whole class of manufactured things

GLAUCON: I will.

SOCRATES: Would you also be willing to say, then, that, as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this ratio: as what is believed is to what is known, so the likeness is to the thing it is like?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Next, consider how the section of the intelligible is to be divided.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: As follows: in one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to base its inquiry on hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle, but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, by contrast, it makes its way to an unhypothetical first principle, proceeding from a hypothesis, but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them...²⁰

As seen in the above text, a line is taken and divided into two. The lower one of the sections obtained at the end of the division shows the sensory world consisting of individual objects that we live in and perceive with our sense organs. The upper section, on the other hand, represents the world of intelligible universals or intellectually intelligible ideas consisting of essences, species and genera. In terms of existence, the world of ideas consisting of the first examples, archetypes/prototypes of everything, the objects in the sensory world shown by the section below, come into existence by taking a share from their first examples and archetypes.

In the same line, the sections obtained as a result of the division are divided into two again, according to the ratio observed during the initial division of the line. In this case, four separate

²⁰ Plato, *The Republic* 509-510a.

sections are obtained. This last division serves Plato's purpose of showing the ontological basis of mathematics and the arts such as sophism, painting, and tragedy. Accordingly, the objects of mathematics are located in the second part of the upper section. The objects of mathematics are also intelligible objects, but they differ from ideas in that where every idea is one, they are many. On the other hand, sophism and arts such as painting, tragedy are shown with the fourth section at the bottom, because the Sophist and the painter's products are things that are at least two degrees away from reality, a shadow of a shadow.²¹

In the divided line, while there is a downward descent in terms of existence, that is, the upper sections are the reason for the existence of the next section, there is an upward movement in terms of knowledge, because real knowledge is the knowledge of unchanging, intelligible entities and real causes.

In the context of the Republic's *dashed line*, *sun analogy* and *cave metaphor*, we can show the states of mind in Plato's epistemology and the objects that meet these situations in four stages.

Plato talks about four different types of knowledge. Two of these four types of knowledge are the sensory world; that is, the world of individual sensory beings that change, come into existence and disappear, whereas the remaining two are related to the world of unchanging, general and eternal beings.

Plato considers estimation (eikasia) to be the least important of these types of knowledge. What is in question in this type of knowledge is to guess the original from the shadow of a shadowy being.

The second type of knowledge is knowledge of sensory objects, which Plato called belief (pistis). The source of the information here is sense-perception, and although it may be a more reliable way of cognition than guesswork, it is still only probabilistic knowledge, not actual knowledge. According to Plato, there

²¹ See: İlyas Altuner, "Ontological Bases of the Universe in Plato's and Aristotle's Cosmologies", *Iğdır University Journal of Social Sciences*, 3, 2013, p. 3-4..

are two main reasons that prevent it from being real knowledge. First, the senses are sources of information that cannot be trusted in any way, due to sensory illusions. Second, the sensory objects, which are the objects of such knowledge, are changing. For, according to Plato, knowledge is not always particular, but general; it is not the knowledge of the changing, but of the unchanging. Therefore, here we have knowledge only of appearances, not of realities. These two types of inferior knowledge are classified together as sensory knowledge as conjecture or conviction (*doxa*).²²

The first two types of knowledge are the types of knowledge, which are the subject of phenomena entirely by Plato. We cannot speak of knowledge in Plato's sense. Here, we would like to refer to the field of knowledge that Plato accepted as reality, which Plato himself had already mentioned, especially in the example of the dashed line.

When it comes to the field of thought, Plato speaks of two types of knowledge, just as in the world of sense. The first of these is mathematical knowledge, which is not sensory entities, but mathematical objects such as numbers, lines, planes and triangles. He also speaks of a second type of knowledge when it comes to Plato and the intellectual field, which is nous, which no longer has anything to do with the sensory world. this knowledge is a rational understanding based on direct acquaintance with the ideas and a rational pure knowledge of general concepts. Here is the dialectical method. Plato's dialectical method consists of a kind of addition and division. Accordingly, the particulars scattered around are grasped by gathering in an Idea, and then the Idea is divided into types. That is, the dialectical method that leads to knowledge of general concepts is first of all a generalization and then a classification. According to Plato, only in this way, that is, by moving from one general concept to another from top to bottom, by generalizing and specializing our con-

²² Plato, *The Republic* 509-511e.

cepts, combining and dividing, synthesising and analyzing, can we achieve clear and coherent thought.

The dashed line, the sun analogy and the metaphor of the cave of the *Republic* aim to separate the visible universe from the universe of ideas. It is to indicate that there can be knowledge of the universe of ideas, but that the visible universe cannot, and to show us how dialectical reasoning is possible. In other words, we cannot obtain knowledge through the senses. Because not only the objects of knowledge (episteme) but also the mental level is very different. We cannot see the authority of everything in the sensible universe. We even see it with some paradoxes. For example, again according to the passage in *The Republic*, when we look at our hand, the third finger can be both long and short, compared to what the senses give us, compared to the fingers on the side. Our knowledge of this situation can be paradoxical.²³ Again, according to the passage in the *Phaedo*, we cannot obtain knowledge with the senses. Because objects do not appear to us as they are.²⁴ If we take two rods that look equal according to the given example, the perceivers do not appear equal to some and not equal to others. The idea of equality or equality has an independent existence. This is an objective equality that does not change according to the perceivers, and it exists in everyone, it is universal. We do not derive this idea from external experience. Pure (absolute) equality is in the universe of ideas. When a person who can grasp the ideas dialectically looks at the seemingly equal things in the outside world, he sees that they are not equal.

The episteme-doxa distinction is based on the ontological status of things specific to sense perception that cannot be the subjects of true knowledge because they are excluded from the realm of true being (to on). Although this position had hitherto been supported and sustained by the Sophists' persistent attack on aisthesis as it is relative, in *The Republic* Plato establishes Parmenides' distinction as a series of epistemological and onto-

²³ Plato, *The Republic* 523c.

²⁴ Plato, *The Phaedo* 73b-c.

logical connections: true knowledge is about true reality, i.e., Ideas, whereas ignorance is all about non-truth. Between these two there is an intermediate stage: a half-knowledge about half-being. This intermediate faculty (dynamis) is doxa, and its subjects are sensible things (aistheta) and opinions commonly believed by humanity. The consequences of this are further refined by dividing the domain of doxa into belief (pistis), the subjects of which are sensible things, and "knowledge of appearances" (eikasias), a category of cognition that includes Plato's view of the nature of productive activity.

Here, perhaps, with an appropriate question, we can ask what was the reason that pushed Plato to this difficulty. As far as we understand, the main reason here is Plato's conviction that the audible or perceptible universe changes and is not reliable. This distrust is, in a way, based on Protagoras' relativity and Heraclitus' theory of flux, as we have already stated. Plato accepts the validity of these two theories for the perceptible universe (not only at the level of perception, but also at the level of opinion). On the other hand, Plato, following Pythagoreanism and Socrates, believed that there is an unchanging and reliable universe (the universe of ideas) beyond this changing and unreliable universe. This universe is beyond, superior and reality, and even more accurately, reality is the universe itself. This dual worldview of Plato seems to be an extension of his great distinction between knowledge and opinion. We should also underline that the most fundamental characteristic of this distinction itself is the result of Plato's reaction to the sophists.²⁵

What is this distinction between knowledge and belief (doxa)? A person who has knowledge has knowledge of something that exists. Because we cannot talk about the knowledge of

²⁵ For details see: Donald, Rutherford, *The Cambridge Companion To Early Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 2007. A.E., Taylor, *Plato The Man and His Work*, Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London, 1966. C.C.W. Taylor, *History of Philosophy From The Beginning to Plato*, Routledge Press, New York, 1997.

“nothingness”. Ideas exist and are real, and even in the case of Plato they are literally the only reality. So only their knowledge is in question. Therefore, there is no error in the information. This is logically impossible. Because it has objects and is real. As long as the mind is at that level, it can comprehend them. But there is an error in the assumption. Something that does not exist cannot be conjecture; but an existing thing cannot be a conjecture either. For Plato, if there is belief/opinion, this is not belief, but knowledge. Therefore, belief, doxa, are both existing and non-existent or semi-existent perceptible particulars. Plato, in the Republic, Phaedo and other dialogues, gives these particulars a place between the existing or the real (ideas), the non-existent or the unreal, and says the particulars are quasi-real. The cave had developed the line and sun analogies for this. Things that have semi-real existence, that is, perceptible particulars, have not knowledge but belief. Based on the relativity of Protagoras and the flux theory of Heraclitus, Plato considers particulars not only relative and variable, but also contradictory.

Just as Plato looks at knowledge and opinion as two separate states of mind, he also looks at the objects that meet these two states in two different situations (hierarchically). In knowledge, there is no question of knowing little or knowing much for Plato. Plato states that there is certainty in knowledge that something or a situation can either be known or not. And he states that there must be sufficient and compulsory conditions for this situation, otherwise, there would be no information situation. As a matter of fact, episteme cannot be mentioned in the nature of Plato's dualism at the level of belief/opinion; likewise, belief/opinion cannot be mentioned at the level of ideas.

Conclusion

In this study, the episteme-doxa distinction in Plato's philosophy was decisive for us. For Plato, when it comes to absolute reality and knowledge, only ideas are real. But especially in Theaitetus, which is one of the last period dialogues, "What is

knowledge?" We can say that the question is handled without resorting to ideas.

State of knowledge, only "what is knowledge?" It is not only the difficulty in answering the question, but also the complexity of the idea about whether we have knowledge of something. For this reason, skeptics have put forward to appear to be known rather than to know since Ancient Greece. How much do we know about something we think we really know? Or is it fragmentary information that is all we know? Can we explain how we know something we think we know?

In the Meno, Socrates says that there is a distinction between correct opinion and knowledge, and that he does not guess but knows. Accordingly, there is a clear distinction between correct opinion and knowledge. If a person has knowledge of something, he also has the right opinion. But a person may not have knowledge of that thing, even though he has the correct opinion.

The question of "what is knowledge" asked in this recent period is very different from the question of "what is knowledge" in the first and middle period. In the first period, the aim was to find a general definition gathered in a concept or idea. However, the question of "what is knowledge", which has been asked in the Theaitetus recently, is asked in terms of perception, opinion and knowledge (knowledge of the outside world). All kinds of answers to these questions are expected. Undoubtedly, there is no single answer to this question, and various assumptions and definitions are tried.

Although these assumptions and definitions are eventually rejected, they actually constitute an aspect of knowledge. Questions such as "what are the criteria for knowing something", "are there such criteria", "how much of something can we know" are of the nature of being the basic questions of Plato's theory of knowledge.

Plato's knowledge-belief distinction may have led him to a two-world metaphysics view. In other words, Plato's epistemo-

logical view led him to an ontology with two worlds. When Plato states that knowledge is knowledge of the real, we can say that he means a different meaning than what we really mean. For example, if we characterize tables and chairs as real, Plato here wants to understand something different from "reality". He seems to want to say that, as a particular sensory, the table is only half real. And Plato will also state that there can never be knowledge about the table, that we can only have belief about the table. Only ideas have knowledge, and only ideas are wholly real.

Although for Plato, only the knowledge of ideas is in question, in one of his recent dialogues, *Theaitetus*, he investigates "what is knowledge" based on particulars, and ultimately what he reaches is not what it is, but what it is not.

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Kaya Argument: A New Logical and Philosophical Expansion to the Premise ‘God Exists’

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Discussion

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Abstract: If ontological, cosmological, religious experience and moral argument on the existence of God are valid proofs, or at least to the point of convincing us, then, the premise “God exists” is correct. If there is no valid argument, that is, if they do not prove the existence of God, or if we believe that they are not convincing arguments for us, we are still within the boundaries of the reason when we said “God exists” and we believed in it. Consequently, in both cases, the premise “God exists” is within the limits of the reason. While in the first case the proposition is rational and affirmed, in the second case it is denied and not irrational.

Keywords: Kaya argument, ontological argument, cosmological argument, the existence of God, logic.

Introduction

The arguments for the existence of God are methodologically either inductive or deductive, and the first is cosmological and the second is ontological.

It is clear that Saint Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz came to mind in the West, while Eastern thinkers had their efforts in the works of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant have essential criticisms against this belief.

Cosmological argument has been spoken by Plato, Aristotle, al-Razi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina and Thomas Aquinas; we know that criticism against this argument is expressed by thinkers such as Ibn Rushd, Kant, Mill and Hume. In addition to this, it is also necessary to mention the argument of *nizam* and *ghaya* or teleological argument, possession and religious experience. We can finally go on to defend our thesis by giving brief information about these arguments.

“God exists” is within the boundaries of the reason.

We must not explain that anyone who says ‘God exists’ will still be in the mental frame, even if all these proofs are invalid or not persuasive. Let’s ask the following question about the suggestion that God exists”: Is this proposition proven or irrational? We are arguing that if we believe that the argument we have developed is ‘God exists’, it is not proven or proven that it is included in the bounds of the mind.

The Terms of Kaya Argument

A : Affirmed

E : Exists

G : God

N : Nonexistent

Note: In this demonstration, even if the existence of God has not been proven, when we say “God exists” or put forward the premise “God exists”, we are still trying to demonstrate that we are within the limits of reason.

The Form of Argument in Classical Logic

Argumentation 1

- I All A is E,
G is A,
Then, G is E.
- II Some G is not E,
G is A,
Then, some A is not E.

The premise "Some A is not E" is contradictory with "All A is E". Then, the premise "G is E" should be correct.

Argumentation 2

- I All A is E,
No E is not N,
Then, no A is not N (All A is E).
- II Some A is not E,
No E is not N,
Then, some A is not not N (Some A is not E).

The premise "Some A is not E" is contradictory with "All A is E". Then "No A is not N (Every A is E)" is correct.

Argumentation 3

True conversion of the premise "All A is E" is "Some E is A".

If "Some E is A", then, "Some E is not A". Because,

- All E is not A,
Some E is A,
Then, some E is not A.

Argumentation 4

There is no logical contradiction between premises "If G is A, then, G is E" and "If G is not A, then, G is E". Because,

- Some E is A,
Some E is not A.

Argumentation 5

If there is no logical contradiction between premises “If G is A, then, G is E” and “If G is not A, then, G is E”, then, this premises are not irrational.

We proved in *Argumentation 4* that there was no logical contradiction between premises “If G is A, then, G is E” and “If G is not A, then, G is E”. Then, these premises are not irrational.

Conclusion

If ontological, cosmological, religious experience and moral argument on the existence of God are valid proofs, or at least to the point of convincing us, then, the premise “God exists” is correct. If there is no valid argument, that is, if they do not prove the existence of God, or if we believe that they are not convincing arguments for us, we are still within the boundaries of the reason when we said “God exists” and we believed in it. Consequently, in both cases, the premise “God exists” is within the limits of the reason. While in the first case the proposition is rational and affirmed, in the second case it is denied and not irrational.



The Matrix and the Desert of the Truth

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Review Note

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I will try to explain in the context of the *Matrix* and philosophy what the truth is and whether there is the free will or not. Everyone wants to know the truth, but no one apparently explains what it is. The matrix is the desert of the truth, and human mind remains therein thirsty. Can we know that we are alive or dead, that is to say, what is the difference between reality and imagination? Never can this problem only be solved by our minds. So long as we try to arrive at necessity, we remain in possibility.

The first film of the Trinity¹ told us that the matrix was, in fact, an unreal world and we were slaves of that world. This idea made me remind Plato's allegory of the cave and Cartesian mind-body dichotomy immediately. As in the film, we could be actually in an imaginary world, maybe we could be made by the Architect. Morpheus said to Neo that if the mind had dead, then the body could not live. Because every vital activity happens to mind or brain, they could not get the immortality and freedom unless human beings abstracted from the body themselves.

In the second film,² this opinion identifies with which Mor-

¹ Joel Silver, *The Matrix* [Film], dir. Larry and Andy Wachowski (USA and Australia: Warner Bros. Pictures and Roadshow Entertainment, March 1999).

² Joel Silver, *The Matrix Reloaded* [Film], dir. Larry and Andy Wachowski (USA and Australia: Warner Bros. Pictures and Roadshow Entertainment, May 2003).

pheus told that everything began with the choice. Not only Neo did describe what the freedom was but also define it. As for Merovingian, he believed that causality was the only truth and even the meaning of life was based on which has to be understood the relation between cause and effect. So, which are those right, free will or causality?

The last film³ showed us that the highest good had exposed itself. According to Kant, the *summum bonum* had to win forever, because it was the reflection of God in this world. Everything was a program written by God: Smith has played a lousy man rebelled against God, whereas Neo is a good man as a Messiah. But the justice of God would not let to evil forever, at last, the prophecy of the Oracle has occurred and Neo has won the fight and put the peace. Perhaps, all of these, like that Neo had chosen to love Trinity, were events which had actualized in God's mind.

Everything that has a beginning has an end. It is not impossible but inevitable. It is true that both reality and imagination might be, as Smith said, caprices of the perception and illusions of the mind. But Smith knew that everything had been created for a purpose, and his fight was intended for the retrieval it from Neo. In this film, the truth is relative, and it is composed of the possibilities. Thus, there is no difference between the fact and imagination. Eventually, let me say that the matrix is everywhere which the mind was not free from the body. We should not forget that our emotions are probably saviors for our minds.

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Style Sheet

A. BOOK OR A PART OF BOOK

One Author

¹ Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 50.

² Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 51.

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⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, A.1, 980b17.

⁵ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Anthony D. Woozley (New York: Meridian Book, 1974), 123.

⁶ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 129.

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