

The Construction of Conceptual Boundaries: Definition Theory and Scientific Classification in Classical Logic

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Review Article

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Abstract: This study examines the ontological and epistemological scope of the definition theory, which determines the cognitive framework for objects in classical logic, and investigates the transformation of this cognitive construction that leads to scientific taxonomy. The study emphasizes that definition is not so much an existential proof of an object as a logical tool that reveals its nature. The epistemological limits of definition are discussed through the observation that individual singularities, the highest genera, and direct sensory experiences cannot be confined to conceptual parameters. The study explores how the conceptual framework, freed from the ambiguity of everyday language, evolved into an objective scientific classification through experience, observation, and causal connections. Finally, within the context of Aristotle and the Islamic logician tradition, the conceptual unity between the questions “what is?” and “why?” is analyzed, supporting the idea that explaining the reason for a phenomenon’s existence leads to constructing its perfect definition.

Keywords: Classical logic, definition theory, epistemology, philosophy of science, taxonomy.

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Introduction

Humanity's attempt to understand truth begins with its effort to comprehend the complex external world that surrounds its mind and simultaneously to bring order to that plurality.¹ The ideal of thought taking on a coherent structure and penetrating the truth of things has made it imperative for knowledge to be transformed from random collective experiences into a systematic whole.² At the base of this transformation lie logical tools that systematize the complex interaction between language, mind and existence, making the ill-defined reality measurable.³ In contemporary philosophy of science, the construction and delimitation of concepts tend to be approached as a linguistic, semantic, or pragmatic synthesis.⁴ However, when one delves into the origins of the history of philosophy and science, it becomes clear that the act of mental limitation is not merely a practice of naming.⁵ On the contrary, it appears to be a foundational mechanism that makes sense of the nature of existence, the epistemological limits of the possibility of knowledge, and the networks of causality in nature.⁶ The attempt to comprehend things at a mental level and to classify them in the external world inherently contains a profound ontological and epistemological concern.⁷ However, the question of how this philosophical concern has been transformed historically into modern taxonomic systems, experimental observations, and theories of scientific causality in the natural sciences, and where and under what conditions the conceptual overlaps with the empirical, necessitates an interdisciplinary and holistic theoretical reading.⁸

¹ Akif Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, PhD Thesis (Sakarya: Sakarya Uygulamalı Bilimler Üniversitesi, 2020), 17.

² Katibi, *Şemsiyye Risalesi: Tahkik, Çeviri ve Şerh*, ed. Ferruh Özpilavcı (İstanbul: Littera Yayıncılık, 2017), 11.

³ İbrahim Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık* (İstanbul: Asa Kitabevi, 1999), 15.

⁴ Alex Rosenberg, *Bilim Felsefesi: Çağdaş Bir Giriş*, Tr. trans. İbrahim Yıldız (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2015), 75.

⁵ Rosenberg, *Bilim Felsefesi: Çağdaş Bir Giriş*, 103.

⁶ S. Ertan Tağman, "Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles'in Dört Neden Kuramı", *Dört Öge* 13 (2018), 98.

⁷ Hasan Ayık, "Mahiyet-Hakikat İlişkisi", *Mantık Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1, no 2 (2019), 10.

⁸ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 22.

This research does not treat the act of mental limitation and conceptualization, a fundamental component of the history of thought, merely as a formal set of rules. Rather, it aims to address how this limitation and conceptualization is a significant driving force in the processes of constructing, controlling, and scientifically establishing knowledge. Furthermore, it attempts to examine how ambiguity in everyday language is transformed into scientific certainty.

1. The Scientific Function of Definition Theory

In classical logic, comprehending the essence of beings and giving them meaning in the mind begins with concepts and the definitions that frame these concepts.⁹ Definition is the process of identifying the meaning of a concept, determining its mental position, and distinguishing it from other things.¹⁰ In a philosophical and logical context, a definition is the most authoritative answer to the question “What is it?” asked about objects.¹¹ It reveals their essential qualities and nature.¹² The primary logical tools used in constructing conceptual boundaries are the Five Universals, originating with Aristotle and classified by Porphyry in her work *Isagoge*.¹³ A complete essential definition is made using the proximate genus and proximate distinction of the object to be defined, thus separating the object from other entities in its class with strict boundaries.¹⁴ This logical activity is, in classical terms, an act of limitation that is “inclusive of all its members and exclusive of all non-member outsiders.”¹⁵

These defining and dividing activities in logic also form the basis of scientific classification.¹⁶ Since the dawn of humanity, people have

⁹ Abdulkadir Coşkun, “İbn Sînâ’da Mantığa Genel Bir Bakış”, *Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi İslam Tetkikleri Merkezi Dergisi* 8, no 1 (2022), 34.

¹⁰ Ali Sedat, *Mizanu'l-Ukul fi'l-Mantık ve'l Usul*, eds. İbrahim Çapak & Harun Kuşlu & Metin Aydın (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), 19.

¹¹ Kamil Kömürçü, “Farabi’de Beş Tümel Kavram”, *Bingöl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9, Suppl (2019), 266.

¹² Coşkun, “İbn Sînâ’da Mantığa Genel Bir Bakış”, 38.

¹³ Kömürçü, “Farabi’de Beş Tümel Kavram”, 265.

¹⁴ Ebheri, *İsagoci ve Şerhi*, Tr. trans. Ferruh Özpilavcı (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2017), 38.

¹⁵ Şifanur Kaya, *İbn-i Sina’da Tanım Teorisi*, MA Thesis (Isparta: Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, 2024), 42.

¹⁶ Sedat, *Mizanu'l-Ukul fi'l-Mantık ve'l Usul*, 19.

tended to categorize the entities around them based on their similarities and differences.¹⁷ Scientific classification, which began with Aristotle's categorization of living things according to their structure and life forms and developed in the modern era with Carolus Linnaeus's binomial (two-letter) nomenclature, categorizes entities within a hierarchical paradigm.¹⁸ Classification and division operations essentially involve analyzing the scope of a concept; they are a fundamental method for better understanding the defined concept and identifying its types.¹⁹

Ultimately, the definitional theory in classical logic is not merely an abstract philosophical polemic, but a general methodology that reduces complexities and variations of objects into manageable categories, enabling accurate scientific communication.²⁰ The correct organization of conceptual boundaries in accordance with definitional rules both guarantees the consistency of thought and ensures that scientific taxonomy is built on a solid logical foundation.²¹

2. The Logical and Ontological Basis of the Definition

In classical logic and philosophy, definition points to a problem that lays the groundwork for both the theoretical foundation and the ontological structure of objects. In the Aristotelian and Ibn Sina tradition, definition is not seen merely as a nominal evaluation. On the contrary, it is considered as the transmission of the truth of an object to the mental plane.

2.1. The Logical Basis of the Definition

In the corpus of logic, knowledge is broadly divided into two types: conception and affirmation.²² Definition is the fundamental means by which the mind reaches conceptual knowledge, and it does not inherently contain a judgment.²³ To arrive at a conceptual understanding, one fundamentally seeks answers to the questions “what is it?” or

¹⁷ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 17.

¹⁸ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 4.

¹⁹ Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık*, 107.

²⁰ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina'da Tanım Teorisi*, 14.

²¹ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina'da Tanım Teorisi*, 19.

²² Ali Durusoy, *Örnek Çeviri Metinlerle Mantık İlimine Giriş* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 48.

²³ Coşkun, “İbn Sînâ'da Mantuğa Genel Bir Bakış”, 37.

“which thing is it?”²⁴ A logically perfect and competent definition is formed by combining the essential concepts of the five universal concepts, namely the proximate genera and the proximate distinction.²⁵ Indeed, describing humans as “thinking beings” is a perfect definition. If accidental and incidental qualities are used in the definition instead of the intrinsic elements that constitute the essence, then this process becomes merely a description, not a definition.²⁶

Furthermore, according to logical principles, a complete identity and equivalence between the defining and the defined is an indispensable condition. That is, the elements constituting the definition must fully correspond to the scope and truth of the concept; in other words, it must be “inclusive of all its members and exclusive of all non-member outsiders”.²⁷

2.2. The Ontological Basis of the Definition

The ontological basis of the definition rests on the relationship between the conceptions of essence and truth. Essence is merely the individuals in the mind and their common qualities within a universal concept, while truth is the totality of the concrete, singular individuals in the external world that correspond to this universal concept.²⁸ Definition aims to bring into existence in the mind, in an essential and obvious way, the truth and essence of the object, ensuring that it is what it is.²⁹ When the components that constitute a definition are synthesized in the mind, meaning is formed, and if it is revealed that this meaning exists exactly the same outside the mind, that is, it refers to existence in the external world, then the expression in question becomes a true “definition”.³⁰ If what is being described has no reality outside of the self, then this statement can absolutely not be the true essence of anything and will remain merely a collection of parts constructed within the self.³¹

²⁴ Coşkun, “İbn Sînâ'da Mantığa Genel Bir Bakış”, 34.

²⁵ Ebheri, *İsagoci ve Şerhi*, 38.

²⁶ Coşkun, “İbn Sînâ'da Mantığa Genel Bir Bakış”, 39.

²⁷ Ayık, “Mahiyet-Hakikat İlişkisi”, 13.

²⁸ Ayık, “Mahiyet-Hakikat İlişkisi”, 7.

²⁹ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina'da Tanım Teorisi*, 58.

³⁰ Farabi, *Kitabu'l Huruf: Harfler Kitabı*, Tr. trans. Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2008), 104.

³¹ Ayık, “Mahiyet-Hakikat İlişkisi”, 7.

From an ontological perspective, the most important element defining the framework of a definition is the distinction between “essence” and “being.” A definition reveals the essence of something by giving its constituent parts, namely genus and species, but it does not prove its existence.³² In the philosophies of Aristotle and Ibn Sina, the essence of an object is its core, but existence is separate from essence; being is not a genus or a species, but a consequence that is subsequently necessary for essence. Therefore, definition does not prove existence; it is proof that establishes existence and demonstrates its truth.³³

Briefly stated, definition is, at the logical level, an instrument that delineates conceptual boundaries through genus and differentia. At the ontological level, while it corresponds to the object's absolute essence, it provides a ground for understanding whose justification concerning the object's existence is left to the logical certainty of syllogistic demonstration.

3. Epistemological Limitations of Definition Rules

Although definition plays a fundamental role in enabling the mind to grasp objects from obscure frameworks into an understandable form, it is a structure subject to formidable epistemological limitations in the production of knowledge and the pursuit of truth.

3.1. Indefinability in the Context of Existence, Essence and Individuality

The primary epistemological threshold of definition is that while it states what something is, it cannot prove whether that thing actually exists.³⁴ As Ibn Sina also emphasized, existence is outside the scope of essence because the object has no genus or distinction; it is, in fact, a quality that is included in essence later. Therefore, definition does not give rise to the existence of a thing; only proof expresses and affirms its existence and ontological truth.³⁵ In other words, merely

³² Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 97.

³³ Durusoy, *Örnek Çeviri Metinlerle Mantık İlmine Giriş*, 263-264.

³⁴ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 98.

³⁵ Durusoy, *Örnek Çeviri Metinlerle Mantık İlmine Giriş*, 263.

containing a definition of something does not imply epistemological certainty that it absolutely exists in objective reality.³⁶ Logic and science demand not boundless particulars, but limited and manageable universals.³⁷

Since particulars encompass not only the present but also the future and constant change, a necessary and permanent definition cannot be given to them.³⁸ As Aristotle stated, individual, concrete entities have no definitions; they can only be perceived through intuitive understanding or sensory experience.³⁹ Because individuals are not universal, they lack general and essential distinctions that would absolutely set them apart from their counterparts; therefore, individuals can only be described, and their complete essential definitions are impossible. For something to be defined on a logical level, it is essential that it be considered a “species” and that both its proximate genus and proximate distinction exist.⁴⁰ However, since the highest genera such as existence, time, space, unity, and multiplicity do not have a higher genus that is more comprehensive and encompasses them, their definitions cannot be fully defined logically. Such concepts can only be known through certain abstractions or representations, or through descriptions based on covering.⁴¹

3.2. The Problem of Intransitivity and Circularity Between Sensory Experience and Conceptual Definition

Colors, tastes, smells, and sounds, which are direct data of individual experience, cannot be confined within the scope of a purely logical definition. For example, the color red cannot be defined for a person born blind. Similarly, personal emotions such as love, pain, affection, and hatred cannot be defined; their comprehension depends only on experiencing and perceiving them.⁴² In this context, defining an

³⁶ Katibi, *Şemsiyye Risalesi: Tahkik, Çeviri ve Şerh*, 214.

³⁷ Durusoy, *Örnek Çeviri Metinlerle Mantık İlmüne Giriş*, 31.

³⁸ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 94.

³⁹ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 98.

⁴⁰ Ayık, “Mahiyet-Hakikat İlişkisi”, 9.

⁴¹ Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık*, 101.

⁴² Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık*, 101.

object and proving it are different epistemological acts. Not everything that can be defined can be proven, and not everything that can be proven can be defined.⁴³ Because the fundamental principles upon which evidence is built are essentially definitions. If these definitions, which form the basis of knowledge, were also subject to verification through evidence, this process would continue indefinitely, making the grounding of knowledge impossible. Therefore, definitions are at the epistemological level, epistemologically necessary assumptions and starting principles that are “based on but cannot be proven.”⁴⁴

Outside of this logical framework, not every defined concept needs to have a concrete counterpart in the external world. Concepts such as “phoenix,” “mount qaf,” or “void,” which only have an essence in the mind but no reality in the external world, can only be defined nominally.⁴⁵ Such nominal definitions, being based on personal agreement, do not provide truly objective information and cannot be proven or refuted.⁴⁶ Furthermore, modern epistemology has weakened the classical logic's assertion that “there is a complete equivalence between concepts and the essence of objects.”⁴⁷ This is because our concepts are not structures that perfectly encompass objects in all their details, but rather limited cognitive constructs, symbols, and summaries that we create by abstracting certain qualities.⁴⁸ Therefore, a definition can never fully encompass all the information about an object until it is exhausted.

In this context, the functionality of definition becomes vital for the construction of knowledge. A definition intended to generate knowledge should not express the thing being investigated in a way that is vaguer and more difficult than the thing itself.⁴⁹ In the method

⁴³ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 94.

⁴⁴ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles’in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 97-98.

⁴⁵ Farabi, *Kitabu'l Huruf: Harfler Kitabı*, 103.

⁴⁶ Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık*, 95.

⁴⁷ Doğan Özlem, *Bilim Felsefesi* (İstanbul: Notos Kitap, 2012), 23.

⁴⁸ Özlem, *Bilim Felsefesi*, 24.

⁴⁹ Katibi, *Şemsiyye Risalesi: Tahkik, Çeviri ve Şerh*, 86.

of accessing a known concept, explaining something by referring to itself creates an excessive definitional vicious cycle.⁵⁰ This situation represents an epistemological dilemma in terms of knowledge production. Consequently, for a definition to build enlightenment in the mind and ensure a healthy transmission of knowledge, the defining element must always be composed of elements more understandable and known than the defined.⁵¹

4. The Transformation of Conceptual Boundaries into Scientific Classification

One of the important steps in the transformation of a conceptual framework into scientific validity is the process that Carnap calls “conceptual clarification.” Expressions that are unclear in scope and meaning in everyday language give way to more absolute and rule-bound expressions in the scientific stage. To illustrate this theoretical shift on an experimental level, for example, in everyday language the term “fish” is a concept with unclear boundaries. A whale or a dolphin could also be called a fish.⁵² However, in zoology, fish are repeatedly defined with precise boundaries as “cold-blooded animals that breathe with gills”, and this new definition replaces the old vague concept, becoming integrated into a scientific system. Scientific concepts acquire meaning by being related to other concepts within a dense system of theories.⁵³

The transition to scientific classification is complete when classification moves beyond purely cognitive or abstract theories and is based on empirical cases. Classification, frequently used in the social sciences, relies on conceptual and multidimensional mental constructs. Taxonomy in the positive sciences is the empirical classification of organisms or phenomena based on their observable, comparable similarities and natural relationships.⁵⁴ When examining the historical foundations and development of taxonomic systems based on such objectivity, it is evident that scientific classification began with

⁵⁰ Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlarıyla Mantık*, 98.

⁵¹ Katibi, *Şemsiyye Risalesi: Tahkik, Çeviri ve Şerh*, 88.

⁵² Özlem, *Bilim Felsefesi*, 24-25.

⁵³ Özlem, *Bilim Felsefesi*, 25-26.

⁵⁴ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 22.

Aristotle's classification of living organisms according to their lifestyles and anatomical structures.⁵⁵

Carolus Linnaeus's creation of a binomial nomenclature system that hierarchically classified living organisms based on their common characteristics into "kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species" gave rise to modern scientific taxonomy.⁵⁶ With the formation of the theory of evolution, artificial classifications based solely on external appearance have been replaced by "natural classification," which is based on the level of kinship between living organisms stemming from a common ancestor.⁵⁷ Attempting to define species by dividing them solely into logical oppositions (for example, separating organisms into herbivores and carnivores) is often insufficient for scientific classification and leads to artificial results.⁵⁸ Aristotle, by examining Plato's purely logical method of division, argued that natural species should be classified not merely according to accidental and external qualities, but according to the internal principles that determine their modes of life and functional integrity.⁵⁹ Scientific classification aims to reveal the "real causal unities" inherent in nature itself, rather than creating abstract conceptual sets.⁶⁰ In conclusion, the transition of conceptual boundaries to scientific classification involves the abstract processes of definition and logical division that the human mind uses to simplify the world and reduce chaos;⁶¹ this involves the transformation of data into objective, hierarchical, and clearly defined taxonomic systems, grounded in experience, observation, causal links, and natural relationships.

5. The Relationship Between Causality and Definition: The Transition from Essence to Cause

Aristotle argues that to arrive at complete and absolute

⁵⁵ Mehtap Bağlıoğlu, "Taksonominin Kısa Tarihçesi ve İlk Hayvan Taksonomisi Kitabımız: Mebâdî-i Tasnîf-i Hayvânât", *Dört Öge* 4 (2013), 34-35.

⁵⁶ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 4.

⁵⁷ Bağlıoğlu, "Taksonominin Kısa Tarihçesi ve İlk Hayvan Taksonomisi Kitabımız: Mebâdî-i Tasnîf-i Hayvânât", 32.

⁵⁸ Seden Pozan, *Aristoteles'in Biyoloji Felsefesinde Yöntem Problemi*, MA Thesis (İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, 2025), 52.

⁵⁹ Pozan, *Aristoteles'in Biyoloji Felsefesinde Yöntem Problemi*, 59.

⁶⁰ Pozan, *Aristoteles'in Biyoloji Felsefesinde Yöntem Problemi*, 64.

⁶¹ Gökçe, *Turizm Taksonomisi: Epistemolojik Bir Analiz*, 42.

knowledge, four questions must be asked in sequence: that which investigates the fact is that (does reality exist?), why is that?, whether existence is absolute or not, and what is essence?⁶² The investigation begins by first determining the existence of the phenomenon, asking “Does a solar or lunar eclipse occur?” Once we know the phenomenon, the mind immediately moves to the question “Why does it occur?”, that is, to the causal explanation.⁶³ When the nature of this object, whose existence has been proven, is questioned, the most perfect definition of that object is obtained.⁶⁴

The element that logically enables the transition from the question “What is it?” to the question “Why?” is the middle term in the comparison. According to Aristotle, questioning what the middle term of something is actually questioning its reason for existence.⁶⁵ When we question the cause of a phenomenon, we look for the central term that brought it into existence, and the questioning of “why” evolves into an investigation of a central term, which is also at the heart of the definition.⁶⁶ When one traces the cause from the fact, the causality reached actually constitutes a complete definition of that thing.

This situation is explained in classical sources with two famous examples:

Lunar Eclipse: The answer to the question “What is an eclipse?” is “The moon being deprived of light.” The answer to the question “Why does the moon eclipse?” is “Because the Earth blocks the sun's light.” Ultimately, the answer to the question “what is it?” which expresses the essence of a phenomenon, and the answer that gives the reason, point to the same empirical truth.⁶⁷

⁶² Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles'in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 96.

⁶³ Pozan, *Aristoteles'in Biyoloji Felsefesinde Yöntem Problemi*, 16.

⁶⁴ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina'da Tanım Teorisi*, 52.

⁶⁵ İkra Özbayrak, *Aristoteles'te İlke ve Bilgi*, MA Thesis (İstanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi, 2024), 29.

⁶⁶ Tağman, “Bilimsel Açıklamanın Felsefi Temelleri Bağlamında Aristoteles'in Dört Neden Kuramı”, 96.

⁶⁷ Özbayrak, *Aristoteles'te İlke ve Bilgi*, 29.

Thunder: While the question “Why does the sky thunder?” is answered causally with “Because the fire in the clouds has gone out,” the question “What is thunder?” is defined as “The sound of a fire going out in the clouds.”⁶⁸ Therefore, when we fully explain the reason for an object’s existence, we indirectly provide the most perfect definition of that object.

Islamic logicians have made this transition much more methodical. According to al-Farabi, the questions “Why is it?” and “What is it?” sometimes come together, and what they expect is fundamentally the same.⁶⁹ Because the answer to the question “why does something exist?” essentially defines that thing.⁷⁰ Ibn Sina, on the other hand, classifies the questions asked in the stage of acquiring knowledge as “Does it exist?”, “What is it?”, and “Why?”.⁷¹ According to Ibn Sina, the question “what is it?” seeks to conceive of the nature of the object, while the question “why?” seeks to confirm that nature and find the reason for its existence.⁷² Ibn Sina states that the art of demonstration aims to find the “why,” while definition aims to find the “what.” However, since both investigations reveal the nature of the object, they converge at one point. Therefore, knowing what an object is also means knowing the reason for its existence.⁷³

Conclusion

This study reveals that the intellectual journey humanity embarks upon with the desire to understand truth is more than a mere practice of naming; it is an effort at ontological and epistemological grounding. The methods of definition and division presented by classical logic initially appear as merely an abstract thought process. However, it is a methodology that reduces the complex world to malleable categories and determines the principles necessary for the formation of knowledge.

The primary goal of intellectual activity is to bring together,

⁶⁸ Pozan, *Aristoteles’in Biyoloji Felsefesinde Yöntem Problemi*, 17.

⁶⁹ Farabi, *Kitabu’l Huruf: Harfler Kitabı*, 135.

⁷⁰ Farabi, *Kitabu’l Huruf: Harfler Kitabı*, 134.

⁷¹ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina’da Tanım Teorisi*, 53.

⁷² Kaya, *İbn-i Sina’da Tanım Teorisi*, 54.

⁷³ Kaya, *İbn-i Sina’da Tanım Teorisi*, 72.

within the same framework, what something is and why it exists. In this process, definition provides the mind with a scope for action by delineating the boundaries of the object. However, this activity focuses not on exhausting the truth of existence, but on making it a suitable basis for scientific classification. The mere construction of conceptual boundaries through logical rules is only the first stage of the scientific process. The real transformation occurs when the concept transcends its obscurity in everyday language and connects with networks of experience, observation, and causality.

In conclusion, definition and causality are two key elements that complement each other. The concept of definition establishes positions, while causality integrates it with life. The human mind, by combining these two tools to make the world comprehensible, builds a bridge from ambiguity to certainty, from conception to proof. This perspective shows that even the rigid taxonomy underlying scientific systems is actually a reflection of the human mind's effort to understand existence, organize it, and construct truth within a coherent whole.

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