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# Entelekya

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### Contact Information

Igdir Universitesi, Sehit Bulent Yurtseven Kampusu, Igdir, 76000, Turkey

*Phone:* +90-476-223-0042

*Web:* <http://www.entelekya.org>

*E-Mail:* [entelekyareview@gmail.com](mailto:entelekyareview@gmail.com)

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## DEDICATION

This issue of *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* has been dedicated to Cemil Taşcıoğlu, who recently died of the Covid-19 virus and sacrificed his life for humanity in order to treat coronavirus patients. May he rest in peace.



## Suhrawardī the Philosopher and the Reasons Behind His Death \*

İLYAS ALTUNER   
İğdır University

Research Article

Submitted: 25.12.2019 | Accepted: 20.03.2020

**Abstract:** Although the cause of Suhrawardī's death may have been his esoteric views, we can see that this was a political medium. Because the decision of Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to execute Suhrawardī was political, especially because of the Crusades moving towards al-Quds at that time, where was taken by the Crusaders. There is a definite alliance upon that Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī ordered to kill Suhrawardī. Because the other issues Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī was dealing with prevented him from coming to Aleppo and examining this issue in detail. At the same time, Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī could not have time to discuss whether the decision to kill Suhrawardī for political reasons was a hasty one. Although the cause of Suhrawardī's death may have been his esoteric views, we can see that this was a political medium. As a result, the decision of Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to execute Suhrawardī has based on political reasons. Some matters were mentioned in Suhrawardī's death fatwā, especially his suggestion of disbelief to the people and his disorderly conduct of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir were cited as the cause of death.

**Keywords:** Suhrawardī, Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, esotericism, death fatwā, execution.

\* This article was presented orally at the *International Ayyubids Symposium*, held in Iğdır, on 20-21 April 2019.

## Introduction

Although it is said that Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī sometimes creates antipathy towards philosophers, this discrimination does not seem to be reflected in the field of the kalam. The establishment of several Muslim theological schools (madrasa) at that time, not only the Sunni madrasas but also Shiite madrasas in the activity, it is important to show that the exchange of information between Sunnis and Shiites. Here, Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī has an important initiative: Making Sunnism a state policy was a work done before, and during this period, the Shāfi‘ī-Ash‘arī belief theory of al-Ghazālī continued.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the years of the Ayyubids, there was a controversy between philosophers and religious scholars over the murder of Suhrawardī. We can see that this relationship between philosophers and theologians has become a matter of political interest.

Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl was born in north-west Iran,<sup>2</sup> found in various regions, traveled to many parts of Anatolia, then traveled to Konya, and eventually moved to Aleppo (Ḥalab). We can see in the sources that Suhrawardī was a Shāfi‘ī-Ash‘arī,<sup>3</sup> but we do not know this apparently. It is not very meaningful to say that philosophers are committed to any denomination in general, but they are known to have been brought up on Ash‘arism. All the cities he visited are the regions where the Shāfi‘ī-Ash‘arī belief is located. Especially in Konya, we see that he was given great care by al-Malik al-Zāhir, the son of Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, during the Ayyubids period.<sup>4</sup> This has made the Muslim scholars (al-‘ulamā’)

<sup>1</sup> Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, the Martyr of Aleppo,” *Al-Qantara: Revista de Estudios Arabes* 22, no. 1 (2001), 404-6.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, trans. Liadain Sherrard (London and New York: Kegan Paul, 1993), 205.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A’yān wa Anbā’ Abnā’ az-Zamān*, ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās (Beirut: Dār Şādir, 1977), VI, 272; al-Asnawī, *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi‘iyya*, ed. Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1987), II, 242; al-Şafadī, *al-Wāfi bi al-Wafayāt*, ed. Aḥmad al-Arnāwūt and Turkī Muşţafā (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ at-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 2000), II, 236.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn Abī Uşaybi’a, *‘Uyūn al-Anbā’ fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā’*, ed. Nizār Riḍā (Beirut: Dār Maktaba al-Ḥayāt, 1965), 642.

uneasy because we can see that when the scholars decides to execute Suhrawardī, the statements in the explanation of the decision as to why he was executed do not actually reveal the truth. Because, as we said at the beginning, political debates are the most important factor that caused Suhrawardī's death. Of course, his philosophical and esoteric (bāṭinī) views, which are related to Sufism, were also influential in this. We can say that Suhrawardī, who will be killed for a political reason, was given a legal opinion (fatwā) for his death by spreading his esoteric and perverse views.<sup>5</sup>

### Suhrawardī's Death Execution

Therefore, although the cause of Suhrawardī's death may have been his esoteric views, we can clearly see that this was a political medium. Because we can see that the decision of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to execute Suhrawardī was political, especially because of the border discussions between the Seljuks and the Ayyubids at that time, their battles with each other in places, their attempts to eliminate the pressures of the Abbasid Caliphate with a maneuver while declaring their allegiance to the Abbasids, and their relations with the Fatimids, the Crusades at that time were moving towards Jerusalem (al-Quds) in a big way and al-Quds was taken by the Crusaders. There is a definite alliance upon that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī ordered to kill Suhrawardī. Because the other issues Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī was dealing with prevented him from coming to Aleppo and examining this issue in detail. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī could not have time to discuss whether the decision to kill Suhrawardī for political reasons was a hasty one. At that time Suhrawardī was described as a Seljuk agent, because we understand from some works that al-Malik al-Zāhir was appointed as a close advisor and that the scholars around al-Malik al-Zāhir was excluded after the arrival

<sup>5</sup> Carl Brockelmann, *Gesichte der Arabischen Litteratur* (Weimar: Verlag von Emil Ferber, 1898), I, 437; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-Anbā' fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā'*, 642.



of Suhrawardī, so there was jealousy in the scholars.<sup>6</sup> The fact that a philosopher who was seen as a Seljuk agent at the same time opened a door to the esoteric thought against Sunni, especially the Sunni formed by al-Ghazālī, caused the formation of a philosophical and religious basis for his murder.

Besides, Suhrawardī is a rough man who has become famous for his output and is someone who does not know the science of politics. It is said that his teacher al-Mārdinī warned him and said, “They will not keep this man alive very long.”<sup>7</sup> He was given great freedom in Anatolia, especially in Konya, where he took great care and even taught the children of the Sultan. As an indication of this, it is normal for him to be described as a Seljuk agent when he arrived in Aleppo because the majority of the cities he traveled to places under the Seljuk rule. It is also said that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī since espionage were famous at the time, avoided being distracted by such espionage and esoteric thoughts at a time when he was dealing with the Crusaders and made this decision. In fact, al-Malik al-Zāhir did not immediately implement this decision. The scholars sent such a fatwā to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, but his son al-Malik al-Zāhir did not apply it, despite the order of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī. Therefore, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī sent word to his son to apply this punishment, otherwise, he would punish both. So Suhrawardī suggested to al-Malik al-Zāhir, saying, “Condemn me to hunger because you do not want to follow this fatwā, so that I may starve, and you will not be in this sin.”<sup>8</sup> Although there are rumors that he was thrown from the castle and killed, it is generally thought that Suhrawardī probably starved to death while in prison.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Hossein Ziai, “Al-Suhrawardī,” *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, eds. Clifford Edmund Bosworth and Others (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), IX, 782.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Shahrazūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ*, ed. Eşref Altaş (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), 875.

<sup>8</sup> Al-Ḥamawī, *Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ: Irshād al-Arib ilā Maʿrifat al-Adīb*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), VI, 2807.

<sup>9</sup> Al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām: Qāmūs Tarājim Ashhur ar-Rijāl wa an-Nisāʾ* (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm al-Malāyīn, 2002), VIII, 140; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-Ayān wa Anbāʾ Abnāʾ az-Zamān*, VI, 273; Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, *ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aʿtibāʾ*,

It is required to mention some of the beliefs that led the scholars to take this fatwā against Suhrawardī, who was killed for political reasons, and also the arguments between Suhrawardī as a philosopher and the law scholars (fuqahā') representing the religion.<sup>10</sup> Some matters were mentioned in Suhrawardī's death fatwā, especially his suggestion of disbelief to the people and his disorderly conduct of al-Malik al-Zāhir were cited as the cause of death.<sup>11</sup> We know that there were spies in Aleppo, a city that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī cared about. There is a danger of Crusades at the time, but Aleppo is not fully Muslim, that is, there are people from different religions and sects. It is hard not to think that Suhrawardī's putting esotericism in the minds of the people in Aleppo would disrupt Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī's idea of establishing Islamic unity through Sunni thought. It is also said that Suhrawardī has Ismā'īlī and esoteric ideas, but this is an accusation attributed to all philosophers from time to time. Because, of course, there are places in Iran where Ismā'ilism is active, but not all of Iran was Shiite at the time, and Sunnism prevailed in certain areas.<sup>12</sup> People in these Sunni areas have also been accused of being Ismā'īlī and esoteric from time to time because of their different opinions. As a result of al-Ghazālī's work against esotericism,<sup>13</sup> we know that those who belong to these ideas, especially the Neo-Platonist philosophers or Sufis, are constantly under surveillance and subjected to oppression by statesmen for their alleged involvement in esoteric thought.

### The Claim of Disbelief about Suhrawardī

Otherwise, it is rumored that Suhrawardī belonged to the Mazdaism or Zoroastrian religion. Suhrawardī stated at the be-

644; al-Shahrazūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ*, 873.

<sup>10</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Siyar Alām an-Nubalā'*, ed. Bashshār 'Awwād Ma'rūf and Muḥyi Hilāl as-Sarḥān (Beirut: Muassasa ar-Risāla, 1984), XXI, 210.

<sup>11</sup> Al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Udabā': Irshād al-Arib ilā Ma'rifa al-Adīb*, VI, 2807.

<sup>12</sup> Marcotte, "Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl, the Martyr of Aleppo," 405.

<sup>13</sup> Al-Ghazālī, *Faḍāih al-Bāṭiniyya*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiyya, 1964).

ginning of his work *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* that he was not a member of the old Zoroastrian religion, but rather a member of Islam.<sup>14</sup> It is necessary to mention that Suhrawardī was a Zoroastrian. Suhrawardī's idea of the light (nūr) describes the Light of lights (Nūr al-anwār) and other lights that open from it.<sup>15</sup> His philosophy based on the conflict of two opposing entities, the light (nūr) on the one hand and the darkness (ẓulumāt) on the other, may have led people to believe that Suhrawardī was a Zoroastrian. The fact that he opposes God and devil, the Light and the dark, as in Zoroastrianism, reinforces the possibility that he is a Zoroastrian in the eyes of people.<sup>16</sup> Even though he said he did not have such an opinion, the scholars, citing some of his thoughts, accused him of many superficial statements. We can assume that he was influenced by the ancient Persian religion, so that is a possibility. However, even if people are influenced by their own ancient culture, they can continue to do some extent. In my opinion, Suhrawardī took certain concepts from Zoroastrianism, but since he had a Platonist understanding, we can see that he adapted Plato's concepts of the sun and the darkness here. We can assume that he also acted from the expressions of light and darkness in the Qur'an, in fact he attempted to create a Qur'anic epistemology, by combining ancient cultures with the concepts of light and darkness in the Qur'an. Because in Plato's allegory of the cave, light represents the idea of good, namely knowledge and reality, as well as darkness represents evil, namely ignorance and the world of phenomena that are matter, we can see that Suhrawardī attributes the relationship between good and evil, namely knowledge and ignorance, to the relationship between light and darkness.

Whether Suhrawardī was a philosopher or a Sufi is a debate.

<sup>14</sup> Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, ed. Henry Corbin, *Majmū'a-yi Musannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq* (Tehran: Pajūgāh-i 'Ulūm-i Insānī wa Mutāla'āt-i Farhangī, 2001), II, 10-1.

<sup>15</sup> Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, 171-2.

<sup>16</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr. *The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia*, ed. Mehdi Amin Razavi (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 138.

There are two Suhrawardī, both named after Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī. We know that the works of the philosopher Suhrawardī and the Sufi Suhrawardī are sometimes confused and some of the works of Sufi Suhrawardī are thought to be the works of the philosopher Suhrawardī. Although their works are intermingled, we can see that the philosopher Suhrawardī was influenced by Sufi things and illuminationist (ishrāqī) thought in some places. We can say that the illuminationist idea here, the concept of light, is inspired by Plato's idea of Good. However, this does not mean that Suhrawardī was a mere Platonist and just acted from the idea of Good. He is also a representative of the Peripatetic (Mashshāī) school. Although he has criticized Avicenna, we see that he expressed such that as an extension of the idea of Eastern philosophy.<sup>17</sup>

### **Conclusion: Illuminationism as Platonism**

Because of his views on the theory of prophethood, Suhrawardī is thought to have strengthened the scholars' hand. During a discussion, it is also narrated that al-Malik al-Zāhir said, "Since you are against Suhrawardī, then let's prepare a discussion and put forward your ideas in this discussion." Suhrawardī seems to have given proper answers to the scholars' questions. However, we can say that he gave a deficit in one question: "Is prophethood continuous or not continuous, and will the prophet come after this?" Because the esoteric idea of prophethood was common at that time. According to Suhrawardī, although there will be no prophet after this, he has been asked such questions because he stated that some Sufis got a revelation (waḥy) from God in an esoteric way. Suhrawardī said in his reply that this might be possible. There is a discussion on the concepts of possibility and necessity. He stated that this was possible on a rational

<sup>17</sup> John Walbridge, *The Wisdom of the Mystic East: Suhrawardī and Platonic Orientalism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). For the criticism of Avicenna's refutation the Platonic ideas, see Tahir Uluç, "Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of Ibn Sīnā's Refutation of the Platonic Forms," *Ilahiyat Studies* 3, no. 1 (2012), 8 ff.

basis as “God can send a prophet after this if he wants” because the power of God cannot be limited. However, since the scholars drew this from rational to action-based, they claimed that Suhrawardī implied that the prophet might come and that he was obsessed with the esoteric idea and was in a state of perversion. As a result of all this, we see that Suhrawardī was executed because of some beliefs and philosophical views.<sup>18</sup>

As to talk about the purging of the soul, there is the question of purifying the soul and being submerged at the basis of Sufism or illuminationism. In the theological thought, this was a superstition. There is an antipathy towards esotericism among scholars in the Sunni world as the issue of esoteric prophethood arose at that time. But we see that the situation here is derived from a kind of Pythagorean thought of purification of the soul and its influence on Platonism. It is also possible to say the influence of Aristotelian theories on Suhrawardī.

Also belonging to a Pythagorean tradition, Suhrawardī took certain things from Pythagoreanism, which had influenced Platonism in particular. It was here that the political thought in Pythagoreanism could also occur in Suhrawardī. Because of the idea that politically enlightened people should eventually take over, and therefore society could be enlightened in this way, passed from Pythagoras to Plato in the form of a “philosopher-king”. So, we know that the idea that rational philosophers should rule the state forms the basis of Plato’s idea of the state. The fact that both ideas were among Suhrawardī’s sources may also have led him to be accused of this.

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<sup>18</sup> Muḥammad ‘Alī Abū Rayyān, *Uṣūl al-Falsafa al-Ishrāqīyya* (Beirut: Dār at-Ṭalaba al-‘Arab, 1969), 25-6.

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## Tracing al-Dawānī in Ottoman Lands: Mu’ayyadzāda ‘Abd al-Raḥmān and His Natural Theology

OSMAN DEMİR 

*Hacı Bayram Veli University*

Research Article

Submitted: 30.04.2020 | Accepted: 26.05.2020

**Abstract:** It is generally considered and widely accepted that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī School to be effective in the formation and development of Ottoman intellectual life. However, there are some ‘ulamā’ such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, who influenced the Ottoman mindset with both their works and ideas and beyond, they create distinct traditions. Present outline aims to draw attention to this issue through Mu’ayyadzāda ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Efendi, who is a famous disciple and representative of al-Dawānī perspective in Anatolia. In this respect, it introduces the two risālas belongs to him that are important in terms of his theory of nature, and by moving here it points to some questions that need to be answered here and some issues that need to be addressed.

**Keywords:** Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, Mu’ayyadzāda ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Dawānī School, Ottoman thought, natural theology.

OSMAN DEMİR ✉

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Department of Basic Islamic Sciences

Kuzey Ankara Yerleşkesi, Keçiören, Ankara, 06300, TR [demirosman1974@gmail.com]



## Introduction

The Ottoman State, as an important representative of the Islamic thought heritage and a powerful conveyer of it, became the locomotive of Islamic civilization immediately after its appearance on the historical stage and continued its scientific opportunities with making new compositions (*tarkīb*) almost until the last century. By courtesy of its political and scientific power, the Ottomans have inflamed not only the intellectual activities around Istanbul and Anatolia but also all scientific activities produced in the Islamic lands. So much so that, after a stage, thanks to the strong political and administrative structure, this land became the gravitational focus of scholars and ideas. Even with the contribution of this geography, the mainstream formed an upper-constitutions and meta-synthesis. To determine the Ottoman theoria, especially the notion of *kalām*, it is necessary to consider all the traditional elements that affect the formation of this thought and the contribution of this soil itself.

Although it is accepted that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and his followers are influential on Ottoman thought, many authors influenced this conception both with their works and ideas. To emphasize it with a metaphor; the Ottoman period can be likened to a deep and colorful lake where many rivers may have fallen. For this reason, all these branches should be reviewed for a detailed analysis of Ottoman thought. In this context, the importance of al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502) and Mu'ayyadzāda 'Abd al-Raḥmān (d. 922/1516) who has been considered his important intellectual follower in the Ottoman basin should be revealed. This article aims to share as a research note the first results of a project that we have been working on for a while. For this reason, it plans to illuminate the natural theory of Mu'ayyadzāda at first sight and to compare the early data with the system of al-Dawānī.<sup>1</sup> As a result, some opinions on the impact of al-Dawānī

<sup>1</sup> Between the years October-2018 and October-2019, I launched to work on this topic as a post-doc fellow by the support of the University of Bonn. First of all, I would like to point out my gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt Founda-

will be stated in the Ottoman geography and some ideas about the circulation of knowledge at the turning point of the 16th century will come up.

### Scholarly Effect of al-Dawānī on Anatolia

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502) was a prominent philosopher and theologian from Shiraz, whose ideas spread to Anatolia in various ways and provided a cultural vitality between the Ottomans and Persians. His works are syncretic in character (*mamzūj*) that contain overtones of new Ash'arism, Ishrāqī philosophy, and theory of the *unity of existence* (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). Jalāl al-Dīn's scholarly activities caught many student's eyes on Shiraz from the different reigns of Anatolia, Khorasan, and Transoxania. Thus, those disciples contributed to the spread of his ideas and writings in their lands.<sup>2</sup>

Al-Dawānī's impact to Ottoman intellectual ethos manifested itself mostly with his treatises on proving God's existence (*al-ithbāt al-wājib*) and also with his ḥāshiya on the text of 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's (d. 756/1355) *al-'Aqāid. Risālāt al-Qadīma fī al-Itihāt al-Wājib* is a treatise that addresses the major proofs of God's existence under two arguments: The argument from temporality (*ḥudūth*) and that from possibility (*imkān*) of the universe. The treatise in question has over a hundred commentaries and glosses in Turkish libraries<sup>3</sup>. His commentary on al-Ījī's *'Aqāid* known as *Ḥāshiya al-Jalāl* initiated an individual tradition of writing many commentaries and glosses on it.<sup>4</sup>

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tion for Islamicate Intellectual History and it's precious adviser and administrator Judith Pfeiffer.

<sup>2</sup> About al-Dawānī's life and theology, see Harun Anay, *Celâleddin Devvânî, Hayatı, Eserleri, Ahlak ve Siyaset Düşüncesi*, PhD Dissertation (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> Hülya Terzioğlu, "Celâleddin ed-Devvânî'nin İsbât-ı Vâcib Anlayışı ve Osmanlı Düşünce Dünyasına Etkileri," *Osmanlı Düşüncesi: Kaynakları ve Tartışma Konuları*, eds. Fuat Aydın, Metin Aydın and Muhammet Yetim (İstanbul: Mahya Yayıncılık, 2019), 177-190.

<sup>4</sup> About the impact of *Ḥāshiya al-Jalāl*, see Muhammed Ali Koca "el-Akâ'idü'n-Nesefiyye ve el-Akâ'idü'l-Adudiyye Örneğinde Osmanlı'da Akaid Risaleleri: Problemler, Özellikler ve Literatür," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 28

Al-Dawānī's glosses on 'Ali Qūshjī's (d. 879/1474) commentary on *at-Tajrīd* (*Sharḥ al-Jadīd 'alā at-Tajrīd*) also received considerable feedbacks. The polemics with Şadr al-Dīn al-Deshtakī (d. 903/1497) on some issues related to this book had an impact quite a long time on the Ottoman thought. In the light of these disputes, the works were written titled *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Jalāliyya wa aṣ-Ṣadriyya* and it can be alleged that Ottoman thought is close to al-Dawānī's line of thought, based on his copies happen to be in majority in Turkey's Manuscript Libraries<sup>5</sup>. Famous biography author Tashkūbrizādā (d. 968/1561) referred to him many times in his *ash-Shaqāiq* as an indication of his influence on Ottoman thought.<sup>6</sup>

It is asserted that the ideas of al-Dawānī came to be known in the Ottoman scholarly environment through his disciple al-Mu'ayyadzāda 'Abd al-Raḥmān who was appointed as the military judge (*qādi al-askar*) of Anatolia and Rumelia regions during the reign of Bayazid II (1481-1512).<sup>7</sup> His close relationship with Jalāl al-Dīn in this period and his place in the Ottoman educational system (*'ilmīyya*) and also, to these, training many important scholars (*'ulamā'*), among them Kemalpashazāda (d. 940/1534) and Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1490/1574), were all aroused interest as to whether the existence of Dawānī School is like Rāzī School in Ottoman State.

Mu'ayyadzāda, who took lessons from al-Dawānī for seven

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(2016), 41-97.

<sup>5</sup> Salih Günaydın, "Nasīruddīn et-Tūsī'nin *Tecrīdu'l-İ'tikād*'ı Üzerine Oluşan Şerh-Hâşiye Literatürü: Türkiye Yazma Eser Kütüphanelerinden Bir Bakış," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 28 (2016), 264-265.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, see Tashkūbrizādā Ahmed Efendi, *ash-Shaqāiq an-Nu'māniyya fī 'Ulamā' ad-Dawla al-'Uthmāniyya* (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2019), 234, 254, 468.

<sup>7</sup> To obtain general knowledge about Mu'ayyadzāda's life, see Taşköprülüzāde, *ash-Shaqāiq an-Nu'māniyya fī 'Ulamā' ad-Dawla al-'Uthmāniyya*, 466-72; Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Kafawī, *Katāib A'lām al-Aḥyār min Fuqahā' Madhhab al-Nu'mān al-Mukhtār*, eds. Saffet Köse and Others (Istanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 2017), IV, 419-24; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1949), II, 657-60.

years in Shiraz,<sup>8</sup> presented his important pupils and followers, such as al-Dawānī's groom, Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shirāzī and the glosser of *Sharḥ al-'Aqāid al-'Aḍudiyya*, Ḥakīm Shāh Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (d. 926/1521) to the Bayazid II after his return to Anatolia. It is known that Ismail al-Shirwānī (d. after the second quarter of the 10/16th century) moved to Anatolia after learning lessons from al-Dawānī whether his relationship with Mu'ayyadzāda is not clear. Ibn al-Katkhudā al-Garmiyānī (d. after the second quarter of the 10/16th century) who was of Anatolian origin, had taken lessons from al-Dawānī for many years, even so, that al-Dawānī sent him on his way back to Anatolia for delivering his treatise titled *Ithbāt al-Wājib* to Mulla Luṭfī or Izārī (d. 901/1495). He was very pleased with his interest and taught this textbook despite all the challenges and oppression he faced. As one can see, al-Dawānī's books arrived at Anatolia and were studied by 'ulamā' while he was in life.

Although the influence of al-Dawānī's works on Ottoman intellectual life is admitted by everyone, the scholarly effect of his idea is not elucidated in-depth yet. For such a study, first of all, the main and distinctive features of al-Dawānī's theoria must be determined by comparison with other Schools. Then, the people who belong and track to the Dawānī school, the chains of scholars ('ulamā'), given diplomas (*ijāzah*), and citations must be identified regarding bio-bibliographical sources. Thus, the mutual understandings and tendencies of the people who followed al-Dawānī's methodology would be manifested. Scholars have long since known that the accepted and mainstream theoretical perspective in Ottoman lands pertains to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, so the obtained outcomes need to be compared in particular with the

<sup>8</sup> The *ijāzatnāma* which was given by al-Dawānī to him just published by Judith Pfeiffer, "Teaching the Learned: Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's *Ijāza* to Mu'ayyadzāda 'Abd al-Raḥmān Efendi and the Circulation of Knowledge between Fārs and the Ottoman Empire at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century," *The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi*, eds. Maurice A. Pomerantz and Aram Shanin (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), 285-332. Pfeiffer also wrote some articles relating to the library of Mu'ayyadzāda and its contention.

Rāzi School. This effort also requires the detection of the geographical region under the effect of al-Dawānī between the 16th and 18th centuries; and a consideration of social, cultural and political changes experienced in that zone; and an analysis of the cultural relations in conjunction with the circulation of knowledge.

### Two Risāla of Mu'ayyadzāda Relating to the Physical Theory

This project, which I started with the support of the University of Bonn, in first place focuses on analyzing and comparing these two authors' natural theory. This issue of nature is important in terms of the fact that it points out the scholars' basic methodology relating to the metaphysics. Fortunately, the works of al-Dawānī and Mu'ayyadzāda directly allow us to understand their views on physical phenomena. In this respect, first, we identified the two important treatises of the Mu'ayyadzāda concerning to the subject: *Risāla fī al-Juz' Alladhī lā Yatajazzā'* (A) and *Risāla fī ash-Shubha al-Āmma* (B).<sup>9</sup>

After completing our study on the first treatise last year, we published it in the form of *editio princeps* and translation with a middle-size analysis relating it's content by the introduction (*dirāsa*). In here, we discussed the first grasps and observations taken from it.<sup>10</sup> Mu'ayyadzāda primarily refutes Ibn Sīnā's (d. 428/1037) thesis about the touch (*tamās*) between two points/instants is perpetual in time with eight geometric evidence and then concentrates the matter he calls well-known "suspicion/ash-shubha al-mashhūra". This issue is a major and famous problem that has been discussed from the time of Plato (427-347 BCE) including the Islamic era that is named; the relation of continuous and discontinuous quantity or relation of time

<sup>9</sup> From here onwards, both treatises will be followed by these capital letters, A and B.

<sup>10</sup> Osman Demir and Mehmet Arıkan, "Touching the Point: Mu'ayyadzāda 'Abd Al-Rahmān Efendi's Treatise on *Juz' Alladhī Lā Yatajazzā'*: An Analyses, Critical Edition, and Translation," *Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Science* 5, no. 1 (2019), 135-94.

and instant. More specifically, it is a discussion between the two opposing movements about whether the moment of rest (*sukūn*) exists between them (*quia media*).<sup>11</sup> Giving a concrete example, a stone that climbs up will stop after a while as a result of the pressure of the air from the outside and turn the direction of movement downwards. Ibn Sīnā handled it in his *Ishārāt* and after that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365) tracked his words and discussed it widely in their commentaries. The risālā of Mu'ayyadzāda is the part of that literature. After rejecting the perpetually of contact (*baqā at-tamās*) in time, he explains the topic around the concepts temporal occurrence (*ḥusūl az-zamānī*), arrival (*wuṣūl*) and separation (*zawāl*). Accordingly, a moment of arrival is also a moment of separation for a point of an object moving in a limited space and distance. To him, the moment of rest here is realized by the continuity of the arrival. Although Mu'ayyadzāda accepts the moment of rest by the atomic theory, it builds it on the concept of the moment (*ān*), not time. Here, it is required to what extent this theory is affected by al-Dawānī. Because Mu'ayyadzāda uses expertly philosophical and theological arguments. In particular, the ontological category of *naḥs al-amr* (fact of matter) to prove the existence of the point may have influenced al-Dawānī, which he has a treatise in this regard.<sup>12</sup>

The risālā that we consider secondly about Mu'ayyadzāda is titled *al-Shubha al-Āmma*. As a matter of fact, that risālā is the ḥāshiya of the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, one of the strongest texts containing theoretical physics among the kalām works. Hereby, it focuses on the concept of time and space as an extension for the

<sup>11</sup> In this subject, see Tzvi Lengerman, "Quies Media: A Lively Problem on the Agenda of Post-Avicennian Physics," *Uluslararası İbn Sīnâ Sempozyumu: Bildiriler*, eds. Mehmet Mazak and Nevzat Özkaya (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2009), II, 53-67.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Dawānī, *Risālā fī Naḥs al-Amr* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Cârullah Bölümü, No. 1159). For an article analyzing it, see Hacer Ergin, "Celâleddin Devvânî'nin Nefsü'l-Emr Anlayışı," *Osmanlı Düşüncesi: Kaynakları ve Tartışma Konuları*, 87-99.

link of continuity and discontinuity that is mentioned in *Risāla A*. The main problem being discussed on (*shubha*) is whether the sphere, which moves at a certain distance, proceeds this distance through a single or adjacent space.

Al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) argues that, for an object moving at a certain distance, there is only one common space (*makān*) between the beginning and the endpoints. However, his location (*kawn*) is constantly being renewed, and his relation varies according to the limits of the distance. Therefore, that limit multiplies in the assumption, as well as these places multiply according to the assumption. Thus, it is possible to assume two adjacent spaces in this continuous space.<sup>13</sup> Mu'ayyadzāda interprets at the beginning the al-Jurjānī's answer to this classic problem, known as "public doubt/ash-shubha al-āmma", and then reasonably sorts the parties he finds right and wrong. As a result, as per his concept of physics, he tries to explain how objects move in basic categories such as space (*makān*), quality (*kayf*), quantity (*kamm*), and disposal (*vaḍ'*).

After illuminating *Risāla B* by the project, then, it would be appropriate to return to the problem of the first one. Because both *risāla* implicitly discuss a theological topic within the possibilities of theoretical physics. This case can be very natural due to the period and ecological conditions they are written in. It makes it difficult to understand these texts because of their focus on abstract problems and using a theoretical language. Besides, the *risālas* stipulate a certain level of equipment -as per the periods- in almost all historical sciences, such as mathematics, physics, logic, philosophy and astronomy.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, it will be inevi-

<sup>13</sup> For the relevant chapter, see al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, ed. and Tr. trans. Ömer Türker (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2013), II, 634-64.

<sup>14</sup> The *ijāzatnāma* obtained by Muayyadzāda from al-Dawānī indicates that he is at a serious level in these disciplines. Mu'ayyadzāda's famous library proves to have a broad interest in these fields. See Pfeiffer, "Mü'eyyadzade Abdurrahman'ın Kütüphanesinin Peşinde: Amasyalı Bir Âlimin Kitap Toplama İhtiyâkı," *Uluslararası Amasya Âlimleri Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı*, eds. Şuayip Özdemir and Ayşegül Gün (Ankara: Kibatek Yayınları, 2017), II, 399-404.

table to treat both risālas together. The fact that these risālas are followed by each other in the copy of Suleymaniye, reveals the condition of priority and posteriority between them.<sup>15</sup> So that they can be compared as such generally:

*Risāla A* has generally discussed the relationship of time and moment, in the context of the problem of contact (*tamās*) which is defined by the terms of *wuṣūl* and *zawāl* under the title of “public doubt”. In contrast, the problem of *makān* is mentioned as the extent of this subject in *Risāla B*. The latter gives a more specific image than previous one with the holistic approach.<sup>16</sup> The prior target of the *Risāla A* is the Aristotelian tradition represented by Ibn Sīnā. In this way, after criticizing the perpetuity of the contact in time, it put forward the temporal occurrence to conclude the aforementioned knot. But in *Risāla B* it seems that the essential respondent is al-Jurjānī and his comment on the nature of space which was preceded by the body transiting between two distance. Both risāla focuses on universal matters that cannot be solely limited to the history of Islamic thought and try to untie it using the local instruments inspired by Islamic theoría. The reference frame in *Risāla A* is quite extensive from the other; that is to say, it cited from the ancient philosophers such as Autolycus (360-290 BCE), Theodosius (160-100 BCE) and Euclid (third century BCE) to important authors of Islamic thought such as al-Jurjānī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and al-Ṭūsī; while in the latter, the issue is mainly examined in opposition to al-Jurjānī. *Risāla A* is also larger in terms of volume, which is divided into two sub-chapter respectively; the cancel of the perpetuity of touch contiguity in time and the well-known doubt, after the entrance that the problem exhibited there, whereas *Risāla B* just handles the category of movement within the sample of the space. In the upcoming phases of our study, these for-

<sup>15</sup> See Mu'ayyadzāda, *Risāla fī al-fuz' Alladhī lā Yatajazzā'* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi Fatih Bölümü, No. 5414), vr. 31-45.

<sup>16</sup> The context that is criticized in *Risāla B* very much looks like the paradox of Zeno in which in the development process, hopefully, that point also will be excavated.



mal comparisons will be made on a content basis; however, after one stage, despite all its difficulty, it may be necessary to go to other works of Mu'ayyadzāda. Then, in his work on logic, as well as the ḥāshiya of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* there is information that we need to consider. Moreover, the notes taken by the Mu'ayyadzāda on the compilation (*taḥrīr*) of al-Ṭūsī will also be important in shedding light his theory of nature.<sup>17</sup>

After treating the Mu'ayyadzāda's treatises which were of our concern now, it will be essential to focus on al-Dawānī. Mu'ayyadzāda did not refer directly to him in both works. Undoubtedly there can be several reasons for this, it seems that both risāla appears to have been written after his turn to Anatolia from Shiraz, and the tradition that prevails here in that era was the Rāzī School.<sup>18</sup> The fact that al-Dawānī did not touch immediately the “well-known” and “public” doubt debates in his works can be considered as a factor in this direction. In any case, extra information and further works will be needed to prove these hypotheses. For this purpose, firstly, the ideas of al-Dawānī about the structure and running of the universe and so his theory of nature will be determined. Therefore, his treatises on the *al-Ithbāt al-Wājib* and the glosses on *al-Aqāid* and *at-Tajrīd* will be treated to grasp his ideas. Afterward, to trace the effects of those ideas in the Ottoman intellectual World, they will be compared with 'Abd al-Raḥmān's natural theology. Mu'ayyadzāda, in particular in his treatise on atoms (*Risāla A*) while he was trying to solve the problems that arose from the tension between Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā in physical matters; he asserted several different ideas from those signified by the Rāzī School. For understanding to what extent those ideas had been affected by al-Dawānī, we

<sup>17</sup> His scribe Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's compilation (*taḥrīr*) of Euclid by making some notes on the edge of the pages also shows his level and concern for that topic. For a related copy, see al-Ṭūsī, *Taḥrīr Uqlīdis fī al-Uṣūl al-Handasa wa al-Ḥisāb* (Istanbul: Beyazıt Kütüphanesi Veliyyüddin Efendi Bölümü, No. 2304).

<sup>18</sup> A detailed information about the Rāzī School in Ottoman, see Müstakim Arıcı, “İslām Düşüncesinde Fahreddin er-Râzî Ekolü,” *İslām Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahreddin er-Râzî*, eds. Ömer Türker and Osman Demir (Istanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2013), 167-202.

should compare the model suggested by them to explain the physical phenomena.

Taking these two treatises to the center and using advantage of his other works and notes additionally, Mu'ayyadzāda's views on the natural issues of the physical realm and the phenomena of time, space and motion can be evaluated. Based on this, al-Dawānī's position between the theories of atomism and hylo-morphism and how he developed a method to solve the knot of contact, etc. can also be questioned. Of course, these questions can be extended, but in the first hand, they will allow us to make an entry-level comparison. At this point, some links can be established that will lead to subsequent studies rather than achieve extremely final and analytical results. Although the historical contact of these two authors is obvious, it is not easy to determine the intellectual transition. Moreover, it seems impossible to specify whether there is the Dawānī School in the Ottoman lands with the efforts of Mu'ayyadzāda, it will be the success of this study, of course, to raise questions that will keep this work on the agenda and inspire new researchs.

### Final Remarks

Of course, in an attempt for hypostasis in a system of thought as an alternative model to the Rāzī School in Ottoman context considering the effects of al-Dawānī, it would be inadequate to focus only on opinions of Mu'ayyadzāda. How and in what dimension this interest proceeded and by whom effected in the following centuries is the point to be emphasized. In this context, some works of Kemalpashazāda, who was the student of Mu'ayyadzāda, on the theory of nature must be evaluated. Also, Ismā'īl al-Galanbawī (d. 1205/1791) who was a distinguished theologian of the 18th century, while discussing the proofs of invalidity of the infinite regress (*tasalsul*) he lined up with al-Dawānī and use his postulates instead of al-Rāzī's one; so that this fact is a very important clue to show the continuing efficacy of his ideas in the later years. No doubt the project, that I will try to under-

stand and bring to light the expression of the Dawānī School, requires a long-term study. In the ongoing process, as a later part of the project, I am planning to show how that influence proceeded for centuries; but in the first phase, it will be adequate to compare al-Dawānī and Mu'ayyadzāda's natural theologies.

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## Spinoza's Distinction between Religion and Reason \*

KİBAR GÜRBÜZ 

Ankara University

Research Article

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**Abstract:** The main point that Spinoza emphasis in his religious criticism is the distinction that he made between religion and philosophy, also, this is becoming the main topic of Spinoza's book named *Theological-Political Treaties*. Spinoza reveals the inaccuracy of attempting to adapt religion to reason/ philosophy or to adapt reason/philosophy to religion, through the works of two prominent names, Mūsā bin Maimūn (Moses Maimonides) and Juda ben Alpakhar, in the Jewish traditional thought. Although these two thinkers belong to the same tradition and the same faith, they differ from each other in terms of methodology. In this study, firstly, we will examine the opinions of Ibn Maimūn and Alpakhar on the subject and subsequently, we will try to analyze the subject with consideration of Spinoza's criticism and comments related to the subject.

**Keywords:** Religion, philosophy, reason, criticism of religion, Spinoza, Mūsā ibn Maimūn (Moses Maimonides), Juda ben Alpakhar.

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## Introduction

Baruch Spinoza's theological approach is closely related to the general characteristics of 17<sup>th</sup> Century Western philosophical thought in which Baruch Spinoza grew and lived in. The 17<sup>th</sup> century is a new philosophical era in every aspect of Western thought history. Descartes (1596-1650) one of the philosophers who played a crucial role in forming the world of thought at that period. Descartes objected to the truth and illogicality of the revelation, on the other hand, he used mathematics as a method to glorify the mind.<sup>1</sup>

Spinoza influenced by Descartes's ideas in different dimensions since Descartes made a similar distinction between reason and religion in his work *Descartes Metaphysical Meditation*.<sup>2</sup> Also, the distinction between theology and philosophy in terms of their content and purpose, that Spinoza indicated, has a very crucial part in Descartes's religious concept.

According to Spinoza, anyone who knows the basis and purpose of religion and philosophy could easily realize that there is a huge gap between these two. In the simplest sense, the main purpose of philosophy is to seek only the truth, but the main purpose of religion is obedience. The ancient stories, a language that has been used in these stories have an essential part in religion, while nature has an essential part in philosophy. Also, religion is generally based on revelation and religious texts.<sup>3</sup> According to Spinoza, the argument about whether the religious text is at the service of the reason or the reason at the service of the religious text and the possibility of adapting religion and reason to each other have been made by those who do not know how to make a distinction between these two disciplines. The defender of the first approach, namely the approach that claims the reli-

<sup>1</sup> Ahmet Cevizci, *17. Yüzyıl Felsefesi* (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2016), 149.

<sup>2</sup> Étienne Balibar, *Spinoza ve Siyaset*, çev. Sanem Soyarslan (İstanbul: Otonom Yayıncılık, 2017), 21.

<sup>3</sup> Baruch Spinoza, *Teolojik-Politik İnceleme*, çev. Cemal Bâli Akal and Reyda Ergün (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2016), 220. [Henceforth, with the acronym TTP]

religious texts should be in the service of the reason is named as skeptics, the defenders of the second approach are named as dogmatists. However, the basis of defender of the both climes is not convincing for Spinoza. Because, in such a case if they have to choose one of these approaches, this means, they have to refuse another one, namely reason or religious texts. Also, the religious text does not teach philosophy and its only attempt to teach how to be obedient in accordance with the abilities of the believers. Therefore, the one who tries to adapt the religious text to philosophy will do a vain effort to achieve an impossible work.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, the one who tries to put philosophy into the service of the religion will have to accept the old-time prejudgments as a religious value, since some people have a religious belief which is based on the superstition and prejudgments. Regarding this understanding, people veil many illogical matters with the mask of religion. In Spinoza's opinion, this kind of belief consists of absurdity and a vain, man-made religion. There is a clear dilemma between religion and philosophy and due to this contradiction, one approach must be rejected while the other one has to be accepted as a criterion. Therefore, the attempts for the adaption of these two disciplines will be fruitless and illogical effort.

Spinoza reveals the falsity of the attempts to adapt religion to reason or to adapt reason to religion through the works of two prominent names in the Jewish philosophical tradition. The first of these names is Mūsā ibn Maymūn. In this part, we will closely analyze his approach to the subject.

### 1. Mūsā ibn Maymūn (Maimonides)

Mūsā ibn Maymūn is one of the most influential names in the Jewish philosophical tradition. Ibn Maimūn is a theologian in addition to his philosopher identity and he was impressed by the Islamic intellectual tradition. His ideas and viewpoint about religion are other points that made him a unique and important name. Although he has the thought that based on Jews discours-

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<sup>4</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 221.



es, “From Moses to Moses there was no equivalent of Moses”<sup>5</sup> he expressed his contradictory opinions to his traditional intellectual system. Jews did not lean towards the ideas that Ibn Maimūn stated about the relationship between religion and reason

Ibn Maimūn tried to reconcile religion and philosophy through the scope of reason. Specifically, He used the interpretation method to reconcile the differences that arise from these two disciplines.<sup>6</sup> Because, he thought that verses and Holy Text should be analyzed allegorically, by the hermeneutic principle. In this sense, if religious scripts are interpreted in this way, then, it will be seen that the reason and religious scripts are compatible with each other.<sup>7</sup> Since, the revelation just as reason is a natural God’s gift to the human being, hence there is no contradiction between these two.<sup>8</sup>

Although Ibn Maimūn has a Philosopher identity, his theologian character is more dominant. Spinoza did not strongly emphasis on the reason, with his theologian identity, especially, while he pointed out the falsity of attempts for adapting religion to reason or adapting reason to religion. Although Ibn Maimūn tried to reconcile the religion and philosophy, he prioritized the revelation in his attempts. Because revelation has a crucial and special place for the salvation of mankind. In this case, the reason is insufficient, and revelation could be taken into consideration as a basic principle.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, in his thought religion is more inclusive and has a larger scope in terms of content and subjects rather than philosophy. Regarding this approach, since the philosophy could not determine the religious principles, it has to continue his existence within the theological framework.

<sup>5</sup> Israil Wilfinson, *Mūsā ibn Maymūn: Hayātuh wa Muşannafātuh* (Cairo: Lajnat at-Ta’lif wa at-Tarjama wa an-Nashr, 1936), 26.

<sup>6</sup> Mūsā ibn Maymūn, *Delâletu’l-Hâirîn*, çev. Osman Bayder and Özcan Akdağ (Kayseri: Kimlik Yayınları, 2019), 70-71.

<sup>7</sup> Leo Strauss, *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 148.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn Maymūn, *Delâletu’l- Hâirîn*, 40-52.

<sup>9</sup> Strauss, *Spinoza’s Critique of Religion*, 147; Ibn Maymūn, *Delâletu’l- Hâirîn*, 91-92.

Although he considerably influenced by Aristotle, he never accepts the superiority of Aristotle over Moses as well as the superiority of Philosophy over the Torah.<sup>10</sup> He thought, despite philosopher obtains many pearls of wisdom abilities through reason, this does not mean, philosophers could have accessibility to all unlimited knowledge. Besides this, Philosophers do not have the capabilities of accessing to the knowledge about the nature of God and many metaphysical issues with only their wisdom. But he thought that prophets are capable to access this knowledge, due to this fact, prophets are superior to philosophers.<sup>11</sup>

Spinoza criticized Ibn Maimūn, despite his importance a crucial contribution to the field of religious studies. The main point of Spinoza's criticism is the efforts of Ibn Maimūn on the instrumentalization of the reason and in this way attempting to adapt religion to the philosophy. Spinoza objected to the argument of Ibn Maimūn for adapting religion to the reason and on the contrary, Spinoza thought that neither theology should be in the service philosophy nor philosophy should be in the service of theology. Namely, these two disciplines should independently prevail in their fields because the fields that have been dominated by these two disciplines are different from each other. Since the master point in the theological field is devotion and obedience while the reason and wisdom are the masters of philosophy. However, if these two phenomena come together, the occurrence of unresolved dilemmas and conflicts would be inevitable due to their contradiction on the yardsticks and value. Theology only obeys what has been dogmatically ordered by religion, even these orders could be illogical, while the reason does not accept anything without questioning. That is why, these two disciplines must operate and exist freely, and without entering the service to each other.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Hüseyin Karaman, "İbn Meymūn'un Düşüncesinde Aklın Sınırları ve Din-Felsefe İlişkisi," *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* 6, no. 4 (2006), 169.

<sup>11</sup> İbn Maymūn, *Delâletu'l- Hâirrin*, s. 91-92.

<sup>12</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 222-25.

## 2. Juda ben Alpakhar

Another name that has been addressed by Spinoza in virtue of his distinctive view on religion and philosophy is Juda ben Alpakhar, the contemporary of Mūsā ibn Maymūn. Although Ibn Maimūn had a remarkable reputation for his lifetime, his view on the compatibility of reason and theology was not accepted by them. Instead, the approach of Jewish theologian Juda ben Alpakhar who thought that the reason should be in the service of the religion/ theology was mostly welcomed at that time.

Alpakhar acknowledges that some statements in the religious scripts could be opposite to the reason. However, he underlined that this is not resulting from religious scripts itself but from misinterpretation that has been made. Merely, he said that these opposite statements do not originate from the holy script itself but from misusing of some certain expressions. According to Alpakhar, the meaning and content of the holy text are not problematic directly. This demonstrates that there is no irrationality in the scriptures, but the uniqueness of the expression in the holy text causes the argument of irrationality. In some specific cases, the statements in the holy text could be explained via metaphors. For instance, the Bible clearly said that God is one<sup>13</sup> no statement claims God is not one in the scriptures. In some sections of the holy text, God uses the plural suffix, when he speaks about himself and the prophets. Naturally, it cannot be a deduction from these statements that God is not one. Therefore, the sections that have such expressions should be interpreted metaphorically. Because in the holy text it is clearly stated that God is one. Also, there are some physical definitions such as the hand, foot and face of God, in some chapters of the holy text, but regarding the previous verse these definitions should be interpreted metaphorically.<sup>14</sup>

To Alpakhar, the definition of whether something right or

<sup>13</sup> Yasa'nın Tekrarı, 6:4.

<sup>14</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 222.

wrong depends on the approval of the Holy Text. This means that Holy Text does not change its approach towards approvals and rejections on a subject in other chapters. In another word, the holy text has internal consistency. That is why he stated that every expression in the holy text that refers to God must be accepted as absolute truth. Regarding this, in the case of encountering contradict expressions in the Scriptures, one should seek the real meaning by interpreting and referring to other chapters of Holy Text.<sup>15</sup>

Spinoza appreciates Alpakhar's interpretation studies on Holy Text. Also, Spinoza finds his work very ironic, how one can object to rationalism while using the rational method. Since, the method should be accurate to be used, to understand the internal consistency of the scripture and determine the veracity of the messages that the prophets brought to the people. By considering this method, then, we will obligatorily use our reason and our related judgments for comprehending what has been stated in the scriptures. If our reason cannot be compatible with religious texts, even if in such a case, how one can determine this without applying to a rational method or reason? Is this should be done by resorting to reason or by excluding the reason completely? Spinoza tried to find answers to these questions. On one hand, if one completely excludes rational methods, this would be an inane approach according to Spinoza. On the other hand, if one only uses rational methods, in this case, scripture would only be under the authority of the reason. Spinoza did severe criticism of the irrational method that has been used in interpreting Scripture. He said that if the scriptures all opposed to the reason, then, we would not accept it or we would turn over it via our mind to reasonable it. Also, the efforts for bringing the Holy Text to the reason will eventuate that some changes should be done to make religion and reason closer to each other. Those who completely exclude the mind from the process for avoiding this dilemma will have to exclude the Divine light(reason), which is the great-

<sup>15</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 224.

est God gift that has been given to mankind. To Spinoza, this is not the right method. Since the real text of God and the noumenal one is the human mind itself. Rejecting this reality will put one in the equal condition of a blind one, that lost his way.<sup>16</sup>

To Spinoza, Alpakhar's argument on the internal consistency of the Holy Text is invalid. Because, first of all, is the Holy Text is consisting of several other scriptures, it has been written at a different time and by different writers. Therefore, taking this kind of text as a standard for the accuracy and rightness and wrongness in such a circumstance will cause problems in terms of internal consistency of the text. Also, Spinoza indicates that Alpakhar's argument about the internal consistency of the holy text is his interpretation. To Spinoza, if he had followed the methods listed below, instead of insisting on the internal consistency of the holy text, his argument would have been on a more coherent ground,

1. Considering the linguistic Structure and the context of the holy scripture.
2. Interpreting the irrational parts metaphorically.
3. Finally, indicating that the holy scripture has not been distorted up until now.<sup>17</sup>

Besides these suggestions, Spinoza asks another question related to the subject: Do we have to consider the holy text as the only authority instead of reason? In response to this question, the possible answer to Alpakhar would be, there is nothing unreasonable in the scripture. Spinoza gives an example of the subject from the scripture. If there is not any contradiction in the scripture, as Alpakhar argued, then how should we understand from the state of the scripture that says God is jealous? If we consider the Holy Text itself as an only criterion in this case, will we understand this statement as it is written in the holy text?

Likewise, if there is a statement that has completely opposite

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<sup>16</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 222-23.

<sup>17</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 224.

meaning to this statement, will we explain it metaphorically as a way of solution.<sup>18</sup> Spinoza pointed out that there are many similar examples in the scripture. For example, in some passages, God is described as motionless, but in other passages, God is depicted as a creator that in a certain place and dynamic.<sup>19</sup> According to Spinoza, the reason for this kind of statement is for adapting the Holy Text to the level of comprehension of ordinary people. However, to Spinoza, we learned this method via reason and philosophy, not from scripture/ we have been taught this method by reason and philosophy, not by holy text. on the one hand, to Alpakhar, these kinds of statements and their meanings also should be considered as truth. On the other hand, to Spinoza, the reason is the only way to determine right from wrong. Alpakhar does not consider reason as a determinant criterion.

To Alpakhar, the Scripture is the only and true authority and every statement in it must be considered as absolute truth. Also, Spinoza does not agree with Alpakhar's ideas that arguing the contradiction between the chapters does not originate from the statements of scripture itself, but it is originated from not interpreting the statements directly. in such a case, how we will explain the fact of the differences between the statement in the scriptures that said God is fire<sup>20</sup> and statement that said God is not like anything<sup>21</sup> in the visible realm, which is on the contrary of Alpakhar's argument. Regarding these, if we consider Alpakhar's approach which is defending that contradiction of these statements originates from indirect interpretations, then we will consider the first statement as absolute truth and believe that God is fire, with a direct interpretation? Spinoza finds this is an inconsistent and absurd explanation.<sup>22</sup> Spinoza says that the approach which is considering the Scripture as the sole authority lead Alpakhar to a deadlock. if we consider what scripture says

<sup>18</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 224.

<sup>19</sup> Mısır'dan Çıkış, 19:20.

<sup>20</sup> Yasa'nın Tekrarı, 6:24.

<sup>21</sup> Yasa'nın Tekrarı, 4:12.

<sup>22</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 224-25.

right as right and wrong as wrong, then we have to accept both of these opposite statements as truth, which is logically impossible. Additionally, Spinoza objected to Alpakhar's statements concerning the contradiction in the scripture to the indirect interpretations. Also, Spinoza finds Alpakhar's statements on the contradiction in the scripture are senseless and as evidence of this, he indicates the existing contradictions in any chapters of the Holy Text. Moreover, he argued that these statements are contradictory in terms of their consequences, but this does not change the fact of their contradiction.

Spinoza states that he has difficulty in understanding the cause of prejudice against reason and cannot make sense of it. Is it not possible to defend his faith without rejecting or turning his back to reason? Does not even the prejudice of a person against reason show that his distrustfulness to the Scripture? If one believes that his own belief is true, then why he is afraid to resort to reason. Spinoza came to the conclusion that the view of those who argue that religion must be in the service of the reason or reason must be in the service of religion and they cannot rule/operate in a separate field are wrong. Spinoza criticized the religious view and argument of the masses based on dogmatic and superstitions, as well as criticized the arguments of philosophers such as Ibn Maimūn and Alpakhar in the field of religion without hesitation. Particularly, his criticism on religion was not directed towards a certain religion and certain persons, but rather than this, towards the illogical approach and arguments that have been produced by them. Another point that related to the issue and Spinoza pointed out that he has difficulty to understand people who defining their suspect about reason and their judgment as a pure faith, and blaming those who are skeptical about the people that convey the messages of the scriptures to us as a faithless. This kind of attitude is "not a religious devotion but pure foolishness", according to Spinoza.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 223.

We have explained Spinoza's ideas about the arguments of Ibn Maimūn and Alpakhar on the relationship between religion and philosophy so far. We see that he criticized both approaches. Well then, what is Spinoza's argument about the relationship between religion and philosophy. Spinoza defines reason as the light of the mind in respect of the relationship between religion and reason. Also, he defines the Scripture as a synonym of revelation and the word of God. To Spinoza, revelation, namely, the word of God is not only restricted to a certain number of books. Because the scripture is meant to understand the mind of the prophets. Comprehending the divine mind is something else. Comprehending the divine mind is meant to understand the reality of things, beings without any intermediaries. Spinoza argued the universality of theology.<sup>24</sup>

To Spinoza, the real meaning of the scripture should be derived only from its history, not from the principle of the universality. Because the principle of universal history forms the basis of philosophy. The meaning of the scripture should be deduced from its history and at this stage, even if we deduced irrational meaning from the scripture, still this should not stop us. For, the things that we comprehend by our minds are opposed to religion and words of God. Therefore, in such cases, people are free to think as they will. Because, the unreasonable adscititious issues in the scriptures are consist of insignificant social and personal matters or they have been added to the scripture, not the main issues matter.<sup>25</sup>

Spinoza tries to prove the distinction between religion and philosophy/reason by relying on the thesis that the nature of these two disciplines is different. He is questioning the possibility of establishing the accuracy and inaccuracy of the view on people who could be only saved by obedience. In this case, if one believes blindfolded and without resorting to reason, then he will be alike desperate and mindless people. Additionally, at-

<sup>24</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 226.

<sup>25</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 226.



tempting to determine this by relying on reason, will also make theology/ religion as a part of the activity of the mind. Spinoza makes this explanation regarding these two contradictions: no one can explain the dogma of theology with the reason (*natural light*) and it is not possible. In this condition, revelation remains as the only source to be consulted. However, we can consult our judgment to determine the reality or rather than this the morality of revelation.

To Spinoza, the preciseness which is essential for the prophets is essential for the scriptures as well, since the authority of the scriptures is based on the authority of the prophecy. In this case, the holy text truth depends on the preciseness of morality. We cannot expect from a prophet, that is sent by God and convey his messages, to go beyond revelation to determine the reality of it. However, we could consider moral certainty as to the yardstick of revelation. In this sense, Spinoza infers that the messages are conveyed by religion and prophets and have moral aspect could be considered as a basis, the matters out of this aspect cannot be explained by reason. The religion that Spinoza mentioned as a religion cannot be explained by reason, it is based on revelation and the outside of moral teachings.

We have tried to demonstrate the definitions of Spinoza about how the relationship between religion and philosophy should be. Hereby, we will try to examine how Spinoza grounded his argument that theology and philosophy are independent fields.

Spinoza makes mention of those who claim that theology and philosophy in conflict with each other and they argue that when one of these two (religion and philosophy) should not exist in the influence area of the other. Although he generally criticizes both sides his main criticism towards those who prioritize theology and use mathematical methods and reason to strengthen its ground. Regarding this point, the person that Spinoza referred to as Ibn Maimūn. To Spinoza, this approach has an exact contradiction. Because Ibn Maimūn again has to consult to rea-

son even when he wants to prevail it from the field of theology. However, with this approach, they put theology under the authority of reason. Besides, consulting to the reason for such an aim will conclude that theology is insufficient and will be in deficiency without reason. Also, Spinoza finds the attempts of the people who consulting a rational approach to persuade irreligious people unrealistic. Especially, he does not find adequate their statements on linking this attempt with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is consisting of a peaceful mind that occurs only because of good deeds. However, for other issues reason must get involved. Because the existence of reason is necessary for reality.<sup>26</sup>

As can be seen, Spinoza's approach in general based on the distinction of religion and reason/philosophy, namely, these two disciplines should not be in the service of each other and both religion and reason should rule over freely on their specific ground. But this issue merely raises the following questions: Does not mean that Spinoza, who considers the reason as a yardstick in field of religion and as a rationalist philosopher, has contradiction when he says that there should be the distinction between reason and religion and while he somehow advocates, with Wolfson's terms, '*the religion of reason*'<sup>27</sup> Actually, we can find the answer to this question through the background of his statements. Spinoza discusses religion and reason as two disciplines that should freely obtain in their field. Nevertheless, these two disciplines are needed and in total harmony with each other in terms of purposes.<sup>28</sup> Spinoza distinguishes these two disciplines from each other, but in the meanwhile combine them. Based on the general argument of Spinoza. We can say that religion and reason can obtain independently, but also, they could peacefully live together for the common purposes that they have.

<sup>26</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 228-29.

<sup>27</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books. 1961), II, 328.

<sup>28</sup> Musa Kazım Arıcan, *Spinoza Felsefesi Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: Divan Kitap, 2015), 184.

Reason and religion could be interpreted as two reflections of the same truth, within the context of Spinoza's conception.

To Spinoza, God has given natural light (reason) characteristics to all minds. All the religions, that have a longstanding, essentially express the truths that have been pointed out or found by natural light (reason) as truth.<sup>29</sup> However, within time, people and theologians have distorted religions for the sake of some certain benefits.

The main purpose of Spinoza is going beyond the dogmatic religious perspective that exists in his period, to arguable religion philosophically. Dogmatics perceive the truths as they are written in the religious text. Namely, they do not accept that the views in the Scriptures are negotiable. However, Spinoza, unlike dogmatic, tries to retrieve the supra-rational and contra rational knowledge in the Scripture from the revelation ground.

### Conclusion

Spinoza states that religion and philosophy are different in terms of purpose and content, hence they must exist and continue independently. Because, obedience is prevalent in theology, while the reality is prevalent in philosophy. In this sense, Spinoza mainly criticized Ibn Maimūn, who tries to reconcile religion and philosophy through the scope of reason, and Alpakhar, who argues that the reason should be in the service of religion. In this respect, Spinoza did not only criticize the religious conception and arguments of the cases following dogmatics and superstition. But also criticize the views of philosophers such as Ibn Maimūn and Alpakhars about religion. The fact that his criticism towards two important names of Jewish tradition, also shows that he has made an internal criticism about the subject.

Finally, the main reason for his distinction that he made between religion and philosophy is similar to the general purpose of his work named *Theological and Political Studies (TTP)*. Be-

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<sup>29</sup> Spinoza, *TTP*, 95-105.

cause, when we carefully analysis his book *TTP*, we can see that the idea of separation of political power and theology and in parallel with that religion and philosophy should be discussed separately. His aim primarily is establishing political freedom, establishing freedom of belief and differentiating reason and religion from each other. In this sense, even though Spinoza tries to explain the issues as a purely religious matter through the examples from the Scriptures, he added a political purpose in the matter.


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## Religion, Pluralism, and the Problem of Living Together in the Light of Kymlicka's Thoughts: An Overlapping Consensus or A Modus Vivendi?

SELÇUK ERİNCİK   
Ankara University

Research Article

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**Abstract:** Today's societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi.

**Keywords:** Modernism, postmodernism, religion, living together, modus vivendi, overlapping consensus.

## Introduction

This article includes some concepts such as modernism, postmodernism, religion, living together, *modus vivendi* and overlapping consensus in the light of Will Kymlicka's thoughts.<sup>1</sup> However, they require many others to mention. So, since pluralism and living together come with identity and recognition matters, this work will include these two, among others. Accordingly, I will refer to them much.

I will handle this far-reaching, multilayer issue that requires almost every discipline of philosophy, the philosophy of history as well as sociology. By the way, it is useful to specify that by religion I primarily imply monotheistic religions with personal God as *ex nihilo* creator of everything, belief in the afterlife and legal, political order. After all, concepts such as pluralism, autonomy and questioning will be examined to make clear whether or not they are reasonable from the religious perspective and coherent even from their own inner logic, contingent or final phase of humanity. And as the last step: it will be discussed what the appropriate religious reaction to this reality can be.

It is widely accepted that modernity was raised on the individual/self who constructed his own self and the nation-state became the political organization of this individual. However, the nation-state that claims to be based on homogeneous race, language, ethnicity, and culture has produced many "disadvantaged others" and caused fatal sorrows. With the second part of

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<sup>1</sup> This article is based on my TUBITAK Research Project, the title of which is *Religion, Pluralism and the Problem of Living together in Political Philosophy within the Transition Period from Modernism to Postmodernism: An Overlapping Consensus or a Modus Vivendi* that I completed at Queen's University (Kingston, Canada) under the tutelage of famous philosopher Will Kymlicka from August 2018 to August 2019 in accordance with 2219 International Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship Program. I would like to take this opportunity to thank TUBITAK for their support and to Kymlicka, despite his great reputation, for never refusing my appointment requests and being kind enough to discuss various issues of political philosophy. Accordingly, I generally use the materials I collected from our conversations with Kymlicka, unless otherwise specified, during my research period there along with some other sources.

the 20. century, the subject and hence the nation-state underwent weakening. The placement of the subject in history, culture and a context gave rise to a perception according to which human being was a product of their environment. Therefore it was accepted that the commitments that encompass the subject such as society, skin color, language, culture, religion were effective factors as “sources of the self” in the process of the making of the identity.<sup>2</sup> The logical result of this acceptance is that the individuals who are deprived of their commitments feel an ontological imperfection and disintegration. That's why the politics of the identity, recognition and multiculturalism that demands some respect and rights for those with a different culture, language, etc. the nation-state has usually suppressed instead of discerning has gained an important position in the political theory of the postmodern world.

The sentences of the last paragraph would be a good abstract of what has been going on for decades. However, it needs a clear explanation and discussion in detail. So, after sketching World's intellectual panorama, I will try to give common ideas related to the reasons and transformations by means of which today's controversial agenda has come into being. I'll analyze this topic at the philosophical level by referring to the concepts above and at the practical level to the facts, Will Kymlicka, the most leading liberal theorist of multiculturalism<sup>3</sup>, has pointed out. However, I will argue that these two levels are not completely separate or disconnected, for in practice if there are still some people, minority, immigrant, refugee or native fellow citizens, there must be some theoretical reasons which should be searched or there may be just practical reasons and facts. But, this time, they should be

<sup>2</sup> This is such an important issue that no socio-political philosophy attempt can ignore. There is a large literature but especially Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* is very important. See Charles Taylor, *Benliğin Kaynakları: Modern Kimliğin İnşası*, Tr. trans. Selma A. Baş and Bilal Baş (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Tariq Modood, *Çokkültürcülük: Bir Yurttaşlık Tasarımı*, Tr. trans. İsmail Yılmaz (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2014), 39.



theorized to form schemes and frameworks. Doubtlessly, to know reasons and conclusions is a good starting point to be able to cope with the challenges of pluralism and living together.

Kymlicka's view on the matters that cause especially religions to get involved in political issues is practical rather than being meta-narrative concerning the postmodern, post-structuralist paradigmatic shift from modernism. For example, according to him, what called Rawls's attention to the relations between religions and political process was largely abortion conflict and the resistance from religious sides. He holds that Rawls was more worried about the future and stability of liberal democracy and that he attempted to develop a new interpretation of liberalism to be able to answer this challenge and prevent liberal democracy from being scattered around such topics.

### **The Decentralization of the Modern Self as the Harbinger of New World**

As the postmodern condition, the well-known definition of which is incredulity toward metanarratives has gained importance and become tangible more and more in every aspect of human life and with the spreading of the idea that individuals/selves are constructed in a socio-cultural-political-historical context, social structures and other features of background cultures of people have been started to be seen as a crucial and indispensable part of human beings, instead of the abstract, ahistorical, universal, homogeneous, isolated subject of modernism who creates himself and the entire world out of nothing.

Therefore, it is hard to think that these features are contingent things that are easily separated from human identity. From now on these are the constitutive elements of identity. The turn from the understanding of ahistoric self-isolated from all contingencies to the contextual one which is located in historical-social-cultural bonds means that we owe our identities to the others. Consequently, this leads to the idea that it should be accepted

human beings are the bearers of different faiths, languages, ethnicities, genders, colors, cultures which all make undeniable contributions to the formation of their identities. Doubtlessly, it is a game-changing approach to human beings modern universalism oppressed or at least ignored.

By the same token, it has been claimed that in the postmodern period, with the decentralization of modern self and the nation-state which is seen as identical to the former, so many elements that construct different identities and subjects have taken to the stages. As formulated by Rawls' *reasonable pluralism*, the contemporary world consists of many worldviews, comprehensive doctrines, different cultures. Hence, one can hardly see homogeneous societies that do not need to face the minorities demanding recognition of their identities and asking for respect for cultural differences.<sup>4</sup>

### Pluralism, Identity and Recognition as Challenging Outputs

Modern societies face minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the *challenge of multiculturalism*.<sup>5</sup> It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the value of human beings. This transformation is described as the collapse of old hierarchies which are the source of honor. Instead of a concept of honor, just some people have, now the honor of citizenship everybody equally has and necessary for democracy.<sup>6</sup> Therefore "to find morally defensible and politically valid answers is the most serious challenge modern democra-

<sup>4</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Çokkültürlü Yurttaşlık: Azınlık Haklarının Liberal Teorisi*, Tr. Trans. Abdullah Yılmaz (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1998), 37.

<sup>5</sup> Kymlicka has a key question to understand the transformation: why has a new citizenship that focuses on the politics of identity and differences taken the place of a social-right-based one that seeks the unity by getting equal education and wealth. He states that there are two kind of hierarchies: Economical and Status. The former demands politics of redistribution whereas the latter does the politics of recognition which aims at selling the differences.

<sup>6</sup> Charles Taylor, "Tanınma Politikası," Tr. trans. Yurdanur Salman, *Çokkültürlülük; Tanınma Politikası*, ed. Amy Gutman (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), 44.

cies have encountered.”<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, the last years of the previous century witnessed the emergence of a series of intellectual and political movements. These have traditions, lifestyles that are different from those of dominant culture and hence they are being oppressed. Although they have differences in the way that there can be no common philosophical and political agendas, these groups have resisted against the oppression of dominant culture which is homogenizing and assimilating and against the claim that there is only one true path to follow.<sup>8</sup>

According to Kymlicka, a nation is an institutionally developed historical community which has a separate language and culture on the same territory. A country including at least two or more cultural groups is a multinational/multicultural state, not a national one. As for multiculturalism which can be called as a demand to minimize the risks for all nations, social groups appear as a puzzle asking how can we provide justice, equality among the three sides, the ones who believe homogeneous *national identity*, and the ones who trace the signs of their cultures in their *ethnic identity* and the ones who see their *religion* as their identity too.<sup>9</sup> In relation to that, *the politics of recognition* upon which today’s social and political life centered simply states that ethnic origins, skin colors and cultures of individuals have to be politically and legally accepted. The concept of identity with which the politics of recognition and multiculturalism have a close relationship can be used about everything that separates individuals or groups from others as well as all elements they choose or inherit and play important role in their thoughts about themselves. Therefore, the demand that the recognition of identity differences has to be accepted is assumed to be a crucial part of politics of recognition.

<sup>7</sup> Kymlicka, *Çokkültürlü Yurttaşlık*, 25-26.

<sup>8</sup> Bikhu Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek: Kültürel Çeşitlilik ve Siyasal Teori*, Tr. trans. Bilge Tanrıseven (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2002), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Modood touches on the confusion about some issues after 9/11, terror attacks: are pluralism, multiculturalism dead or have they made the differences “ob-session” and are they really has-been now? Modood, *Çokkültürcülük*, 24-28.

Some thinkers like Taylor hold that we should consider, to understand the close connection between identity and recognition, a crucial characteristic of the human condition that monological inclination of mainstream modern philosophy made nearly invisible. Therefore, today identity has to get recognition via interactions, which leads people to the acceptance of such a necessity. Now, besides, we are facing with the demands going beyond the recognition and explanation of specific cultures. The desire for recognition in multicultural politics appears as the recognition of the individual's culture and their cultural identities. Modood claims that the normative and pragmatic rationale of multiculturalism is that the oppressed identities people care about and that it can never be ignored neither for the sake of individuals nor for the citizenship needs respect.<sup>10</sup>

### **Nation-State versus Pluralism, Multiculturalism and Politics of Identity**

The politics of identity and recognition has another modernity-oriented facet: their connection to the reign of nation-states.<sup>11</sup> In the post-Westphalian period, the nation-state strengthened its hegemony with the help of its nature which overlapped with early capitalism. Nation-state which has the right to use legitimate force/violence is also the point where solid power is centralized. As Anderson said, in modern times it was the nation-state that founded its nation/people with constitutive myths.<sup>12</sup> But such a construction necessitates rendering people one homogenous body by ignoring differences and using educa-

<sup>10</sup> Modood, *Çokkültürcülük*, 167.

<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, for sure, modernism was put on trial on the ground that it caused deep sorrows and troubles all around the world. Besides the calamities, it brings forward have been accepted as the inevitable consequences of some fundamental ideas. So some big thinkers such as Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon, among many others have been held responsible for this situation, which has also provided the new theories with ground and legitimacy, even if they insist they do not need any kind of legitimacy or justification.

<sup>12</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, Tr. trans. İskender Savaşır (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007), 20.

tion, ideological history, eventually violence as many historical facts have proved. This means that even though the nation-state aims at going beyond ethnic differences and making one nation a super-ethnos which embraces all ethnic differences, for the sake of it, it made some groups minorities. Herein lies the source of tension between nation-state and multiculturalism. Once it is understood that nation-state which is expected to solve the problem of unity can only do it by oppressing a remarkable number of people, that nation-state underwent a process of losing power and legitimacy became manifest.<sup>13</sup> So some claim that losing its legitimacy forced the nation-state to replace its public sphere which is close to cultural membership that rests in different life practices and based on homogenous citizenship with a new one which is sensitive and respectful to differences. It is told that on the one hand nation-state that was weakened by the emergence of a national and international cultural and electronic network, the local and global political actors seem too small to cope with economical, ecological and informatics problems, but on the other hand too big to hear identity-based social movements.

### Will Kymlicka's Thoughts

I will try to exhibit Kymlicka's ideas. He has explained these opinions in our conversations in which he has attributed the birth of recognition, identity and multiculturalism primarily to the phenomenal world rather than the noumenal world. It can be said that his approach to the socio-political philosophy shows very practical characteristics. He seems that he thinks it useless to look for some deeper speculative, metaphysical meanings and reasons in history and human conduct.

Therefore, for him, the issue has more practical roots like immigrants. With the coming of those immigrants with different cultures, religions, languages, color skins emerged the problems of pluralism, multiculturalism and living together. He maintains

<sup>13</sup> Gerd Baumann, *Çokkültürcülük Bilmecesi: Ulusal, Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlikleri Yeniden Düşünmek*, Tr. trans. Işıl Demirakın (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2006), 35.

that for instance, today's Canada is closer to the overlapping consensus while what they first did to indigenous people could be a *modus vivendi*. The dominant culture has more just feelings about indigenous people than before, which is moral itself. According to him, *modus vivendi* is real-politics but we as humans have been trying to head towards *overlapping consensus*. In this direction, he attaches importance to recognition. He thinks that everybody wants to be recognized by others. All groups think of how others see them. We are so obsessed with the opinions of others.

Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, either. So it is not true that we can not get common grounds because we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He also argues that there are no things such as modernism and postmodernism separated from each other by thick lines. Besides, he refuses the idea that in modernity there was a universal consensus whereas postmodernism makes it a long shot. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. The idea of the nation served this purpose. Although it has had some bad examples in the course of its history like Hitler, not all nations have some flaws. So it is crucial to living together as a national culture. Kymlicka thinks that the idea of a nation has still positive energy, hence what should be done is to liberalize it, not removed.

He thinks that we should work to calm it down at two levels. The strategies of social sciences about strengthening living together have to focus on the creation of public spheres in which communicate and stay together with their differences without any fear. After regulating local levels and connecting them, it must be thought at the national level. However *right-wing populism* and *white supremacism* have been bringing damage to these efforts. There have been and will always be us/them discrimina-

tion. But we are always getting socialized everywhere in the ordinary routine of daily life, on the streets, in the malls. We are not monads. That is the culture we inherited, and we do nonstop daily moral explanations. Humans are moral beings and show it every day. There are values, rules which render our lives meaningful. So, our efforts for justice contain justification and persuasion, definitely not threat, which is again a moral process itself. Persuasion is more moral than threatening. For achieving the politics of living together, he supports the approach of “live and let them live” and mutual non-interference. Because, for him, the most significant promises of any liberal democracy are freedom and equality of its citizens. Besides, according to Kymlicka, individual autonomy is a right for every individual to question and decide to change the lifestyles, religious community that inherited from parents.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike the general discontent about nation-state in recent times, he has positive thoughts about nation and welfare nation-state. The idea of a nation has done good deeds and supported the welfare state. This energy should be utilized by amending its extremisms. According to Kymlicka, the welfare state should be strong enough to reduce inequality. However, with the leadership of Reagan and Thatcher, the free-market economy attacked the welfare state and it has been on the decline ever since. Finally, free markets crushed it.<sup>15</sup> That’s why the steps to justice stopped in the 1980s. In the meanwhile, *welfare chauvinism* that has a distrust of other races appeared. If the government helps Canadians, chauvinists do not object, if it helps others they ob-

<sup>14</sup> Despite being a very distinguished philosopher, Kymlicka's emphasis on daily practical life and phenomena rather than philosophical abstractions is also understood from the fact that he points out to me the university youth with different origins walking together on Queen's University campus. According to him it is a strong evidence that human beings are moral beings and able to live together. As can be seen, these ideas are mostly the ones taken from our conversations.

<sup>15</sup> About the function and history of welfare state, see Asbjorn Wahl, *Refah Devletin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü*, Tr. trans. Haldun Ünal and Baran Öztürk (İstanbul: H2O Kitap, 2015).

ject. He thinks that our basic political problem is to find a solution for how we can get support for the welfare state and social consent for it. We have been in the age of nativist populism since 2008. Humans worry about concern for the future. A fight between elites and people emerged but there is a misunderstanding about the definition of the enemy: are Bankers, that is, the ones who waste people's money or the others? While the answer is obvious, they fired arrows of criticism to the others and racist grudge came into existence. The feeling of economic ambiguity dominated, which actually meant the domination of perception instead of reality. The young generation who does not see gay marriage wrong anymore is not aware that the welfare state had a big role in this kind of liberties. So, since they found it already available, it seems spontaneous.<sup>16</sup>

Today's reality is nation-states. The idea of a nation includes a desire for a collective agent/actor. People imagine themselves as agents acting together. The idea of a nation is based on people who act together and a sense of belonging to a territory/land.<sup>17</sup> They must be able to communicate to act together. If being a nation can only be possible by creating a society, it requires belonging to certain land and shared public culture. He states that these are pre-conditions for a nation to be a democracy. According to Kymlicka, these conditions in question may be realized by a race-obsessed society and even some can claim that one can only be a member of the society so long as their grandfathers were the members of the same society. That is called *biological social membership*. But, for him, those whose grandfathers were not the members of society can also be the members by coming a country and feeling of belonging and being a part of it (just like his

<sup>16</sup> By the way, he sees himself as left-liberal, not a libertarian. He does not accept to be "communitarian", either.

<sup>17</sup> Kymlicka has "still" deep positive feelings concerning welfare nation states that he applies the ideas developed for political structures and concepts of human condition to the "animal condition". This approach is also clear in the book *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*, about which I am about to publish an article: "Zoopolis or Postmodern Fabl".



forefathers). That is *nonbiological membership*. Besides, one can inherit from the past actions of his/her country since they have become a part of it now. For instance, he says that although his ancestors had nothing to do with the slaughter of indigenous people, he takes responsibility. Therefore, he has responsibility for the past and future generations. This patriotism must be passed on to the next generations.

He states that the multiculturalism started 60s in Canada and had different reasons such as the human rights revolution and the democratization of liberalism. But it had no relation with religion. Only when religious groups began to take an active role in the discussions on multiculturalism in the 80s and 90s, Canada has confronted an ongoing problem that how can religions be integrated into the multicultural structure which was based on democracy, liberalism and rights aftermath of 60s. *Ethnicity, race and religion* are the three layers, waves, phases of multiculturalism.<sup>18</sup> So there is no need for some “post-multicultural” concepts to discuss them. He claims that they are already included in the inner logic of multiculturalism, which means that the discussion of belief problems is also multiculturalism, not post-multiculturalism. According to him, the problem is how to relate post-1960s multiculturalism in Ontario to the Catholic-Protestant tension in the 1880s that occurred not based on the human rights, liberalism, and democracy. They faced each other with just power politics. But it still gave some rights to some groups like Catholics even if they did not confront a rights-based liberal framework. Nonetheless, the problem is that there are still some groups that have fewer rights than the Catholics had the 1880s even though Canada has been constantly trying to apply liberal democratic values. This matter results from the fact that some Christian groups, before the multiculturalism conditions, got

<sup>18</sup> Will Kymlicka, “The Three Lives of Multiculturalism,” *Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada*, eds. Shibao Guo and Lloyd Wong (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2015), 17-35. Here, he explains the origin of multiculturalism as a three-layer-process: From ethnicity to race, from ethnicity and race to religion.

some different rights from the ones which seem correct in terms of the logic of liberal democracy. It's hard to get rid of and to know how to do with that asymmetry.

As we have pointed out, Kymlicka has doubts about the great narratives of secularization, modernism and postmodernism. However, he holds that it is evident that US academia defended secularist modernism in philosophy, sociology and politics in the 50s-60s. The same was valid for race and ethnicity. There was a strong belief in the rationalization and secularization of societies. But it has been proven wrong both for religion, race and ethnicity. People see now that modernity is not the sole way and they do not believe its meta-narrative. Canadians and Americans were living in both secular-liberal and kind of patriarchal states. But soon after the human rights revolution, in 1965, with the liberalization of laws on the criminalization of homosexuality and abortion as well as banning of divorce and gender discrimination, things started to change. They all provoked a religious reaction from evangelic Christians and conservative Catholics. It triggered a counter-revolution and a culture war between secular liberals and religious conservatives. This conflict, at the very beginning, was about the decriminalization of homosexuality. But today, after it cooled off, there are severe debates about same-sex marriages.

However, the fact that religions have become apparent and active more and more may not mean the return/revival of religions. Kymlicka has some doubts about what has returned. It may not be religion in the traditional meaning of the word, but kind of spiritualisms, the essence of which is the suggestion that people feel as if something important is missing because of a life captivated by a world of materialist consumption. This can be called an "escape of materialism." Nevertheless, the reason why they are not religious, but spiritualist is that they deeply internalized the liberal democratic values. Therefore, they cannot put up with established churches. Even if some tend towards spiritual things since they feel something went wrong in such a material-

istic world<sup>19</sup>, in any case, the remedy is the liberal rights. These non-religious but spiritual groups who internally feel uneasiness support the liberal gay rights, whilst those who challenge liberal rights are religious conservatives. According to Kymlicka;

Very few, if any, of the religious-based claims being raised in Canada today threaten the principle of secularism. No one is seriously proposing to replace the secular state with a religious state or to privilege one faith over others in tax codes or service delivery. The real issue, I believe, is not secularism, but human rights, and in particular norms of individual freedom and equal citizenship. The task for the third stage of multiculturalism is to determine which claims for religious accommodation enhance the freedom of individuals to lead the kinds of lives they choose, strengthen their ability to participate as democratic citizens in our collective life, and remedy the inherited stigmas and burdens that minorities have faced. As I said, this can only be done on a case-by-case basis: there is no magic formula, such as ‘secularism,’ that can solve all these issues at once. And we can only address these case-by-case issues if we create new mechanisms of consultation, participation and deliberation that enable the expression of the full range of voices within religious communities.<sup>20</sup>

He thinks that sociological and psychological biases still prevent us from a better understanding of the world. But if we count on post-structuralism which holds that every thought is equally valid, it cannot be certain what is bias or not because of the absence of any standard. So, what about Rawls’ position on fixing standards? Rawls and Dworkin had a significant role in the justification of redistribution politics and made a huge contribution to the constitutional liberal welfare state. Rawls justified basic liberal values and said we should respect each other. He decisively defended that there is a coherency between redistribution and

<sup>19</sup> For the discussions on moral behaviors and (post)modern world, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Etğın Tüketiciler Dünyasında Bir Şansı Var mı?*, Tr. trans. Funda Çoban and İnci Katırcı (İstanbul: De Ki Yayınları, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> Kymlicka, “The Three Lives of Multiculturalism,” 31.

equality, freedom, not a gap. Even if one does not share the common doctrines of good, he can still get on well with them. A sense of belonging/commitment has other roots. It must not necessarily be originating from common views of good. The tension between modernism and postmodernism cannot explain Rawls' approach. He has a specific motive when handling religions: Abortion. He was trying to answer to a culture war in the context of the abortion conflict. This was the main reason. What was none was that the liberal rights revolution stirred serious resistance among conservatives. There can be two answers one of which is to assert that religions are only superstitions, intrinsically illiberal, pre-modern dinosaurs, hence they should not be taken seriously. We should exclude them and follow modern liberalism. This is one extreme. The second one is the position of post-modernist/relativist circles who assert that there is no objective reason, truth. Rawls follows a different path. He thinks that it is incumbent upon us to find a solution by which religious people can see themselves as volunteer members of a democratic regime. Rawls did not want the USA to get involved in culture wars. Therefore, he looked for a middle way between two extremes.<sup>21</sup>

Kymlicka thinks that although the west is not self-interested about their citizens but irrelevant to the rest of the World. In brief, foreign politics is Hobbesian. Some maintain that domestic politics is about justice, whereas foreign politics should be based on self-interest. This is philosophically incoherent, for we must adopt strong moral responsibilities. Morality has to be universal which tells us to help those in need. As Pogge said that even if "the more advantaged citizens of the affluent countries" do not believe such a moral principle that demands to help those who

<sup>21</sup> Rawls, the most important political philosopher of the last century, writes a lot about the stability of liberal democracies under the conditions of reasonable pluralism and developed so many concepts, ideas especially in his works: John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2003), 184-188. See also Selçuk Erincik, "Kamusal Aklın Sınırları İçinde Din (John Rawls'un Düşünceleri Bağlamında)," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 51, no. 2 (2010), 291-314.

suffer in other countries, they still have to help them because they are the ones who pushed them into the poverty. The affluent countries are actively responsible for most of the life-threatening poverty in the World.<sup>22</sup> The poor ones did not do that by themselves. The universal economy-political system forced millions of people to be confined in a structure within which the rich and powerful peoples are at the top of the decision-making mechanism. Seeing that humans incline to think that their interests are compatible with universal interests, they cannot see that these interests are actually against those of others. People really have to discern that they get some advantages at the cost of sufferers, lives of others in remote countries. Eventually, power reproduces itself. It is striking that powerful societies think the world is just. They believe that their countries act justly. So the riddle is: How can one think that the world is just while they are taking advantage of such inequalities? The answer is that human nature sees itself to be reasonable, which is a cognitive thing. Human beings have some strong biases to justify their privileged position. As moral beings, humans want to believe that they are acting morally. The problem is not that they do not have a sense of justice or ignore it or not to commit moral judgments. It is the decomposing of them within injustice and the conditions of will to power. Since we are beings with deeply incomplete reason and not good at reasoning, our reasons are not enough to remove all inequalities. We are incomplete biased, fallible beings whose theories are not sufficient to catch the World. However, we have to try to be more objective and humbler in our lives. Human beings should discuss this main question: what we owe others in politics, morality. What kind of reasoning can be legitimate when using reason? It is a sense of justice.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," *The Journal of Ethics* 9, no. 1 (2005), 29.

<sup>23</sup> Pogge's remarks are of importance. For him, "a prominent concept in economics is that of homo economicus, an individual who, single-mindedly and rationally, seeks optimally to satisfy his preferences. Such imaginary creatures are not good approximations of persons in the real world." Therefore, lots of politicians and economists' function as ideologists for the elites of developed

According to Kymlicka, liberal political philosophy needs a theory about the distribution of the responsibility to decide who is responsible for what and to what extent? He thinks that the most fundamental question of political philosophy is this: "who is responsible for what?" But we can not solve it referring to the metaphysical free will. This debate does not give any answer to how can we be held responsible for our behaves to each other. Even in Spinoza's Universe, the question of responsibility should be solved. This has no connection with the issue of free will. Even if someday somebody claims that there is no free will and that all of us are predetermined, the responsibility would still matter.<sup>24</sup>

The liberal riddle is to determine what gives the right to govern the others to those holding the state power. This is a long-term liberal puzzle, that is to say, to justify the right to govern the others and to decide the way they are supposed to behave. The problem for liberals is that the state power has always the potential to be used for oppressing some people. So, we need a balance between the usage of state power and the rights of people. First, we should handle the state and show that it needs the consent of people. One of the ways to get the consent is Lockean approach, which is the liberal side of liberal democracy in the sense that the state needs the consent,<sup>25</sup> whereas its democratic side starts with the people and asks: Why do the people demand a state?

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countries, "much like most theologians did in an earlier age." Thus, he thinks, somebody can claim that global inequality and poverty are "not a question of justice." Besides, if we look at the experts, we see important flaws: "From Amartya Sen to the Chicago School, which is overwhelmingly focused on relating the persistence of severe poverty to local causes -bad governance, sexist culture, geography, and much else- while leaving unstudied the huge impact of the global economic order on the incidence of poverty worldwide." Pogge, "Real World Justice," 29-30.

<sup>24</sup> These, again, can be taken as Kymlicka's focus on praxis rather than conflictual abstract concepts.

<sup>25</sup> Locke is an important and positive figure in the liberal political philosophy with his famous concepts such as consent, freedom, labor and property. Nevertheless, it is also a very disputable matter. Parekh, for instance, explains how Locke's labor theory of property had a merciless justificatory role in the colonization process of lands of the indigenous people in America. Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 47-52.

From the angle of democracy, the main idea is that the state is just a medium for implementing the will of people. This is the idea of popular sovereignty. The people are sovereign and they use the state as a tool for their goals. But the riddle of the democracy side of liberal democracy, for both sides indeed, is that they do not have certain answers for which people, of all, have the right to govern the others, this or that or only one or ten peoples? Democracy and liberalism cannot say which people should govern. They can just demand that the people holding the state power and using it have to do it in compliance with liberal democratic rights.

Political philosophy, for Kymlicka, is a normative matter of just about the right to govern others. “Might makes right” is not the answer. On the contrary, it is just the opposite of bargaining about justice which is a highly normative concept. Politics is about solving conflicts. But given that conflicts cannot be removed, it does not require as if persuasion has no place in politics, otherwise, we will face threatens and bargaining. The essence of Rawls’ theory is that the advantages which are gained by menace are not justice. If one is sure that there is no chance to convince the others, he/she will threaten them. Rawls attaches to the idea that put persuasion in the first place when giving reasons. Kymlicka thinks that this idea which is after persuasion with rational communication, discussion, deliberation, has to be supported instead of threat and bargaining.

### **Comments and Evaluations**

What Kymlicka generally regards as individual freedom is questioning. But it can be criticized whether it has to be accepted as a unique norm to value everything else. For many societies, it is not a meta-criterion. Therefore, they may first and foremost want to question the quiddity of questioning itself along with long philosophical and historical background behind it. People are supposed to comply with the rules even if they cannot prevent others from questioning. But it is likely to result in confront-

ing a fate in two or three generations: To disappear as a different, separate tradition, culture. So, they may demand a right to question the questioning in the mid and long run as the main premise of the dominant culture they had to accept in the short term due to urgent need for security. Perhaps it is going to be their most important contribution to the culture they are living in. In short, it is not useful for them to question the identity, at all. So, I can put it like that: What if some people keep saying that "I believe to understand" instead of questioning? What can the proper reaction to them be apart from that: "if you are in Roman, act as Roman". But this means "the establishment" should question their presence therein.

Lately, the peoples of the World who have not yet got accustomed to the nation-states were suddenly thrown into a new uncertainty by a new discourse: "forget about all we said before; nation-states, universal reason, positivism were all iron cage, the eclipse of reason, sources of totalitarianism that created Hitler, so say farewell to reason, be against Cartesian method. Therefore, since there have been endless chaos, identity crisis, intellectual confusion, political and military turbulences over 100 years leads people to despair of their cultures. To sum up, it is another facet of an identity crisis. In such conditions in which minds can not keep pace with the pendulum, a cognitive complexity arises, nothing is possible to get an integrated approach that enables us to question the prevailing thoughts concerning the legitimacy of the government/sovereignty. Therefore, whatever is in the air will be esteemed a priori, innate ideas, which makes what is a posterior a priori. So, it would not be reasonable to accept the birth of this fact without question. Hence, what those who have been going through a state of nature where human life is "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short"<sup>26</sup> choose can not necessarily be the best options, reasonable and rational choice or considered judgments consistent with reflective equilibrium. On the contra-

<sup>26</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Tr. trans. Semih Lim (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 94-95.



ry, they may be the hopeless, irrational panic effort of the global worst-offs to get rid of the state of nature behind a veil of ignorance (uncertainty/unknown). To put it another way, I want to formulate it like that: Can imaginative overlapping consensus solely be a new conformism?

When taken this way, there seems to be nothing except “an invisible hand” to rely upon. Therefore I believe that while there must still be abstract philosophical investigations, if an approach tells us the theoretical debates have ended a long time ago, hence we should focus on how can be possible to keep pace with pluralism and change our tradition per it, it has to be questioned, too. Because some have enough time to handle the case in terms of identity or redistribution, for some others it is an ontological problem. In short, the balance between freedom and security is upset in favor of security and the need for security will push them to adopt the principles of other cultures as universal primary goods and get close to the overlapping consensus. If so, it can be asserted that an *overlapping consensus* inside still arises from an international *modus vivendi* (mutually assured destruction). This is just an identification implying that almost all models of living together look like *modus vivendi* aside from small ones around families. Therefore I am not as optimistic as Kymlicka about the idea that human beings have a sense of justice which is enough to solve the problems, not because I do not believe in the existence or necessity of a sense of justice, but because it is not strong enough remove all barriers. In my opinion, these usually come from inside of human beings as “the conflict of faculties” such as self-interest, will to power, desire, grudge. Plus, for sure, even if a sense of justice is very important and should permanently be foster, very few people may agree on the definition of justice unless they are Platonists at least, let alone co-religionists in such a nominalist era. Therefore, it directs us to Pogge’s thoughts that criticize some crucial concepts of current economy-politics of the World, such as globalization, invisible hand, free markets, private investment, etc. and linked them to

poverty-related sorrows. One of his interesting claims is that the rich countries have been holding the poor nations responsible for their own miserable condition.<sup>27</sup> It means that there is a global (dis)order in which people who have not yet been able to be accustomed to the previous order become dazed by changing the rules one more time. Accordingly, they are forced to move to other countries with very different civilizations codes. As the turmoils, chaos, violence, poverty have been lasting for decades, eventually nowhere has left to go back and nothing to do apart from developing a sense of belonging to the new conditions. Because constant, consecutive and deep problems lead people to think that what happened to them and their homelands are rooted in their traditions, cultures and religions. That kind of suspicion about themselves is always key to get ready to embrace and accept strange ideas/concepts/points of view.

As many thinkers articulate, the politics of identity, recognition and multiculturalism sometimes can be divisive, which is mostly related to the conditions of underdeveloped countries. These nations with economical and geopolitical disadvantages, and also if their model or method of living together that once worked well has lost its efficiency, troubles arise. Because it is the charism/attraction of the power and GNP to keep the crowd together and to turn chaos into cosmos.<sup>28</sup> If they do not have any,

<sup>27</sup> See Pogge, "Priorities of Global Justice," *Metaphilosophy* 32, no. 1-2 (2001), 6-24. If this situation has nothing with the laziness of the poor and wealthy nations live without "any burdens of judgement", there is a *global natural lottery*. So, we can suggest a *global difference principle* in favor of *globally worst-off people*.

<sup>28</sup> Rorty, for example, argues that the prosperity in the West has a deep impact on the spread of human rights. Today, human rights find wider support in prosperous places where people feel more secure than the places where they experience economic poverty and famine. So, there is a close relationship between wealth, trust, and empathy, and those with that feeling volunteer to engage in moral society and live together. Ruth Abbey, "Closer Kinships: Rortyan Resources for Animal Rights," *Contemporary Political Theory* 16, no. 1 (2017), 8. However a crucial question arises: Where this wealth come from? Are there freedom, equality and living together at the root of wealth? Which one is the cause? Which one is the effect? Are pluralism and living together cause or effect?

that is, if there is no sufficient power, money and glory to satisfy all desires for recognition, tension can become serious disturbances. I think that Parekh has the same point when mentioning that a multicultural society cannot achieve stability and live long without developing a common feeling of commitment.<sup>29</sup>

Parekh's distinction between autonomy and happiness is also useful. To him, human beings can be happy without a feeling of autonomy. So one may claim happiness can be possible within the boundaries of society/culture, and there is no proof showing that the pre-modern societies which never knew autonomy for centuries were less happy and had more sorrows than today's society. Plus, from the point of religion (monotheist ones in particular) autonomy have a completely different and deeper meaning. Religion describes autonomy as a full commitment to God's will and as being free from anything else but God. That is an on-to-theological autonomy that has so many social, political implications. Per these principles and their lexical order, religious people are expected to build a holistic, all-around, comprehensive society, politics, culture, morality, aesthetic.<sup>30</sup> But unlike the widespread belief, it is not unquestioning, on the contrary, it is with free will to devote one's reason/heart to a Being that is superior to him/her.

However, I feel close to multiculturalism as communitarianism. This seems to me to be the only idea that can be reasonable and possible to continue. Because (socially and culturally) there is nothing such as individual no matter what M. Thatcher claimed. So-called individual choice is dictated to him by culture. Besides meaning, identity, sense of self all are social construc-

<sup>29</sup> Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 434-435.

<sup>30</sup> Again as Parekh said, even if very important, to shape society by reducing to one and making a feature essential to a specific society based on a certain doctrine sole fact for signifying another society means to declare that any other moral senses are unreasonable. This gives two advantages to liberals. They both release themselves from the need for justification and saddle others with the task of defending themselves in a way that pleases liberals. Parekh has important criticisms about the contradictions of liberals. Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 141-146.

tions and culture dresses members with them. So a politics based on the recognition of identity can be possible at the intercultural level, not individual. Because the vital motives even the most adamant individualists see necessary for the stability of multicultural societies such as commitment, loyalty, altruism are learned from the family and close relatives and most probable for them without expecting a personal gain. Social and familial bonds, self-sacrifice teach humans the things required for living together by making them to be acquainted with empathy, which gives a stable meaningful environment. After learning that a familiar environment is good and safe for them, people will remember it in political life and try to realize it. Thus it can be said that *familial overlapping consensus* which is not much possible for bigger circles actually provides people of different backgrounds with a stable, softer, calm, peaceful *modus vivendi* as much as possible. Moreover, the fact that some words such as mother-land, mother language, brotherhood, the big family are used to ask for dying for the sake of homelands proves that only by analogies can people adopt something, for “knowledge is generally remembrance.” Nevertheless, as Calhoun mentioned, “modernity destroyed the schemes of identity which include everything or reduce the family bonds. Even if we still attach importance, family relations are not functioning anymore as a model presenting us with social and individual identities.<sup>31</sup>

This means that questioning has turned into a telos itself, not a medium. So, an individual may not have integrity as a fixed self and serenity because the distance/gap between the imaginative next person he/she has to be and the person who he/she is now can never close. Perhaps we can call it the “identity paradox.” It seems sometimes that “to make a difference” becomes an obsession and turns in every field of human life into minimum standard below which is regarded as a big flaw, incompleteness of individuals. Therefore, everybody is obsessed with updating, re-

<sup>31</sup> Craig Calhoun, “Kimlik ve Tanınma Politikası,” *Kimlik Politikaları*, ed. Fırat Mollaer (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2014), 136.

creating themselves in terms of fashion, habitual (not enough time to construct a *habitus*), “lifestyles” and even religion. Because of today’s *panta rhei* obsession, everybody tries to keep pace with the speed of change in which “all that is solid melts into air.” It should be also regarded as natural that the young generations across the world have some trouble with persistence, patience and thereby understanding in depth. Even for philosophers or social thinkers, there is no time/moment to look at, to see and to grasp deeply and to determine what has been happening. It is simple: one cannot catch the clear pose of ever-changing, shaking, flashing objects while even he/she themselves are not stable and on the move. So, a situation in which neither observer/photographer nor objects are fixed does not give any opportunity for having a certain image of the world.

The world, nowadays especially human beings “in the age of quantum” has not been willing to have their photo taken by others (like subatomic particles). If anybody attempts to name someone, it is at once called “oppression, disrespect”. Even parents do not have a say any more to tell something to their beloved kids, or spouses to each other. Because, so to speak, it’s the age of Selfie whereas the time goes by more and more people think that they need nobody to be and to define themselves. It means that the same logic once used against The Church, The State and God respectively are still at work against whatever seems unchanged, old-fashion, static. But what is illusionary/simulative and hazardous is the idea that everything has to change. It seems that today’s people have kind of “original sin: serenity” never seen before. One can purify the original sin only by obeying a categorical imperative: “To Make a Difference, Just Do It (without questioning).” Therefore, I think that Bauman’s question(ing) is of importance: *Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?*

It should be made clear that the problem of (religious) pluralism and living together has really deep theological dimensions. To Eberle, “religious pluralism is the biggest epistemologi-

cal challenge with which any religious tradition faces aside from theodicy. Different and conflicting religious pluralism leads any members of religious groups to doubt...Pluralism injects a high dose of doubt into religious commitment.”<sup>32</sup> But even if I am on the same page with him in general, to me, it is not religious pluralism or even pluralism alone which can be a real challenge as strong as theodicy has been. They are just resulting. The core of the problem lies elsewhere. Although it looks small and simple separation, I strongly believe that this is a very important, crucial nuance that has a potential all religious traditions have been steering clear of facing.

The reason why I think that the real trouble for religions is to suggest that everybody may have a right to read and infer conclusions is that religious pluralism, unlike widespread convictions, fortifies and reinforces the belief in God, religious pillars. Because it supports the idea that human beings who are creatures of a *casua sui*, an almighty, omnipresent being who transcends us and the entire universe cannot be sufficient for themselves and need Him from the very beginning of their life to the end. When everybody in every society, state and civilization believes in an absolute being, especially in monotheism's God who wants people to worship only one true God, it constructs a world in which nobody can think that other possible Worlds without God are even possible to begin, to exist and to endure, to have meaning. So, what's left to people is to commit themselves to one of them by following their society. Most probably, the system of Millet in Ottoman Empire is the best evidence to show that among the societies that share the same premodern wisdom telling that we cannot be sufficient beings to come into existence, to lead a good life and should look to “the sky” could lose political power but not religious commitments/beliefs. The only thing which is possible is that they could convert into another religion. But today's condition is different. What is at stake now is a reli-

<sup>32</sup> Cristopher J. Eberle, *Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32-33.

gious belief in general or the idea of God. Thus, C. Taylor's question in *Secular Age* is very important: "in the 1500s why could not nobody imagine/think a World without God whereas today in the 2000s so many people can think that a world without God is possible?"<sup>33</sup> What has changed? In my opinion, the answer is very complex and filled with numerous motives, historical facts I cannot embrace and discuss here. But all reasons converge on the same case: *sapere aude* or to think not to need anything and to be "self-sufficient", which is the biggest mistake of mankind ever since his creation from the angle of celestial religions. I do not claim that it gives directly rise to an atheistic World or society, culture but to secularism and relativity that enable people to criticize and then to rationalize that traditional definition of God and religion can not be absolute and fixed sole way of thinking about them. Plus, we have been living a post-Lutherian culture that has shaped the entire World with its epistemology, morality, even with the theology which says everybody has the right to interpret and understand the sacred texts. Now God speaks through our mouth whereas especially in Islam only prophets can get revelation and have the right to explain what is God's true intention in his verses. That means prophets determine the boundaries of legitimate and possible interpretations of revelation. What modernity and, if any, postmodernity has done is to undermine and trivialize this methodology and limitations prophet and scholars put for concluding orders, ideas from the texts.

Therefore, again, the problem is not about having a right to refuse traditional bonds, beliefs, convert into another religion, or even not to believe in any God(s), at all. It is the change in believing that there can only one true/mainstream interpretation which is brought both by God's messengers and explained by them. What I exactly mean is that with the increase of legitimacy concerning the individual reading of texts, religious pillars, a

<sup>33</sup> Taylor, *Seküler Çağ*, Tr. trans. Dost Körpe (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 31.

great number of ideas and behaves that premodern religious establishment never accepted before have been seen as true and counted in religious boundaries. If one means this fact by religious pluralism, for sure, it is a real deal, otherwise, a kind of pluralism consists of other religions is not a serious menace. However, no doctrine is okay with all interpretations no matter what they are. Can liberalism connive the violation of its lexical order and breaking of freedom even for the sake of equality? That's why pluralism taken as an inside legitimacy of every individual opinion regardless of the distance between the mainstream body and them produces crucial methodological chaos that comes along with structural ambivalences of the establishment at the end. Well then. What is wrong with that? What is wrong is that (especially monotheist) religions as the most comprehensive meta-narratives, holistic doctrines have turned to a hybrid/collage/eclectic movement as one of the thousands of cults, trends, new age spiritualism without any trademarks, distinctive essentials that are ontological for them. Deprived of vital content and force, religion, thus, has become just content of another meta-narrative that steadily speaks about the death of meta-narratives. So it should be seen natural for religions to refrain their boundaries from excessive obscuring or even erasing. Because, no matter what they say, every worldview rules just by inventing good and bad deeds which are determined by their own elites.

Given that all I am mentioning about the facts and ideas, it can be concluded that all models of living together can be construed as *modus vivendi* provided that any universal single doctrine in some way has not established a matrix which is composed of similar constituents since as if they all share the same single universal Logos. Because it is hardly possible for a worldview to remain the same as what it has been understood for centuries, which makes it different and separate. Once the essentials of another view are adopted, it is often done so at the expense of yours. I have already said before what problems reli-



gion has with the flexible understanding of sacred texts. It causes to see almost all interpretations as legitimate, which sounds like “anything goes” by rejecting the limits of orthodoxy. Here is the exact point that the uncertainty/ambiguity/undecidability about boundaries steps in and provides people with a chance of both remaining to be members of the religion and becoming a part of another worldview.

What I am talking about above is the best way to look at the relation between religion and postmodernism which is a significant component of this essay. “Anything goes, difference and deferral of meaning, undecidability, deconstruction, author’s intention, the death of the author” are the most known, debated concepts especially in theological circles. Therefore, I have to say that postmodernism and post-structuralism do to religion what they did to the modernity. The religious people who seek arsenal against the modernity are so deeply immersed in post-structuralist logic that it escaped their notice the same methodology hits back at religion. Moreover, here to see the convergence of the two important aspects is very illuminating: theory and practice coincide as follows: The people of societies that have been in poor conditions like the state of nature over a century finally starts to think that the reason why they have been stuck in such conditions emanates from their religion and tradition. Hence, they lose their self-respect (even before expecting the respect of others) to themselves and their cultures, religions: here is a previous (self) crisis of Identity. Since they lose trust in the fundamentals of their culture, they become vulnerable, open to new ideas and at that point postmodern logic gets involved in the case by suggesting a lot of bombastic concepts by scholars from every field to reinterpret, re-read, which bends the rules.

As Kymlicka said: A theory must evaluate not only the current conditions but also the next ones. And therein emerges the need for a comprehensive philosophy of history which is necessarily a meta-narrative, for it is predictable that new perspectives, new Robinsons and Fridays may appear depending on the

course of history, zeitgeist, events bringing about sudden and unexpected changes. It should not be expected that this dialectic will be over. Those who look at and see the world out of another window and explain human nature, morality differently can take these problems. Within the framework of it, a political philosophy that will be done within the philosophy of history can find a way of speaking out from its perspective. Seeing that the act of questioning is of the essence, political philosophy in cooperation with history of philosophy must interrogate whether or not today's primary goods and the burdens of judgments became prevalent by the natural and fair process of an *overlapping consensus* of all reasonable parts or it is just some sort of theodicy.

## Conclusion

My objections, doubts and criticisms are permanent but the facts are staring us in the face. We have been living in a world imposing pluralism by any means. So this topic has also that dimension. If something is worldwide, it is one thing to look for, grasp, judge, criticize its philosophical, historical, practical motives. However, it is another thing to ponder about which social-political and moral attitudes we have to adopt until some dramatic changes have occurred. Which actions and ideas can be legitimate? What kind of approaches should be shown both to the narrow differences of methodology in domestic culture and to the structural differences which concern with fundamentals? It is manifest that no matter what happens in the remote corner of the World immediately creates a butterfly effect and shakes the economy and social stability of other countries which are filled with millions by power struggles of superpowers. That's why we need immediate theoretical and practical solutions. Turkey is also at the same historical conjunction as the entire World. For a country that once experienced a very multicultural society with a different scheme, it is really difficult to cope with the burdens of new pluralist conditions and to find new models of living together while the majority of its population has lost the experience/memory of living together because of rude positivist appli-

cations for decades. This is a new kind of challenge we are not familiar with.

Therefore, Islamic societies like all religious traditions have to successfully express themselves for a moral interaction with the rest of the world even for a *modus vivendi*, let alone *overlapping consensus*. This must be done not only for showing themselves nice but also for convincing their generations who have lost trust in their own culture because of the pornography of violence taking place routinely. *Overlapping consensus* may be questioned but it has to be, of course only by defining it in a different way, protected and kept as an ideal theory/telos to reach. Despite everything, it must be put as a flawless answer key, the highest good. If we renounce to keep the ideal of *overlapping consensus* as to the possible highest good, as a meta-criterion by which actions and opinions are valued means that we are beaten to the naked real politics. As a result, “is” ascends the throne of “ought to be.” However, that some moral political fixed principles which are determined independently from practical desires, interests, sensations become common ground moves the realities to the “ought to be” and keeps higher purposes alive for people. So the idea of the ideal must not be given up, just as we do not remove traffic rules since people violate them. Otherwise, we have affirmed the Machiavellian turn from moral politics to real politics. So, the power of reality cannot be the excuse of pulling the ideal over reality. Because *modus vivendi* is seen much more in practice should not make it normal to act in the way Machiavelli suggests. Therefore, a new kind of *overlapping consensus* which are abundant with “domestic” concepts and ideas.

Even if it may be thought that religions have to change the facts or to be dominant over others, it is more reasonable to be oppressed ones to hope to get awarded with the afterlife than cruel to oppress to earn this world. For sure, in the meantime, they have a right to claim that the current one is not “the best of all possible worlds” by showing flaws and to suggest another possible world that will come into existence by far the best. They

must also show the reason why good is prior to right and how and why the latter should be concluded from the former.

Should religions come back through the holes of disappointments that secular meta-narratives caused or if they have never gone anywhere and now one of the active components of this pluralism, they have to develop a discourse of communication to join the public discussion? For the sake of it, religious people must take the risk of loss in translation to some extent. This can be done only by using the terminology and methodology of prevailing political philosophy. However, as Kymlicka said, no political philosophy can solve alone all troubles of pluralism, for none of the theory of justices can overcome the demands neither side steps back as Parekh pointed out. This fact means that it is inevitable to face the multicultural challenge, even if you accept today's conditions as deep and constant as Rawls does or although you see within the philosophy of history it as a volatile step of dialectical journey or temporary stop of Geist.

What I believe to be the most important step is that religious efforts against pluralist challenge should refute the bias/illusion which has been arguing that to hold an idea defending "the oneness of the Truth" is necessarily totalitarianism. This false image should not be allowed to use as a trump card. Because there is no convincing proof to show that there were more sorrows in a world where people were seeking after one single Truth/path. Moreover, even if a World that tried to reach one single universal truth caused sorrows, how can it be reasonably expected that a different experience of different possible worlds would result in the same consequences? In my opinion, at least in terms of the Islamic worldview, it is of importance to show that why/how a monist approach holding that it enjoys sole truth at hand does not always bring about tyranny. To sum up, if history has not yet ended somewhere in the course of history, and human beings continue to reason, celestial religion should convince others of the possibility of another "holistic" world where whole and good have priority over part and right.

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## Aristotle on Phantasia

MURAT DİNÇ CANVER   
Hacettepe University

Research Article

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**Abstract:** Born as φαντασία (*phantasia*) in Greek philosophy, the concept of imagination that today we understand from has a different meaning and contains different functions. This study attempts to reveal the conceptual contents and functions by examining the conceptual transformation of the concept in Ancient Greece and Aristotle's terminology and epistemological function.

**Keywords:** Aristotle, phantasia, imagination, On the Soul, Ancient Greek philosophy.



## Introduction

The concept of imagination is one of the concepts that have undergone many contextual changes in the history of philosophy. The first conceptualizations take place in Ancient Greece Philosophy. However, the concept born as φαντασία (*phantasia*) in Ancient Greek Philosophy contains different meanings and functions than we understand from imagination today.

This study, which will examine the concept of imagination tries to reveal the conceptual content and functions, considering the birth of the concept in Ancient Greece, the terminology of Aristotle, and the contextual transformation of the epistemological function.

### The Concept of *Phantasia* in Pre-Aristotle Period

*Phantasia-phantasma* means “to make visible” in general and derived from the verb of *phantazein*. The concept used before Plato in Ancient Greek philosophy is included in an epistemological discussion for the first time with Plato. There is no clear distinction between impression, image/phantasmata, sensation/aisthesis and *phantasia* in the pre-Socratic period.<sup>1</sup>

There is no terminology of the concept of *phantasia* in Plato. Although concepts such as looking, appearing, being visible, which derive from the same root as *phantasia* in Plato frequently pass, *phantasia* is very rare.<sup>2</sup> By addressing the passages in *Theaitetos* and the *Sophist* dialogues, which are frequently used in studies related to *phantasia* to show the position of *phantasia* in Plato in epistemological discussions, Plato has some unexplained gaps in Aristotle, as will be seen in later chapters.

In the section where the Protagorean arguments in the *Theaitetos* dialogue are discussed, Socrates says:

Thus, temperature and appearance (*phantasia*) and perception

<sup>1</sup> Ahmet Emre Dağtaşoğlu, “Antik Yunan Felsefesi’nde ‘Fantasia’nın Epistemolojik Rolü,” *FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 17 (2014), 266.

<sup>2</sup> Dağtaşoğlu, “Antik Yunan Felsefesi’nde ‘Fantasia’nın Epistemolojik Rolü,” 267.

(aisthesis) are the same for all such situations. Because how a person perceives something should be so for him.<sup>3</sup>

Although *phantasia* and *aisthesis* are used side by side here, since the subject is discussed within the framework of Protogorassian claims, no clear information can be obtained from this passage about how Plato establishes a connection between *phantasia* and *aisthesis*. So, it is necessary to look at *Sophist*, another dialog where Plato deals with phantasia. Here at the *Sophist*, we quote the passage he tries to reveal the distinction and partnership between *dianoia*, *doxa* and *phantasia*:

**Stranger:** What more? Whether thinking (*dianoia*), opinion (*doxa*) and representation (*phantasia*) are false or true, are these not all types of events that occur in our souls?

**Theaetetus:** How?

**Stranger:** First, if you grasp what each of them is and how they differ, then you will understand this more easily.

**Theaetetus:** Come on, tell me!

**Stranger:** So, thinking and speaking (logos) are the same thing. The first, however, is that he speaks to himself in the soul, without sound. So, we call it “thinking”.

**Theaetetus:** No doubt.

**Stranger:** On the other hand, flushing out of the soul and getting out from the mouth is called speech.

**Theaetetus:** Right.

**Stranger:** And there is something else known in the speech.

**Theaetetus:** What?

**Stranger:** Benevolence.

**Theaetetus:** Yes, we know that.

**Stranger:** This means that if it is formed by thinking directly without making any noise in the soul, it can only be stated as opinion.

**Theaetetus:** Exactly.

<sup>3</sup> Platon, *Theaitetos*, Tr. trans. Birdal Akar (Ankara: Bilgesu Yayıncılık, 2016), 32.

**Stranger:** Now, if such a phenomenon is formed in the soul not only on its own, but through reverse perception, then “visual representation (*phantasia*)” is the only true symptom for him.

**Theaetetus:** Of course.

**Stranger:** Now there is a true and false statement (*logos*); thinking in this field, the soul talking to itself; the thought is the result of thinking; As we call “visual representation” (*phainatai*), these phenomena must be partly and in some cases necessarily wrong in terms of being related to speech and relativity as they are seen as a combination of perception (*aisthesis*) and opinion.<sup>4</sup>

Plato associates the concepts of thinking, perception and *phantasia* with the occurrence in the soul. If the phenomenon in the soul occurs because of a perception, it is called *phantasia*. *Phainatai*, the product of *phantasia*, is seen as a combination of perception and opinion, neither is necessarily true nor necessarily false. It can be right or wrong. In addition, thoughts may occur spontaneously in the soul, *phantasia* occurs in the soul through perception, that is, it is presented in a close relationship with the sensation. We chose to quote the context of the dialogue as it is, in order to understand the criticisms brought by Aristotle as a combination of perception and opinion of *phantasia*. However, it should not be forgotten that Plato's view of *phantasia* was effective in Aristotle's definitions of *phantasia* and that the terminology of the concept was built on this view. The proofs related to this will be given in the section where we discuss Aristotle's concept of *phantasia*.

Plato divides the art of painting (*eidolopoiike*) into two styles immediately after the chapter on *phantasia* for the *Sophist* dialogue. One of them is copying (*eikastike*), and the other is art (*phantastike*).<sup>5</sup> In Plato's *Republic*, he talks about the concepts of *eikone* and *eikasia*, which come from the same root as *eikastike*. Their distinction with *phantasia* and *phantasma* is as follows:

<sup>4</sup> Platon, *Sofist*, Tr. trans. Ömer Naci Soykan (İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2015), 288-9.

<sup>5</sup> Platon, *Sofist*, 292.

while *phantasia* and *phantasma* belong to our mind, *eikasia* and *eikone* are their counterparts in external objects.<sup>6</sup> The possibility of being evaluated in terms of epistemologically true-false value pair by considering *phantasia* in terms of the sense within the context of the meaning in the effort to find the sophist in the sophisticated dialogue, this time coincides with the fact that it finds an equivalent in the ontological view as an *eikon*, and its real representation. The quality of the sophist's showing as if it is true is in harmony with Aristotle's effort to place *phantasia* between sensations and thoughts, as we will see later, as attributed to *phantasia*.

### The Concept of *Phantasia* in Aristotle

Compared to the previous period, the concept of *phantasia* in Aristotle is defined more clearly, and its functions are made more distinctive. However, despite efforts to develop this terminology, there are uncertainties about how *phantasia* works in Aristotle and whether it has a mental ability independent of other abilities. Even Aristotle expresses this uncertainty as follows:

But assuming that there are separate divisions in the soul, the imaginative part (*phantastikon*) which we cannot easily tell with which is identical with and which one is different.<sup>7</sup>

Aristotle, who uses *phantastikon* here for the faculty of imagination, usually uses *phantasma* as the product of *phantasia*. However, it is stated that Aristotle used *phantasia* to include all three meanings.<sup>8</sup> Unlike Plato, in Aristotle, *phantasia* is distinctively clearly separated from *aisthesis*, *dianoia*, and *doxa*, but is functionally presented in close contact with *aisthesis* and *dianoia*. "It is clear that my imagination is neither a thought nor a belief: it really depends on us, our imagination ..."<sup>9</sup> Aristotle says on the other hand, "When it comes to the *dianoetic* spirit, the

<sup>6</sup> Dağtaşoğlu, "Antik Yunan Felsefesi'nde 'Fantasia'nın Epistemolojik Rolü," 270.

<sup>7</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, Tr. trans. Zeki Özcan (Ankara: Sentez Yayıncılık, 2014), 185.

<sup>8</sup> Dağtaşoğlu, "Antik Yunan Felsefesi'nde 'Fantasia'nın Epistemolojik Rolü," 271.

<sup>9</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 155

imaginations replace it with sensation”<sup>10</sup> and thus he makes the thought that makes inference impossible without fantasy.

According to Aristotle, *phantasia* takes its name from light (*phaos*); because it is impossible to see without light. Due to the consistency of images and their resemblance to sensations, animals perform many acts with the effect of imagination.<sup>11</sup> Due to the similarity and tight relation between sensation and imagination in Aristotle, it is necessary to start with sensation in order to fully understand the concept and function of imagination. Because there is no image without sensation.

In Aristotle, senses cannot create a sensation without external sensible.<sup>12</sup> In *Peri Psukhe* He explains that the concept of “sensible” refers to three types of objects. While two of these objects can be perceived by the way of itself, the third is accidentally perceivable. In general, the three objects of sensible in Aristotle can be divided into private sensible (*idia aistheta*), common sense (*koina aistheta*) and accidental sensible (*aistheta kata sumbebekos*). Private sensible is a special kind of sensation that is not sensed by any sense other than its own sense and that it is impossible to be mistaken about it.<sup>13</sup> These are the five senses that have their own objects. For example, the eye cannot sense a sound, the eye can sense a color. Sound can be heard by hearing. Private sensible have a sense organ corresponding to each sensation. However common sense is common to every sense, although they are not specific to any sense. These are motion, stagnation, number, form and magnitude.<sup>14</sup> Aristotle says “Every sensation judges at least about their own senses, and even if it is wrong about the nature and location of the colored object, it is not wrong about the presence of color or sound.”<sup>15</sup> He states that it is not possible to be mistaken in private sensible, and that

<sup>10</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 177.

<sup>11</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 161.

<sup>12</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 95.

<sup>13</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 102.

<sup>14</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 103.

<sup>15</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 102.

common sense makes us open to error. Aristotle's example of accidental sensible is the perception of white as the son of Diaries.<sup>16</sup> It is possible to know that a singular which is open to our sensation is known in a singularity by sensed accidentally. When a table is known as a table, it happens when it is perceived together with its accidents. While the color of the table is sensed as private sensible and the shape is perceived as common sense, it is realized by the recognition of the table as a table and its difference from other tables is perceived as accidental sensible. These last two objects of the sensible (common sense and accidental perceptions) will serve as a basis for the possibility of being mistaken in the thought caused by *phantasia*.

In Aristotle, the sense is the accumulation place of substanceless forms.<sup>17</sup> The function of storing these substanceless forms is performed by *phantasia*. Scheiter makes the subject clear with an excerpt from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Aristotle says:

Thus, what we call the memory comes from the sensation, and experience is constituted by the memory of something repeated many times. Now, the principle of art as related to being, and the principle of science as existence, is derived from experience (that is, as a unity and wholeness in all particular matters, except in plurality and as a unity, entirely calm in spirit).<sup>18</sup>

According to Scheiter, the memory here is the function of preserving sensory perceptions, which is the function of *phantasia* in Aristotle.<sup>19</sup> Mneme was used by Plato to see the same function that Aristotle gave to *phantasia*. In the *Theaetetus* dialogue, Socrates likens the recall in the “wax bump”<sup>20</sup> metaphor to a stamping process, which is the “imagination” itself. This wax metaphor, which we will remember from Descartes, is also used

<sup>16</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 103.

<sup>17</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 132.

<sup>18</sup> Aristoteles, *İkinci Analitikler*, Tr. trans. Hamdi Ragıp Atademir (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1996), 135.

<sup>19</sup> Krisanna M. Scheiter, “Images, Appearance and *Phantasia* in Aristotle,” *Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 57 (2012), 262.

<sup>20</sup> Platon, *Theaitetos*, 102.

to explain the material-sensible forms with the trace left by the sensible in Aristotle.<sup>21</sup>

Another perspective of *phantasia* is in the section of *Peri Psukhe*'s "Hearing and Sound". The determinative condition of sound in Aristotle is that solid objects hit each other and vibrate the air.<sup>22</sup> Describing hearing as a physical event, Aristotle distinguishes between the human voice (*phone*) and the physical sound (*psophon*). Although physical conditions such as impact and air vibration are required for the human voice to emerge, the difference between human beings and other creatures is that they can make meaningful sounds. In addition to physical conditions, the soul plays an active role in the emergence of this meaningful voice. According to him, the human voice is a certain voice of the living being. In reality, none of the inanimate beings have a pronounced voice.<sup>23</sup> However, even though the voice becomes when breath hits what we call the trachea, and the reason for this impact is the soul found in these parts of the body. Not every sound (*psophon*) made by the animal is a voice (*phone*). The noise we make with our tongue or cough is not a voice. What is necessary for the voice is that the colliding body is alive and any representation accompanies it. Because the voice is definitely a meaningful sound and it differs from being just a noise of air like a cough.<sup>24</sup> According to Portelli, the reason for the impact here is *phantasia*, which is meant by the soul.<sup>25</sup> Because this function can only be achieved thanks to *phantasia* that Aristotle has clearly stated that a representation accompanies this multiplication with the colliding living thing.

Victor Carson stated the functions Aristotle uploaded to *phantasia* and why he needed this concept, "Why Aristotle needs imagination?" in his work, *phantasia* as an aid in explaining the

<sup>21</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 132.

<sup>22</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 113.

<sup>23</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 115.

<sup>24</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 117.

<sup>25</sup> John Peter Portelli, *The Concept of Imagination in Aristotle and Avicenna*, MA Dissertation (Montreal: McGill University, 1979), 16.

possibility of error in thinking. The foundations of Carson's argument are found in Peri Psukhe's "Thought, Perception, Imagination-Imaging Analysis" section. In this episode, Aristotle criticizes the arguments that identify thinking (*noein*) and perception and subject them to a theoretical refutation. By extracting from Empedocles and Homer, he summarizes those arguments that they identify the thinking and perception as the same and thinking is also a material thing, perceive and think with a similar likeness.<sup>26</sup> However, perception and thinking with similar analogues are insufficient to explain the error that is encountered many times in animals. Accordingly, two conclusions can be reached: Either all appearances are correct, or the reason for the mistake is related to the unlike.<sup>27</sup> While thoughts can be true or false, the truth of the sensation belonging to private sensible cannot be doubted. So how can thinking and perception be identical? According to Aristotle, this is impossible. While the sensation is true and common to all animals, though thinking may be wrong, it is found only in beings that take a share from the logos. So, if our senses are true, and thinking cannot function without senses, how is the contingency of being true or false in our thoughts explained? At this point, Aristotle places *phantasia* in the middle of thinking and sensation. *Phantasia* is something separate from both sensation and thinking. However, there is no *phantasia* without sensation, and judgment is not possible without *phantasia*.<sup>28</sup> It becomes clear from here that *phantasia* has neither thought nor sensation nor belief. It functions as a synthesis that constitutes the source of the error between the accuracy of our senses and the possibility of inaccuracy in thinking. In the words of Aristotle, "*Phantasia* is an ability or a situation that makes us think that our judgment is right and wrong."<sup>29</sup> Aristotle also talks about the correlation of appearances with falseness in *Metaphysics* and refers to *phantasia*:

<sup>26</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 153.

<sup>27</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 154.

<sup>28</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 154.

<sup>29</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 156.



“Fake” or “false” [pseudos] are used on the one hand as the “wrong thing”... on the other hand, it is something that does not exist or seems to exist (such as a perspective picture or dreams, indeed, they are something, but what they dream of not). So things are called “false” or “fake” in these contexts: either because they appear to exist even if they don’t exist, or because they appear to be something they don’t have.<sup>30</sup>

According to Aristotle, if there is no sensation, we cannot learn and understand anything. However, the use of reason comes with an image. In this state, images resemble sensations.<sup>31</sup> Aristotle also reveals the most obvious difference that makes it clear that Phantasia is not sensation. Actually, sensing is either potential or actual, such as the sense of sight or the act of seeing. However, the image can be found even if it is not one or the other of the sense of seeing or the act of seeing. These are the images we perceive in sleep. Sensation always exists, however, phantasia is not so. Sensation and *phantasia* are not identical. If they were identical, *phantasia* should have been present in all animals, just as the sensation was found in all animals. However, according to Aristotle, phantasia is not found in all animals (such as ants, bees). Another distinction is that the sensations (in the field of private sensible) are always true, and the images are often false. *Phantasia* cannot be a process that can always be true as knowledge and understanding. Since *phantasia* can be false.<sup>32</sup> So how does this error occur? How can images be true and sometimes false?

At this point, it is necessary to remember the three types of sensors that are explained earlier. These three objects of sensation underlie the fact that images are sometimes true and sometimes false. The sensation of private sensible is always true in Aristotle. Unless there is a deficiency or disease in the sense or-

<sup>30</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, Tr. trans. Y. Gurur Sev (İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2017), 131.

<sup>31</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 183.

<sup>32</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 156-7.

gans, there is no error in them. I cannot perceive green as red. But I can be wrong about which object is green or red. The reason for this error is movement, number, etc. like common sense. It is also possible to be wrong in the senses that I perceive accidentally. I can be wrong about whether this person from afar is Kleonos' son. *Phantasia*, which Aristotle referred to by saying "...the act that actually occurs with the effect of sensation...", varies according to whether it comes from one or the other of these three types of sensations. The first (private sensible) is correct as long as there is sensation; Whether sensation exists or not and especially when sensible is far away, others will be wrong.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the definition of *phantasia* takes the form of "a movement created by the sensible sensation". Therefore, phantasia cannot be realized without any sensation, cannot exist without any sensation, and belongs to the sensing beings and must be true or false.

Continuing a Platonic discussion, Aristotle continues the discussion by leaving Plato. So, it remains to discuss whether *phantasia* is an opinion or not (*doxa*) because it can be right or wrong. According to him, opinion coexists with belief, because it is impossible for the person who does not believe his opinion. However, phantasia is found in many animals, no belief is encountered. From here, Aristotle concludes that *phantasia* cannot be an opinion adjacent to sensation, opinion created by sensation, and a combination of opinion and sensation. But we also perceive unreal things about which we have a true belief. Aristotle gives the example of the sun here. In this example, which we will also remember from Descartes, it is about the conflict of the image of the sun in us and the opinion we have acquired about the sun. The diameter of the Sun appears to us one foot, and yet we firmly believe that the Sun is larger than the world we live on.<sup>34</sup> Based on the image of the Sun, this would be quite misleading if we had a view of the Sun. What will lead us to the right opinion here will

<sup>33</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 160.

<sup>34</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 157-8.

be to conclude about the sun by making an inference.

One of *phantasia*'s most important functions in Aristotle emerges in its relationship with the practical reason (*nous praktikos*) and will (*oreksis*). When the sensible object is pleasant or annoying, the soul, which is the source of some kind of affirmation or denial, pursues or escapes the sensible object. When the sensible object is accompanied by pleasure or pain, the sensation about it cannot judge good or bad. Making these judgments is the job of the practical reason. In the dianoetic spirit, imagery replaces sensation, and when this soul approves or denies good or evil, it escapes or watches. Therefore, the soul can never think without an image.<sup>35</sup> Practical reason (*nous praktikos*) thinks of the forms in images and decides what to pursue and why to escape. By perceiving that a torch is from fire and seeing it move, we know with the help of common sense that the torch informs that an enemy is approaching. On the other hand, we predict future events based on current events by images in the soul or more. And when we judge what makes it nice or not, we run away from it or go after it.<sup>36</sup> As can be seen, here the *phantasia* has a central position on the road to actions. Actions are a kind of movement, and each movement is based on a specific goal. Whether the goal of the object is nice or annoying, there is a desire or disgust against it. If the request occurs, it is followed by the goal of the object, and if there is disgust or scare, the goal of the object is removed.

Aristotle asks “What gives the animal the movement to move?” This is not nutritious because there is no progression in plants. This movement in animals is always done for a goal<sup>37</sup> because the movement is the action of incomplete.<sup>38</sup> This movement is accompanied by *phantasia* or desire; because unless an animal wants an object and runs away from it, it will not move if

<sup>35</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 177-8.

<sup>36</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 180-1.

<sup>37</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 186.

<sup>38</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 177.

there is nothing that forces it.<sup>39</sup> What moves it is not what we call mind. Because theoretical reasoning thinks of nothing to do with practice, and while the movement of progress is always the movement of the being that avoids or follows anything, this mind does not say anything about what to avoid and watch. There is a fundamental difference in action between animals and humans. While animals move according to appetite, humans can choose the way of behaving restraint using his reason and do what he wants.<sup>40</sup> So the moving abilities can be divided into two: will and practical reason.

Every will is a tool of goal because what the object of the will is the principle of practical reason.<sup>41</sup> Actually what is desired moves, and therefore practical reason moves, since its principle is desirable. Aristotle, who said, “There is only one principle that moves, the ability to will”<sup>42</sup>, though he seems to be in contradiction with his explanation that divides the moving abilities into two, in fact, he sees that as the main reason for the movement, which has various forms in various abilities. He diversifies oreksis as *epithumia*, *thumos* and *boulesis*, saying “If we divide the soul into three parts, the request will take place in all three parts”.<sup>43</sup> These are all varieties of willingness, and they appear in different abilities. “The source of *epithumia*, *thumos* and *boulesis* is *oreksis*,” says Aristotle.<sup>44</sup> While *Epithumia* is about delightful sensual things, *thumos* appear in our desires about anger, which is often non-reasonable. *Boulesis*, on the other hand, is the mental will that involves the process of thinking and moving and approaches the conscious choice, *proairesis*. In this context, the reason for the movement is linked to oreksis, which includes all three types of will. Because practical reason does not move without desire. *Boulesis* is actually a form of will, and when we act as

<sup>39</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 186.

<sup>40</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 187.

<sup>41</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 188.

<sup>42</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 189.

<sup>43</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 186.

<sup>44</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 83.

a result of reasoning, we act according to *boulesis*. Apart from that, *oreksis* can move outside of reasoning, because *epithumia* is also a variant of will. However, practical reason is always right, *phantasia* is sometimes right and sometimes unfair. But it can be either real goodness or seemingly goodness. Because practical good is contingent and otherwise.<sup>45</sup>

To the extent that it is equipped with the will, the animal moves on its own; But if the animal does not have *phantasia*, it has no desire, and every *phantasia* is either rational or sensory. Other than humans, animals get a share from sensory *phantasia* (*phantasia aisthetike*).<sup>46</sup> The reasonable *phantasia* (controversial) is found in intelligent beings. Animals do not have rational judgment, because they do not have this reasonable *phantasia* (*phantasia bouletike* or *logistike*). However, this *phantasia* includes judgment.<sup>47</sup>

### Conclusion

*Phantasia* cannot function without sensation. It is therefore found only in animals. However, it is still not found in some animals. One of *phantasia*'s primary duties is to preserve the forms that are subject to sensory perception. *Phantasia* is neither sensation nor belief nor thinking. It stands between sensation and thinking.

Standing between perception and thinking *phantasia* provides the opportunity to explain the error in thoughts. If the sensations are right and the thinking is wrong, there must be another skill that reveals the error. There is no error in sensations (private sensible). *Phantasia* operate in the field of common and accidental sensible. As it is obvious from the hearing and sound part, *phantasia* functions as a synthesis by making the senses into a meaningful whole.

*Phantasia* is oriented towards the past with its closeness to

<sup>45</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 189.

<sup>46</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 191.

<sup>47</sup> Aristoteles, *Ruh Üzerine*, 192.

memory, to the present with its derivation from sensation, and to its future by making meanings by self-processing. Dianoetic soul cannot think without images. In this sense, the object of thinking is images.

*Phantasia* is either rational or sensory. It can be diversified by taking a share from both reason and sensation. *Phantasia* has a close relationship with oreksis. Without images, there is no will. There is also no act without voluntary action. Therefore, it also provides a basis for actions.


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## From Homo Sapiens to Homo Cogitans

ŞEYMA ŞİRİN 

Ankara University

Review Article

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**Abstract:** In this study, the philosophical and modern problems that arise in the fields of ontology and epistemology within the framework of Descartes' method are studied and investigated. There is an extensive literature on Cartesian philosophy. Homo sapiens refers to the type of people who can think and can collaborate and collaborate with many members. *Homo cogitans* means the kind of person who can think again but thinking here is not just thinking. We are talking about a species that thinks how it thinks and prioritizes its own thoughts and good sense. Our aim here is to study the journey of a man from Homo sapiens to *homo cogitans*. We investigated and analyzed the answers to many questions such as what the effects of Cartesian philosophy are today, how Descartes' methodical suspicion led us to individualism.

**Keywords:** Homo sapiens, homo cogitans, good sense, Cartesian philosophy, individualism, methodical doubt.



René Descartes (1596-1650), along with Francis Bacon, is considered one of the founders of modern philosophy. He took place in continental Europe and Bacon in the UK. The main reason why these two men play this role is that they are trying to establish a system.

Descartes has received an unusually good education, and also had rare mind independence; so that when he was still a student, he realized that the various authorities he worked on often made invalid arguments. He went to the army in his youth and wandered various parts of Europe without seeing any collision. In the same period, Descartes, who was fascinated by the fact that the world of practical life was full of contradictions as much as the world of books was fascinated by the question of whether there is a way to know something for us human beings, and if we can, for sure? Therefore, by putting an end to his travels, he was retired in the Netherlands, the freest country of intellectual life. During the twenty years from 1629 to 1649, he also worked in the field of science, in the Netherlands, besides giving highly original works in mathematics and philosophy. Philosophy and science were not yet separated from each other at that time, and this continued until the eighteenth century.

Descartes found the branch of mathematics known as analytical geometry. His main idea here was to measure the position of a point by its distance from the two fixed lines, that is, whenever we look at a graph, we are looking at something invented by Descartes. Indeed, these two familiar lines on a chart are known as “Cartesian axes”.

The Cartesian corresponds to the adjective derived here from the name Descartes. His most famous philosophical works are Discourse on Method, published in 1637 and Meditations, published in 1642. Descartes lived an ascetic life during his creative work years. However, at the age of fifty-three, Queen Christina persuaded him to come to Stockholm and become her private philosophy teacher, despite all his reluctance. This was a fatal mistake for Descartes. In the severe winter of Sweden, he

suffered from pneumonia and died in 1650, the second year of his illness.<sup>1</sup>

Descartes is the philosopher who made his mark on the whole 17th-century philosophy. In fact, this whole century is called Cartesian: at least, everyone is either against Descartes or for Descartes. Descartes wanted to establish his whole philosophy based on “clear and distinct” ideas, but the method, metaphysics and physics, which constitute the three dimensions of his thought, were the subject of great discussions. One of these discussions is the relationship between theology and physics, which constitute an important aspect of his metaphysics. Some Descartes commentators state that the point that distinguishes it from ancient theologians is that its theology is a theology intended for physics and serving it, whereas, in the past, physics served for theology. Many have developed this approach to claim that Descartes is indeed Godless and that the place devoted to God in his system does not mean much more than the first flick to bring the world to the existence, as Pascal said. In contrast, Lenoble, who is among those who think Descartes needs God to be able to base his physics metaphysically, expresses this with the view that he needs to believe in God to believe in physics.<sup>2</sup>

Descartes is the initiator of the New Age Philosophy as the person who started the New Age Philosophy, where the developments that emerged with Renaissance kneaded and integrated, and who discussed and argued them for two centuries after that, and first thought about them. The pale New Age Philosophy that Descartes brought to philosophy is inexhaustible. He has been criticized by both the rationalist and empiricist tradition. In the development of philosophy from the seventeenth century to the present day, he is seen as a philosopher, who is frequently re-

<sup>1</sup> Bryan Magee, *Büyük Filozoflar: Platon'dan Wittgenstein'a Batı Felsefesi*, ed. Ahmet Cevizci (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2000), 70.

<sup>2</sup> Tülin Bumin, *Tartışılan Modernlik: Descartes ve Spinoza* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 34; İlyas Altuner, *Descartes Felsefesine Giriş* (İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2019), 83.

ferred to, who is reckoned with him, and who has a share in creations in philosophy, even if they are against him. “Every movement that took its first move from Descartes has been productive” as philosophy continues.<sup>3</sup> In this context, Kant presented a radicalized version of Descartes’ Cartesianism, while Hegel presented a kind of variation of Kant’s idealism.

It can be argued in Descartes’ philosophy that he constitutes the subject-centered understanding presented in the subject’s human centralism. The philosophy in which the subject is taken to the center is the philosophy based on the acceptance that the mental content determines the object, which means the acquisition of information with the ideas in the mind of the subject. Descartes acknowledged that cogito also includes “innate ideas”. However, this does not mean that he denies the senses. In the last instance, the person who will say the word becomes the person who understands.

Because of that Descartes has many influences on our modern world like democracy, individualism, rationalism, self-seeking, and mind and matter dualism, and so on.

Descartes believes that all individuals possess the “natural light of reason,” the belief that everyone has the capacity for the discovery of truth, undermined Roman Catholic authoritarianism. Although Descartes was a devout Catholic, this belief gave support to the Protestant affirmation of the supremacy of individual conscience. This belief was also instrumental in the development of democracy. John Locke, a political philosopher whose influence on Thomas Jefferson was considerable, was influenced by Descartes’ assertion that all individuals have the “natural light of reason”.

Descartes believes that the world is essentially rational and comprehensible: For the next two and a half centuries, philosophers build systems of thought which they are confident are

<sup>3</sup> Atilla Erdemli, “Aydınlanma Fılozofu Olarak Descartes,” *Felsefe Arkivi* 27 (1990), 105.

close to absolute truth. This belief also results in a pervasive optimism regarding the progress of science. The universe is thought to conform to scientific laws. Through the understanding of these laws, nature can be subjected to the control of man.

Descartes' analysis of personal experience as an approach to philosophy: The first-person narrative that Descartes' employs in his philosophical writings is indicative of a new approach to philosophy. After Descartes, the analysis of one's own experience is a standard approach in philosophical writings.

Descartes' famous declaration "I think, therefore I am" raises questions about the nature of personality and personal identity. What is the self, the "I" that Descartes establishes as the foundation of knowledge? Descartes' metaphysical dualism that the universe is composed of both mind and matter is so much a part of our intellectual heritage that those not trained in philosophy consider it common sense. Nevertheless, this "Cartesian dualism" poses difficulties which have concerned philosophers, scientists, and psychologists throughout the modern period.

Descartes' quest for certainty determines the direction of much subsequent philosophy. Questions concerning epistemology and methodology take on unprecedented importance.<sup>4</sup>

With Descartes, human-made the transition from Homo sapiens to *homo cogitans*. Before explaining this, we must grasp Descartes' famous declaration, "I think so I am". Descartes explains this in his Discourse on Method:

I am in doubt as to the propriety of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable to every one. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before remarked

<sup>4</sup> Alex Lans, "Descartes' Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View," [https://www.academia.edu/30328864/Descartes\\_Meditations.pdf](https://www.academia.edu/30328864/Descartes_Meditations.pdf), Accessed: May 9, 2020.

that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary, to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search.<sup>5</sup>

With this passage, we can see that human turned from *Homo sapiens* (this merely refers to the place of the human species on the scale of species) to *homo cogitans* which is, an entity that thinks about even thinking because the first foundation of human's existence was its ability to think.

<sup>5</sup> René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, trans. John Veitch (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing, 1903), 34-5.

*Homo cogitans* is a living being with its sense. Descartes says in his book *Discourse on Method*:

Good Sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken: the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing Truth from Error, which is properly what is called Good Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men...<sup>6</sup>

The subjective mind of Descartes, which forms the basis of certain knowledge, differs from the understanding of logos in the Ancient period. It means that the return of the intellectual mind, which is the object of the nature of something, to the instrumental mind in the context of the relation of the mind with the object, has been put forward by his bringing the cogito to the stage of philosophy. It should also be noted that the cogito only proves that the philosopher's existence exists, otherwise he has no claim to say what it is.<sup>7</sup>

If I make a general summary, I can say that Descartes has established modernity and individualism as a system- knowingly or unknowingly-. As seen in the post-Descartes philosophy, the problem of what the nature of reason is and this problem has been further explored with German idealists and English empiricism, and it has become an adventure of knowing together with the question of how the human knows, how much he knows, in other words, what is the source of information, what is the criterion of the limits and accuracy of information. This transformation in philosophy has initiated a thought prioritizing epistemology in the face of ontology. Nietzsche, who is one of those who oppose this thought, argues that human is not a subject in

6 Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, 1.

7 Şahabettin Yalçın, *Modern Felsefede Benlik* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2010).

historical and cultural context, but a product of cultural and historical formation. With the understanding that the real problem is existence, Heidegger, on the other hand, defends the contrary of Descartes' suggestion -*cogitans* as an entity different from the field of existence- and throws the *cogitans* right into the field of existence. In this sense, philosophy corresponds to the ontological problem area as opposed to Descartes reducing the mind to epistemology. The reason why he advocates a concept of *cogitans* living in *extensa* arises from the fact that putting the human consciousness apart from the outside world thinks that both the outside world and the *cogitans* cannot be correctly defined. Finally, it should be noted that in the second half of the twentieth century, the critique of the subjective reason was primarily criticized by Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, Derrida, and the mind was evaluated in a political, social and economic context, and the subject and object were reinterpreted.<sup>8</sup>

In my humble opinion, the fact that Descartes put himself on the premise of being, that is, put man, made so much individualism and self-centeredness that man thought everything was made for him. Animals, plants, nature, all became human servants. At the same time, he praised rationality so much that in time rationalism became a religion. Individualism and rationality brought together the necessity of all religious duties to be subjective.

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## Style Sheet

### A. BOOK OR A PART OF BOOK

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<sup>1</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 50.

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<sup>1</sup> Alfarabi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 45.

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