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# DEDICATION

This issue of *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* has been dedicated to Ömer Naci Soykan, died a short time ago, who is a valuable philosopher. May he rest in peace.

# Deductions and Reductions Decoding Syllogistic Mnemonics

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Abstract: The syllogistic mnemonic known by its first two words Barbara Celarent introduced a constellation of terminology still used today. This concatenation of nineteen words in four lines of verse made its stunning and almost unprecedented appearance around the beginning of the thirteenth century, before or during the lifetimes of the logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, both of whom owe it their lasting places of honor in the history of syllogistic. The mnemonic, including the theory or theories it encoded, was prominent if not dominant in syllogistics for the next 700 years until a new paradigm was established in the 1950s by the great polymath Jan Łukasiewicz, a scholar equally at home in philosophy, classics, mathematics, and logic. Perhaps surprisingly, the then-prominent syllogistic mnemonic played no role in the Łukasiewicz work. His 1950 masterpiece does not even mention the mnemonic or its two earliest champions William and Peter. The syllogistic mnemonic is equally irrelevant to the post-Łukasiewicz paradigm established in the 1970s and 1980s by John Corcoran, Timothy Smiley, Robin Smith, and others. Robin Smith's comprehensive 1989 treatment of syllogistic does not even quote the mnemonic's four verses. Smith's work devotes only 2 of its 262 pages to the mnemonic. The most recent translation of *Prior Analytics* by Gisela Striker in 2009 continues the post-Łukasiewicz paradigm and accordingly does not quote the mnemonic or even refer to the code-although it does use the terminology. Full mastery of modern understandings of syllogistic does not require and is not facilitated by ability to decode the mnemonic. Nevertheless, an understanding of the history of logic requires detailed mastery of the syllogistic mnemonic, of the logical theories it spawned, and of the conflicting interpretations of it that have been offered over the years by respected logicians such as De Morgan, Jevons, Keynes, and Peirce. More importantly, an understanding of the issues involved in decoding the mnemonic might lead to an enrichment of the current paradigm—an enrichment so profound as to constitute a new paradigm. After presenting useful expository, bibliographic, hermeneutic, historical, and logical background, this paper gives a critical exposition of Smith's interpretation.

**Keywords:** Syllogistic, mnemonics, deduction, reduction, *Prior Analytics*, Robin Smith.

#### **Overview**

It is evident too that all imperfect syllogisms are perfected through the first figure. For they are all brought to a conclusion either ostensively or through the impossible, and in both cases the first figure comes about. 29a30

But one can also reduce all syllogisms to the universal ones in the first figure.  $29b1^1$ 

Aristotle's syllogistic is restricted to arguments involving only propositions of the four forms known today by the letters A, E, I, and O, sometimes lowercase a, e, i, and o. Aristotle considered arguments with two or more premises. The fact that he seems to say that nothing follows from a single premise (and thus that all one-premise arguments are invalid) is an embarrassment to his admirers. In contrast, some take pride in his discussion of multipremise arguments and even ones with infinitely many premises. However, at the core of Aristotle's syllogistic are 256 twopremise argument forms, 24 of which are "valid", more properly *omnivalid*, i.e., have only valid instances. The remaining 232 are *nullovalid*, i.e., have only invalid instances.

Although Aristotle did not explicitly identify all 24, the deduction system Aristotle presented establishes validity for each of the 24 by means of direct and indirect deductions that obtain the conclusions from the respective premises in a step-by-step way using eight formally specified rules of deduction. The direct and indirect deductions use as two-premise rules four of the 24 forms—those four known today as Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio. As one-premise rules they uses repetition and the three known as conversions.

The direct and indirect deductions are explicitly goaldirected: after the premises are identified, the conclusion is identified as a goal to be deduced. After that, deductions are completed by chains of reasoning that show the conclusion to be a consequence of the premises. In a direct deduction the first step in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Aristotle, Prior Analytics Book I, trans. Gisela Striker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12.

the chain of reasoning is obtained by applying a rule. In an indirect deduction the first step in the chain of reasoning is the assumption of the contradictory of the conclusion.

Every deduction shows that its conclusion follows from its premise set. But of course, the deduction per se does not show that its conclusion is true. The premises need not be true and, even if they are true, they need not be known to be true—as required for demonstration. As in modern logic, Aristotle distinguishes deductions from demonstrations, which do produce knowledge of their conclusions. Aristotle's successors—whether ancient, medieval, or modern—do not always recognize Aristotle's deduction/demonstration distinction or incorporate it into their deliberations. This oversight leads to confusion.

Aristotle's syllogistic originated about 350 BCE as part of a theory of demonstrative knowledge. After Aristotle's substantial beginnings, early progress in developing syllogistic had been slow. Some historians think neither the number of forms, 256, nor the number of valid forms, 24, were established until about 2000 years later; some say around the time of Leibniz (1646-1716). Knowledge of the number of forms and the number of valid forms was not widespread until at least the late 1800s.

Anyway, much earlier, probably around 1200 there was a major notational and expository innovation—we call *the syllogistic mnemonic*—created by a mysteriously anonymous logician whose identity continues to elude historians. The substance of the innovation was soon reported by William of Sherwood (fl. 1250) and Peter of Spain (fl. 13<sup>th</sup> century). To start with, the A-E-I-O notation was introduced and the remaining letters at the beginning of the Latin alphabet, B, C, D, and F, were used as initial letters of names of Aristotle's four two-premise rule forms—the same names still used today: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio.

The innovation did not end with these useful stipulations. Rather, the notations for the four categorical proposition-forms and four first-figure argument-forms were made the basis of an ingeniously intricate mnemonic system that assigned names—

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such as Baroco, Cesare, Disamis, and Felapton—to most of the 20 non-rule two-premise valid forms. Moreover, that assignment also named processes reflecting a way of relating non-rule twopremise valid forms to the four rule forms, e.g., Baroco to Barbara, Cesare to Celarent, Disamis to Darii, and Felapton to Ferio. The processes were indicated by a third foursome of letters: C, M, P, and S. Some later logicians uncomfortable with the dual use of C replace it with K in the process use—turning Baroco into Baroko, for example. Each non-rule form name begins with the first letter of the name of the rule form it relates to. This paper investigates what that "way of relating" has been taken to be. That "way of relating" is explained in different ways by different decodings of the mnemonic names.

For example, *deductivists*, as we call them, decode the code name Bocardo as signifying a certain five-step indirect *deduction* of an O-conclusion from an O-major and A-minor. The deduction uses Barbara as a two-premise rule. In contrast, *reductivists* decode Bocardo as signifying a one-step indirect reduction that transforms a second-figure syllogism into Barbara, a first-figure syllogism. These are given in detail below.

For another example, *deductivists* decode the code name Camestres as signifying a certain three-step direct *deduction* of an E-conclusion from an A-major and E-minor. The deduction uses Celarent as a two-premise rule. Roughly, from the premises of Camestres the premises of Celarent are deduced and then Celarent is used to deduce a conclusion from which Camestres's conclusion is deduced. In the deduction, Celarent comes in the middle: after Camestres's premises have been given but before its conclusion has been deduced.

In contrast, *reductivists* decode Camestres as signifying a three-step direct reduction that transforms Camestres, a secondfigure syllogism into Celarent, a first-figure syllogism. In the reduction, Celarent comes at the end after three steps: one transforming Camestres into another argument, one transforming that into still another argument, and one transforming that into Celarent. These too are given in detail below.

We focus on three opinions: (1) On the deductivist opinion of the distinguished Aristotle scholar Robin Smith expressed in Appendix I of his masterful 1989 translation of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, (2) on the contrasting reductivist opinion of Peter of Spain, and (3) on the combined deductivist-reductivist opinion of Augustus De Morgan. Other opinions are also investigated.

The issue between the deductivists and the reductivists concerns how the four mnemonic verses are to be decoded. If suitable rules can be found or devised, there is no aprior reason why both cannot be 'right'; the issue would be one of subjective preference. Anyway, the issue does not concern the intentions of its anonymous creator.

Perhaps the issue is analogous to the question of how a certain device is to be used, a question to which the inventor's intention is irrelevant. Moreover, the issue is likewise independent of the content of *Prior Analytics*. Nevertheless, understanding the background of the mnemonic verses, requires awareness, as is widely known, that deduction and reduction are two processes recognized in *Prior Analytics*, Book A, Chapter 7.<sup>2</sup>

Smith 1989 brings deduction to our attention repeatedly but he recognizes reduction as a separate process without, however, attempting to give Aristotle's rules for it. In Chapter A 7, he translates Aristotle: "It is furthermore evident that all the incomplete deductions are completed through the first figure" (29a30). For Smith completing an incomplete deduction (*sullogismos*) is deduction which is distinguished from reduction, a "process of transforming [sc. Incomplete] deductions from one figure to another".<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, Striker 2009 also separates the two processes of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See John Corcoran, "Deduction and Reduction: Two Proof-Theoretic Processes in *Prior Analytics* I," *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 48 (1983); Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, trans. Robin Smith (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989); Aristotle, *Prior Analytics Book I*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 161.

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deduction and reduction. In this chapter she translates Aristotle: "But one can also reduce all syllogisms to the universal ones in the first figure" (29b1). Without explicitly identifying the transformational nature of reduction as Smith did, she did give convincing textual evidence for the separation. It is worth quoting her in full (Striker 2009, page 109). Commenting on 29b1, she wrote: "The word 'also' indicates that [...] all imperfect moods can also be reduced to those of the first figure. Hence it is tempting to treat the verb 'to reduce' (*anagein*, literally, to lead back) as a synonym of 'to perfect', as was indeed done from the ancient commentators on. Yet this assumption turns out to be unwarranted, as the following paragraph shows: there are cases of reduction of a mood to another mood that are not cases of perfection—as in the reduction of the first-figure moods Darii and Ferio, which are already perfect, to second-figure moods".

Although interpretation of *Prior Analytics* is irrelevant to this article, it would be misleading to omit mentioning the fact that several deductions and their rules are readily identifiable in the text of *Prior Analytics*. See Smith's Introduction and Appendix I. In contrast, it would be misleading to suggest that reductions and their rules are readily identifiable in the text of *Prior Analytics*. We know of no clear examples. Smith thinks there are none.

For purposes of exposition we need a neutral word for whatever it is that the 15 "imperfect" mnemonic names encode, more precisely, for the things constructed by following the instructions encoded by those 15 names. The word 'derivation' seems suitable. Accordingly, deductivists take derivations to be deductions. For example, deductivists take Camestres to encode instructions for deducing the conclusion from the premises of a syllogism in the form known as Camestres. In contrast, reductivists take derivations to be reductions. For example, reductivists take derivations to be reductions for reducing the syllogism in the form known as Camestres to one in the form known as Celarent.

Unfortunately, the sharp distinction between (1) deductions

(of conclusions from premises) and (2) reductions (of arguments to arguments) is not yet standard in the literature. Some scholars use 'deduction' in the general sense of "derivation"; some use 'reduction' in that sense; and some use two or all three words interchangeably.

For example, in speaking of Aristotle's treatment of Bocardo on page 36, Parsons uses 'reduction by reductio' to refer to an indirect deduction.<sup>4</sup> Parsons insightfully distinguishes indirect deductions from indirect reductions on page 53 where he takes the name Bocardo to decode an indirect reduction, without using 'deduction' and 'reduction' as contrasting words. For an example of Parsons using 'deduction' for a reduction of an argument to an argument, see the first paragraph of page 39 of the same book.<sup>5</sup>

# Introduction

There are then [nineteen] forms of syllogism [...]. I now put them down, with their derivations, [...], figures into which they fall, and the magic words by which they have been denoted for many centuries, words which I take to be more full of meaning than any that ever were made. — Augustus De Morgan, 1847, 150.<sup>6</sup>

William of Sherwood (c. 1200-1272) gave the oldest known version of the mnemonic.<sup>7</sup> Below we quote from the only known manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Lat. 16617, more briefly, BN 16617. William's quoted version contains 19 names in four lines with the explicit auxiliary stipulation that "The first two lines are devoted to the first figure, four words of the third line to the second figure, and all the other words to the third figure". The first 4 of the 19 names are Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio—the earliest known logical use of these four words.

William's book had not used any of these 19 names earlier.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Terence Parsons, *Articulating Medieval Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic or The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (London: Taylor and Walton, 1847), 150.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See William Sherwood, William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 66ff.

Moreover, before presenting the mnemonic, and of course without using the mnemonic names, William had described conversions, the 4 perfect syllogisms, and the 15 imperfect syllogisms. Moreover he also presents derivations for the 15. Some were deductions using the 4 as rules (with conversions, of course). However, in presenting a deduction for a mood he routinely said that the mood "reduces" to one of the first four moods.<sup>8</sup> Some were reductions to the four; two were indirect even though the rule they used had not been mentioned before. Nothing was said about the lists of arguments later logicians called reductions.<sup>9</sup> We quote BN 16617:<sup>10</sup>

Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum Cesare campestres festino baroco darapti Felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison

A little later, Peter of Spain (fl. 13<sup>th</sup> century) gave a similar list with the same figure stipulation. We quote Parsons:<sup>11</sup>

Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio Baralipton Celantes Dabitis Fapesmo Frisesomorum Cesare Cambestres Festino Barocho Darapti Felapton Disamis Datisi Bocardo Ferison

William and Peter differ on the spellings of Camestres and Baroco. More importantly, both present four-verse poems in classical dactylic hexameter, a form made famous by Homer in Greek and by Virgil and Ovid in Classical Latin. This suggests that the anonymous creator of the mnemonic was schooled in poetry over and above, as we will see, being masterful in his knowledge of Aristotle and imaginative in logic. Anyway, he was as attentive to the appearance of his creation as he was to its substance. His

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Sherwood, *Introduction to Logic*, 64ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Corcoran, "Deduction and Reduction."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Compare Lambertus Marie De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Company, 1967), 401.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 51.

patience, taste, learning, and imagination set him above many who discussed his work later.

Some later versions interpolate words usefully indicating groupings into figures but destroying the classical metric beauty. Others destroy the metric by rearranging the words or moving one word from one verse to another. Others contain alternative spelling such as Ferion and Feriogue for Ferio. Some reflect badly on the education of the author. For example, the word Ferioque was used by knowledgeable Latin writers but not as a name of Ferio: que is a conjunction and Ferioque means "and Ferio". People who copy things they do not understand are more likely to miscopy or to make what they mistaken regard as innovative improvements. On this point, Kneale and Kneale present what they called the first appearance of the mnemonic verses in William of Sherwood.<sup>12</sup> But they actually give Peter's version except that Cambestres is misspelled Campestres—substituting the mnemonically significant p for the mnemonically insignificant b. In addition, like the Parsons rendering of Peter's version, they capitalize all nineteen code names thereby giving the misleading impression that capitalization is mnemonically significant. Today it is conventional to use the capitalized forms whether or not the insignificance of the capitalization is noted.

We use the notation established in Corcoran 2009. In particular, Asp, Esp, Isp, and Osp are respectively the universal affirmative, universal negative, existential affirmative, and existential negative propositions with s as subject and p as predicate. As can be seen, we avoid the clutter of special notation for use-mention except where required by the context.

Arguments, i.e., premise-conclusion arguments, are presented by listing the premises vertically in a column, drawing a horizontal line, and listing the conclusion below. For typing convenience, the line is drawn by underlining the last premise.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *Development of Logic* (London: Clarendon Press, 1962), 232.

Using this notation, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio are as follows.

Amp	Emp	Amp	Emp
<u>Asm</u>	<u>Asm</u>	<u>Ism</u>	<u>Ism</u>
Asp	Esp	Isp	Osp

In addition to the above, vertical column notation, we will also use a horizontal row notation which lists the premises in a row followed by a slash before the conclusion. Using the row notation, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio are as follows.

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Amp, Asm /Asp
Emp, Asm /Esp
Amp, Ism / Isp
Emp, Ism / Osp
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In presenting an argument, as opposed to asserting the premises followed by an assertion of the conclusion as an inference, it would be misleading to replace the separating slash / by the conjunction 'therefore'. Likewise misleading would be to end the presentation with a period suggesting that it is a sentence.

Using the syllogistic mnemonics, Ferio-1, Festino-2, and Felapton-3 are the following three syllogisms.

Emp	Epm	Emp
<u>Ism</u>	<u>Ism</u>	<u>Ams</u>
Osp	Osp	Osp

The first vowel in a code name indicates the type [A, E, I, O] of the major premise; the second indicates the type of the minor; and the third indicates the type of the conclusion. Neither William nor Peter identifies anything in the names Ferio, Festino, and Felapton indicating the figures assigned by the auxiliary stipulation: first, second, and third respectively.

Notice that without the full display of all names with explicit auxiliary figure stipulation the names would not indicate the figure: e.g., it would be unspecified whether the major of Ferio would be Emp or Epm, whether the minor of Ferio would be Ism or Ims, and whether the conclusion of Ferio would be Osp or Ops. Where the auxiliary stipulation is not readily available the figure assignment must be done explicitly, e.g., by adding a number as Ferio-1, Festino-2, and Felapton-3. But that would be to deviate from mnemonic tradition.

Once a system of decoding is obtained, whether deductivist, reductivist, or other, it might be possible to use it to extract the figure from the code name, but we are not aware of any published sources about this. When we tried using one deductivist decoding and one reductivist decoding on a few examples, we succeeded.

According to logicians such as Smith,<sup>13</sup> the names Festino and Felapton encode instructions for constructing a deduction of the conclusion from the premises using Ferio as the two-premise rule—in the context of Aristotle's natural-deduction system.<sup>14</sup> The occurrence of *s* in Festino-2 indicates use of a one-premise rule of "*Simple conversion*" involving the component whose letter it follows: in this case deducing Epm from the major Emp. The occurrence of *p* in Felapton indicates use of a one-premise rule of "*Partial conversion*" involving the component whose letter it follows: in this case deducing Ism from the minor Ams.

1	Epm		1	Emp	
2	Ism		2	Ams	
?	Osp		?	Osp	
3	Emp	1, s	3	Ism	2, p
4	Osp	3, 2 F [Ferio]	4	Osp	1, 3 F
QE	ED		QE	ED	

The above deductions for Festino and Felapton are transcriptions of Aristotle's using the notation established in Corcoran 2009 and 2018 where the question mark indicates the goal, the conclusion to be reached. There are several reasons for leaving it without a line number: For example, no rule of inference is applied to it and thus numbering it would be pointless. For Aristo-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 229ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Presented in Corcoran, "Completeness of an Ancient Logic," *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 37 (1972),

tle's deductions, where the conclusion to be reached is indicated before any deduction rules are applied.<sup>15</sup> Opinions like Smith's that take the names to describe deductions are called *deductivist*. The most recent deductivist opinion is that of Rini, who states: "The names of the syllogisms [...] encode instructions for [sc. constructing] Aristotle's proofs".<sup>16</sup> For convenience we reproduce her only example of decoding: a deduction decoded from 'Darapti' and we juxtapose its transcription into our preferred notation.

(1)	A belongs to every C		1	Aca	
(2)	B belongs to every C		2	Acb	
(3)	C belongs to some B	A-Conversion 2	?	Iba	
(4)	A belongs to some B	Darii 1, 3	3	Ibc	2, p
			4	Iba	1, 3 D
			QE	ED	

To be clear, although this is Rini's only example of decoding, two other deductions are given: Cesare and Datisi.<sup>17</sup> But nothing is said about obtaining those two deductions by decoding the words. Even more peculiar is the fact that despite the claim that "this chapter explains how to decode the medieval names of the syllogisms" nothing is said about transposition (indicated by m as in Disamis-3) or contraposition (indicated by c as in Baroco-2 and Bocardo-3).<sup>18</sup>

Below indirect deductions for Baroco-2 and Bocardo-3 are transcriptions of Aristotle's. As explained in Corcoran 2009 and Corcoran 2018, the X is read "A contradiction" and the numbers indicate the two lines comprising the contradiction. ≥

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 7, 9 and 230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Adriane Rini, "Aristotle's Logic," The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic: From Aristotle to Tarski, eds. Alex Malpass and Marianna Antonutti Marfori (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Rini, "Aristotle's Logic," 42-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Rini, "Aristotle's Logic," 48, n. 3.

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BA	AROCO-2		
1	Apm		
2	Osm		
?	Osp		
3	@ Asp		
4	Asm	1, 3 B	
5	Х	4, 2	
QI	ED		
BC	OCARDO	-3	
B( 1	OCARDO Omp	-3	
B( 1 2	OCARDO Omp Ams	-3	
B( 1 2 ?	OCARDO Omp Ams Osp	-3	
B( 1 2 ? 3	OCARDO Omp Ams Osp @ Asp	-3	
B( 1 2 ? 3 4	OCARDO Omp Ams Osp @ Asp Amp	-3 3, 2 B	
B( 1 2 ? 3 4 5	OCARDO Omp Ams Osp @ Asp Amp X	-3 3, 2 B 4, 1	

QED

As a guard against confusion, it is important to realize (with Aristotle) that every direct deduction transforms readily into an indirect deduction of the same conclusion from the same premises simply by two operations: (1) inserting the reductio assumption between the goal and the first step, (2) noting that the last step is the contradictory of the reductio assumption, thus completing an indirect deduction. Here we give the results of transforming direct deductions of Festino and Felapton into indirect deductions.

1	Epm		1	Emp	
2	Ism		2	Ams	
?	Osp		?	Osp	
3	@ Asp		3	@ Asp	
4	Emp	1, s	4	Ism	2, p
5	Osp	4, 2 F [Ferio]	5	Osp	1, 4 F
6	Х	5, 3	6	Х	5, 3
QE	D		QE	D	

The above indirect deductions for Festino and Felapton are obtained using Aristotle's instructions at 45b1-5.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to logicians who take the mnemonic names to encode instructions for deducing conclusions from premises, logicians such as Eaton,<sup>20</sup> take the names to encode instructions for constructing a "reduction"—a list of arguments transforming the named syllogism (Festino and Felapton in these two cases) to one in the first figure (Ferio in these cases). Here the letter *s* after a premise or conclusion designation may indicate transforming that proposition into its simple converse to get the next argument. The occurrence of *p* in Felapton indicates transforming the component whose letter it follows, the minor Ams, into its *partial converse* Ism.

Epm, Ism /Osp		Emp, Ams /Osp	
Emp, Ism /Osp	s 1 <sup>st</sup> premise	Emp, Ism /Osp	p 2 <sup>nd</sup> prem.

The above reductions of Festino and Felapton to Ferio are transcriptions of Eaton's. Each reduction consists of two arguments: the first reduction is Festino-2 followed by Ferio-1; the second is Felapton-3 followed by Ferio-1.<sup>21</sup> One contrast between deductions and reductions is that although in deductions, except for the intended conclusion, any previous line or line pair is usable in transitioning to the next line (so numbering lines is useful), in reductions only the last line entered can be used in transitioning to the next line (so numbering lines). For a succinct contrast between deduction and reduction, see Corcoran's 1983 lecture abstract.<sup>22</sup>

Corresponding to indirect deductions there are reductions traditionally called indirect.<sup>23</sup> Indirect reductions are those that use a rule, actually either of two rules, traditionally known as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 47 and 155.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Ralph Eaton, *General Logic: An Introductory Survey* (London: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1931), 103ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Eaton, *General Logic*, 125ff. and 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Corcoran, "Deduction and Reduction."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See Eaton, *General Logic*, 128ff.

*contraposition*, that carry one two-premise argument into another sharing one premise and having the other premise replaced by the contradictory of the conclusion while taking as its conclusion the contradictory of the replaced premise. We call the two rules *major contraposition* and *minor contraposition*. To illustrate how these two transformations work, we apply them to the invalid argument Amp, Ams /Asp.

Major contraposition	Minor contraposition
Amp Ams /Asp	Amp Ams /Asp
Osp Ams /Omp	Amp Osp /Oms

Leibniz and others thought of contraposition as combining two operations: (1) take one premise's contradictory and take the conclusion's contradictory, (2) replace that premise with the conclusion's contradictory and the conclusion with the premise's contradictory.

Major contraposition		Minor contraposition		
Amp, Ams /Asp		Amp, Ams /Asp		
Omp, Osp		Oms, Osp		
Osp, Ams /Omp	c major	Amp, Osp /Oms	c minor	

The indirect reductions we know of from the literature have only one contraposition application, but there is no consensus definition ruling out multiple applications. Our introduction to indirect reduction would be incomplete without the classic stock examples: reductions of Baroco-2 and Bocardo-3 to Barbara-1.

Apm Osm /Osp		Omp Ams /Osp		
Apm Asp /Asm	c minor	Asp Ams /Amp	c major	

The above reductions of Baroco and Bocardo to Barbara are transcriptions of Bocheński's.<sup>24</sup> Notice that an indirect deduction contains a contradiction and is thus properly called by names such as "deduction ad impossibile". In contrast, an indirect reduction is free of contradiction and thus should never be referred to by an expression suggesting otherwise such as "reduc-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Joseph Bocheński, *History of Formal Logic*, Trans. Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 260.

tion ad impossibile"—without adequate disclaimers. The fact that indirect deductions contain contradictions but indirect reductions typically don't is clearly noted by Parsons where he attributes the observation to Peter of Spain.<sup>25</sup> Parsons also notes that it was inappropriate for Peter to call such a reduction 'a reduction by impossibility'.

The fact that indirect reduction uses two rules, one replacing the major and one the minor, is reflected in the placement of the code letter c : after major's letter as in Bocardo or after the minor's as in Baroco. This rare observation about the significance of the placement of the c code was made by Kneale and Kneale and by De Rijk.<sup>26</sup> For example, De Morgan 1847 omits it on pages 151ff where the decoding is treated and Parsons 2014 fails to mention it on pages 51ff where the mnemonic is treated.

There is no *locus classicus* we know of about transforming arbitrary direct reductions into corresponding indirect reductions, i.e., of the same initial argument to the same final argument—whether by Aristotle, a commentator, a medieval, or a traditional logician. Eaton mentioned two cases, though not in Aristotle's syllogistic as understood by Smith 1989 and the present writers.<sup>27</sup> However, Leibniz showed that all twelve valid two-premise categorical arguments in figures two and three can be reduced indirectly to one of the six in the first figure. Here are indirect reductions of Festino and Felapton to Celarent and Barbari.

Epm, Ism /OspEmp, Ams /OspEpm, Asp /Esmc, 2<sup>nd</sup> premiseAsp, Ams /Impc 1<sup>st</sup> prem.The above reductions of Festino-2 and Felapton-3 to Celar-

ent-1 and Barbari-1 respectively are transcriptions of those attributed to Leibniz by Bocheński.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Kneale and Kneale, *Development of Logic*, 233; De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum*, 401.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Eaton, *General Logic*, 129f

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Bocheński, *History of Formal Logic*, 259ff.

So far we have seen two approaches to decoding syllogistic mnemonics: one exemplified by Smith which we call *deductivist*, one exemplified by Eaton which we call *reductivist*. There is a major disagreement between deductivists and reductivists, even though in many cases deductivists are unaware or barely aware of the process of reduction and in many cases reductivists are unaware or barely aware of the process of deduction. There is no active debate between deductivists and reductivists. There are also major disagreements among deductivists and major among reductivists, as we indicate below.

However, there is one important agreement between the deductivist and the reductivist: both hold that the mnemonic names of the syllogistic forms not only denote argument forms; the names also encode sequences of operations. From the deductivist perspective, one difference between 'Barbara' and 'Baroco' is that the former names an argument form without giving an algorithm for deducing its conclusion from its premises, so to speak, whereas the latter does both. From the reductivist perspective, one difference between 'Barbara' and 'Baroco' is that the former names an argument form without giving an algorithm for reducing it to another argument form, whereas the latter does both.

The semantic differences between 'Barbara' and 'Baroco' resemble somewhat those between '9' and '((3 + 3) + 3)'. One difference between '9' and '((3 + 3) + 3)' is that the former names a number without giving an algorithm for computing it from a smaller number, so to speak, whereas the latter does both.

Along with the disagreements between deductivists and reductionists, there are many differences between the process of deduction and the process of reduction. Some have been described before.<sup>29</sup> But an important philosophical difference has not been mentioned in print before. To grasp this, notice that not all deduction produces knowledge of truth of their conclusions;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> See Corcoran, "Deduction and Reduction."

but demonstrative deduction does. Likewise, notice that not all reductions allegedly produce knowledge of validity of their initial arguments; but syllogistic reductions allegedly do, where a syllogistic reduction reduces incomplete forms to complete forms.

The alleged cognition-flow direction of syllogistic reduction is opposite from that of demonstrative deduction. We come to know that a conclusion is true by demonstratively deducing it from premises known to be true. The cognition-flow in demonstrative deduction is from known to unknown. Demonstration creates knowledge.

According to several of our sources, reduction has a cognition-producing function.<sup>30</sup> Allegedly, we come to know that an argument is valid by syllogistically reducing it to an argument known to be valid. The cognition-flow in reduction is from unknown to known. Reduction annihilates ignorance. But none of our sources explain how reduction produces knowledge. In fact none of them even attempts to make this obscure claim plausible. None of us, the authors of this article, can see how a reduction can bring about knowledge of validity or how a reduction can destroy ignorance of it. To us reduction is an interesting formal process whose epistemic significance, if any, remains to be established. We need an epistemology of reduction. Although it is easy to see that deductions, and in particular Aristotle's deductions, produce knowledge of validity of arguments. We have all been faced with an argument whose validity we did not know and then, after being shown a deduction of the conclusion from the premise, acquired knowledge of its validity.<sup>31</sup>

Knowing how to deduce is one form of operational knowledge, "know how". Deducing a conclusion from premises produce knowledge that the argument is valid, which is a form of propositional knowledge, "know that".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> See, for example, Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 51ff.; De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, 401; Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, 58ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See Corcoran, "Argumentations and Logic," *Argumentation* 3 (1989), 17-43.

Knowing how to reduce is another form of operational knowledge, "know how". Reducing a given argument whose validity or invalidity is not known to one whose validity is known is supposed to produce knowledge that the given argument is valid. We, the authors, have never had this experience.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, we have never seen a plausible answer to the question of what is learned by reducing a given argument whose validity or invalidity is not known to another whose validity or invalidity is not known. In fact, we have never seen a plausible answer to the question of what is learned by reducing one given argument to another.

Let the above introductory remarks suffice so we may proceed to one of the main goals of this paper: to analyze, criticize, and correct Smith's 1989 account of the mnemonic [Appendix I, pp. 229ff.]

# Some Accounts of the Coded Processes

The third paragraph below is Smith's entire account verbatim. We have numbered selected sentences, clauses, and phrases in braces for convenience. Smith supplied no references and no indications of where he got his information. He did not say who created the mnemonic he uses, or whether there are or were alternatives. Likewise Smith does not reveal whether his mnemonic came into existence all at once or whether it evolved. Moreover, Smith does not say who constructed the deductions the mnemonic names encode. In particular, in contrast his fellow deductivist Rini says that they encode deductions Aristotle presented in *Prior Analytics*.<sup>33</sup>

More importantly, he does not say that the four lowercase vowels, a, e, i, and o, stand respectively for the four propositional

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See Corcoran and Idris Samawi Hamid, "Investigating Knowledge and Opinion," *The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau*, eds. Arnold Koslow and Arthur Buchsbaum (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 95-126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Rini, "Aristotle's Logic," 47.

kinds: universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular affirmative. Likewise missing is indication that the four uppercase consonants, B, C, D, and F, stand for the four perfect, or complete, syllogisms, or deductions (to use Smith's terminology) in the first figure: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio—in which the first vowel stands for the major, the second for the minor, and the third for the conclusion.

Smith's entire account.

{1} The traditional names for the incomplete forms actually encode instructions for carrying out proofs. {2} The first letter of the name (B, C, D, F) indicates the first-figure form to which the proof appeals; {3} 's' following a vowel indicates that the corresponding premise (always an e or i) is to be converted (conversio simplex); {4} 'p' following 'a' indicates 'conversion by limitation' (conversio per accidens) of a universal premise, i. e., {5} conversion into a particular premise (a into i, e into o); {6} 'r' indicates proof through impossibility; and {7} 'm' indicates that the premises must be interchanged. {8} (Other letters, such as 'l' and 'n,' have no significance.) {9}Thus, the name Camestres tells us that a proof that an *e* conclusion follows from an *a* major premise and an e minor may be constructed by {10} converting the first premise (*Camestres*) and {11} interchanging the premises (*Camestres*) {12}, giving the first-figure form *Celarent*, (*Camestres*) then {13} converting the conclusion (Camestres); and, that {14} a proof through impossibility is also possible (Camestres).

For comparison we present the medieval accounts by William and by Peter and the modern account by William and Mary Kneale—but only those sentences relating to the process code.

William's account of the process code.<sup>34</sup>

In these lines [...]'s' [signifies] simple conversion [conversio simplex], 'p' conversion by limitation [conversio per accidens], 'm' transposition of the premisses, and 'b' and 'r' when they are in the same word signify reduction per impossibile.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Sherwood, Introduction to Logic, 67.

COMMENTS: William's account has two errors in the guoted passage alone. (1) His instruction for decoding P does not cover Baralipton either for deductivist or reductivist decodings. The I proposition, indicated by the small letter preceding the P in Baralipton, does not convert accidentally. Other logicians make the same mistake. Jevons makes this mistake in an otherwise flawless and revealing account.<sup>35</sup> As an example on the next page, Jevons tries to reduce Bramantip-4 to Barbara and seems not to realize that he failed. As will be noted below, Smith makes it and another error in his account of the per accidens rule.<sup>36</sup> (2) William's instruction for encodings requiring indirect reduction fits Baroco and Bocardo but not Baralipton. How he arrived at this is a mystery. Besides, even adding a lame patch such as "except Baralipton" does not give enough information for the reader to handle Baroco and Bocardo differently as the different placements of C require—again, either for deductivist or reductivist decodings. Where William said simply that M indicates transposing the premises, Peter is more explicit. Peter says, "Wherever M is put, it signifies that a transposition in premises is to be done, and a transposition is making a minor out of a major, and the converse." This will appear to be a mistake to readers of Striker 2009 and Smith 1989, not to mention De Morgan, Jevons, and many others<sup>37</sup>—all of whom take an argument's major premise to be the one containing its conclusion's predicate and take an argument's minor premise to be the one containing its conclusion's subject. With that definition, transposition could not be making a minor out of a major. The only way of making a minor out of a major is to convert the conclusion.

However, Peter does not define an argument's major and minor premises at all. Rather he defines an argument presentation's major and minor premises to be those coming first and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> W. Stanley Jevons, *Elementary Lessons in Logic: Deductive and Inductive* (London: Macmillan, 1870), 146.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> De Morgan, Formal Logic, 148; Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 128.

second respectively. Thus, Peter is meticulously accurate— "transposition is making a minor out of a major, and the converse".

In contrast, in De Morgan's account the M rule is erroneously described making an argument's major premise of its minor and conversely.<sup>38</sup> Other modern logicians make the same mistake, e.g. Jevons.<sup>39</sup>

Incidentally, William does not give even one example of decoding one of the 15 coded instruction sets. As said above, before giving the mnemonic William gives derivations for his 15 imperfect moods but he never says how they are encoded or how they are obtained using his instructions.

Peter's account of the process code.<sup>40</sup>

"Also, wherever an S put in these words, it signifies that the proposition understood by the immediately preceding vowel is to be converted simply. And by P it signifies that the proposition is to be converted accidentally. Wherever M is put, it signifies that a transposition in premises is to be done, and a transposition is making a minor out of a major, and the converse. Where C is put, however, it signifies that the mood understood by that word is to be confirmed by impossibility."

COMMENT: Peter's account has two errors in the quoted passage alone. (1) His instruction for decoding P does not cover Baralipton either for deductivist or reductivist decodings. Parsons tries to excuse this erroneous instruction by saying: "These instructions work perfectly provided that conversion by limitation is used in the correct order; from universal to particular in premises, and from particular to universal in conclusions (the verse is written so as to require this)".<sup>41</sup> The I proposition, indicated by the small letter preceding the P in Baralipton, does not convert accidentally. Parsons sentence is an oxymoron or a tau-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> De Morgan, *Formal Logic*, 148 and 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Jevons, *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, 128 and 146.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Parsons, Articulating Medieval Logic, 52.

tology. (2) Peter's instruction for decoding C does not give enough information for the reader to handle Baroco and Bocardo differently as the different placements of C require—again, either for deductivist or reductivist decodings.

Where William said simply that M indicates transposing the premises, Peter is more explicit. Peter says, "Wherever M is put, it signifies that a transposition in premises is to be done, and a transposition is making a minor out of a major, and the converse." This will appear to be a mistake to readers of Striker 2009 and Smith 1989, not to mention De Morgan<sup>42</sup> and many others all of whom take an argument's major premise to be the one containing its conclusion's predicate and take an argument's minor premise to be the one containing its conclusion's subject. With that definition, transposition could not be making a minor out of a major. The only way of making a minor out of a major is to convert the conclusion. However, Peter does not define an argument's major and minor premises at all. Rather he defines an argument presentation's major and minor premises to be those coming first and second respectively. Thus, Peter is meticulously accurate. In contrast, in De Morgan's account the M rule is erroneously described making an argument's major premise of its minor and conversely.<sup>43</sup>

Incidentally, Peter does not give even one example of decoding one of the 15 coded instruction sets. Before giving the mnemonic Peter gives derivations for some imperfect moods but he never says how they are encoded or how they are obtained using his instructions.

# The Kneales account of the process code.<sup>44</sup>

Here [...] s appearing immediately after a vowel indicates that the corresponding proposition is to be converted simply during reduction, while p in the same position indicates that the proposition is to be converted partially or *per accidens*, and *m* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> De Morgan, *Formal Logic*, 148.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> De Morgan, *Formal Logic*, 148 and 151.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Kneale and Kneale, *Development of Logic*, 232ff.

between the first two vowels of a formula indicates that the premisses are to be transposed; *c* appearing after one of the first two vowels indicates that the corresponding premiss is to be replaced by the negative of the conclusion for the purpose of a reduction *per impossibile*.

COMMENTS: The Kneales account has at least three errors in the quoted passage alone. (1) As in William's account and in Peter's account, the instruction for decoding P does not cover Baralipton either for deductivist or reductivist decodings. The I proposition, indicated by the small letter preceding the P in Baralipton, does not convert accidentally. (2) The instruction for M has a new error—not in William's or Peter's, and not in Smith's. Inexplicably, it gratuitously restricts itself to occurrences of M between the first two vowels as in Camestres-2. Thus it leaves the Ms in Fapesmo-4, Frisesomorum-4, and Disamis-3.

This account can be credited for recognizing that the position of C is significant. But it can be faulted for referring to the negative of the conclusion instead of the contradictory opposite: there is nothing negative about the contradictory opposites of negative conclusions. Moreover, (3) from the deductivist perspective it is an error to say that a premise is replaced in an indirect deduction or for that matter in any deduction: once the premises are set they remain in place regardless of what is added to complete the deduction. Also, from the reductionist perspective it is an error not to say that the conclusion is replaced by the contradictory opposite of the replaced premise.

# **Deductions and Reductions for Camestres-2**

Apm
 Esm
 Esp
 Ems 2, s
 Eps 3, 1 C [Celarent]
 Esp 4, s
 QED

The above direct deduction for Camestres-2 is a transcription of Aristotle's using the notation established in Corcoran 2009 and 2018.  $^{45}$ 

1 Apm

- 2 Esm
- ? Esp
- 3 @ Isp
- 4 Ism 1, 3 D [Darii]
- 5 X 2,4

QED

The above indirect deduction for Camestres-2 using the twopremise rule Darii is in the notation established in Corcoran 2009 and 2018. Aristotle says that Camestres can be completed indirectly,<sup>46</sup> but he does not give the indirect deduction nor does he say which of the four two-premise rules he used.

According to logicians such as Keynes,<sup>47</sup> the names encode instructions for "reducing" (transforming) the named syllogism to one in the first figure: Celarent in these two cases.

Here the letter *s* before a premise or conclusion designation may indicate transforming that proposition into its simple converse to get the next line. The letter *m*, for "mutation", meaninglessly redundant in deductions, indicates interchanging the premises in reduction—a bookkeeping operation required by the convention that in the initial and final lines of a reduction the major premise comes first.

The letter c indicates indirect reduction transforming the named syllogism by a "double-reversing" process of replacing a premise by the contradictory of the conclusion and replacing the conclusion by the contradictory of the replaced premise—a process known as *contraposition* since the 1200s.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, xxi and 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 27a14ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> John Neville Keynes, *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1906), 318ff.

The below is a direct reduction (left) of Camestres to Celarent juxtaposed with an indirect reduction (right) of Camestres to Ferio.

Apm, Esm/ Esp		Apm, Esm/ Esp	
Esm, Apm / Esp	m	Isp, Esm / Opm	c [mjr contrap.]
Ems, Apm / Esp	s 1 <sup>st</sup>	Ips, Esm / Opm	s 1 <sup>st</sup>
Ems, Apm / Eps	s conclusion	Esm, Ips / Opm	m

The above direct reduction (left) of Camestres to Celarent is a transcription of Keynes.<sup>48</sup> The above indirect reduction (right) of Camestres to Ferio is Corcoran's. Compare Leibniz's one-step indirect reduction Camestres to Darii.<sup>49</sup>

Notice that at lines 2 and 3 in the indirect deduction the minor is the first premise. Moreover, at line 4, the same proposition that was previously a minor becomes the major—and without doing anything to the premises. Converting the conclusion reverses majority and minority. To secure this point that otherwise careful writers stumble over, notice that there is no way to reverse majority and minority without reversing subject and predicate in the conclusion.

# **Critiquing Smith's Account**

Our critique is organized as follows. The main item critiqued is quoted for ready reference. Our comments are labeled A, B, C, etc. followed by the numbers of the relevant items in braces.

{1} The traditional names for the incomplete forms actually encode instructions for carrying out proofs.

Comment A {1}: Instead of "carrying out proofs", this should say something like "completing the incomplete form after the premises are expressed and the conclusion is set as the goal to be reached". For example, Smith's intention is to say that the name 'Camestres' encodes instructions for completing the following incomplete deduction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Keynes, *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*, 320.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Bocheński, *History of Formal Logic*, 260.

- 1 Apm
- 2 Esm
- ? Esp

To be as explicit as this context requires, Smith takes the 9character name 'Camestres' to be an encoding of instructions for going from the above 3-line incomplete deduction to the below 5line complete deduction.

- 1 Apm
- 2 Esm
- ? Esp
- 3 Ems 2, s
- 4 Eps 3, 1 C [Celarent]
- 5 Esp 4, s
- QED

Comment B {1, 6, 14}: There are problems reconciling {1} with {6}, {14}, and the example 'Camestres'. {1} says the names encode instructions for completing a deduction but {6} says r indicates proof through impossibility, i.e. an indirect deduction.

Indicating an indirect deduction is not giving instructions for constructing one. Smith's account is entirely devoid of instructions for indirect deduction. For example, where is there any indication of which premise to use with the contradictory of the conclusion? That would be the major in our indirect deduction for Camestres above. Moreover, where is there any indication of which perfect deduction is to be used? In this case that would be Darii as in Leibniz's indirect deduction for Camestres above.

Without the r, 'Camestres' gives adequate directions for a direct deduction. According to {14} the r says that there is also an indirect deduction. To the best of our knowledge no other commentator in the history of logic took the r in Camestres the way Smith does. William's unfortunate b-and-r instruction is remotely similar. See Comment J below.

{2} The first letter of the name (B, C, D, F) indicates the firstfigure form to which the proof appeals [...]. Comment C {2}: Smith needs to say that each of the encoded deductions has only one application of only one two-premise rule. As it stands, his expression 'the first-figure form to which the proof appeals' is a nonsequitur. Again, 'proof' should be 'deduction', 'completed deduction', or something of the sort. The topic here is deduction, not demonstration. Moreover, {2} has (B, C, D, F) being names: the names are Barbara, Celarent, etc. Finally, {2} does not tell the first-time reader what first-figure form the letter indicates.

Rewriting {2}: The first letter (B, C, D, or F) of the name is the first letter of the first-figure form (Barbara, Celarent, Darii, or Ferio) which the deduction uses. For example, Camestres uses Celarent.

Comment D {3, 13}: Smith's text {3} is: 's' following a vowel indicates that the corresponding premise (always an e or i) is to be converted (conversio simplex).

This reads like a first draft or worse. To clear the air we rewrite it: 's' follows only e and i and it indicates that the corresponding premise is to be converted (conversio simplex), that is, to be used as the premise in an application of the appropriate simple conversion rule [and not to be replaced by its own simple converse].

Smith evidently overlooked the fact that i occurs after conclusion indicators. Here are all relevant occurrences: *Celantes Dabitis Fapesmo Frisesomorum Cesare Camestres Festino Disamis Datisi Ferison*. Smith's rule does not cover *Celantes*, *Dabitis*, *Camestres*, and *Disamis*.

It is incoherent, a nonsequitur, to instruct someone to apply simple conversion to a deduction line that has not been reached yet.

Fortunately for us one of the untreated cases, viz., Camestres, is the one Smith used to exemplify his decoding scheme. His explanation is lucid until he reaches the last occurrence of s. There after the Celarent rule is applied he says at {13} that s tells you to convert the conclusion—meaning the conclusion of the rule application.

Comment E {4}: {4} 'p' following 'a' indicates 'conversion by limitation' (*conversio per accidens*) of a universal premise.

Smith's expression 'of a universal premise' must mean "of a universal affirmative premise" because that is what the letter a would be indicating and because Aristotle—however awkwardly, mysteriously, and arbitrarily—did not recognize partial conversion of universal negatives.<sup>50</sup>

The p occurs in Fapesmo, Darapti, Felapton, and Baralipton. Smith's treatment overlooks the occurrence of p in Baralipton in two ways: because it follows an i and because it follows a conclusion indicator. This raises the question of how a deductivist can deal with the omitted case and in such a way that the code can be applied to deductions other than those already encoded. No solution appears in the literature as far as we now know.

To preserve the viability of the deductivist reading we propose: p following an i in the conclusion position means that the final conclusion is reached from a previously occurring A proposition by partial conversion.

Comment F {4}: {4} 'p' following 'a' indicates 'conversion by limitation' (*conversio per accidens*) of a universal premise, i. e., {5} conversion into a particular premise (*a* into *i*, *e* into *o*)

In the first place, in deduction the result of conversion of a premise—whether simple or partial—is not into another premise. The occurrence of 'premise' in {5} should be changed to 'sentence'. In the second place, in Smith's reconstruction of Aristotle's deductions there is no rule of E-to-O conversion. The occurrence in {5} of '(a into i, e into o)' should read '(a into i)'. In the third place, nothing is said about p following i as in Baralipton. The list of scholars who have made this mistake is long; besides

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> See Corcoran and Kevin Tracy, "Review of Joray, Pierre, 'A Completed System for Robin Smith's Incomplete Ecthetic Syllogistic'," *Mathematical Reviews*, MR3681098, 2018.

Smith it includes Peirce,<sup>51</sup> Rini,<sup>52</sup> Peter of Spain (see above), and others.

Comment G {7}: {7} 'm' indicates that the premises must be interchanged. If one is discussing generating argument presentation from argument presentations, it makes perfect sense to move from one to another by interchanging premises. But in deducing a conclusion from premises, interchanging premises makes no sense. There is no rule for transposing premises in any categorical deduction system we know of.

Once the premises and conclusion goal have been set, no changes can be made. The important point is that a rule of transposition makes perfect sense for transforming one argument presentation into another, but such a rule has no role in deducing conclusions from premises.

As an aside that applies not only to Smith but also to several other logicians, we point out that in Frisesomorum the second occurrence of m does not instruct retransposing the transposed premises. Somewhere each decoding must say or imply that the last four letters are to be ignored in Frisesomorum.

Comment H {8}: {8} (Other letters, such as 'l' and 'n,' have no significance.) In the first place, we are talking about non-initial occurrences in codings for imperfect moods. In the second place, the r that Smith took to indicate indirect deduction is the most used of the insignificant letters, viz., lowercase non-initial d (as in Bocardo), l, n, r, and t.

Comment I {9}: {9}Thus, the name *Camestres* tells us that a proof that an *e* conclusion follows from an *a* major premise and an *e* minor may be constructed by [...].

This might be Smith's worst nonsequitur. In the first place, the name *Camestres* does not tell us *that* anything; it tells us *how* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce: Chronological Edition. Volume 5 (1884-1886), eds. Nathan Houser et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 348ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Rini, "Aristotle's Logic," 48.

to do something. In the second place, it is not about a proof of a semantic metatheorem, viz., "that an *e* conclusion follows from an *a* major premise and an *e* minor". It is about a deduction of an *e* conclusion from an *a* major premise and an *e* minor. In the third place, what Smith needs the name *Camestres* to tell us is much more specific than what Smith says. Smith needs the name *Camestres* to tell us how to deduce the conclusion of an argument in the form named *Camestres* from its premises.

To see how far off this passage is imagine a proof that an e conclusion follows from an a major premise and an e minor, more specifically, a proof that an e conclusion of an argument in Camestres follows from its a major premise and its e minor.

Comment J {6, 14}: {6} 'r' indicates proof through impossibility; {14} a proof through impossibility is also possible (Camestres).

Without clause {14} clause {6} would be taken to instruct us to do an indirect deduction for each form whose coding contained an R. But that would have been an error on Smith's part because telling someone to do an indirect deduction does not tell them how to proceed after assuming the contradictory opposite of the conclusion. What is the next step? This error is not exonerated by {14}: telling someone that an indirect deduction is possible does not instruct them how to proceed. Moreover, {14} introduces a new error: if 'r' says that an indirect deduction is possible, then all fifteen codings should contain an occurrence of 'r'—because every direct deduction is transformable into an indirect deduction of the same conclusion from the same premises. See above.

# Conclusions

After carefully considering the evidence, we conclude that the reductivist decoding of the original fifteen encodings fits much better than the deductivist.

Both do equally well with (1) the initial letter—B, C, D, F indicating for the reductivist the destination of the reduction or for the deductivist the two-premise rule used, (2) the s for simple conversion as reductivist argument-presentation transformations or as deductivist one-premise rule applications, and (3) the c for contraposition as reductivist argument-presentation transformations or as deductivist indirect deduction instructions. Moreover, the letter p works equally well in the last two of its three occurrences: Baralipton, Fapesmo, and Darapti.

However, the two deductivists we studied, Smith and Rini, had nothing to say about p following i. We cannot imagine a plausible deductivist decoding of Baralipton or any other mood name having a p following an i in the conclusion position. This is no problem for a reductivist.

Similarly embarrassing for deductivists is the letter m: there is no rule for transposing premises in any categorical deduction system we know of. Again this is no problem for reductivists.

We are confident that the mnemonic does not readily admit a deductivist interpretation. In an important sense, this is a disappointing conclusion. Of the two processes, deduction is the clearer, the most useful, and the most important philosophically, scientifically, and historically. After two millennia it is still not clear what reduction accomplishes. Until this is known, the enormous attention devoted to reduction and the mnemonic verses could turn out to have been a useless distraction, a red herring in the development of logic.

On a positive note, the reductivist theory underlying the syllogistic-mnemonic verses emphasizes an aspect of *Prior Analytics* overlooked by both the Łukasiewicz paradigm and the Corcoran-Smiley paradigm thereby highlighting their common deficiency. As such, it could lead to a new paradigm that incorporates the Łukasiewicz theory of terms, the Corcoran-Smiley naturaldeduction logic, and the medieval reduction system.

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# Zwei Aspekte der Freiheit in Kants Praktischer Philosophie

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#### [Two Aspects of Liberty in Kant's Practical Philosophy]

**Abstract:** Philosophers who produce ideas about the problem of liberty in general propounded various theories relating to feature, content, and boundaries of freedom. Immanuel Kant is a philosopher who made a name for himself with his thoughts concerning the problem of liberty as well as his ground-breaking ideas in philosophy. The primary purpose of this work is to discuss why he tried to address the freedom in the dual axes in the context of his practical philosophy. Within this framework, it will be scrutinized why Kant founded the liberty by restricting in the philosophy of law while he sought absolute freedom in ethics.

Keywords: Kant, practical philosophy, liberty, ethics, right.

# Einleitung

Was ist Freiheit? Von Sokrates bis Dworkin fragt fast jeder Philosoph, der sich für Ethik, menschliche Philosophie, politische Philosophie, Sozialphilosophie oder Rechtsphilosophie interessiert, in gewisser Weise nach der Antwort. Die Ansichten einiger Philosophen über Freiheit sind jedoch bedeutender geworden als andere. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) war ein der Denker, der neben der Eröffnung neuer Wege in der Philosophie auch mit seinen Gedanken über die Freiheit bedeutend wurde. Seine Philosophie gilt als eine Wende in der Philosophiegeschichte, da er mit seiner kritischen Methode die überlieferte Philosophie neu begründete sowie eine originelle Denkart in den philosophischen Diskurs einführte. In der Erkenntnistheorie versuchte er beispielsweise zwischen Rationalismus (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) und Empirismus (Locke, Hume) eine Synthese herzustellen.<sup>1</sup> Dabei war sein Ziel die kopernikanische Revolution der Wissenschaft auch in der Philosophie zu schaffen.<sup>2</sup> Im Grunde enthält Kants praktische Philosophie auch einen revolutionären Charakter, wobei er sie auf der Grundlage seiner theoretischen Philosophie entwickelte.

Hierbei ergibt sich die Frage ob Kants Freiheitsphilosophie auch einen revolutionären Charakter hat. In dieser Studie, die zwei verschiedene Aspekte des Freiheitsbegriffs in Kants praktischer Philosophie thematisiert, wird auf diese Frage bezogen untersucht. Der erste Aspekt des Freiheitsbegriffs die und der zweite die Rechtsphilosophie. In diesem Kontext sind folgende Begriffe wie "Autonomie" und "Kategorische Imperativ" bei seiner Begründung von zentraler Bedeutung. Dementsprechend müssen diese Begriffe verdeutlicht werden, um sein Freiheitsverständnis besser zu definieren.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Genau lautet das eingebettete Zitat: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind." Aus: Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [KrV], *Kants Werke: Akademie Textausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), IV 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Vgl. KrV, Kants Werke, IV 12.

# 1. Kants Praktische Philosophie und Autonomie

Das Grundprinzip, das sich zentral in die Kantische Philosophie einordnet, ist die Autonomie, die für alle Bereiche der Philosophie gilt. Zwischen zentraler Rolle der Autonomie in seiner Philosophie und dem Aufklärungsgedanken besteht ein unverzichtbares Verhältnis.<sup>3</sup> In seiner berühmten Schrift Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? bringt er die Autonomie des Verstandes und die Aufklärungsidee in Zusammenhang: "Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen."<sup>4</sup> Kant zur Folge sollte man Mut und Entschlossenheit zeigen, den eigenen Verstand von anderen zu befreien. Mit seinem Worten: "Sapere aude! Habe Mut dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung".<sup>5</sup> In diesem Zusammenhangsollte erklärt werden, welche Bedeutung die Autonomie in seiner praktischen Philosophie hat.

Kant untersucht in der praktischen Philosophie sowohl die Autonomie des Individuums als auch die Autonomie der Vernunft. Er sieht die menschliche Vernunft in der Lage, aus sich selbst eine allgemeingültige Ethik und Recht zu begründen. Hierbei unterscheidet er sich von der naturrechtlichen und empirischen Philosophietradition, da er der Überzeugung ist, dass diese seiner Ansicht nach das allgemeine Moralgesetz nicht bestimmen können. Kant formuliert seine Ansicht in der *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*: "Jedermann muß eingestehen, daß ein Gesetz, wenn es moralisch, d.i. als Grund einer Verbindlichkeit, gelten soll, absolute Notwendigkeit bei sich führen müsse [...]."<sup>6</sup> Die Menschen können z.B. die Berechtigung des Gebots "du sollst nicht lügen" nicht von der Natur aus oder durch Erfah≽

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Hakan Çörekçioğlu, "Kantçı Otonominin Politikası," *Muğla Üniversitesi Uluslararası Kant Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Nebil Reyhani (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2006), 439.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? [BF], Kants Werke, VIII 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> BF, Kants Werke, VIII 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Kant, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten [GMS], Kants Werke, IV 389.

rung herleiten, sondern nur durch reine Vernunft ankommen.

Dieser Prozess der Herleitung beinhaltet nach Kant nicht eine *a posteriori* sondern eine *a priori* Vorgehensweise. Die höchsten Prinzipien der Moral und des Rechts sind nur im Rahmen der reinen Vernunft erreichbar.<sup>7</sup> Die Natur und die menschliche Erfahrung sind allein nicht ausreichend, die höchsten Prinzipien der Moral und des Rechts zu erreichen. Kant fügt hinzu, dass die Sittengesetze sich nicht mit der Natur des Menschen oder mit den Umständen in der Welt verbinden lassen, sondern a priori lediglich in Begriffen der reinen Vernunft gesucht werden müssen.<sup>8</sup> In diesem Kontext bemüht er sich, Antworten auf die Frage *Was soll ich tun?* zu suchen, indem er sich mit dem Prinzip des guten Handelns auseinandersetzt. Die anstrebte Antwort auf diese Frage findet Kant nur in der Vernunft, und zwar dass man für ein gutes Handeln als höchstes Prinzip den *Kategorischen Imperativ* benötige.

Der Kategorische Imperativ bei Kant ist sowohl für seine Moralphilosophie, als auch in der Rechtsphilosophie wesentlich. In der Moralphilosophie favorisiert er den Kategorischen Imperativ als einen Maßstab für moralisches Handeln. Das bedeutet, dass das eigene Handeln universalisierbar sein muss. In der Rechtsphilosophie geht es um die Universalisierung der Normen des Miteinanderlebens. Hierbei liegen die Autonomie der Vernunft und der Begriff der Universalisierbarkeit als Grundformen im Zentrum der praktischen Philosophie Kants. Die Autonomie der Vernunft bedeutet nach Kant, dass man in der Lage ist seine Vernunft ohne irgendwelche äußeren Wirkungen zu benutzen. Mit anderen Worten Voraussetzung für die Autonomie der Vernunft ist, dass die menschliche Vernunft von allen äußeren Einmischungen befreit ist. Die Autonomie der Vernunft bedeutet auch gleichzeitig die Autonomie des Menschen. Zudem signalisiert es auch in welchem Zusammenhang Kant den Freiheitsbe-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Vgl. Celal Yeşilçayır, *Ebedi Barış: Pax Romanadan Birleşmiş Milletlere* (İstanbul: Tezkire Yayınları, 2017), 54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Vgl. GMS, Kants Werke, IV 389.

griff in seiner praktischen Philosophie anwenden möchte. Um diesen Punkt besser analysieren zu können, setzen wir uns im Folgenden mit Kants Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie auseinander mit Hinblick darauf, wie Kant den Freiheitsbegriff in der Moralphilosophie und in der Rechtsphilosophie mit welchem Unterschied formuliert und ob sein Freiheitsverständnis einen neuen Ansatz in die Philosophie eingeführt hat?

#### 2. Freiheitsverständnis in Kants Moralphilosophie

In seiner Ethik formuliert Kant die grundlegenden Prinzipien des moralisches Verhaltens in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft mit dem kategorischen Imperativ: "Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne."<sup>9</sup> Das Prinzip der allgemeinen Gesetzgebung sieht Kant schon in der Schöpfung der Menschheit, die der Mensch "als das Urbild seiner Handlungen in seiner Seele trägt".<sup>10</sup> Überdies ist der Mensch als ein vernunftbegabtes und autonomes Wesen Initiator seines Willens durch dieses ursprüngliche Gesetz verpflichtet: "Da aber der Mensch doch ein freies (moralisches) Wesen ist, so kann der Pflichtbegriff keinen anderen als den Selbstzwang (durch die Vorstellung des Gesetzes allein) enthalten, wenn es auf die innere Willensbestimmung (die Triebfeder) angesehen ist, denn dadurch allein wird es möglich, jene Nötigung (selbst wenn sie eine äußere wäre) mit der Freiheit der Willkür zu vereinigen, wobei aber alsdann der Pflichtbegriff ein ethischer sein wird".<sup>11</sup> Hieraus folgern beschreibt er den Mensch als ein freies (moralisches) Wesen und bringt dabei die Begriffe Pflichtethik und Freiheit ein. In diesem Kontext bedarf es der Erklärung der Autonomie und Freiheit in Kants Moralphilosophie, und in welchen Zusammenhang er diese Begriffe mit der Moral verbindet.

Wie bereits erwähnt wurde, bezeichnet Kant den Menschen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [KpV], Kants Werke, V 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> KpV, Kants Werke, V 202.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten [MS], Kants Werke, VI 379ff.

als autonomes Naturwesen. Die Autonomie der Vernunft steht als Prinzip im Zentrum seiner praktischen Philosophie. In der Tat wird Kants Moralphilosophie sowie die Beziehung zwischen Moral und Freiheit von diesem Prinzip geprägt. Die Kantische Verwendung des Autonomiebegriffs trifft in der Ethik auf den menschlichen Willen. Um ein Handeln als moralisch oder unmoralisch bezeichnen zu können, benötige das Individuum einen selbstgesetzgebenden sowie autonomen Willen: "Die Autonomie des Willens ist das alleinige Princip aller moralischen Gesetze (...)"<sup>12</sup>. Nach Kant kann der Mensch durch die reine Vernunft dem moralischen Gesetz unmittelbar bewusst werden, mit der Bedingung die Vernunft gänzlich als unabhängigen Bestimmungsgrund zu definieren.<sup>13</sup> Die Autonomie der Vernunft zur Erreichung des Moralischen Gesetzes führt zur Klärung des Freiheitsbegriffs. Kant versteht die Freiheit als Grundbegriff der Ethik, indem die Freiheit die apriorische Möglichkeit eines freien und moralischen Handelns zeigt. Er legt in Bezug auf die Ethik großen Wert auf Freiheit. Sein erwünschtes Ziel ist dabei, die Möglichkeit der Willensfreiheit in der Ethik auszudrücken. Zusammenfassend erkennen wir soweit, dass Kants Moral Philosophie eng mit der Willensfreiheit zusammenhängt und die Willensfreiheit als das höchste Prinzip zentral in seinem Ethikverständnis ist. So mag man sich aber fragen, ob ohne die individuelle Freiheit moralische Handlung nach Kant überhaupt vorstellbar ist.

Die Autonomie des Willens bedeutet nach Kant, dass dem moralischen Gesetz die individuelle Freiheit vorausgesetzt ist, weil sie die Bedingung des moralischen Verhaltens ist: "Wäre aber keine Freiheit, so würde das moralische Gesetz in uns gar nicht anzutreffen sein."<sup>14</sup> Mit anderen Worten versuchte Kant die Freiheit und das moralische Gesetz miteinander gleichzuschalten, so dass das moralische Gesetz und die Freiheit gegen-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> KpV, *Kants Werke*, V 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> KpV, *Kants Werke*, V 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> KpV, *Kants Werke*, V 34, Vorrede 4. Fußnote 1.

seitig ihre Existenzgrundlage werden. Die Freiheit ist die *ratio essendi* (Grund des Seins) des moralischen Gesetzes und das moralische Gesetz ist die *ratio cognoicendi* (Grund des Erkenntnis) der Freiheit sind. In diesem Kontext hängen Moral und Freiheit eng zusammen, aber hierbei sollte erklärt werden von welche Art der Freiheit Kant in diesem Kontext redet?

Erstens unterscheidet er zwischen positiver Freiheit und negativer Freiheit. Die Autonomie des Willens ist alleiniges Prinzip aller moralischen Gesetze, als Freiheit im positiven Sinne. Die Unabhängigkeit von allen Materien bestimmt das Prinzip der Sittlichkeit, als eine Freiheit im negativen Sinne. Das moralische Gesetz wird bedingt von der Autonomie der reinen praktischen Vernunft und diese bedingt von der positiven Freiheit.

Im weiterem unterscheidet Kant die Freiheit anhand von psychologischen und kausalen Beimischungen. Wie er in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft darlegt, lässt sich die wahre Freiheit nicht psychologisch begründen oder auf keine Weise mit den Kausalverhältnissen vereinigen. Mit anderen Worten lässt er den Freiheitsbegriff nicht auf innerem und äußerem Determinismus begründen. Nach Kant kommt psychologisch begründete Freiheit von einer bloß inneren Verkettung der Vorstellungen der Seele hervor. Leidenschaften und Affekte demolieren die vernünftigen Überlegungen des Individuums, womit ein Mensch in seinem Handeln nicht mehr frei ist.<sup>15</sup> Auch demoliert die Naturkausalität äußerlich die Freiheit, so dass man prinzipiell nicht in den Bedingungen der Natur der echten Freiheit begegnen kann. Die Bestimmung der Gründe für die Kausalität eines Wesens kann nach dem Naturgesetz möglich sein. Entsprechend Kant kann die Naturkausalität mit der Freiheit des Individuums nicht zusammen bestehen.<sup>16</sup> In der Betrachtung des Freiheitsbegriffs in bloßer psychologischer Beziehung liegt die Gefahr, daß

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Jens Timmermann, *Sittengesetz und Freiheit* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003),
9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Vgl. KpV, Kants Werke, V 94-97.

man sich vom Sinn der Freiheit entfernt.<sup>17</sup> Was ist dann wahre Freiheit entsprechend Kant?

In der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft versucht er diese Frage zu beantworten: Nach Kant muss das moralische Gesetz nicht nach der Naturnotwendigkeit, sondern nach der absoluten Spontaneität der Freiheit beurteilt werden.<sup>18</sup> Kant glaubt an eine absolute Freiheit, auf der zentralen Grundlage der menschlichen Vernunft. Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass Kant in seiner Ethik unser Wollen und Handeln im Hinblick auf mögliche Prinzipien einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung (im kategorischen Imperativ) sowie im Hinblick auf eine Pflichtethik betrachtet, die er mit der Freiheit des Individuums in Zusammenhang bringt. Dabei versteht Kant unter dem Freiheitsbegriff keine durch psychologische oder kausale, sondern eine absolute (echte) Freiheit. In diesem Kontext macht Kant drauf aufmerksam. dass, um ein Handeln moralisch oder unmoralisch zu bezeichnen, es durch den freien Willen des Individuums entstanden sein muss. Die Autonomie des Willens und der Freiheit sollte es dem Individuum ermöglichen, das freiwillig universelle moralische Gesetz zu achten. Ohne Freiheit des Willens können wir gar nicht vom moralischen Gesetz sprechen, da die Freiheit als Existenzgrund Voraussetzung des moralischen Gesetzes ist.

# 3. Freiheitsverständnis in Kants Rechtsphilosophie

Die Pflichten des Menschen unterscheidet Kant nach *Moralpflichten* und *Rechtspflichten*. Den Rechtsbegriff entwickelt er dabei durch die Pflichtethik.<sup>19</sup> Das Recht steht im unverzichtbaren Verhältnis zur Moral, da sich das Recht auf "das äußere und zwar praktische Verhältnis einer Person gegen eine andere"<sup>20</sup> bezieht. Kant formuliert in seiner Rechtslehre ein von der Vernunft gegebenes allgemeines Rechtsprinzip des menschlichen Miteinanderlebens. Ähnlich wie in der Ethik bemühte sich

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Vgl. KpV, Kants Werke, V 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Vgl. KpV, Kants Werke, V 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Vgl. MS, Kants Werke, VI 239.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> MS, Kants Werke, VI 230.

Kant in der Rechtsphilosophie, die grundlegenden Rechtsprinzipien zu begründen. Das oberste Rechtsprinzip hängt dabei mit dem berühmten Prinzip des *Kategorischen Imperativs* zusammen. Und während er die grundlegenden Prinzipien von der Ethik auf die Rechtslehre überträgt ist, ist es zu klären: wie er sich mit dem Freiheitsbegriff in der Rechtsphilosophie auseinandersetzt und ob er es ähnlich wie in der Ethik oder in einem anderen Zusammenhang formuliert.

Wie auch in der Ethik beschreibt Kant seine Rechtslehre im Zusammenhang mit dem Freiheitsbegriff. Das ursprüngliche Freiheitsrecht des Menschen soll durch den *Kategorischen Imperativ*<sup>21</sup> (das allgemeine Gesetz) beschränkt werden. Otfried Höffe bezeichnet Kants oberste Rechtsprinzip als *kategorischen Rechtsimperativ*. Keine individuelle Moral, basierend auf der inneren Freiheit der Person, um die allgemeine Gesetzlichkeit, die äußeren Verhältnisse des Menschen sind bestimmend: "Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter denen die Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des anderen nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann."<sup>22</sup> Welche Beziehung besteht zwischen dem obersten Rechtsprinzip und der Freiheit des Individuums?

Nach Kant bezieht sich das Recht auf das äußere Verhältnis der Menschen zueinander, wobei die Freiheit der Personen in diesem Verhältnis durch das allgemeine Gesetz geregelt werden muss. Mit seinem Worten: "Handle äußerlich so, daß der freie Gebrauch deiner Willkür mit der Freiheit von jedermann nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammenbestehen könne."<sup>23</sup> Dieses Freiheitsverständnis spielt in der Kantischen Rechtslehre eine wesentliche Rolle, ferner plädierte er für die Universalisierung der allgemeinen Rechtsregeln. Die Universalisierung der allge-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Vgl. Otfried Höffe, "Der kategorische Rechtsimperativ," *Immanuel Kant: Meta-physische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, hrsg. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999), 41-61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> MS, Kants Werke, VI 230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> MS, Kants Werke, VI 231.

meinen Rechtsregeln bei Kant resultiert aus Freiheitsverständnis. In der Tat war eine Suche nach allgemeine Moral- und Rechtsregeln für die ganze Menschheit in seiner Zeit eine neue Theorie. Daher kann man die gesamte praktische Philosophie Kants- die Moralphilosophie wie die Rechtsphilosophie - als revolutionär bezeichnen, da er ein neues geltungstheoretisches Fundament in die Philosophie eingeführt hat.<sup>24</sup> Bei diesem revolutionären Charakter Kants resultiert die Idee der Beschränkung der menschlichen Freiheit. Warum sollte meine Freiheit mit deiner Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz beschränkt werden?

Die Begrenztheit der Erdoberfläche führt uns nach Kant zwangsläufig dazu, allgemeine und notwendige Regeln zu entwerfen. Der Mensch kann auf der Erde nicht unbegrenzt durchreisen. Die Bewegungsfreiheit des einen endet dort, wo die Nase des Anderen beginnt.<sup>25</sup> Folglich befürwortet Kant die Freiheitsbegrenzung, um die Freiheit des Individuums zu beschützen. Daraus resultiert, dass die Freiheit des Einzelnen dort endet, wo die Freiheit des Anderen beginnt. Die Begrenztheit der Erdoberfläche ist für Kant eine Realität und das Schicksal der Menschheit. Diese Tatsache erwähnt unsere Vernunft, dass jede Freiheit begrenzt sein muss. Wie können aber die einzelnen Freiheiten nach einem allgemeinen Rechtsgesetzt vereinigt werden?

Um dieses Problem zu lösen verfolgt Kant die vertragstheoretische Tradition.<sup>26</sup> In der ursprünglichen Gemeinschaft waren

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Vgl. Wolfgang Kersting, Die Politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Vgl. Reinhold Zippelius, *Das Wesen des Rechts* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1997), 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Kant sieht in Rousseaus Contrat Social eine generell verbindliche Willensform: den volonté générale. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Der Gesellschaftsvertrag, übers. Hermann Denhardt (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 59-60. Ähnlich redet Kant in der Metaphysik der Sitten vom vereinigten Willen, da der rechtliche Zustand nur durch den vereinigten Willen der Bürger möglich sei; "Dieses ist also ein System von Gesetzen für ein Volk, d.i. eine Menge von Menschen, oder für eine Menge von Völkern, die, im wechselseitigen Einflusse gegen einander stehend, des rechtlichen Zustandes unter einem sie vereinigenden Willen, einer Verfassung (constitutio), bedürfen, um dessen, was Rechtens ist, theilhaftig zu werden." MS, Kants Werke, VI 311. Rousseaus

Rechte (das Privatrecht) provisorisch, was er als Naturzustand bezeichnet. Sein Ziel ist es, diesen Zustand zu verlassen und einer vertraglich<sup>27</sup> gestifteten Gemeinschaft beizutreten: "Aus dem Privatrecht im natürlichen Zustande geht nun das Postulat des öffentlichen Rechts hervor: du sollst, im Verhältnisse eines unvermeidlichen Nebeneinanderseins, mit allen anderen, aus jenem heraus, in einen rechtlichen Zustand, d. i. den einer austeilenden Gerechtigkeit, übergehen."<sup>28</sup> Mit diesem Akt hat das Volk "die wilde gesetzlose Freiheit gänzlich verlassen, um seine Freiheit überhaupt in einer gesetzlichen Abhängigkeit, d. i. in einem rechtlichen Zustande unvermindert wieder zu finden."<sup>29</sup> Diese gesetzliche Abhängigkeit muss aus dem eigenen Willen des Volkes kommen, damit die Bürger ihre angeborene äußere Freiheit nicht zu diesem Zweck aufopfern, sondern sie durch das Gesetz sichern.

Der Vertrag als Mittel ist zentral in Kants Rechtphilosophie. In einem Vertrag sind die "äußeren Verhältnisse der Menschen" geregelt. Das äußere Verhältnis ist nach Kant die oberste formale Bedingung im Vertrag, da dieses Verhältnis "jedem das Seine bestimmt und gegen jedes anderen Eingriff gesichert werden kann."<sup>30</sup> Zusammenfassend fordert Kant in der Rechtstheorie einen *vertraglichen* Übergang durch Verlassen der gesetzlosen Freiheit aus dem Naturzustand zu einem rechtlichen Zustand. Dieser Übergang ermöglicht dann uns das Recht und die Freiheit des Menschen im Miteinanderleben gegenseitig zu beschützen.

Trotz der Übertragung der oben genannten Grundelemente der Moral auf das Recht, bestehen bei Kant nach Freiheits*ver*-

- <sup>27</sup> Vgl. MS, Kants Werke, VI 251-256.
- <sup>28</sup> MS, Kants Werke, VI 307.
- <sup>29</sup> MS, Kants Werke, VI 315.
- <sup>30</sup> Vgl. MS, Kants Werke, VI 250.

volonté générale taucht bei Kant als allgemein vereinigter Volkswille wieder auf und auch nur der vereinigte Wille des Volkes kann gesetzgebend sein. "Also kann nur der übereinstimmende und vereinigte Wille aller, sofern ein jeder über alle und alle über einen jeden ebendasselbe beschließen, mithin nur der allgemein vereinigte Volkswille gesetzgebend sein." MS, *Kants Werke*, VI 313-314.

ständnis zwischen Moral und Recht entscheidende Differenzen. Während er in der Ethik als Bedingung des moralischen Handelns die individuelle Freiheit voraussetzt, sieht Kant in der Rechtsphilosophie die Begrenzung der individuellen Freiheit nach allgemeinem Rechtsgesetz vor. Wenn nach Kant die menschliche Freiheit in der Ethik absolut sein sollte, warum geht er im Recht von der Beschränkung der individuellen Freiheit aus?

In der Tat liegt die Antwort auf diese Frage im individueller Leben und miteinanderleben. Während in der Ethik die Maximen des moralischen Handelns auf der individuellen Ebene betrachtet werden, bezieht Kant in der Rechtsphilosophie die Maximen der äußeren Verhältnisse des Menschen aufeinander. Kants Gerechtigkeitsbegriff betrifft nur die äußere Seite der Handlungsfreiheit; mit anderen Worten, behandelt das Gesetz nur die Konsequenzen unseres Handelns in Bezug auf die Handlungsfreiheit anderer. Innere Absichten und Intentionen bleiben außerhalb des Rechtsbereichs.<sup>31</sup> Dementsprechend müssen die individuelle Freiheiten im Zusammenleben miteinander vereinigt werden, so dass die Freiheit des Eines dort aufhört, wo die Freiheit des anderen beginnt.

# Schlussbetrachtung

Wie oben bereits erwähnt wurde, spielt die Autonomie der Vernunft in Kants praktische Philosophie eine zentrale Rolle. Demnach ist der Mensch befähigt durch seine reine Vernunft universale Ethik und Rechtregeln zu konstruieren. Es folgt jedoch, dass die individuellen und universellen Prinzipien der Handlungsfreiheit eng mit dem Kategorischen Imperativ zusammenhängen. Der *Kategorischer Imperativ* ermöglicht uns moralische Handlungsformen und eine gerechte Freiheitsverteilung zu bestimmen. Hierbei zwei unterschiedliche Freiheitsbe-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Vgl. Wolfgang Kersting, "Politika, Özgürlük ve Düzen: Kant'ın Politika Felsefesi," der. ve çev. Hakan Çörekçioğlu, Kant Felsefesinin Politik Evreni (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 60.

gründungen werden bei Kant, in der Ethik und in der Rechtsphilosophie, herauskristallisiert.

Kant verknüpft in der Ethik das Handeln und die Freiheit des Individuums nach den Maximen von Kategorischen Imperativ. Die moralische oder unmoralische Bestimmung des menschlichen Handelns hängt mit der Freiheit des Individuums zusammen. Denn, so mag man sagen: Nur freie Handlungen können mit den Moralkriterien bewertet werden. Im Gegensatz dazu favorisiert Kant in der Rechtsphilosophie die Begrenzung der individuellen Freiheit, wobei er dieser Regel mit der begrenzte Erdoberfläche begründen möchte. Nach Wolfgang Kersting bietet die Kantische Ethik eine Lehre der unvollkommenen Pflichten, hingegen geht aber seine Rechtsphilosophie von einer Lehre der vollkommenen Pflichten aus.<sup>32</sup> Ebenfalls wird unverzichtbarer Bezug der Freiheit zur Ethik auf der individuellen Ebene betrachtet, daher kann man dieses Freiheitsverständnis aus dem universellen Blickwinkel als unvollkommen bezeichnen. Aus diesem Grund ist eine Freiheitskonstruktion auf diese Ebene nach Kant nicht ausreichend. Den unvollkommenen Freiheitsbegriff in der Ethik versucht er in der Rechtsphilosophie zu vollkommenen.

Auf den Ersten Blick kann die Freiheitsbeschränkung in der Rechtsphilosophie als negativ erscheinen. In der Tat aber ermöglicht es jedes Individuum das Beschützen seiner eigenen Freiheit und bringt damit Gerechtigkeit und Frieden. Schlussfolgernd lässt sich sagen, dass Kant mit der Idee einer Freiheitsbeschränkung des menschlichen Handelns, die ganze Menschheit auf der universellen Ebene betrachtet. Dieser Ansatz kann im Namen der Universalisierung der Menschheit und der menschliche Vernunft als ein neuer Schritt betrachtet werden. Kant hat erheblich mit seinem philosophischen Fundament der im XX. Jahrhundert entstandene Globalisierungsströmung beigetragen.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Vgl. Wolfgang Kersting, "Der Kategorische Imperativ, die vollkommenen und die unvollkommenen Pflichten," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 37 (1983), 404.

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# An Ontological Analysis of Hitler's Anti-Semitic Perspective

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**Abstract:** There is a common prejudice against "different ones", not just for Jewish people, also against Gypsies, homosexuals, Poles, and communists. But the most significant minority in Austria and Germany was Jews in those years. Some of them were a merchant and working under suitable conditions, so they were living wealthy and affluent. So they were affected more than the others. Public opinion and support were taking importance for Hitler, this is why he evaluated this situation was dangerous for the German public. He blamed Jews even for the crisis of Austria. From year to year, he specified his thinking around small groups and affected them. In the future, Hitler would blame the Jews for the Second World War. In this paper, we will analyze Hitler's attitude towards Jews and examine the film made upon him.

**Keywords:** Hitler, Nazism, Jews, German nationalism, anti-Semitism, genocide, concentration camps.

# Introduction

Hitler was born and grew up in Austria. In those years Austria had multinational social construction. Slavs, Serbs, Jews, Germans lived here together harmoniously in those years. Long story short; this multinational environment disturbed Hitler, and he started to practice some national activities. He thought that "the foreigners are the cause of degeneration and that's why they are a potential danger for German people".

In 1907 Hitler relocated to Vienna. He was planning to study art, but he failed to get into art school. While in Vienna, Hitler affected by various ideas. "He was interested in Pan-Germanism –the conviction that Germans should be unified in one state instead of dispersed throughout central and eastern Europe- as well as in ultra-nationalism and antisemitism... He became enthusiastic about Social Darwinist theories that described life as a struggle between races."<sup>1</sup> In those years Hitler consolidated his anti-Semitic worldview, and he began to create groundwork of his book "Mein Kampf" that affects many people.

# Hitler and National-Socialist Party Ideology

After defeating of First World War Hitler joined German Workers Party and in time he started to play a very active role in the party. In 1920 Hitler made a great speech about party program and party's name was changed to "National Socialist German Workers Party". This new nascency contained anti-Semitic, anti-democratic and anti-capitalist views. After Hitler's rise and gathering power in a single center, it became the only party in the country and consolidated its anti-Semitic activities.<sup>2</sup>

"In the 1920s there were both piecemeal welfare schemes and prejudice against groups regarded as non-conformist, in Nazi Germany, there was active official discrimination against

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Doris L. Bergen, *The Holocaust: A Concise History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 32-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Neil Gregor, Nazism, War and Genocide: New Perspectives on the History of the Third Reich (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), 35-42.

targeted groups along with a much more comprehensive welfare system for those regarded as deserving. These policies were entirely complementary, for Nazi notions of health were inextricably bound up with an obsession with 'superior' and 'inferior' races. There was, therefore, a direct correlation between promoting the health and well-being of the 'Aryan' race and mistreating those who were either non-'Aryan' or 'Aryan' with perceived defects, whether of mental, physical or behavioral nature."<sup>3</sup>

When Hitler came to power, he had three basic purposes: (1) Lebensraum - (living room) the need for 'living space' for the German nation to expand. (2) Strong Germany - the Treaty of Versailles should be abolished and all German-speaking people united in one country. (3) Social Darwinism - the idea that the Aryan race was superior and Jews were 'subhuman'.

Hitler executed this purposes step by step and in the whole

time he used some propaganda methods such as "Germany was in danger from Communists and Jews, who had to be destroyed." He also used always the motto of Nazi Party "Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer" and this saying consolidated his ideas.<sup>4</sup>



Anti-Jewish violence increased in the following years. Jews had to wear Star of David and their movement was restricted. They forced to live in the 'ghettos' of each city. "Hitler's Nazis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Jill Stephenson, *Hitler's Home Front: Württemberg under the Nazis* (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "The Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, 2011," *Yad Vashem*, Web. 1 Nov. 2013.

used a combination of intimidation and legislation to create a mood of hostility toward Germany's Jews, a kind of open season for abuse. During the boycott, Stormtroopers stood outside Jew-ish businesses to frighten potential customers. Some Jewish children experienced vicious harassment in school from teachers as well as fellow students."<sup>5</sup>

#### The "Kristallnacht" Pogrom

The most dramatic expression of this new stage of Nazism was the attack on Jews in Germany and Austria on the night 9-10 November 1938. During Crystal Night over 7,500 Jewish shops were destroyed and 400 synagogues were burnt down. Ninety-one Jews were killed and an estimated 20,000 were sent to concentration camps. Because of the after-pogrom-picture of cities, Nazi leaders called this pogrom "Kristallnacht" (night of broken glass).<sup>6</sup>

One of the other consequences of this night, as remarked by Doris L. Bergen in her book "The Holocaust", was that: "Nazi authorities, always alert to public opinion, noticed even that low level of disapproval. It is no coincidence that Kristallnacht marked the last open pogrom they organized in Germany and annexed Austria. In the future, they would avoid having reluctant "Aryans" witness wide-scale violence at home. It would prove easy enough to move blatant attacks further from the public eye."<sup>7</sup>

# **Concentration Camps**

In 1933, after Hitler became chancellor, Nazi authorities created the first concentration camp in Dachau, Munich. Dachau Concentration Camp was no secret; there were also present political criminals, communists, men charged with homosexuality and common criminals. Between 1933-1945, Nazi Germany created approximately 20.000 concentration camps. These camps

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Bergen, *The Holocaust: A Concise History*, 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Stephenson, *Hitler's Home Front*, 142-143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Bergen, *The Holocaust*, 85.

separated different kinds, such as, (a) labor camps, (b) arrestment camps, and (c) extermination camps.

In the beginning, these camps displayed to the public as labor camps by Nazi leaders. J. Noakes and G. Pridham specified this topic in their book *Nazism 1919-1945*: "Many Jews have organized in labor camps away from their families and forced to work on various construction projects for the German authorities. The following excerpts from a report of the labor camp desk of the Jewish labor battalion in Warsaw describe the inhuman conditions in these camps (in 1940)".<sup>8</sup>

In the years of Second World War Nazi terror expanded through conquered lands such as Poland (Auschwitz) even Russia. One of the most famous concentration camps was Auschwitz, in the following years was transformed an extermination camp.<sup>9</sup>

Nazi soldiers shotted millions of people killed by gas chambers or they. Some of them (generally kids) were used for medical experiments and the doctors who made these experiments say that these are necessary experiments for medical progress. Because of these experiments, numerous cure and medical methods were improved. They explained themselves in that way: "We invented more than one cures of illnesses because of these useful experiments". In this way German public ignored victim Jewish people. Even they were didn't killed these ways; they died from hungry or inhuman conditions in camps. So that, with the war years, concentration camps became extermination camps step by step for Jews.

# **Final Solution**

"Final Solution" to the Jewish question means that murder all of the Jews of Europe. It contains one last single powerful movement to the Jews. This way of the solution will be a result the entire Holocaust in those years. Hitler and other leaders

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, Nazism, 1919-1945: The German Home Front in World War II (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1998), 1059-60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Charleotte Delb, *Auschwitz and After*, trans. Rose C. Lamont (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

started a conference which called Wannsee Conference and they discussed the Holocaust that contains all Europe.<sup>10</sup>

# **Adolf Hitler in Movies**

# Triumph des Willens

This is the documentary movie which is taken by Leni Riefenstahl for Nazi propaganda purposes. In 1934, the National Socialist German Workers' Party to be held in Nuremberg, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels personally requested to this



documentary must published. be It generally showed us after First World War German victimizabefore Hitler tion came to power, and then how he brings the welfare to the country again. It also

emphasizes that power of superior German race. Hitler's anti-Semitic views always supported during the film, and it shows Hitler's political determination.

# Schindler's List

In Poland during World War II, Oskar Schindler gradually becomes concerned for his Jewish workforce after witnessing their persecution by the Nazis. *Schindler's List*, concerns the



efforts of an industrialist to save his Jewish workers from exter-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Francis R. Nicosia, Zionism and Antisemitism in Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 246-8.

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mination in Poland and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Oskar Schindler was a most unlikely candidate for an advocate of such oppressed people. Politics were never as important to Schindler as making money and living the good life. When Germany invaded Poland, he saw his chance to get rich, and he convinced the Armaments Inspectorate to allow him to take over a bankrupt enamelware factory in Krakow. He named the company Deutsche Emailwaren Fabrik (commonly called Emalia) and soon had army contracts to produce mess kits and field kitchenware. Schindler made the Emalia camp as much unlike a labor camp as he could. He kept the SS guards out of the factory and living guarters, spent \$360,000 on food for the prisoners, and used bribery and another chicanery to get more Jews out of Plaszów and into Emalia. The prisoners considered it a paradise compared to Goethe's camp, inspiring in them "a sense of almost surreal deliverance, something preposterous which they didn't want to look at too closely for fear it would evaporate." Schindler grew to see the fates of the prisoners as intertwined with his and sometimes referred to the end of the war as 'our freedom.'<sup>11</sup>

This movie was shown one of the most dramatic realities about Jew's situation in Nazi Germany. In these years Jewish people have seen Schindler as a savior for them and they still profoundly grateful to him.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Thomas Keneally, "Schindler's List – Analysis," *Literary Masterpieces*, Volume 13, ed. Frank Northen Magill (eNotes.com, Inc., 1983).

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Mogens Herman Hansen, *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237 pp.

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This small book (actually booklet will be the correct name) is the result of many years of work that Mogens Herman Hansen; after relevant preparatory work and together with others, began in 1993 with the establishment of the Copenhagen Polis Center

(CPC). A number of academic conferences have been held since 1992 and have dealt with many relevant topics in numerous publications. An provisional report detailing the aims of the company was published in September 1998: in the form of 95 theses a kind of balance: and also the introduction of the closing volume, the inventory, published in the autumn of 2004, deals with the topics systematically, similar to this book. This, in turn, was first published in Danish language (Polis: the Old-



ABDULLAH DEMİR 🖂

graeske Bystatskultur, Copenhagen 2004), as stated in the dedication (for John Crook, the translator's assistant). With him Herman, still after the end of the CPC according to the program in the spring of 2005, kindly provides all due to people a resume of his many years of work, compressed to a little more than 200 pages.

In the introduction Herman has an explanation on the motives that led to the creation of the CPC. Due to the lack of comprehensive studies on *polis* both as a concept and as a historical phenomenon, the plan arose, a list of all 1500 in archaic and classical Greece (from about 650 to 323 BC), including the colonies to create  $\pi \delta \lambda \varsigma$  called settlements. Conversely, the completion of this directory should now provide the opportunity to review previous views on the polis from a much broader basis than before. And for that, the *polis*, the ancient Greek city-state, should be compared to the other known city-states in world history.

This will be the first chapter. In a nutshell, all 37 cosmopolitan city cultures known today, from the Sumerians of the Middle East to the present day, are presented, including the famous medieval city republics of the Middle Ages and the German imperial cities of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, but also a whole series little known in the West from Asia, Africa and Central America. They have all historically been replaced by territorial states, but their world heritage, the market economy and self-government, is effective in modern (area) states. On the question of how to explain the emergence of city states here and territorial states there, a number of hypotheses are formulated, which allow the conclusion that there are historical laws only very limited or random. After all, it is clear that a certain amount of urbanization is а conditio sine qua non (without which it could not be). So where a strong state is already emerging before the urbanization of a country, the emergence of citystates is almost impossible. But that's almost tautological.

In the main part, under the heading *The City-State Culture in Ancient Greece*, we will go through a short course of the ancient Greek city -state (from 650 to 323 BC) on nearly one hundred pages (pp. 31-134) in 20 chapters (Chapters 3 to 23). It should be noted that the chapter headings sometimes refer only to parts of the chapter contents and that some topics are dealt with in several chapters. Although there are chapters on the beginning and end of the *polis*, it is not a general description of the historical sequence but a systematic, synchronous description. The time that is described is more likely to be the 5th and 4th centuries.

In the last chapter (pp. 137-146) then the findings in *Polis* are compared with the other known city-state civilizations. The specific features of the Greek city-state culture are emphasized: the small size of the average *polis* and the (in the lex Hafniensis formulated as a norm) close link between urbanity and statehood, from "town and state" (p. 146). With these characteristics, the Greek  $\pi \delta \lambda \epsilon_{1\zeta}$  (city-states) formed the numerically largest network of city-states in the history of this earth so far.

The most concise comments (pp. 147-190) naturally refer, in addition to the cited ancient sources, to works which have arisen in the context of the work of the CPC, but also to others, often called into question by the work of the CPC views. The bibliography (pp. 191-214), though over 500 titles, offers only a relevant selection from the infinite literature on the ancient city and polis. The booklet is completed by a number of useful indices: an index of the (ancient) literary and in-writing sources, an index of (mainly geographical) proper names, and a short but very useful general index.

The extremely instructive booklet is well legible and clearly written and sometimes really exciting. I pick out some aspects that seem important to us:

## Word and Term

In 1985, Wilfried Gawantka referred to the sloppy use of the term polis in historical science, which had been going on for more than a hundred years. At the latest since Jacob Burckhardt's Greek Cultural History (published in 1898), *Polis* was the versatile cipher for the Greek state (which, however, does not yet have any) proper state), the state idea, the city-state, the city. Herman, obviously took this to heart and tackled the subject with profound philological-historical tools, which is not self-evident given the popular use of transliterated Greek words as academic terms. The simple word with its meaning ("term") and a concept encompassing another concept ("concept") are distinguished, and the term is not arbitrary in relation to the meaning of the word. Starting point and criterion of the concept formation *Polis* is and remains the Greek word  $\pi \delta \lambda_{1}$ , its meaning and what it designates and what is associated with  $\pi \delta \lambda_{1}$ . And against all skepticism it turns out that this is a meaningful procedure.

The investigation of the meaning of the word  $\pi \delta \lambda c$  initially showed, which is no surprise that  $\pi \delta \lambda c$  mainly two things, namely, on the one hand, a settlement consisting of houses ("settlement") and on the other a man-made community ("community") (p 56). But not every settlement is referred to as  $\pi \delta \lambda \alpha$  (as little as any community), but in archaic and classical texts the word  $\pi \delta \lambda \varsigma$  usually only a city, if this city is also the political center of a community (a municipality, a city-state), and conversely, every community called  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota \varsigma$  has an urban center called  $\pi \delta \lambda \iota \varsigma$ . This finding, which applies to Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, as to all other archaic and classical authors, is what Herman and his Copenhagen colleagues call the lex Hafniensis de Civitate and the inverse lex Hafniensis de Civitate. Herman has my opinion in this regard rightly, and it is good that he insists against all criticism that the modern word Polis should only be used for what the Greeks  $\pi \delta \lambda_{i}$  have called, but of course modern terms such as city-state or state can and should be used, when, from a modern perspective, it is about analyzing what a *polis* is, and comparing the *polis* with other city-states.



# Ali Tekin, Varlık ve Akıl: Aristoteles ve Fârâbî'de Burhan Teorisi [Being and Intellect: Theory of Demonstration in Aristotle and al-Fārābī] (Istanbul: Klasik, 2017), 477 pp.

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The examinations of knowledge and science in the classical period are considered as a subject of the fields called epistemology or philosophy of science. In traditional philosophical understanding, there have been three fundamental subject matters titled ontology or metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology or

practical philosophy. The problem where classical or Aristotelian logic stands in this trio classification of philosophy needs to be clarified. In recent centuries, classical logic has generally been tried to reduce to the classical period, that is, it has been left to history. It, of course, has an essential role redirecting of the scientific researches. In the classical era, scientific inquiries of knowledge have been discussed within the sci-



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Iğdır University, Faculty of Divinity, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies Şehit Bülent Yurtseven Kampüsü, Iğdır, 76000, TR [altuneril@yahoo.com] ence logic, especially the fourth book of this science titled *Posterior Analytics*. This work named *Kitāb al-Burhān* in the Islamic world has always been the primary source of the science logic.

Muslim Peripatetic philosophers adopted the method of this book in order to distinguish themselves from the others. They called *burhān* (demonstration) for this method, and this turned out to be the most fundamental element differentiated between Peripatetic philosophers and the others. The Peripatetic philosophy, the primary way of traditional Islamic philosophy has constructed its being on demonstration. That is to say, the manifest of Islamic Peripatetic philosophical tradition has been imposed in the works of *Burhān*. This work has lost its actual value after Averroes in the Islamic world as well as Western world since the seventeenth century. This theory of knowledge or science, first found by Aristotle, has been imposed by al-Fārābī in Arabic. Al-Fārābī's theory of demonstration has played a decisive role on the methods of following philosophers in the Islamic world.

The subject of the work which I review constitutes theories of demonstration of Aristotle and al-Fārābī, who are the First Master and the Second Master of Peripatetic philosophy. This study about demonstration will contribute to being evaluated of both the classical logic and philosophy and the contemporary theory of knowledge and science. In the work, it has been discussed some problems and sought some questions on theories of both philosophers. In fact, did al-Fārābī repeat Aristotle's theory of demonstration or reconstruct it? If he did latter, then what makes his work different from the other works? Is what really matters the work itself or the theory mentioned in that work? And so on. By dealing with Aristotle's and al-Fārābī's approaches to theory of demonstration as comparative, the author aims to find answers to these questions or analyze those problems.

The author explains the reason for naming the work: "Philosophy is an effort to understand being in itself, the theory of demonstration is a discipline for the effort to understand being in itself. How to think of and to investigate being by intellect is the matter of demonstration. This theory is a way from intellect to being and being to the intellect. Then, it is a bridge linking intellect and being each other." Here, the purpose of the author is to give meaning the theory of demonstration, that is to say, to connect with theory and its content.

We clearly see that the author has planned the study as an introduction, four main parts and conclusion. (i) Introduction of the work reveals all studies on the theory of demonstration either books and thesis or articles and reviews. Here the author displays both general researches on demonstration and particular on Aristotle's and al-Fārābī's theories. (ii) The first part shows the position of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in Peripatetic philosophy. The book is known as Kitāb al-Burhān in the Islamic world and has great importance. Also, it is explained in this part the short introducing and its commentaries, afterward, al-Fārābī's works on demonstration, his Kitāb al-Burhān and studies about it. (iii) The second part of the work describes Aristotle's theory of demonstration, and attempts to express the theory of the First Master under favor of the works of the Second Master. (iv) In the third part, the author does describe and analyze al-Fārābī's demonstration theory, and when doing so he refers to *Kitāb al-Burhān*, because of being a very systematic work. (v) In the four or last part, it is tried to handle al-Fārābī's contributions to theory of demonstration in the context of the solutions of the questions mentioned in Posterior Analytics. This part looks like a comparison part, but the author states that he has prepared it by means of a contribution rather than a comparison. As far as I comprehend, the author first explains the meaning and the position of the demonstration, afterward, he shows Aristotle's theory and its application to Islamic Peripatetic philosophy by al-Fārābī. (vi) The conclusion consists of explanations of evaluations getting from the analysis of the problems. The author does not prefer making a comparison between two philosophers and their approaches to theory. Also, it seems that a dictionary of Posterior Analytics has added to end of the work.

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Finally, I believe that I should especially say: Though drawn up in the Turkish language, this work fills an essence gap on the demonstration. It has great importance around the world with regard to explaining Aristotle and al-Fārābī together.