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Contact Information

Igdir Universitesi, Sehit Bulent Yurtseven Kampusu, Igdir, 76000, Turkey

Phone: +90-476-223-0042

Web: <http://www.entelekya.org>

E-Mail: entelekyareview@gmail.com

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DEDICATION

This issue of *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* has been dedicated to John Corcoran, who is an important staff of this journal. He contributed a lot to both science Logic and our journal with his work. May he rest in peace.



Language, Giving-the-Meaning and Interpretation *

İLYAS ALTUNER 

Iğdır University

Research Article

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Abstract: The subject that we have tried to mention in this article mainly intensifies on the meta-ontological or metaphysical field. Although we cannot know the real existence of objects, at least, we say something that cannot be expressed. Then, we should not ignore that our judgments belonging to the unknown field can be interpreted, more or less, on account of the relation to the area of the facts we know them. It is clear that trying to get the meaning of the world in itself or noumenon through the image of the concrete world is useless. Nevertheless, this condition does not mean that it should not make inquiries concerning the noumenon world and discontinue thinking about what the field of existence in itself is. Interpretations on this field of existence in itself cannot be expressed by mere knowledge of the actual area or the real notions. Because, in our image of the real world, there seems a situation that continually changes and which converts its meaning in each change.

Keywords: Language, understanding, sense, meaning, giving-the-meaning, world of meaning, interpretation.

* This article is translated into English and considered the paper published in *Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy* 2, no. 1 (2012), 75-86.

Introduction

A man carries out the process of giving-the-meaning both himself and the world he lives within a certain date and within time and place. Every speculation about the meaning of this process is parallel to the language of the environment in which the person lives. Language is, in its most general sense, not a means of understanding the historical process in which man lives, but a structure that saves this sense of enigma. As each structure changes according to the style of the constructor, the language is shaped according to the elements or processes that configure it. If we look at it from this point of view, what we mean to give-the-meaning keeps changing the historical process that emerges in language on the one hand, and exposes its evolution on the other hand.

Language is given to us as a gift. Combining the dimension of existence to the dimension of thought, language undertakes the manifestation of all these in the meaning and thus comes out as a mirror of the world of being for a human. Language presented in the focus of the controversies that have been going on from time to time, and the problem of giving-the-meaning depend upon it, continues to be astonishing. A living and thinking entity called human is involved in this process both at the beginning and at the end.

1. The Relation of Language and Thought

Because a human being is an entity that thinks and has language, it stands as an entity that enables the right thinking to be done within certain rules.¹ The reflections of this thought come out in language in a most beautiful way. The logos, or kalam, reduced to human discourses and thinking as mimesis or the act of creation continues to be a feature of being divine in that it is a

¹ Aristotle advanced rhetoric as an analytical art that puts method and principles truly thinking and making good use of language or eloquence. See Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, trans. John Henry Freese (London & New York: William Heinemann & G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926), 1359b.

quality that brings a man to the highest level. The language reveals the given of thought with regard to being given to the human being. Every idea about language is always included in the language before time. Because thinking about language determines that this thought is included in the language, which is the instrument of thought. Besides the fact that human language is the main element shaping a certain thought, there is also the ability to have a structure to grasp what the essential elements of language are. The quality of the spoken words informs us about the nature of the language, depending on its shaping around the particular thought. When Augustine says that the single words in the language entitle the objects, he emphasizes the shaping of the human mind.² Not only he draws a picture of the situation of the mind in the face of the objects during this naming but also exposes the relation of each word to its sense.

The actions of man arise from his use of thinking in the process of naming and giving-the-meaning to the objects. If we say it like Wittgenstein, we can say *language game* for the whole composed of language and actions that the language intertwines.³ Each thought is actualized within a certain language game and is given meaning within the same game. So when a person thinks and acts, he does not act independently on language, that is to say, the language, including symbols, reveals itself as an essential reality to determine both thinking and acting. A man who has no language is a state of thing that is void of thinking.

No thought arises out of a certain language, even though it may be possible to express any thought with a certain thought. For this reason, language and thought are not something identifying with one another but are two different structures, that which complete the whole and provide to be defined this whole and that which are known to be lack of each other completely impossible

² Aurelius Augustine, *The Confessions of S. Augustine*, trans. Edward Bouverie. Pusey (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1853), 1.8.

³ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 7.

regarding ontological. Consequently, human thinking is possible from speaking and his discourses are possible from thinking, and when the two complement each other the *logos*, i.e., the *kalam*, emerge. Logos is a concept that can express thinking on the one hand and speaking on the other hand. Both thought and discourse are included in the logos.

2. Language, Meaning and Giving-the-Meaning

As the first condition of self-expression, a person must know and recognize himself, that is, be aware of his existence. For this reason, that a person can ask himself what he is and why he exists, and then answer it, is a clear indicator of the way he expresses himself. All these statements of man are nothing more than articulate as a result. If there is no thought that is not meaningful, we think that it is not, it seems that what makes it meaningful is language. A thought that qualifies as a kind of human speech is an act of the mind that connects individual objects, as well as an act of the word. In this sense, the word, i.e. *logos*, is the *Divine Word* can be considered the source and most basic element of language. While each expression reveals itself in a language, each word internalizes itself in thought. Because it is a living being located at the center point of such fiction, man becomes a sacred structure in which all kinds of thoughts and discourses take place. Because man's relationship with God is possible by thinking about the meaning of the word and harboring abstract concepts in which the divine Mind is expressed.⁴

The fact that a concept called language has meaning through man comes from the fact that man is the only being who makes sense by establishing a connection between what he thinks. Language is, about objects, the vehicle by which common things and harmony between them are completed in itself. Man is able to give-the-meaning of the correlations between beings with the help

⁴ For divine logos, see Heraclitus, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A New Arrangement and Translation of the Fragments with Literary and Philosophical Commentary*, trans. Charles H. Kahn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-2.

of language and which can be understood through reason. Giving-the-meaning, which is an aspect of the fact that man, as a rational being, is worthy of being a subject through the linguistic operability that the man's world of meaning dictates to the external world, which is his object, makes man very honorable in this regard. Each attempt to give-the-meaning leads us to a text that eventually brings with it a chain of comments. Text is an object configured by the interpretation rather than a parameter that makes the interpretation valid. The human being, because of becoming subject remaining alone with own consciousness and responsibility in the face of this text, has maintained becoming the speaking and rational being renewing throughout the history and holding new meanings himself and then interpreting these meanings differently.

The picture of the man's world of meaning, which has been the main goal of research for centuries, is a typical historical acquisition rather than an ordinary ontological picture. Every historical acquisition that occurs cumulatively must also have been given meaning *qua* being. The meaning given to an object, as a description of that object as such, is also related to the form of the perception of being *qua* being the external world.⁵ Here, with being *qua* being, means that man reaches to the spiritual knowledge of which he makes sense. The realization of being *qua* being at the highest level occurs in humanity, and the fact that man is a living being who thinks and speaks, the owner of logos, symbolizes this

⁵ Aristotle sought to explain the relationship between being human and being existent by the human soul. Because the characteristic that distinguishes a person from other beings is thinking. But according to him, being an existent happens with the composition of form and matter. Aristotle mentions substance in several senses, those are the sense of matter, the sense form, and the sense of that which is compounded of both matter and form, as well as that matter is energy and form is entelechy, which should be understood as both science and the application of science. In fact, the concept of entelechy is in a sense closely related to the concept of intellect and presents a view of what is mental. Aristotle clarifies this by asserting that a soul is necessarily a form of the natural body with potential life while accepting the soul is the entelechy of the body. Aristotle. *De Anima: Books II and III*, trans. David W. Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 412a1-20.

situation. Although we cannot express our judgments about what meaning is separate from history, that is, time and space, we have a belief that there is a meaning that is not spoken of. The interpretations of the world in itself cannot be made only with concrete knowledge or concrete concepts. Because in our concrete world design, there is a situation that is constantly changing and changes its meaning every time it changes.⁶

In addition to the fact that thinking and speaking are related to each other, it is also important for us that they have an intangible structure. Because it is possible for a person to become aware of his spiritual existence with the power abstracted from matter, that is, humanity, what indicates that a person is a human, can be comprehended with the ability to understand completely abstracted from matter. Whether from a logical or ontological or even metaphysical point of view, humanity only includes what makes man human, and in this respect, it is far from factual.⁷

A man's self-understanding is closely related to the history of the phases that he has traditionally undergone. For this reason, each individual's attempt to understand himself and giving-the-meaning of the external world always comes with different interpretations. Discussions and theses on the objectivity of interpretation, which seem to be dragged into a subjective position, still do not go further than subjective. But this does not eliminate the fact that what is interpreted remains somewhat the same, although it is quite far from universality. This is what is interpreted is the tradition in the case of the historical process itself. The object of this historical process has to gain meaning through language. Gadamer states that in this regard, the recognition of language as part of the historical movement resolves the relationship between the infinity of the possibilities of world experience and the finality of

⁶ "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change." Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. Denis Paul & G. Elizabeth M. Anscombe (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 65.

⁷ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1991), 11.

man's ability to understand.⁸ Such an understanding shows the historical connection between the preservation of the traditional structure of language and the preservation of interpretation. Because the act of interpretation becomes legitimate only through verbal language.

3. The Relation of Giving-the-Meaning and Interpretation

Giving-the-meaning, which is the design of human existence, necessarily goes along with understanding. The understanding design has its own possibility of development, and the development of this understanding will be called interpretation. In interpretation, while there is no differentiation of understanding, interpretation transforms itself. By changing what is interpreted with interpretation, it is not said that what is interpreted changes its own existence.⁹ Just as the actual thing being interpreted never changes in itself, there is still a relationship between what is changing, because of the interpreter's interpretation of its meaning to sending the actual meaning. Each interpretation, while transforming itself, also bears witness to the change of the process in which it is located. Because the factor that transforms interpretation and differentiates it from the previous interpretation is that what is in its interpreted position transforms itself. Here, a person needs to interpret his position and the historical process in which he lives, rather than his interpretations of his own existence. But it should be noted that there is an unbreakable connection between the interpretation of man's position and his understanding of his own process of existence and his understanding of it.

Plato said that what makes all life meaningful is the effort to reach the knowledge of the forms. This ideal life is led to the depiction of an *afterlife* in parallel with the immortality of the soul.¹⁰

⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum Publishing, 2006), 316.

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 139.

¹⁰ "So we shall be at peace with God and with ourselves, both in our life here and when, like the victors in the games collecting their prizes, we receive our re-

As a contribution to the process of giving-the-meaning for a person's life, we have to engage in a conception that is contrary to Plato, who argues that the meaning of existence is only a form. Because in response to a question about what we give-the-meaning, it is appropriate to say that we only giving-the-meaning of this world. The problem of understanding is not separate from the historical process in which we live and surround ourselves. What is happening is only the history of the finite phenomena of this world, and the fact that every occurrence depends on corruption is the inevitable result of this process. Because generation is of something, and in this sense, it is impossible for it to have an eternal character.

Each act of giving-the-meaning concerning life and interpreting it certainly occurs within a language. So the structure of language also limits a person's ability to understand in a sense. By saying that language limits its ability to understand, we are not saying that it cannot overcome the world of facts. This discourse draws attention only to the interest between our limited ability to understand and our limited ability to express. But the ability to understand and language are limited by being in history, that is, belonging to time and space. As Gadamer says, language is not one of how the power of thinking communicates with the sphere of being. Because man never meets the world as consciousness or thought. A person is always surrounded by his own language, both in the knowledge he has about himself and the environment in which he exists. "Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that in our own."¹¹

The understanding, being literally a mental activity, has the power to transform interpretation as being influenced by the

ward, and both in this life and in the thousand-year journey which I have described all will be well with us." Plato, *The Republic*, trans. H. Desmond P. Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 621c-d.

¹¹ Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 62.

changes of its own process. All vital activities that are far from eternity prove their own evolution, even with this finite adjective they carried. Life has both a mental state and an actual function and therefore needs both giving-the-meaning and interpretation. A language that takes on the task of gathering all these actions under the roof can only transform the gains it provides into an operational state by shaping it around its potential structure. Every power that goes into an actual state will go into a phase of corruption again, being subject to a movement or generation. The act of reaching the peak of the spiritual power of existence, which we call humanity, emphasizes the dependence of vital activities belonging to a place on the historical process, by reminding us of the condition of understanding belonging to the time. Life, constantly changing historically and differentiating as it changes, reminds us of the difficulty of making a finite interpretation of the infinite structure of meaning.

It should be normal for there to be a parallel between the achievements provided by language and the analysis of understanding. Because interpretations of meaning can gain value to the extent of the gains that language provides, that is, the interpretation of something is only possible as long as it provides the conditions for expressiveness. It should be noted that we are not drawing a picture of any meaning here. To say that we draw a picture of meaning means to say that we state the judgments about meaning in precise language. We see that Wittgenstein points out the discourses on facts as painting, with reference to the picture theory of meanings put forward in the philosophy of the first period. According to this rule, we draw pictures of facts; so that what can be expressed is only a fact, as well as a model for reality. Propositions can tell reality as a picture and interpret and giving-the-meaning of them by talking about things that exist in this sense. "The proposition only asserts something in so far as it is a picture."¹² This is an attempt to equate existence with a factual object

¹² Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. Charles Kay Ogden (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 4.03.

by digressing the infinite meaning of the nature of being. By such a consequence, glorifying interpretations of the meaning of man are completely eliminated. Our concern is not because such discourses strike a blow to our glorifying interpretations of meaning, but because meaning is objectified and deflected from its true meaning by being trapped in a vicious circle.

Conclusion

A person cannot be condemned to live only in a world of facts. In this case, the world in which man lives contains a world of meaning that transcends facts. This world of meaning, as we have mentioned above, hides itself in us by having infinite potential.¹³ This situation is not temporary because we cannot break off our relationship with finite phenomena, it will live with us constantly and gain continuity by being in history.

Man's world of meaning is also limited to his world of thought. The understanding can explain and interpret the meaning as far as the competence it has gained in terms of being itself, and at the same time, it can attempt to reach a world of meaning by transcending the phenomena of the external world. Unfortunately, such development of the understanding or intellect will never achieve meaning itself, that is, thing in itself. Because only the world of meaning itself is closed to the understanding. This situation shows us the impossibility of the meaning of the unlimited world by the limited understanding. We can best understand this from Kant's comments on the subject. Kant clarifies that the pure reason, by the nature, makes an effort to reach into the world of meaning that in itself, but this might be possible by the only practical reason, that he will the highest Good.¹⁴

¹³ Wittgenstein states that what is related to the field of value, namely meaning, is outside the world. And the someone who paints the world is the someone who makes sense of the world. He stated hereof that: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world." and that "How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world." Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.41 and 6.432).

¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer & Allan W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), A797/B825.

Reality has not completely disconnected us from hiding itself, but rather, with its mystery, it has led us to investigate and interpret itself. However, here we do not mention that there is a mystical and hermetic structure of reality, and we do not mean it can be obtained through an inner vision. On the contrary, our knowledge manifests itself to us, as much as possible, which can be obtained by valid paths belonging to the field of being. So we must go as far as our understanding limits us, even despite Kant, we must strive to go further. In this way, by being close to the world of meaning, we can be close to the world of reality.

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The Question of Subject in Descartes and Foucault

NAZAN YEŞİLKAYA 

Şırnak University

Research Article

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Abstract: It is important to make clear the question of subjectivity, how the Modern zeitgeist imposes "subject" idea and around which thinkers the important breaking points that appear in the historical adventure of subjectivity is formed. Since the metaphysical understanding of modernity is based on subjectivity, the essence of human existence becomes science, and the issue of truth evolves into the consciousness of consciousness to know first "itself" and then other existing ones. This work will examine the "subject" issue, which has a wide scope, based on Descartes and Foucault. Thus, it will be analyzed how modern subject thought transformed with Descartes and how it is related to Foucault's criticism of the subject. The study reveals the connections of the humanist belief in the subject on the lines of Descartes and Foucault. The article will present a comparison of Descartes' and Foucault's theory of the subject after a brief review of how subjectivity has transformed.

Keywords: Descartes, Foucault, modern philosophy, humanism, subject.

1. Transformation of Subjectivity from Hypokeimenon to Human Subject

It can be stated that the notion of subjectivity has expanded, enriched and changed direction throughout the history of thought. The phenomenon of "subject" mentioned in the Greeks is used in the meaning of "hypokeimenon (the thing that stands in front), the reality that confronts the man." In other words, in Greek origin "the Latin equivalent of hypokeimenon, which means basis, is subjectum."¹ Ancient Greek thinkers call what we call "the object" today "the subject". The fact that they find themselves in it, not despite the reality that comes before them. Thus, the term *hypokeimenon*-subject refers to what collects everything within itself and what lies beneath.²

For the Greeks, the hypokeimenon meant "substance" in the meaning of the fundamentally prominent thing that contained the various dimensions of a whole. With another phrase, the hypokeimenon was the "foundation" or "substance" member of things. The living substance was used to mean the thing that brought it to the fore and "realizes" itself. Therefore, the substance has found meaning as synonymous with "subject." It is a phenomenon that can be defined as we speak of "the subject of research" in today's world.³

However, note that the word *hypokeimenon* is not used in Ancient Greek thought to mean a subject that provides a basis for knowledge. As can be seen from here, the meaning expressed by hypokeimenon, in other words, "the subject of the Greeks," was definitively transformed by Descartes.⁴ In this way, in the process up to Cartesian thought, the dominant and unique understanding of the subject reaches our present-day by going through radical

¹ Ahmet Cevizci, "Özne," *Felsefe Sözlüğü* (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 1999), 668.

² Doğan Özlem, *Heidegger ve Teknik* (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 1998), 19.

³ Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger: Moderniteyle Hesaplaşma: Teknoloji, Politika, Sanat*, Tr. trans. Hüsamettin Arslan (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayıncılık, 2011), 317.

⁴ Özlem, *Heidegger ve Teknik*, 18.

changes and transformations. For example, the concept of the subject was not affected by changing conditions as discussed by Aristotle in Scholastic philosophy and the Middle Ages until the 17th century. It contains a meaning “very close to the substance that remains the same with itself, really exists there, as a thinking entity, does not need anything other than itself to exist as a mere mental content.”⁵ In this way, it is possible to summarize the traces of the concept of the subject before Descartes throughout the historical process.

As a general acceptance, the issue of subjectivity is based on the “thinking self” and the transformation of the human subjectivity is linked to Descartes, who pioneered the search for a ground that will form the basis of all existence. He put the subject in the center and replaced it with God. The mind, whose content changed Cartesian philosophy, turned from “substantive mind” to “instrumental subjective mind” by turning to the essence of existence, as in Ancient Greek thought.

Descartes makes a touch that will affect the whole modern philosophy, and that is the determination of the thinking substance as the subject.⁶ With the Renaissance, nature became objectified while humans became subjects and this change deeply affected the entire philosophy. The modern era bears witness to the overthrow of the God of the Middle Ages, the emergence of a new vision of the subject by placing the human at the center of truth and meaning.

Subjectivity metaphysics has been established as a system of subjective consciousness by starting the whole philosophical inquiry from the “I” and basing it on the “I”. “My mind” is the only definitive and undoubted basis that creates my self-consciousness and has no epistemological-ontological relationship with other

⁵ Sevcan Yılmaz Kutlay, “Çeviribilimde Özne ve Özneyi Konumlandırmak,” *Çeviri Üzerine Gözlemler: Observations on Translation*, ed. Seda Taş (İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2019), 124.

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Kant Üzerine Dört Ders*, Tr. trans. Ulus Baker (İstanbul: Öteki Yayınevi, 2000), 73.

things in the world. Therefore, the subject is the main distinguishing parameter of modernity.⁷ When considered within this framework of meaning, Descartes strives to overcome philosophical skepticism and relativism with the precise knowledge it finds on the subject itself.

Consequently, the birth of modern science is associated with the transformation of substance from hypokeimenon to the human subject. Making man a subject in contrast to the world-made object has been the extremely important breaking point. As Küçükalp notes humanism, in which the human mind is centered as a reference in the knowledge of the truth, refer to an understanding in which the search for all kinds of the truth is reduced to a human perspective and turned away from the idea of the other world in favor of this world.⁸ Based on this idea, it should be stated that in modern thought, although the subject is a rational and willful being that forms the basis for knowledge, the transition from the God sphere to the human sphere. In other words, the transition from absolute subject to the individual and empirical subject is observed.

In modern thought, the world declares that it is composed of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, accepting that the mind is limited only to the individual mind and what is beyond it constitutes the objects in the mechanical-physical realm.⁹ With the Cartesian "return" humanity has made itself the substance of "things," the self-confident subject, the foundation-builder, the founding foundation of every truth and value.¹⁰

With the transformation of the world into an object, the change in the perspective of the universe, the use of mathematics

⁷ Couze Venn, *Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 107.

⁸ Kasım Küçükalp, "Yeni Hümanizm ve İnsan Kavramının Küçülmesi," *İnsanı Yeniden Düşünmek*, ed. Lütfi Sunar and Latif Karagöz (Ankara: İlem Yayınları, 2019), 289.

⁹ Lawrence E. Cahoon, *Modernliğin Çıkması*, Tr. trans. Ahmet Demirhan and Erol Çatalbaş (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2001), 68.

¹⁰ Zimmerman, *Heidegger: Moderniteyle Hesaplaşma*, 317.

as the basic instrument of physical sciences every day. The denial of qualitative evaluations by expressing the results in numbers is an expression of the change and transformation of the philosophical perspective.¹¹ In the pre-modern period, while metaphysical questions about the "why of things" were at the forefront, now with modernity, this situation has been replaced by scientific questions about "how things". The scientific questions are answered only by establishing connections between the facts through logic or mathematics that reach the goal.¹² As it can be interpreted that the central concern of philosophy has shifted from ontology to epistemology. It has reduced the entire philosophical structuring to only the epistemological context. Therefore, since the metaphysical understanding of modernity is based on subjectivity, the essence of human existence becomes science, and the issue of truth evolves into the consciousness of consciousness to know first "itself" and then other existing ones.

2. René Descartes and the Active Subject Design

Since epistemology has replaced ontology in the Modern period, Descartes develops a new concept of the subject using the concept of "epistemological subject." This changes the object definition and the style of relationship that exists between them. The subject is the one who builds and uses knowledge, not merely to know. In the construction of the concept of the subject, Descartes directs his focus to "the consciousness of itself and what is present in this consciousness. At this point, man becomes a self-consciousness, that is, the subject" henceforth, the reality is not the prominent thing but rather Descartes' subject.¹³ Descartes' basic approach towards the subject is that thinking is only a predicate belonging to the "thinker" and the thinker cannot be separated from the being. In this way, Descartes finds the undoubted thing in the

¹¹ Colin A. Ronan, *Bilim Tarihi*, Tr. trans. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Feza Günergun (Ankara: Tübitak Yayınları, 2005), 373.

¹² Alexandre Koyré, *Yeniçağ Biliminin Doğuşu*, Tr. trans. Kurtuluş Dinçer (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1994), 63.

¹³ Özlem, *Heidegger ve Teknik*, 19.

expression "Cogito ergo sum," in other words, in the "thinking subject" without interruption.¹⁴

Descartes argues that thinking requires a thinker, and that is a subject. By expressing the unquestionable certainty of the "I", he also pushes philosophy into the lane of subjectivity metaphysics. Because for Descartes, it is the subject whose existence and certainty cannot be doubted. In other words, the knowledge of the "I" is correct and it is the first principle on which the whole system will be built. Thus, the "Cogito ergo sum" proposition reveals what is undoubted about the existence and the certainty of the thinking self, that is, the subject.

In modern philosophy, it is undoubtedly the Cogito that moved to a centralized status that sparked discussion of the subject. Descartes constructs the manifestation of truth through the first thinking subject. He sees the Cogito as a subject who is conscious of his existence and firstly proves itself, and then the existence of God and the external world with the ideas. The man comes to the fore as the subject of his/her thought and singularity, abandoning his/her passive position against the absolute subject. As Descartes "searched for subjectum in the predetermined path of metaphysics, he found the ego Cogito as constantly found. So, the ego sum became the subjectum, that is, the subject became self-knowledge."¹⁵ In other words, the Cogito is the subject that makes others "objects." Only after the subject has proved its existence as a Cogito, God and other beings are proved, and their knowledge is reached by this method.

The subject is not merely knowing, but the one who builds the knowledge and uses the information it has built. The condition of being the subject who does all this is realized by thinking. In this way, the subject grasps itself as a thinking being. The activation of humans from the object is due to its thinking ability. In other

¹⁴ René Descartes, *İlk Felsefe Üzerine Meditasyonlar*, Tr. trans. Aziz Yardımlı (İstanbul: İdea Yayınevi, 2011), 34.

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche'nin Tanrı Öldü Sözü ve Dünya Resimleri Çağı*, Tr. trans. Levent Özşar (Bursa: Asa Kitabevi, 2001), 36.

words, the subject becomes the active knower and ceases to be the passive knower. This causes the object to be interpreted as being separate from the subject and unable to think.¹⁶

With the metaphysics of subjectivity, Descartes put forward the formula of escape from Cartesian anxiety that is the chaos with the subject and subjective mind, which are the basis of universal, precise knowledge. According to Descartes, a person who rises to the position of the judge of nature with his knowledge is the product of a thinking subject. At this point, Descartes' metaphysics of subjectivity appears because the "thinking I" is conscious of its existence. Therefore, this active entity is the subject. The source of such an effective being of subjectivity is that it can return to itself with the thought. As all these points out, this activity of subjectivity separates it from the object that makes it active. This separates subjectivity from the object that does not have thinking and unconsciousness and dominates it because of its activity on the object. Thus, the subject-object relationship is reversed, in other words, subjectivity is not only knowing but also ruling.

3. Michel Foucault and Death of the Subject

At Foucault's work, which criticizes the fundamental paradigms of the Enlightenment, the subject holds a key position. Underlining that he is concerned with "a power that transforms individuals into subjects," Foucault uses the word subject in two senses; in the sense of being controlled by others and in the sense of being attached to identity with self-consciousness and knowledge.¹⁷ Later in his career, Foucault admits that he identifies the subject very closely, with a certain humanistic understanding of the human being.¹⁸ According to Foucault, "man is not giving meaning, but a second-order interpreter and descriptor who is placed in the essence of things by a transcendent and infinite

¹⁶ Afşar Timuçin, *Descartes'çı Bilgi Kuramının Temellendirilişi* (İstanbul: Bulut Yayınları, 2000), 76.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982), 777.

¹⁸ Clare O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 110-111.

source, trying to understand and explain the meaning."¹⁹ In this respect, Foucault's analyzes describing the limits of humanism are condemnations of the modern humanist regime.

Foucault's subject is certainly not rational, yet socially intelligent and in his historical analysis "reason" is in a very special position because it is societal-specific.²⁰ The problem with this understanding of the subject concept, according to Foucault and other thinkers of the 1960s, was that it determined the status quo and linked people to special identities that never be changed. His rejection of the subject reflected his desire to decipher identities and organize information differently. For Foucault, the denial of humanism did not mean the denial of "human rights" and "freedom," on the contrary, it meant that humanism, as a concept, is an unchanging essence of human nature that limits these values. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Foucault stated that people unhesitatingly agreed that they were part of universal humanism, suggesting anonymous structures and networks of knowledge that do not stem from individual consciousness, instead of from the subject. According to Foucault, the older spiritual knowledge systems that required working on the self to reach the truth were changed in favor of new forms of scientific and intellectual rationality.²¹ As it can be understood from this approach of Foucault, self-studies have changed shape with the gaining of rationality for the sake of reaching the truth, and the values of the old have been left behind.

Foucault emphasizes that the subject, like the truth, does not go down in history. Rather, the subject is constantly dissolved and recreated in different configurations, along with other forms of knowledge and social practices.²² A subject is a form, not a thing, and that form is not constant even when connected to the same

¹⁹ Veli Urhan, *Michel Foucault ve Arkeolojik Çözümleme* (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2000), 70.

²⁰ Orhan Tekelioğlu, *Foucault Sosyolojisi* (Bursa: Alfa Aktüel Yayınları, 2003), 13.

²¹ O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 111-112.

²² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 118.

individual.²³ In Foucault's view, form is nothing and does not have a fixed quality. Foucault's discourses on the subject, which mention that the essence is not isolated in the ego and the existence of certain models imposed by the culture on the ego, are statements outside the humanistic line and draw attention as the anti-humanistic view. According to Foucault, the created self is a form that trusts its existence in its interaction with others, history and culture. Here he opposes the idea of a true self that must be discovered in inner isolation and can be uncovered when cultural and historical veils are swept aside.

The aim of Foucault's work over the last two decades is to create a history of the different modes in our culture in which people are made subjects.²⁴ Foucault positions himself by being subjective: "The relationships we must maintain ourselves are not identity relations; rather, these should be relationships of differentiation, creation and innovation. It is boring to be the same all the time."²⁵

According to Foucault, who tends to investigate the problems caused by the division of man into two as subject and object, man is the object of our knowledge of the last two centuries and man might be simply "erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."²⁶ So, "man" is an invention of recent date and one perhaps nearing its end.²⁷ As can be seen, most of his arguments in his philosophy are his provocative statements that man, whose recent death was promised, is an invention. Foucault, who frequently emphasizes that man is a discovery of modern thought, states that the modern age is a period when "human" is the subject of episteme. According to Foucault, "man" witnessed both his

²³ Foucault, "The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom," *Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984*, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), I, 291.

²⁴ Paul Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 7.

²⁵ Foucault, *İktidarın Gözü*, Tr. trans. Işık Ergüden (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2003), 276.

²⁶ Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 387.

²⁷ Tony Davies, *Hümanizm*, Tr. trans. Emir Bozkırlı (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2010), 73.

birth, his death at the same time. To put it briefly, it is the "death of man" that Foucault refers to, which he usually calls "the death of the subject." It should be read as the death of a particular human view, which took shape within the humanist tradition and that regarded man as the measure of all things, in which infinite progress on the personal level can be experienced. Indeed, for Foucault, this approach led to a distorted view of human nature hence, it is an ideal that can be overcome. As Foucault highlighted, man is the invention of recent history, and perhaps now he is approaching the end. When this probable end occurs, the humanist tradition will lose its significance.

4. Comparison of Descartes' and Foucault's Subject Theories

Foucault does not deny that Descartes caused the important break in philosophy while reaching precise information. However, the conceptualization of modernity, which includes the character of absolutism about human beings, is a situation that Foucault avoided. According to Foucault, the distortion of the modern period regarding the subject is the formation of the modern subject isolated from ethical and aesthetic concerns and the fact it becomes an undisputed ruler of human life.

In Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" determination, a relationship has been established between thought and being. In this regard, language is seen as the determinant of the thinker. According to Foucault, if this situation is accepted as correct, it is not possible to problematize human existence in such an analysis. Because despite being thinking and existing is claimed simultaneously in the discourse, "Cogito" cannot be claimed as a solid basis for existence. Foucault argues that Descartes de-ethicalized scientific rationality to make it possible.

Unlike Descartes, Foucault does not accept a moral structure consisting only of codes and codes of conduct. It is seen that he is oriented towards a holistic and self-related moral understanding. According to Foucault, the subject as determined in Descartes' phi-

losophy was not seen as a substance.²⁸ Foucault says that the Cogito does not provide a solid ground for "being" on the contrary, he argues that it has revealed a series of problems about being.²⁹ Foucault, accepting that he left modern philosophy aside, claimed that all systems of thought that prioritized the subject from Descartes to the present and placed it in a supra-historical position have been dissolved. Foucault stated that he believes that different subjects who change, transform and have certain operating rules are positioned throughout history.³⁰

In Descartes, the subject excludes changes and transformations regarding his existence. It is a subject claimed to be able to reach the truth as it is. Foucault proposed genealogy, despite its understanding of absolute subject and essence. In this way, it is necessary to express how different identities are possible. In this context, he argued that instead of establishing an unhistorical subject, the possibilities that make the genealogy of the subject possible should be investigated. Foucault thinks that identities are dissolved inherently in history.

In contrast to Descartes, Foucault stands against humanism (or the transcendence of the subject). Foucault's anti-humanism has a political character. According to Foucault, the humanist belief in the subject is a politically suspicious manifestation of modernity. He prefers to bring a historical interpretation to the emergence of the subject rather than completely removing the subject. Foucault takes the subject away from his privileged epistemological position and makes the subject not a premise but a subject of analysis.³¹

By rejecting humanism, Foucault distinguished between three

²⁸ Foucault, *Özne ve İktidar*, Tr. trans. Osman Akinhay and Işık Ergüden (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2014), 234.

²⁹ Foucault, *Kelimeler ve Şeyler*, Tr. trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001), 453.

³⁰ Foucault, *Felsefe Sahnesi*, Tr. trans. Işık Ergüden (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2011), 291.

³¹ David West, *Kıta Avrupası Felsefesine Giriş*, Tr. trans. Ahmet Cevizci and Hüsamettin Arslan (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayıncılık, 2016), 282-283.

possible grounds: (a) "conceptual or philosophical" (humanism so confused in Western subject-oriented metaphysics), (b) strategic (objection to humanist values as covering strategies of domination) and (c) normative. These three possibilities are expected to be suitable for the three main stages of Foucault's philosophical development (archeology, genealogy and history of subjectivity).³²

Conclusion

In today's ethical and political world, where the death of the subject is discussed and the artificial human being portrayed, this intellectual trend brings with it new epistemological, ontological and methodological problems. The "subject" discourse, which influenced the modern period, has changed dimensions with the effect of science and technology at the point we have reached and lost its privileged and central position. The possibilities offered by technological applications play an active role in the emergence of new subject conceptions and in shaping the interest towards the postmodern subject.

The evaluation of Descartes and Foucault's subject theories with the method of comparison is meaningful in that it reveals the close connection with today's new subject debates. In contemporary philosophical theories, the problem of the subject has an aspect that determines the course of philosophy. For postmodern thinkers, the position of the subject opens the door to serious questions. Even the loss or death of the subject is touted as the beginning of postmodernity.

This study has clearly observed that Foucault's analysis of the subject problem, starting with Descartes, is important in terms of presenting the inclusive perspective to modern and contemporary subject conceptions. We need to understand the modern period in which the subject is glorified and the contemporary period in which anti-subject approaches are intense. In this way, important

³² Béatrice Han-Pile, "The 'Death of Man': Foucault and Anti-Humanism," *Foucault and Philosophy*, ed. Timothy O'Leary and Christopher Falzon, (Malden: Blackwell, 2010), 119-120.

findings have been obtained in terms of showing how different subjects are possible.

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Analysis of Monotheistic Discourses in Apologist Irenaeus' *Adversus Haereses*

NUREFŞAN BULUT USLU 

Ankara University

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Abstract: The patristic period is the process that starts with the birth of Jesus and continues until the Nicean Council (325). Before the Nicean Council, Jesus, the only God's apostle, has gone instead of Jesus, the son of God. There was no intact Bible in the time of Irenaeus, who was among the apologists who advocated monotheism. This harsh and hard struggle of Irenaeus against those who do not accept the one God undoubtedly provides us with information about the profile of Christ before the Nicean Council. *Adversus Haereses* consists of five parts. In the first part of the work, he explains his thoughts on Gnosticism, in the second part, he criticizes and refutes the gnostic arguments, and explains the Christian doctrine in the other three parts. The first sentence of his book begins with "There is only one God: it cannot be otherwise." In this article, I will analyze the monotheistic words of Irenaeus in *Adversus Haereses*.

Keywords: Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, *Against Heresies*, monotheism, tawhid, Christianity, Jesus, son of God.

Introduction

Patristic philosophy consists of two periods, the first and the last patristic period in the Middle Ages. It is connected with early Christianity and Hellenistic philosophy at the beginning of medieval philosophy. The first patristic period is the ongoing process from the birth of Jesus until the Council of Nicea (325), which includes the preparation and regulation of the rules of Christianity. Paul, who was the first to theoretically build Christianity, blended the laws of the Bible, the shari'ah and laws of the Old Testament. Paul saw his philosophy as superstitious and deceitful.¹

The apologists, who reject this attitude of the gnostics who use Christianity for their own teachings based on some philosophical mythologies and establish a knowledge building that will replace faith, have aimed to cleanse the true belief of Christianity from these myths and certain purposes. According to apologists, there are some limits that the mind cannot reach, and it is impossible to talk about it as the gnostics do. Apologists made it their goal to show the only true truth pointed out by Christianity in philosophy and said that religion should be presented as the only and highest goal. They argued that Christianity was a rational religion and that philosophical truths served Christianity. While apologists defended religion this much, they did not have a Bible that was not destroyed by human hands. Different Bibles were presented to the commission at the Council of Nicea held in 325.² This commission accepted only four Gospels.³ This point is one of the important turning points for Christianity. The pure revelation (untouched) Bible texts from Jesus started to be corrupted by human hands over time, and then only four Gospels that will be presented as the

¹ Murtaza Korlaelçi and Celal Türer, *Felsefe Tarihi* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Uzaktan Eğitim Yayınları, 2012), 133.

² Constantine was not yet a Christian at the time of the Council of Nicea (325). However, considering the conditions of the period, it seems possible to say that the Council also had a political purpose. İsmail Taşpınar, "I. İznik Konsili (325) ve İslâm Kaynaklarındaki Yeri," *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 26 (2004), 26.

³ Korlaelçi and Türer, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 135-137.

original Bible texts in the Council of Nicea were determined by the human mind. Unfortunately, Christianity, which is built on distorted texts on this reality, is far from its original form. Most of the apologists tried to defend the true religion from Jesus as much as possible. This point is one of the important turning points for Christianity. The pure revelation (untouched) Bible texts from Jesus started to be corrupted by human hands over time, and then only four Gospels that will be presented as the original Bible texts in the Council of Nicea were determined by the human mind. Unfortunately, Christianity, which is built on distorted texts on this reality, is far from its original form. Most of the apologists tried to defend the true religion from Jesus as much as possible. According to monotheist apologists, true Christianity is the religion of monotheism, not trinity. God is one and Jesus cannot be Lord or God. He is the messenger of God. How can we attribute “Lordship” to Jesus when he does not say that he is “Lord” while living? Some apologists advocating monotheism: Irenaeus (140-200), Aristides (c. II. Century), Justinus (100-165), Tatianus (120-173), Minucius (c. II. Century), Athenagoras (c. II.), Clemens of Alexandria (150-215), Origenes (185-254), Lactantius (Lactance) (260-325), Arnobius (260-327), Arius (280-336).⁴ In this article, I will focus on the reasons why Irenaeus (c. 126-202), one of the above-mentioned apologists who are pro-unification, rejected the idea of the trinity and the reasons for accepting the idea of unity.

Tawhid derives from the root “wahd”, meaning “one” in Arabic. It is to admit that something is one and only. In the belief of Islam, tawhid is to embrace that God is one, unique and unique in his essence, attributes and actions.⁵ Tawhid declares the unity and uniqueness of God as the creator and protector of the universe. It is used by Islamic thinkers as a regulatory principle for human society and the foundation of religious knowledge, history, metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics, as well as social, economic and

⁴ Korlaelçi and Türer, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 137.

⁵ Mevlüt Özler, “Tevhid,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 41, 18.

world order.⁶ The opposite of tawhid is shirk. Tawhid; If it includes the concepts of whole, harmony, order, unity, shirk; It is the counterpart of the concepts of disharmony, disorder and confusion. In verse 105 of Surah Yunus: “and, ‘Be steadfast in faith in all uprightness, and do not be one of the polytheists.” Then, we can see that choosing tawhid and cleansing from polytheism is to be able to read the unity of Allah from the reflections of the unity in the universe, and we can see that it is necessary to stop the chaos and conflict and turn towards tawhid.

The perfect order and harmony in the universe show us that it came out of a single hand as a “meaning of stance”. This unity of the landscape in the universe should only not be read theologically, it can be thought with the same understanding of unity for human beings. As the manifestation of the idea of the one and only God in the universe, oneness is also like a gate of friendship where all humanity is together. Because the only God of all humanity is the unification of people under the roof of tawhid.⁷

Irenaeus and the All-Inclusive Father in *Adversus Haereses*

Saint Irenaeus was born in 126 around Smyrna. He communicated frequently with Polycarpe, who came from a generation who saw Jesus himself. Polycarpe was educated by the apostles and met with others who saw Jesus. It is the apostles themselves who appointed Polycarpe to the Smyrna church as a bishop. Polycarpe has held himself obliged to protect the only truth he learned from the apostles. From the rumors, we see that Polycarpe learned about the life of Saint John close that he can still describe. The meaning of life for Irenaeus is hidden here. It is not known when Irenaeus came to Gaul from Smyrna. But in Gaul, he was promoted to priesthood and even was elected as the successor of the archbishop. There are allegations of martyrdom about him, but it

⁶ “Tawhid,” *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2356>.

⁷ Türer, “Tevhid ve Bir İnsanlık,” *Hiz. Peygamber: Tevhid ve Vahdet* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2016), 93-100.

is not known exactly whether it is true or not.⁸

Irenaeus's book *Adversus Haereses (Against Heresies)*⁹ has a Latin translation, which is common in Greek but contains some errors. My source is Philip Schaff's English translation published in the *Ante-Nicene Fathers* series. In the book, I will try to examine Irenaeus' discourses of monotheistic. The first chapter of the work, which consists of five books, describes the thoughts of Gnosticism, the second chapter criticizes and refutes the gnostic arguments, and the other three chapters explain the Christian doctrine. The second part of the book begins with the title "There is but one God: the impossibility of its being otherwise", right after the first chapter preface of the book. Irenaeus says that he should begin this chapter with the most appropriate title and that it is a beginning like this: The Creator has no power above God, and then there is no power but Him. He is not affected by anybody. It creates only by its own free will. Because he is the one God, One Lord, One Creator, One Father, and the One Father, who commands all things to come into being and exist to them.¹⁰ The emphasis on uniqueness here is intriguing. It seems that he needed such an explanation in order to break down the emphasis on Jesus, which Christianity rable with his own hands. In particular, Irenaeus' emphasis on "One Father that contains everything" is a harsh criticism of metaphysical explanations developed over the trinity belief, for example,¹¹ the triangular triangle metaphor. The word "One God" appears in many places in Irenaeus' *Against Heresies*.

⁸ Étienne Gilson, *Ortaçağda Felsefe*, Tr. trans. Ayşe Meral (İstanbul: Kalcı Yayınevi, 2003), 41-42.

⁹ The Greek title is "Presentation and Refutation of Pseudo-Knowledge." See Gilson, *Ortaçağda Felsefe*, 42.

¹⁰ Philip Schaff, *Ante-Nicene Fathers 1 : The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus* (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1885), 939.

¹¹ "Richard Swinburne developed a Trinity theory that each person is a different individual and that God is the unity of these persons. He states that this theory is compatible with Athanasian's teachings and the Fourth Lateran Council." Nicholas M. L. Nathan, "Yahudi Monoteizmi ve Hristiyan Tanrısı," Tr. trans. Mehmet Ata Az, *Şırnak Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 4 (2011), 190.

The book *The Doctrine of The Trinity: Christianity's Self-Inflicted Wound* expresses the accusations of the central dogmas of historical or mainstream Christianity. Scholars of the Baptist School of Theology of America, who are the authors of the book, ask the question: "He points out that Christian people have the ability to convince three people that there really is a god. Paul preached God's full appreciation from its source (Acts 20:28)." But why didn't he reveal the Trinity from its source?"

Why has not a subject of faith such as the Trinity been removed from the Bible and explained by reference? After these comments that emerged about the metaphorical concepts of the Bible, the disruption brought about by the change of the Bible by the human hand has created the present-day Trinity belief. Whether Paul's idea of a Christ God crucified in the name of human sins contains a difference in nature or a difference in degree.¹² This is a question that needs to be explained in more detail.

According to the authors of the book, Anthony F. Buzzard and Charles F. Hunting, "The Trinity Doctrine is an adult theological legend". "Orthodoxy wants something equally problematic: a very personable God": "A familiar criticism of the Protestant Reformation only goes back to the Nicaean Council. Here it encountered a barricade, in which case it consisted of politics, philosophy, reluctance, jealousy, and intrigue. The authors of this book are not deterred by such a barricade - Nicaea, Caledon or otherwise."¹³

Christianity's Self-Inflicted Wound is not an anti-Christian book, yet it intends to reveal what is essential in the Council of Nicea. Their most important and striking question is: "If Jesus himself did not belong to the" Trinity "principle, why should his followers be like that?" This is the main question to be asked. The answer is clear. His followers should not be, but "Christianity still

¹² Salime Leyla Gürkan, "Pavlus: Hristiyanlığın Mimarı, Şinasi Gündüz," *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8 (2002), 124.

¹³ Anthony F. Buzzard and Charles F. Hunting, *The Doctrine of the Trinity: Christianity's Self-Inflicted Wound* (Oxford: International Scholars Publications, 1998), xii-xiii.

prostrates before Constantine's low throne with gold tattoos.”¹⁴

Irenaeus asks, in the second point, how can there be another principle, power, or God above God, and says that no one but Him can contain these properties that God has.¹⁵

II. The title of the second part of the piece is: “The world was not created by angels or any other being against the will of the highest God, but by the Father through the Word.” Under this heading, he continues his discourse on tawhid. According to him, the claim that God and his angels created the world is false. For if angels were capable of creating the world, they would have to be strong like God. This is not possible. It is He who created the world and created the angels. As an indicator of the glory of Allah, He does not need any other means to create.¹⁶

He quotes Paul's words from the New Testament: “There is only one God, the Father is in all of us before and with everything. (Eph. Iv. 6, differing somewhat from Text. Rec. Of New Testament.)” He then says that he proved that there is only one God through the apostles. “In this case, there is no trace in the New Testament that Jesus is God or the formulation of the testament. In the First Letter to the Corinthians (12 / 4-6), Paul establishes a relationship between spirit, lord and God, but this does not mean trinity.”¹⁷

VI. chapter writes: “... there is only one God, the Lord of all.”¹⁸ By 320, most churches regarded the “Father” as the only God who created all things, all-powerful, eternal and eternal. It was unthinkable that Jesus the Son had attributes of God. Arius says it is religious denial to think that Jesus the Son is divine in the sense that it corresponds to the attributes and names of God, but Bishop Alexandros and Athanasius disagreed. According to them, father

¹⁴ Buzzard and Hunting, *The Doctrine of the Trinity: Christianity's Self-Inflicted Wound*, xiii.

¹⁵ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 939.

¹⁶ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 941-942.

¹⁷ Kürşat Demirci, “Hristiyanlık,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 17, 346.

¹⁸ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 952.

and son had the same essence. God was one essence and made up of three persons. When the disagreements grew, the Council of Nicea was established in 325. As a result of the council, Athanasius, the party holding the dominant and political powers, managed to impose his views. According to the Council's conclusion, "one essence, three hypostases" was accepted as the official doctrine for Christianity.¹⁹ A common day has been determined for the Easter holiday celebrated on different days. Abdülehad Dawud, who had been guided before as a Christian, writes that the number of those who attended the Council of Nicea was 2048 but after the council, this number decreased to 318 and that these people accepted the deity of Jesus and accepted to change the creed of the religion. After that, it is decided what kind of a book the New Testament will be, and the rest of them are destroyed as a result of the decision taken by the Council.²⁰

In XXVIII. chapter, he explains that many problems in our present life that we cannot know everything from which we cannot achieve perfect knowledge must be left in the hands of God with a surrender. Accordingly, the answers to many questions that we cannot find answers to in the universe are hidden in God's knowledge. It uses the definition of "living god" later in the text. We can investigate the mystery and will of the living God so that we can increase our love for God with the information from him. The meaning of the living God can mean both "Jesus" and any spirit that is God's image in the universe that will increase our love for Him. It could be an "Agapornis" (lovebird) where we see God in that thing, or it could be a "baby" with its loveliness that touches our souls. Looking at the end of the paragraph for a better understanding of this subject, Irenaeus says, it should never be doubted that this Being alone is truly "God and the Father" (as the same person) who formed this Being, the world and formed man. The

¹⁹ Hasan Yücel Başdemir, "Thomas Aquinas'ta Tanrı Tasavvuru," *Gazi Üniversitesi Çorum İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 3 (2003), 110.

²⁰ Suat Yıldırım, *Mevcut Kaynaklara Göre Hristiyanlık* (İzmir: Işık Yayınları, 2005), 286.

Creator of a baby in the womb is also the same Creator, the Creator of the sun. It is the same Lord (Lord) who grew corn stalk and grew wheat and blessed it. Considering that the word “Lord” is used here as Jesus / Lord after the council of Nicaea, Irenaeus clearly states in the text that the one who is the Lord is one God who creates everything. As it can be understood from the paragraph, what he calls living god (living god) can be understood as God who is the Living (al-Hayy / the Ever-Living), al-Qayyûm / the Sustainer of [all] existence) at every moment and who is always in a state of creation.²¹

Hans Küng, a contemporary theologian in revealing the true identity of Jesus, offers a way for him to be better understood by sincere Christian followers. Accordingly, the Jewish followers of Jesus invite him to listen to him by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him) so that Jesus can be understood.²² To see Jesus in the Qur'an is to see the true position of Jesus. Monotheistic Christians do not deny this position.

The claim that Jesus represents God in the soul can never be a claim to Jesus. There is no evidence for this in the first three Gospels. Even Jesus warned Christians to be deified himself. It shows as “Jew slander” that he is God or equal with God in John. He tells him that the father did not reveal all the secrets to him. As a revelation messenger, Jesus is of course different from other people, but if he is the Son of God, all men are the Son of God, that is God's creation. The word “son” is used in different meanings in the New Testament. It is possible that the “son of God” has been removed from its own meaning by degrading it after a comprehensive and broad meaning in the sense of “son of man” and attributing divinity to Jesus. Jesus is a prophet charged with guiding people to define “right” and “wrong.”²³

Irenaeus, in the fifth point of the same chapter, criticizes those

²¹ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1026.

²² Mahmut Aydın, “Tarihsel İsa Araştırmaları ve Onların Bulguları Üzerine Bazı Mülâhazalar,” *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5 (2001), 41.

²³ Yıldırım, *Mevcut Kaynaklara Göre Hristiyanlık*, 184.

who destroy the word by confusing the human word with divine revelation. He says that they conveyed the lineage of the Prophet as if they came from God. He criticizes their attitude to transferring the word of man to the word of God that he has produced, and to portray non-divine things as divine. You do this because you think you know what is in God's mind. Even the Lord, the Son of God²⁴, does not know of the last hour, says that his knowledge is with God.

The title of the fifth part of the third part of the book titled *Against Heretics* is as follows: "Without any fraud, deception, or hypocrisy, Christ and His Messengers preached that one God, the Father, is the founder of all."²⁵ Again, chapter VI heading is "The Holy Spirit did not mention any God or Lord other than Him who is the true God in all of the Old Testament scriptures."²⁶ In the same paragraph, Irenaeus says that neither Jesus nor the apostles call the person who is not God "God". Likewise, God said to Moses: "I am me. You will tell the sons of Israel that you have sent me to you." (Jesus. xliii. 10).²⁷ A similar verse is mentioned in the Qur'an. In the 104th verse of Surat al-A'raf: "And Moses said, "O Pharaoh! I am truly a messenger from the Lord of all worlds."

XXV. The title of the chapter is "This world is governed by the discretion of one God. He is endowed with both eternal justice to punish the wicked, and eternal goodness to bless the devout and give them salvation." In the third point, Irenaeus accuses Marcion of dividing God in two. He mentions that he divides one into two as the good and the other as the provider of justice on earth, and actually says that Marcion put an end to the existence of God in both respects. Because if he is not good at legal matters, God is not

²⁴ We can assume that the word "son" here is used in the meaning of "messenger" not in the trinity because the rest of the paragraph will already say that this "son" does not have the knowledge of God. In addition, we can say at the beginning of the work Irenaeus's explanation of "there is only one Lord" so that we think that the word "Lord" here means "our master", "his dignitaries".

²⁵ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1066.

²⁶ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1068.

²⁷ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1069.

because God is good. If the good God cannot provide justice, he is not almighty. Therefore, he is not God again.²⁸ Here we can say that Irenaeus had the idea of an indivisible, all-encompassing and all-powerful God. Apart from this, Irenaeus went to prove the existence of God in many parts of his work and turned to prove God with different evidence. In these proofs, he generally mentioned only one God, but he used the word “Lord” for Jesus.²⁹

IV. In chapter V of the passage it says that there is only one God, whom Christ calls the Father, declared to humanity by the prophets.³⁰ In Islam, Jesus is the prophet of God. Also, Christians were warned that they should give up the trinity. In Surah an-Nisa, verse 171 it is stated as follows: “O People of the Book! Do not go to extremes regarding your faith; say nothing about Allah except the truth. The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was no more than a messenger of Allah and the fulfillment of His Word through Mary and a spirit created by a command from Him. So believe in Allah and His messengers and do not say, “Trinity.” Stop!—for your own good. Allah is only One God. Glory be to Him! He is far above having a son! To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth. And Allah is sufficient as a Trustee of Affairs.”³¹

The religion of Christ is pure monotheism. However, Qadi Abdul-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) explained how Jesus was impressively included in the trinity system. According to him, Paul applied Rome's own religious beliefs to Christianity in order to impose himself on Roman domination.³² In the 19th century, the images of Paul's trinity arrangement and the idea of an absent third God appear based on the discourse that “God did not create man, man

²⁸ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1153.

²⁹ For example: “Chapter II.—Proofs from the plain testimony of Moses, and of the other prophets, whose words are the words of Christ, that there is but one God, the founder of the world, whom Our Lord preached, and whom He called His Father.” Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1163.

³⁰ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1169.

³¹ Surah an-Nisa, verse 171.

³² Jon Hoover, “İslâmî Monoteizm ve Teslis,” Tr. trans. Zeynep Yücedoğru, *Oksident* 1, no. 1 (2019), 120-121.

created God”, which stood out with a temporary passion for innovation.³³

In Chapter XX it is written that it is impossible to know God. Because Father is immeasurable. When we obey God's word, he leads us to God.³⁴ But in the history of Christianity, Paul will withdraw from God and direct obedience to himself. Paul made it his duty to see the deformations in the religion of the Jews and to correct them. In fact, “God has given me to the non-Jewish nations.” He declared himself a prophet. Later, he said that he saw Jesus on the road to Damascus, and therefore he expected people to believe and obey him. Subsequently, his influence on the Church increased, and the Church adopted basic doctrines such as trinity, incarnation, penance, and fundamental sin. Whereas Paul was a former enemy of Christians.³⁵

In Chapter XXXII, Irenaeus says, “The author of both Testaments is one God.”³⁶ But now how do we explain the difference between the Old Testament and the New Testament? If only one God wrote them both, then there should be no contradiction in them, but there is.³⁷

While Jesus was a human being made of flesh and bones in the region and his lifetime, who called people to God, after Easter, Jesus was stripped of flesh and bone and became a God with the same gem as God's ore. Jesus, who invited people to God, suddenly disappeared, on the contrary, he turned into a figure calling people to himself.³⁸ The following question summarizes the problem

³³ Hasan Hüseyin Tunçbilek, “İslâm'ın Dışındaki Monoteist Düşünce ve İnançlarda Ulûhiyet Anlayışı,” *Marife* 3, no. 1 (2003), 139.

³⁴ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1216.

³⁵ Mahmet Zafer İnanlar, *Din-Mitos İlişkisi: Hristiyanlık Örneği*, PhD Thesis (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2015), 60-61.

³⁶ Schaff, *The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus*, 1257.

³⁷ Maurice Bucaille, *Tevrat, İnciller, Kur'an-ı Kerim ve Bilim*, Tr. trans. Suat Yıldırım (İzmir: Işık Yayınları, 2005), 19.

³⁸ Who is God according to the Bible? Is the true God of the Bible one individual - the Father or two or three Gods? Sidney Hatch and Anthony Buzzard, “Who is God? Bible Discussion,” <https://www.21stcr.org/one-god-over-all-videos/who-is-god>.

here very nicely: “How was it that Jesus, a Galilean peasant who invited people to worship God throughout his life, was elevated to the position of being with the same essence as God, who was worshiped after his death?”³⁹ Although Jesus today appears to be an image of God, a historically reconstructed image of Jesus cannot of course be this image itself.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Monotheid ones among the apologists who aim to defend the intact religion from Jesus emphasized one God and maintained that Jesus also spoke of one God. There is the work *Adversus Haereses (Against Heretics)*, in which Irenaeus, who lived between about 140-200 years, criticized the denials and wrong ideas of the gnostics. He explained the false theses of the gnostics and tried to refute them with the rules of logic. Irenaeus is a devout Christian, but examples of rational theology are seen in his work.

According to Anthony F. Buzzard and Charles F. Hunting, who work on monotheist Christians, if the Trinity was such an important subject of faith for Christianity, why do we not find such information in Jesus' explanations? Even Paul did not receive any information explaining the submission in all its details. In the introduction to the Book of Trinity, they summarize the purpose of writing the work as follows: “This book deals with a single question. Does the Bible show God as the only creator of the universe as a unique being, or is God just two or three peers?” We explained that the answer to this question varied before and after the Council of Nicaea (325). Jesus, who was “the prophet of God” before the Council, was changed to “the son of God” after the Council. This was decided by the human mind. “Man” replaced “God”.

Irenaeus divided *Adversus Haereses* into five parts, wrote the

³⁹ Aydın, “Birbirine Tezat İki Farklı İsa Portresi: Paskalya Öncesi İsa versus Paskalya Sonrası İsa,” *Milel ve Nihal* 4, no. 1 (2007), 143-156.

⁴⁰ Marcus J. Borg, “Does the Historical Jesus Matter?” *HTS Theologisches Studien* 51, no. 4 (1995), 956.

claims of gnostics item by item and made criticisms and explanations under that item title. At the beginning of the work; It says that there is a Creator who commands all things to come into being and to exist as one God, One Lord, One Creator, One Father, and all-inclusive. The emphasis on “one God” in the book is mentioned in most places.

Some of Irenaeus' monotheist statements in *Adversus Haereses* are as follows:

- There can be no other power or principle above God.
- No one other than God can have the qualities that God has.
- The world was created by God, not angels or other beings, against God's will.
- There is only one God, Lord of all things.
- Christ and His Apostles preached that one God is the founder of all things.
- This world is ruled by the will of one God, bestowed with both eternal justice to punish the wicked and eternal goodness to bless the pious and give them salvation.
- There is only one God declared to humanity by the prophets.
- When we obey God's word, he brings us to Himself.
- The author of both Testaments is one God.

However, we cannot infer that there are only monotheist discourses in Irenaeus's work. Although there are monotheistic and descriptive discourses, concepts such as “Son of God” and “Our Lord Jesus Christ” are also included. We mentioned that there may be a shift in meaning due to the use of words in the background of these concepts, but we cannot present this as absolute truth. From this article, we can definitely say that there are unified discourses in Irenaeus' work, but I have to abstain from inferring purely monotheistic Irenaeus. Although the concepts of “One Lord” and “One God” are monotheistic, the mention of the aforementioned discourses in the work makes it difficult to see Irenaeus as a complete monotheist. Of course, his views are closer to the monotheistic line than Paul or other non-monotheistic apologists, but if we

are to give a definition, we can define him as a monotheist Christian based on the *Adversus Haereses* by Irenaeus.

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İlyas Altuner, *Descartes Felsefesine Giriş [An Introduction to Descartes' Philosophy]* (İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2019), 110 pp.


FATİH ÖZKAN 

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Book Review

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All philosophy is a history of mental reflections in a sense because of the curiosity to learn and understand about the man himself and the nature in which he lives, and we are faced with a pile of information that is difficult to come out of with independent thoughts, and we believe that this should be met naturally. Because fictional thoughts that arise as a result of justified interrogations born of human curiosity are enough to be a harbinger of such a situation. But it doesn't work on an axis that happens with this either. The existence of religions and the metaphysical information they offer to people, especially the Divine Appeal reported in the scriptures, deepens the event, as well as the mystical teachings with mysterious thought structures that arise, the subject has been dragged into an impenetrable situation in a



FATİH ÖZKAN ✉

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Kuzey Ankara Yerleşkesi, Keçiören, Ankara, 06300, TR [fozkantr@hotmail.com]

way. The fact that all these teachings claim that they aim to convey a person to the knowledge of the truth, that is, to the only knowledge, has made the tendency to see the truth in its nakedness more difficult.

Every philosopher is an intellectual trying to shape his age. Philosophers, leading who have people shaped society since antiquity, have also served people as scientists.

Western philosophy, after Plato and Aristotle, took on a kind of Neo-Platonic identity, a mystical appearance, and remained under the influence of Scholastic thought during the reign of Thomas and his successors. On the one hand, philosophy, on the other hand, religion and the church have attempted to influence society. But in this period, we see that philosophers were punished by the church. Descartes, who was born in such an environment and educated at a school where the church is active, such as La Flèche, comes across as one of the rare philosophers who dare to change all this.

For Descartes, philosophy comes before all other sciences and is superior to them. Philosophy is as important as getting rid of being blind. For this purpose, it is necessary to make philosophy and determine a method when starting it. Descartes' philosophy begins with methodology as a reaction to classical philosophy, and this new philosophy is primarily shaped by the principle of the inferior God.

Although Descartes leaves important influences in all areas, his most important aspect is his philosophy of mind. This great philosopher, who founded his metaphysics on the human mind, has also been much discussed with the dualist understanding in his philosophy. The human mind, the only power that can make sense of the world in which we live, is often perceived as a divine being that has come from outside the body due to its tinsel structure, and continues to be perceived as such. The aim of the paper is to convey Descartes' approach to this issue and his views on the solution, which is trying to create solutions to these problems.

Designed as an introduction to the philosophy of Descartes, this work deals with the most basic aspects of the philosopher's thoughts under the main headings of Method, metaphysics, God, psychology, and physics. In addition, two short texts belonging to Descartes are included in the October Section. The articles in this work have been prepared from the articles that the author has worked on for many years and submitted to the publication and have been impersonated as books.

Author Guidelines

1. **Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review** publishes studies on the Classical Aristotelian Logic, Metaphysics and Rational Psychology and Theology; in addition, other classical, modern and contemporary studies related to the Aristotelian tradition. Submissions are accepted in English but submissions in other languages are decided by Editorial Board.
2. Book reviews sent to **Entelekya** are expected appropriate to the publication policies of the journal. Book reviews written in languages other than English will never be accepted. As to translations into English, they can be published when related to Aristotelianism.
3. All papers must contain an abstract of 150 words and at least 5 keywords in English. When the submission language is different, both abstract and keywords should be in English only.
4. Papers should not exceed 5000 words, with a double space interlining, with margins, left 4,5, up 4,5, down 3,5 and right 4,5 cm. In papers, it should be made use of Times New Roman 11 points. Pictures or graphics in the papers should be sent separately as png or jpg file, maximum 10x20 cm in size.
5. Annotation and reference system of the journal has been described the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition. Henceforth, in manuscripts to send to the journal, it will be used.

Style Sheet

A. BOOK OR A PART OF BOOK

One Author

¹ Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 50.

² Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 51.

Ryle, Gilbert. *The Concept of Mind*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

Two or More Authors

¹ Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 3 vols.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), I, 23.

² Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, I, 30.

Whitehead, Alfred North and Bertrand Russell. *Principia Mathematica*. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.

Editor, Translator, or Compiler in Addition to Author

¹ Alfarabi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 45.

² Alfarabi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, 49.

³ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, trans. W. David Ross, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. VIII, ed. W. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-52), A.1, 980a21.

⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, A.1, 980b17.

⁵ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Anthony D. Woozley (New York: Meridian Book, 1974), 123.

⁶ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 129.

Alfarabi. *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*. Trans. Muhsin Mahdi. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

Aristotle. *Metaphysica*. Trans. W. David Ross. *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. VIII. Ed. W. David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-52.

Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Ed. Anthony D. Woozley. New York: Meridian Book, 1974.

Chapter or Other Part of a Book

¹ Richard Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. Richard Sorabji (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 23.

² Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," 30.

Sorabji, Richard. "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle." *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*. Ed. Richard Sorabji. New York: Cornell University Press, 1990: 1-30.

Preface, Foreword, Introduction, or Similar Part of a Book

¹ George F. Hourani, "Introduction," Averroes, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, trans. and ed. George F. Hourani (London: Luzac and Company, 1976), 7.

² Hourani, "Introduction," 8.

Hourani, George F. "Introduction." Averroes, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*. Trans. and ed. George F. Hourani. London: Luzac and Company, 1976: 2-8.

B. JOURNAL ARTICLE

Article in a Print or Online Journal

¹ Amos Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 250.

² Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics," 253.

Bertolacci, Amos. "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics." *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005): 241-75.

Article in a Newspaper or Popular Magazine

¹ Daniel Mendelsohn, "But Enough about Me," *The New Yorker* (25 January 2010).

² Mendelsohn, "But Enough About Me."

Mendelsohn, Daniel. "But Enough About Me." *The New Yorker*, 25 January 2010.

C. OTHER FORMS

Book Review

¹ İlyas Altuner, "Being and Intellect: Theory of Demonstration in Aristotle and al-Fārābī by A. Tekin," *Entelekyia Logico-Metaphysical Review* 2, no. 1 (2018), 68.

² Altuner, "Being and Intellect," 69.

Altuner, İlyas. "Being and Intellect: Theory of Demonstration in Aristotle and al-Fārābī by A. Tekin." *Entelekyia Logico-Metaphysical Review* 2, no. 1 (2018): 67-70.

Thesis or Dissertation

¹ Roger Ariew, *Ockham's Razor: A Historical and Philosophical Analysis Ockham's Principle of Parsimony*, PhD Dissertation (Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976), 15.

² Ariew, *Ockham's Razor*, 21.

Ariew, Roger. *Ockham's Razor: A Historical and Philosophical Analysis Ockham's Principle of Parsimony*. PhD Dissertation. Illinois: University of Illinois, 1976.

Presentation at Meeting or Conference

¹ Alix Cohen, "Kant on the Ethics of Belief," *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (London: University of London, June 2, 2014).

² Cohen, "Kant on the Ethics of Belief."

Cohen, Alix. "Kant on the Ethics of Belief." *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. London: University of London, June 2, 2014.

Film

¹ Joel Silver, *The Matrix* [Film], dir. Larry and Andy Wachowski (USA and Australia: Warner Bros. Pictures and Roadshow Entertainment, March 1999).

² Silver, *The Matrix*.

Silver, Joel. *The Matrix*. Film. Dir. Larry and Andy Wachowski. USA and Australia: Warner Bros. Pictures and Roadshow Entertainment, March 1999.

Website

¹ "Aristotle," Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle> (Accessed May 10, 2014).

² "Aristotle," Wikipedia.

Wikipedia. "Aristotle." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle> (Accessed May 10, 2014).

