H. Bradley’s Concept of Immediate Experience

An Evaluation in terms of Debates on Phenomenal Consciousness

Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine the concept of "immediate experience" in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley, one of the prominent figures of British Idealism, and to re-evaluate the philosophical problems it generates within the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to Bradley, immediate experience is a primary, non-relational unity that precedes thought, judgment, and the subject-object dichotomy. However, attempts to bring this experience into conceptual and philosophical discourse objectify it, thereby altering its pristine immediacy and generating a "paradox of reflection." This paper argues that, contrary to Bradley’s historical marginalization by the analytic tradition, his methodological dilemma shares a common ground and a meaningful structural tension with contemporary debates on phenomenal consciousness (Ned Block), qualia, Thomas Nagel’s "what is it like to be" question, and non-conceptual content theories (Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke). While the study addresses the difficulties inherent in Bradley’s idealist metaphysical commitments and the problem of "ineffability," it ultimately concludes that his approach to immediate experience remains a provocative conceptual resource for current consciousness studies due to its power to problematisze deeply-entrenched epistemic and cognitive assumptions.