Russel and Frege on the Question of Definition in Logic

The Distinction between Meaning and Reference

Abstract

In the 20th century, beginning with Frege, logical thinking brought fundamental criticism to Aristotle's logical tradition, which had been practiced for centuries. In this context, Russell emerged as an important thinker alongside Frege in establishing new logical thinking. This study examines Frege and Russell's views on definition in logical thinking. In this vein, the study also discusses the limits and functions that modernity has brought to logical thinking. Frege and Russell's explanations of the concepts of meaning and reference have determined the course of the philosophy of language. Frege's distinction between meaning and reference set him apart from other logicians. According to Frege, meaning is a form of presentation of the reference of a name. Frege defined reference as the object to which a name refers. Russell focused on the problem of meaning and reference discussed by Frege. In this context, Russell's 1905 article “On Denoting,” considered one of the most important philosophical articles of the 20th century, added depth to this discussion. Our study aims to evaluate the direction of logical thought that emerged in Russell and the character and analytical power of Frege's logic by comparing them in a more specific context. In particular, the ideas put forward by the two thinkers on meaning and reference have been compared.