Pragmatic Verificationism in Hillary Putnam in the Context of the Critique of Metapysical Realism

Abstract

This article attempts to explore Hilary Putnam's understanding of pragmatic verificationism, which plays a significant role in his philosophy, within the context of his critiques of metaphysical realism. Although Putnam, who presents a new perspective on the concept of truth, does not explicitly state that he has constructed it within the framework of pragmatic principles, we argue in this study. Upon examining his thoughts, it can be seen that his later ideas, in particular, are consistent with a pragmatic philosophical understanding. Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism, along with logical positivism's critiques of verificationism and Popper's critiques of induction, shape his approach to truth and verificationism. Based on this, after presenting these critiques, we attempt to present the Putnamian version of pragmatic verificationism. In short, our study argues that Putnam is a pragmatic verificationist when it is recognized that he has introduced a new dimension to the concept of truth within the framework of his critiques of metaphysical realism.